CRITICAL
# MOBILITIES

Edited by Ola Söderström, Shalini Randeria,
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Of Mobilities and Moorings: Critical Perspectives

The Editors

A "mobility turn" is spreading into and transforming the social sciences, transcending the dichotomy between transport research and social research, putting social relations into travel and connecting different forms of transport with complex patterns of social experience conducted through communications at-a-distance. It seems that a new paradigm is being formed within the social sciences, the "new mobilities" paradigm. (Sheller and Urry 2006: 208)

Introduction

In 2008, the French Parliament passed a law regulating the mobility of dead bodies. Aiming to control the disposal of mortal remains, the law stipulates that they henceforth be either buried in cemeteries or dispersed as ashes in the air, but that in the latter case the place of dispersal has to be notified to the commune of birth of the deceased (Esquerre 2011: 98). This legal intervention took place in the context of the massive "mobility" of the dead since the 1970s in many countries of the world, which is in part related to a global cremation-boom. In France, for example, the proportion of cremations has increased from approximately one percent to around thirty percent today, and

it is even higher in other European countries (110). This phenomenon can be interpreted as part of a movement for the free disposal of human dead bodies. France's 2008 law counters this trend by trying to regain state control over human remains and to regulate movement by stipulating a territorial fix. In practice, however, the mobility of the dead seems difficult to control, as European citizens choose burials at sea, or scattering of ashes over the Alps, or as migrants prefer to move either the bodies of deceased relatives to their home countries for burial or for a dispersal of ashes. The traveling of bodily remains is likely to continue to increase as a worldwide phenomenon.

This somewhat bizarre story reflects many facets that make mobilities a fascinating lens for the analysis of several issues, which this volume addresses. The French state's attempt to regulate the mobility of entities that may appear problematic – and the practices of conforming to or subverting these – reflects the changes in norms, forms, paths, and patterns of mobilities, that take place in the context of globalization. *Critical Mobilities* thus focuses on diverse mobile entities considered (at least by some) as problematic, such as reproductive health technologies and medical migrants in India, undocumented labor migrants in the USA, road interchanges and shopping malls in cities of the global South, or branch campuses in the United Arab Emirates. But it also brings critical perspectives to bear on an understanding of society itself as composed of mobile assemblages. Moreover, it is equally concerned with methodological critiques of the study of social phenomena as mobile, while trying to overcome the limits of mobility as a way of capturing processes in space. Finally, it offers critical perspectives on processes through which mobilities shape society. It deals with the interaction of the mobile and the immobile in the formation of the social over time and across space. For, as the authors argue, both time and space are crucial elements for theorizing mobilities. The volume thus aims to provide critical insights into how society is constituted by different forms of mobility: policies, urban forms, people, institutions, and technologies. Drawing on the work of, among others, Cresswell (2010) and Kaufmann (2002), several contributors have termed this the "mobile constitution of society" (Söderström and Crot 2010) in the common analytical framework jointly developed by them as members of the Swiss MOVE project.[1]

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[1]   MOVE is a network to further research on mobility in its most general sense: the mobility of people, objects, and ideas (http://www.move-network.ch). The network is an initiative of the universities of Berne, Lausanne, Neuchâtel, and Zurich, and was funded by the Swiss University Conference. The network's activities entailed the establishment of the Swiss Chair for Mobility Studies, which enabled its members to invite eminent scholars from abroad for a semester each to teach and carry out research at a Swiss university. The program also funded four postdoctoral research positions in different mobility-related domains.

The chapters refer to this framework in various ways to describe both what mobilities are constituted by (paths, velocity, rhythms, spatial scale, meanings, forms of regulation, experience, and competences) and constitutive of (bodies, subjectivities, materialities, economic resources, social positions and organizational structures).

The contributors use the lens of mobility to analyze, for example, the glocalization of urban forms that reframe ways of living or the global diffusion of branch campuses in higher education. The contributors address these issues from a variety of disciplinary perspectives ranging from social anthropology, geography, and sociology to public health and migration studies. The volume explores how persons, policies, practices, and technologies cross borders. The chapters analyze the interplay of the state with a variety of other new actors, public and private, national and transnational, whose interventions direct or regulate mobilities, or even attempt to curb the mobility of some persons and objects through distinguishing between those that are more or less acceptable.

The volume is divided into four different parts: the first section consists of three contributions, which address the issue of circulating urban policies and types in the making of contemporary cities. The two following sections focus respectively on people and technologies on the move. By pointing to the interdependence of various norms, forms and entities on the move, mobility studies have proved highly fruitful for the kind of cross-disciplinary research brought together here. Although writing about mobilities in the plural, as we do here, has become something of a hallmark of "mobility studies," this book is not firmly situated within the new "mobilities paradigm" (Sheller and Urry 2006). It draws instead on a series of different interdisciplinary research fields – medical anthropology, anthropology of the state, urban studies, migration studies, or cultural geography – to combine a variety of perspectives that problematize mobilities.

In this Introduction, we first make an argument for the ways in which mobility studies can provide a critical lens for an understanding of contemporary processes. We then discuss how a well-established research field, migration studies, can engage critically with different forms of human movement, especially when dealing with forced migration (Gill et al. 2011), and contend that both mobility studies and migration studies would benefit from a more intensive dialogue. The four chapters on migration (Cresswell, De Genova, Lahav, and Nedelcu) raise questions regarding the malleable nature of citizenship today as well as the active resistance to attempts to impose limitations to mobility. Finally, we will introduce the different contributions to this edited collection and show how they deal with different critical aspects of mobility.

Critical Mobilities

The deep transformations associated with the current phase of globalization have prompted scholars to search for new conceptual, theoretical, and methodological approaches to make sense of contemporary social (re)configurations. Most of the critical analyses of globalization within contemporary social theory share the assumption that our times are characterized by increasing mobility (Maurer 2000), so that "mobility has become a most suitable trope for our time, an era accelerating at what seems to be ever faster rates of speed" (Tiessen 2008: 112). The "new mobilities paradigm" (Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2007), for instance, constitutes the most prominent of these sets of theoretical reflections. It has drawn attention to a "mobility turn" (Urry 2007: 6) in social theory. Several other influential approaches today are also built on more or less explicit assumptions about accelerating and diversifying types of mobility and their constitutive role in shaping society. This holds, for instance, for Actor-Network Theory (Latour 2005), theories of cosmopolitanization (Beck 2006), Bauman's (2000) account of liquid modernity, assemblage theory (Collier and Ong 2005), and sociological (Sassen 2006) or anthropological theories of globalization (Appadurai 2006). These approaches seek to move beyond the metaphysics of presence and fixity (Cresswell 2006), which they identify as characteristic of most twentieth-century social science.

Before we can delineate critical perspectives within mobility studies, we need first very briefly to summarize its main arguments. The point of departure for the new mobilities paradigm is the argument that mobility has remained under-theorized for most of the history of the social sciences. Despite a long-standing interest in "how life moves" (Cresswell 2006; Valier 2003), the question of the conceptual and theoretical content of mobility has remained at the margins of social science for much of the last century.[2] Although not entirely excluded, the scope and meaning of mobility have long largely been restricted to, and equated with, the movements of people and goods in migration and transportation studies. Equally, scholars of economic exchange, trade, capitalism, and imperialism from Malinowski to Marx have addressed questions of the movement of goods and people, though these were not central to the

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[2]   John Urry considers Georg Simmel to be an important precursor of mobility studies, and sees his legacy in the early work of the Chicago School on migrants, hobos, gangs, and prostitutes. In his view, however, the development of structuralist and positivist approaches around the mid-twentieth century overshadowed and marginalized the insights of these early studies into mobility (Urry 2007).

way in which they conceptualized society. With the rapid intensification of travel – whether physical (people, goods, materials), imaginative (knowledge, ideas, images), or virtual (money, information, practices, e-mails) – the fact of movement, its meanings, and its implications must be studied in their own right and as affecting the very constitution of societies (Urry 2007; Watts and Urry 2008; Cresswell and Merriman 2008).

The aims of the new mobilities research agenda are threefold. First, it formulates a forceful critique of the "sedentarist" (Cresswell 2002) and "a-mobile" (Urry 2007) premises on which social science theorization has been traditionally based. It seeks to replace these by new epistemological foundations based on considerations of the centrality of mobility. Second, it calls for not only an epistemological change but also for a different ontological understanding of mobility. A "mobile sociology" is predicated on the fact of movement, not the fixity, of the objects, units, institutions, etc. that it studies. Whereas within the framework of traditional social theory people, objects, and ideas moved from origins to destinations, the new mobilities approach is interested in how the process of movement constitutes the entities in circulation, be they people, objects, or ideas. Mobility is thus recognized to constitute an ontological absolute for a "sociology of the 21st century" (Urry 2000). Since "mobilities come in all shapes and sizes" (Tiessen 2008: 112), the new paradigm moves beyond a narrow conception of human and material travel to consider a vast array of crisscrossing mobilities, thereby shedding light on the complex interconnections and interdependencies between different networks and spaces. Such "new mobilities" include phenomena as varied as "the mobilities of money laundering, the drug trade, sewage and waste, infections, urban crime, asylum seeking, arms trading, people smuggling, slave trading, and urban terrorism" (Sheller and Urry 2006: 220).

Third, proponents of the new research agenda contend that new epistemological objectives and ontological conceptualizations require appropriate research methods (Sheller and Urry 2006; Watts and Urry 2008; Büscher, Urry, and Witchger 2011). Watts and Urry argue that "the analysis of mobilities as a wide-ranging category of connection, distance, and motion transforms social science and its research methods" (2008: 862). An understanding of the movements of different types of technologies, policy frameworks and institutional arrangements thus requires that the researchers themselves carry out fieldwork including participant observation at a variety of locations and scales, as Towghi and Randeria argue and illustrate in the case studies presented in their chapter here. One way to do so is to follow the objects of study (vaccines and contraceptives in their case) across sites and scales in

order to map the relationships between different actors, locations, and levels through "multi-sited" ethnography (Marcus 1995). Some have advocated that researchers themselves travel in order to trace movements across space and over time. Such "mobile ethnography" – also called "itinerant ethnography" – recognizes the deterritorialized character of mobile subjects (Schein 2002). It may involve engaging with people's worldviews by traveling with them, or closely following the itineraries of material, virtual, and imaginative entities (Spitulnik 2002; Molz 2006). More generally, it means forging methods able to deal "with the fleeting, the distributed, the multiple, the non-causal, the sensory, the emotional and the kinaesthetic" (Büscher, Urry et al. 2011: 15).

A criticism leveled against the new mobilities paradigm is that if everything is mobile, then mobility as a concept loses its analytical purchase (Adey 2006). Such a view, however, overlooks the fact that scholars of mobilities are not only aware of the limits of mobility but also explore these limits explicitly. For example, the chapter by De Genova outlines increased securitization as an attempt to limit the movement of people. The pervasiveness of movement does not exclude physical, material, or institutional fixities. Rather, they seek to identify and analyze the relations between various movements, and the ways in which these relations are channeled, facilitated or constrained by place-bound, immobile "moorings" (Urry 2007) and by actors with different economic, political, or legal means to ensure, advance, direct, or prevent movements. Mobilities and moorings are thus conceived of as being in a dialectical relationship of interdependence (Adey 2006). Sheller and Urry insist that

> the new paradigm emphasises how all mobilities entail specific often highly embedded and immobile infrastructures. […] The complex character of such systems stems from the multiple fixities or moorings often on a substantial physical scale that enable the fluidities of liquid modernity. Thus "mobile machines," mobile phones, cars, aircraft, trains, and computer connections, all presume overlapping and varied time space immobilities. (2006: 210)

What constitutes the critical potential of mobility studies? Their critical purchase lies, we argue, primarily in their attempt to address explicitly the interplay of mobility and power. They do so with reference to questions of inequality, domination, and constraint.

First, the study of gradients of inequality has been central to mobility studies (Adey and Bissell 2010). Inequality has primarily been conceptualized as a differential social distribution of mobility as a resource and as capital, or as Kaufmann terms it "motility," the capacity to move (Kaufmann 2002;

Flamm and Kaufmann 2006). In other words, inequality lies in the unequal access to means of mobility and to know-how concerning technologies of mobility understood in a broad sense. Access to transportation and information and communication technologies (ICT), to passports and visas, to name but a few prerequisites, as well as different competence to travel long distances or to use complex software are part of a "mobility capital," whose distribution does not necessarily correspond, as Nedelcu shows in her contribution to this volume, to the distribution of economic capital. Considering mobility as competence leads us also to understand subjectivity and experience as constitutive of unequal mobilities (Jensen 2011; Conradson and Mckay 2007). In sum, in a period when mobility has become a mantra in public discourse and a requirement in many jobs, mobility studies draws attention to mobility as a resource and as a right while pointing to its entanglements with (im)mobility and inequalities. As Zygmunt Bauman (1996) has powerfully argued, such a postmodern world of flexible labor has made vagrants of us all, on the move constantly by choice or force, unwilling to cast roots, unable to determine our itineraries and duration of stay.

Second, scholars working with ideas drawn from the new paradigm consider mobilities as structured by domination and predicated on the immobilities of other persons and things (Cresswell 2001). Mobility, the authors of this volume argue, is a relational phenomenon and should be understood as depending on a series of moorings, including infrastructure, regulatory frameworks, and the social practices that enable or further it, or even contest and curb it, as illustrated in the chapters by Lahav and Cohen, as well as Towghi and Randeria. For instance, in order to provide very profitable quasi-instantaneous replies to information requests across the world, Google owns buildings filled with servers and hires large numbers of maintenance specialists, who are anything but mobile. To take another example, during the weekends the streets of central Hong Kong or Singapore are filled with migrant domestic workers – often from the Philippines – who at other times barely leave their apartment, to allow their employers to move around the globe. Many Asian businesswomen would, for instance, not be able to lead their mobile careers and be part of the "kinetic elite" without their migrant nannies being rendered quasi-immobile (Devasahayam and Yeoh 2007). Just as the notion of mobile capital does not substitute for a focus on the unequal distribution of other sorts of capital, looking at how different forms of mobility depend on fixity does not eclipse the role of other forms of domination. Instead, by focusing on the interrelation of mobilities and immobilities, it provides new insights into contemporary patterns of asymmetrical power and privilege.

Third, asymmetries of power may force individuals in the absence of alternatives to accept harsh, and even harmful conditions of life and work. At its extreme, power is being exercised to curb mobility through the deportation, involuntary displacement, or forced migration of individuals or large collectives of people. In their introduction to a special issue of the journal *Mobilities* on forced migration, the editors argue that the study of forced migration is an antidote to a potential romanticization of mobility (Gill et al. 2011). However, they also recognize that the mobilities literature is fruitful in highlighting the interlinkages of different mobilities, and in allowing one to connect all that is mobile with displaced populations (the movement of clothing, keepsakes, identity documents, longings, memories, etc.). The contribution of this volume to a critical analysis of mobilities lies in such a dialogue between mobility and migration studies. It is to the relation between these two interdisciplinary research fields that we now turn.

Migration Studies

The linkage between mobilities studies and migration studies must begin by questioning some of the assumptions underlying standard definitions of international migration located within the framework of the international nation-state system. The classical theory of migration was largely built on the idea that citizens or residents of one nation-state can be said to have migrated when they leave that nation-state, cross an international border, and settle in another state. This conception of migration was already present in the scholarship of the Chicago School of Sociology at the beginning of the twentieth century (Park 1928). Undoubtedly, Park and his colleagues understood migration as an emblematic phenomenon in the turbulent times of modernizing societies. But their reflections on cultural patterns of civilizational change and the processes of social adaptability have always been entangled with the ethics of immigration and nation building. Classical migration research, therefore, from its very inception was from the perspective of the so-called receiving society and its capabilities (in the best of cases) to transform foreigners into citizens. Within the nation-building framework, even if immigration was not a grave political issue in some contexts, so-called host societies exhibited anxieties about the incommensurability of race, culture, or religion of migrants and "natives." Older discourses of racial hierarchies and incompatibility may now have been replaced by those highlighting unbridgeable cultural differences (Stolcke 1995), but migration continues to be publically debated around the

topologies of incommensurability, integration, and assimilation, the migrant considered as an outsider and a stranger, a "foreign body" which needs to be absorbed into the body politic of the so-called host society.

Uncoupling migration from the nation-state framework entails conceiving of it as a phenomenon embedded in a larger context, be it regional or global. Such a conceptualization was foreshadowed in the earlier structuralist work of Michael Piore (1979), Castles and Kosack (1973), or in the adaptation of migration studies to international system theory by Portes and Walton (1981), which foregrounded relations of power and structures of economic dependency between the "West and the Rest" (Hall 1992). The call to transcend the Eurocentrism of much of migration research has often been accompanied by a broader critique of the entire modernist, developmental paradigm that privileges the perspective of the West (Favell 2007). It has resulted in studies of transnationalism (Schiller et al. 1992; Kleger 1997), hybridity (Werbner and Modood 2005), and of cosmopolitanism (Beck and Sznaider 2006; Werbner 2008; Holton 2009). Transcending the methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller 2002) of migration studies opened up yet new perspectives on the mobility of people, objects, and ideas. Studies on transnationalism questioned the assumption that migration is a one-way and once-for-all movement from a place of origin to a destination. It highlighted instead the continual interactions between these two, or more, places while focusing on the negotiating of ties, belongings and locations within various transnational networks in which migrants are embedded. This led to numerous empirical studies exploring cross-border kinship relationships and transnational flows of remittances as well as of double incorporation of migrants into two nation-states.

But, despite this new perspective on mobilities, studies of transnationalism remained captive to the nation-state framework, for they often failed to adequately address the problematic nature and implications of the binary division between "receiving" and "sending" societies. A critical mobilities perspective, therefore, needs to rethink the extent to which migration as a phenomenon should be defined in terms of, and derived from, the needs of the state to classify spatial mobility in a particular way. As Favell (2007) suggests in his recent attempt to "reboot migration theory," we need to understand the power of the state to classify different types of mobile subjects and their practices. We need thus to explore the mechanisms and logics by which the state distinguishes migrants from those not mobile or from residents, namely through schemes of categorization to manage people by naming and counting them. Conventionally a migrant is defined and counted as such if the border-crossing involves a stay of a certain minimum length of time. Others who cross

borders – such as tourists, business people, and international students – remain by contrast largely invisible to the state and classical migration research due to the short duration of their stay and the temporariness of their movement. Thus migration remains a state-centered interdisciplinary field. Moreover, migration studies also remains a policy-driven field in which academic debate often follows political contention. It is thus not surprising that the binary categorization of migrants into "wanted" and "unwanted" migrants from the perspective of the "receiving" state and its national economy continues to be the main axis of distinction as well as the fulcrum of public debate. The transnational migration perspective has also failed to problematize the implications of this dichotomy.

The dismantling of fixed borders, boundaries and conceptualizations underlying standard definitions of migration is a welcome move towards a critique of the fixity of categories, which the mobilities paradigm calls for. Instead of accepting the naturalized quality of physical, national, and legal boundaries and borders, these must be studied as objects that are created and negotiated within the organization of labor division, state practices, transnational family making and material exchange (Rouse 1991) and which allow for different practices of spatial mobility according to class, race, and gender positions. It is thus possible to transcend the classical optic of fixity by accepting the assumption that movement creates a particular relationship with the so-called receiving society, exemplified by the new status of residence of immigrants. This status singles out the migrant as an outsider, a 'foreign body' that needs to be absorbed into the body politic of the so-called "receiving society." A critical migration approach as exemplified in Lahav's and De Genova's contributions here then goes beyond the reproduction of the conventional and still dominant nation-state perspective and opens up novel perspectives on the paradoxes of citizenship and on the governance of mobility in an age of securitization.

We would suggest, however, that it is not simply enough to bring the state back in since migration as a field of study has always been predicated on the existence of states, their interventions and legal classifications. And despite requiems to it in the so-called 'global age', the nation-state continues to maintain its ability to designate which migrants are considered legitimate and which are not, even if it is not entirely successful in surveillance and control of the latter. It is, therefore, necessary from a critical mobilities perspective to explore the state's power of classification as it is continually enacted. What is of interest from this perspective is the extent to which this conventional definition of populations, distinguishing citizens from denizens, legal from illegal residents, is changing in the wake of a restructuring of the

global economy. International political economy as an interdisciplinary field is deeply concerned with the politics of this shifting relationship. Scholars in this area challenge, for example, the power of nation-states to define who is, and who is not, allowed to enter its territory (see the discussion of GATS Mode 4 Agreements and the mobility regime within the European Union in Kunz et al. 2011). But these discussions need to be situated within large debates on the increasingly blurred roles and responsibilities of "public" and "private" actors that were earlier so neatly demarcated and separated from one another. Several authors in this volume examine the implications of the blurring of these distinctions along with the part transnationalization and part privatization of the state that enables new paths and patterns of mobilities of policies, persons, and technologies (see, for example, the chapter by Towghi and Randeria in the third part of the book).

In sum, we need to explore the reconfiguration of the state and its practices in the field of migration and citizenship in their interplay with capital. Such an approach would then subsume migration studies into a much larger field of mobility studies, albeit with a distinctive subject matter of its own, namely human movement in a world of states. The four contributions in the second section of this book all contribute to such a renovated perspective on migrations.

More generally, the book as a whole draws on the strengths of critical work within both mobility and migration studies. From recent work in the former, it retains the specific insights on inequality, domination, and constraint provided by focusing on the interdependence of different mobilities and immobilities. From recent work in the latter, it retains a strong engagement with how the state, but also private actors (and the two together) shape the possibilities and implications of different forms of mobility. As a result, this book proposes an original set of chapters dealing with quite different forms of mobility and their relations, but, in contrast with most work in mobility studies, it looks less at the experience of mobility than at its institutional framing.

Structure of the Volume

The aim of this interdisciplinary and wide-ranging collection is to provide critical insights into how the spatial mobilities of people, policies, practices, imaginations, and technologies shape society. The chapters illustrate distinct ways in which gradients of illegality and inequality as well as asymmetrical relations of power are intertwined with mobilities and moorings today.

The **first part** consists of three chapters dealing with issues of mobilities of norms and forms in relation to post-colonial cities. Whereas Robinson's chapter is concerned with the circulation of urban policies, Söderström investigates how traveling urban types configure social practices. While both geographers draw on mobility studies and Actor-Network Theory, their focus on circulation explicitly seeks to critique traditional comparative research while suggesting novel methodological alternatives, on the one hand, and to move beyond postcolonial critique in urban studies, on the other. Geddie and Panese analyze the mobility of a specific institution (the university) and built form (the branch campus) offering a detailed case-study of the process through which such mobility is organized.

Jennifer Robinson contends that cities are sites of assemblages and connectedness with links to the hinterland, to other regions within the nation-state but equally to other cities in the world, so that empirically and imaginatively an "elsewhere" is crucial to understand forms and experiences of urban life. One vantage point to study these linkages is to investigate the circulation of urban design or policy ideas, an exercise that has conventionally involved a model of transfer from an origin to a destination. Moving beyond what she calls the "physicalist ontology" of Actor-Network Theory and the postcolonial critique in urban studies, she proposes to study "ideas in motion." Policies are not simply mobile objects that are passed on unchanged from sender to recipient. They not only evolve while on the move but also forge new connections between the actors and sites among whom they circulate. She makes a strong case for paying attention to the fleeting, the ephemeral, the haphazard, and the unpredictable in the circulation of policies, to learn to recognize what is new, what never arrives, or what is thwarted or even simply forgotten. Instead of asking what we can learn about mobilities from a study of/in cities, she reverses the question: how can a study of urban policy mobilities extend our understanding of cities? The chapter shows how mobile parts of "elsewhere" make up the local. Using the case of Johannesburg's city development strategy to understand how urban policies today are forged within a global context of policy exchange, borrowings and impositions, it illustrates the merits of shifting the focus to how policies are "arrived at" in specific locations rather than how they travel or arrive from other often far-away places.

Like Söderström in the subsequent chapter, Robinson too invites us to rethink conventional models of comparison involving variation-finding and suggests replacing them instead by relational comparisons. Randeria (2006; 2007) introduced the term "entanglements," an idea she uses in her own contribution in the final section of the volume, to suggest that tracing relations

matters as the units of comparisons are themselves formed in the process of circulation and do not stand preformed outside these linkages. Robinson proposes just such an experimental approach to comparitivism based on tracing specific processes, elements, and connections on the move rather than to start from the assumed fixity of pre-given entities.

Ola Söderström also develops a form of relational comparison by looking at how two cities are reshaped by their connection to different elsewheres and in particular by the introduction of new urban types. Drawing on governmentality studies, postcolonial urban studies and Actor-Network Theory, he argues that traveling urban norms/forms both reflect and enact power through their capacity to shape social practices. He uses empirical material on mobile nonresidential urban forms from his research in two postcolonial cities, Hanoi (Vietnam) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), to trace the effects of shopping malls and road interchanges respectively. While these newly introduced forms make everyday urbanism in these cities more amenable to business and the promotion of economic growth, the same forms also provide ordinary users with new possibilities for action. They are used playfully by city-dwellers to experience urbanity differently and to develop a new sense of themselves. Transcending the conventional framework of a disciplining/educative view of such new urban interventions, the chapter shows these forms thus to be productive in a Foucauldian sense, for they are experienced by users as enabling rather than as merely constraining. Locating the current modernization and diffusion of urban types against the background of a long colonial history of "urban pedagogies," it is argued that unpacking these pedagogies is an important but neglected aspect in understanding how cities globalize.

Kate Geddie and Francesco Panese venture into a study of the controversial development of overseas branch campuses set up in the global South by many European and North American universities, which has remained a surprisingly under-researched field. Exemplifying the rapid internationalization of higher education, these campuses are ideal sites for understanding novel forms, paths, and patterns of mobilities of institutional policies and practices, of academic and administrative personnel and students, of curricula, and of degrees and administrative structures. Little is known about the constellation of actors or the actual process of transfer and domestication of institutional norms and forms taking place across countries and campuses, with most studies conceptualizing such institutional mobility in terms of push/pull factors in analogy with human migration. Using insights from a Science and Technology Studies (STS) approach, Geddie and Panese employ a "boundary object" approach in order to identify the range of actors and mediating objects

involved in the process of mobility. They analyze how boundary objects enable communication across diverse social worlds and enable consensus to be forged between different actors with diverging worldviews, competing agendas, and conflicting interests. Combining insights as participant observers at their own location at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), Lausanne, with fieldwork in the Gulf, they trace the process of establishing a branch campus in the United Arab Emirates, a tiny oil-rich kingdom that is host to one-fifth of all branch campuses in the world. They demonstrate the variety of objectives pursued by universities through international initiatives, and the conditions that enable the transnational mobility of an academic institution. They also alert us to the fragile and precarious consensus on which such projects often rest and the danger that these entrepreneurial activities will reinforce unequal spatial relations between the home and branch campus societies.

The four chapters that make up the **second part** address numerous issues relating to human mobility and migration. **Tim Cresswell** critically examines the connection famously made by Max Weber between the city and the legal figure of the citizen in modern society in order to argue that, pruned of Weber's orientalism, the link needs serious consideration once again today. Like Cohen in the concluding chapter of the volume, Cresswell too is interested in imaginations at work in the making of the citizen, a figure at the heart of the nation-state. While Cohen approaches the issue through the lens of the popular culture of Indian films, Cresswell considers the role of mobility in the changing geographies of the legal figure of the "citizen." The citizen as a figure stands at the intersection of three geographical imaginations: the imaginary of a rooted and immobile nation with clearly defined and circumscribed boundaries, of the city as a space of dense heterogeneity, and of free mobility in an interconnected world. Cresswell agrees with Groebner (2007) that legal notions of citizenship and identity emerge in early modern Europe precisely at a time of heightened mobility, especially of the poor. The citizen, he argues, is thus a "cultural/social/political/legal figure" located simultaneously within a "sedentarist" and a "nomadic" metaphysics that respectively privilege the fixed/rooted and those who may be mobile or cross borders legally. Central to his account of the geographies of citizenship is the recognition that geographies of mobility are crucial to the production of new entanglements of rights and identity. His incisive analysis also points to the paradox of contemporary state discourses on migration, which, on the one hand, celebrate and promote free movement, while simultaneously curbing and condemning the mobility of "the alien," on the other.

In explicit dialogue with Hannah Arendt's famous essay on the "Rights of Man" and the coproduction of rightlessness and statelessness, **Nicholas De Genova** meditates on the same paradox. His theme is the ever increasing securitization, which attempts to regulate migration and thwart human mobility, that goes hand in hand today with calls for open borders and freedom of movement. He highlights the vulnerability of unprotected and undocumented labor migrants, those forcibly displaced as well as refugees, denizens that have been dispossessed and driven out of their homelands, who are not only rendered homeless and rightless but also face the ubiquitous threat of deportation. He shows how detention and deportation are no longer an exception but have been normalized into a routine exercise of state power, with some 1.2 million being forced to leave the USA in 2008 alone. "Securitarianism," he argues, has become a global social formation that aims at controlling and disciplining work-related migration (in post-9/11 USA in particular) in the name of a "war on terror." However, the worldwide proliferation of deportation regimes has also produced various forms of resistance by migrant workers, which constitute an emerging global social movement for a veritable freedom of movement, as the protests in the USA in 2006 or in France in 2008 remind us.

As De Genova looks at migrant workers movement, **Gallya Lahav** examines political mobilization at the other side of the political spectrum. Her chapter analyzes movements against the mobility of unwanted immigrants, in a comparative framework disaggregating the triangulated neo-corporatist relationships between states and non-state actors (e.g., those involved in the securitization of international migration). Analyzing this process through the "trilemma" between markets, rights, and security that confronts liberal democracies in Europe and North America, she shows how political organizations have positioned themselves on the issue of migration in different national contexts and in different phases after 9/11. The chapter examines the politics of liberal states as they attempt to navigate between the competing demands of surveillance, securing of borders, and of civil liberties and citizen freedoms, on the one hand, and pursue their competitive interests in higher education or medical tourism, on the other hand. Based on a neo-institutionalist analysis of formal and informal norms, she argues that national policy-makers in the age of security have been able to overcome domestic constraints to mobilize against mobility. Globalization facilitates new modes of regulation that trump other considerations when fears of compromising national security loom large.

Mihaela Nedelcu examines the role of mobile phones, Internet and other digital technologies in shaping the life-worlds of migrants and their

experiences of transnational mobility. She reframes the national–transnational nexus using the lens of cosmopolitanism following Ulrich Beck (2002). She argues that theories of migration cannot be dissociated from larger epistemological debates. For mobility and "methodological cosmopolitanism" (Beck and Sznaider 2002) not only move beyond the dichotomy of nation-state and trans/inter/multinational but also change the very meaning of fundamental sociological categories of time, space, proximity or place. Using empirical material on the use of ICT by migrants to mobilize resources and create dense transnational social ties, she challenges the methodological nationalism of migration studies, on the one hand, and its binaries of mobile/sedentary, native/foreign, included/excluded, on the other as immigrants straddle both sides of the divide that are conventionally posited as mutually exclusive.

The two contributions to the **third part** of the volume critically examine medical and especially surgical interventions from sociocultural anthropological perspectives. The authors are concerned with mapping the complex relationships between the mobility of pharmaceutical technologies or the surgical operation and the immobility of persons or populations, who are governed today through a nexus between state power and market forces.

As shopping malls exemplify the commercial in Söderström's chapter in part one, **Fouziehya Towghi** and **Shalini Randeria**'s ethnography traces the impact of traveling-population policies and pharmaceutical technologies in India, where commercial interests of pharmaceutical companies collide with those of poor populations. The chapter shifts the focus away from the movement of patients in the recent literature on "medical migration/tourism" in order to map the intra- and international circulation of reproductive health technologies within shifting national and international regulatory regimes and institutional contexts. It also draws attention to the ways in which organizational structures and practices are put in place and promoted by international donors and multinational corporations. It analyses how reproductive technologies are circulated along with organizational practices, and are received locally but also resisted by transnationally networked women activists. The two case studies in this chapter undertake a limited comparison of the assemblages of state and non-state, national and international actors and institutions, which successfully furthered the mobility of contraceptives and the human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine. If their empirical material attests to a blurring of boundaries between public/private and national/transnational, on the one hand, it also illustrates the much more worrying trend of increasingly fuzzy overlaps between medical research, clinical trials, public health programs, and marketing strategies, on the other.

Towghi and Randeria delineate the interdependent mobilities of technologies, actors, and policies while pointing to the indispensable, albeit constrained, role of the state in reconfiguring regulatory norms to facilitate global flows. Like Robinson's contribution in part one of this volume they trace the mobility of the relevant policy instruments cobbled together by new public–private partnerships. And like Geddie and Panese in the same part of the volume they are also interested in understanding how institutional infrastructure is shaped and rendered mobile in order to enable the easy movement of specific pharmaceutical technologies. But it is also important to remember how selective such mobility is. For whereas enormous expense and energy was expended to create a market for pharmaceuticals in India, as Towghi and Randeria show, the effective long-term supplies of antiretroviral and antitubercular medication were highly uncertain during this same period in other regions of the global South. The movement of pills in poorer countries was restricted, for instance, by their expense and by regimes of global pharmaceutical patent protection. But it was also blocked by the erosion of regional distribution networks due to the cuts in subsidies imposed by structural adjustment programs in many regions of Africa or Latin America, as Cohen reminds us in the concluding chapter.

Lawrence Cohen's contribution relates a series of well-known Bollywood films to a sociology of mobility in relation to medicine and health by focusing on their treatment of the surgical operation. Central to his argument is the idea of clinical mobilities, that is, the institutionalized practices of therapeutics that organize or hinder the movement of persons and populations. The chapter delineates the entanglements of capital, the postcolonial state, and medicine through the lens of popular culture in India in order to examine the figure of the immobile, poor villager or slum-dweller in need of urgent lifesaving surgery, and the specter of mobile organ trafficking. Like migration to the city, the operation is framed in these films as the only option for survival. Cohen shows how the clinic becomes not only the hyper-mobile space of death but also the reworking of family and kin relationships. Transnational mobility within the logic of the developmental planning state of the 1960s and 1970s, he argues, emerged simultaneously as necessity and problem. For in Hindi films' material culture, the United States was often the most visible as a source of mobile forms. The chapter provides an incisive analysis of the multiple registers in which the meanings of the operation as a symbol of mobility are coded, including the difference between an operation performed abroad (e.g., in Switzerland) that is accessible only to the country's elite, and one at home that is barely affordable for the immobile masses. The analysis contrasts

the "foreign" to the "domestic" as the mobile to immobile persons, in order to unpack the ways in which this dichotomy constitutes the nation. The contribution also illustrates the role of mobilities and stasis represented in the virtual world of films, pointing, for example, to the doubling of the society – mobility nexus that both reflects and refracted back to the world beyond the screen.

Mobility is thus conceptualized by the contributors as constituted not only by *movement*, but also by *meaning*, such as ideological constructions of an imperative of mobility in neoliberal discourse, and by *power*, be it economic, symbolic or military (Cresswell 2006). Mobility is, therefore, neither conceived of as undetermined nor as unstructured movement. There has been a tendency to conceptualize contemporary trajectories or forms of mobility as mere reflections of overarching phenomena such as neoliberal economic policies or the weakening of the nation-state. While these factors clearly contribute to the shifting paths and patterns of mobilities, the empirical material and theoretical arguments in this volume suggest that contemporary mobilities are often both a cause and a consequence of these transformations. The contributors to the volume provide different disciplinary and thematic perspectives on mobilities. The diversity of their approaches bears testimony to the versatility and productiveness of the concept for critically understanding our contemporary world.

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Chapter 1

"Arriving at" Urban Policies/ the Urban: Traces of Elsewhere in Making City Futures[1]

Jennifer Robinson
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There is a perhaps defining quality to cityness which composes particularity – a place – in the midst of elsewhere. The metaphors which are often used by scholars to understand cityness in general draw our attention to some of the ways in which cities quite literally make elsewhere present – they are seen as sites of assemblage and centrality, territorialization and connectedness. And as the focus of attention zooms in on trying to identify and distinguish different kinds of cities, elsewhere is also important to how we make sense of cityness. Individual cities are often thought of through their associations with their wider regions (as in African, or Asian cities, the South American city, or the Chinese city); through the kinds of connections they have with other places (those which seem to span the globe, or link certain kinds of economic activity internationally – as in "global" or "world" cities); or perhaps through

features which they share with a selected range of other cities (as in "developing" or "poorer" cities, "advanced," "modern," or "postindustrial" cities). Both empirically and imaginatively, then, elsewhere is crucial to how cities are experienced and produced as well as to how we think cities, to how we make sense of the urban condition of contemporary life.

Understanding how elsewhere shapes cities is important to explaining particular cities, for example through the circulation of policy ideas or urban design; and it is also central to the project of thinking the urban in general – to thinking "cities in a world of cities," and therefore to initiatives to build more international accounts of contemporary urbanism. In this chapter I want to explore some ways in which these two aspects of thinking elsewhere in relation to cities can inform one another more directly. I will therefore consider some features of how elsewhere shapes particular cities empirically, using the example of how cities "arrive at" policies in the context of a globalized world of urban policy circulations. I will then draw on this empirical analysis to revisit the challenge of theorizing cityness in the face of a great diversity of different kinds of urban experiences. Theorizing cities, then, can be thought of as a condition in which elsewhere is always pressing on our imaginations.

This is to take forward my sense that we might follow the spatialities of cities themselves to help us compose new comparative urban methodologies, looking for creative ways to draw here and there to the service of understanding cities through an experimental comparativism (Robinson, 2011a). Building from a critique of conventional variation-finding comparative methods, we could delineate the core features of comparative thinking as: explaining outcomes; thinking through elsewhere; revising theory. In this chapter, I suggest some ways in which we can extend our practices of building knowledge about cities by learning from analyses of policy mobilities.

The paper thus offers a critical reflection on the ways in which urban policy mobilities constitute cities and their futures – it is in the context of circulating policies that city managers, citizens and other actors frame their imaginations about where their cities are going and make city futures. In seeking to understand how exactly these actors arrive at policies the paper offers a different perspective on studies of policy mobility and mobility studies more generally. This approach seeks to move beyond a focus on what is moving (tracing the trajectories of a policy document, an idea, a policy consultant), and rather looks at how policy makers compose their ideas in the midst of a myriad of influences from elsewhere. As Guggenheim and Söderström (2010: 3) remind us, "the here in the built environment is always also an elsewhere;" it is not always the movement of things which is relevant. In this case,

many policy ideas may have already arrived, or failed to arrive, been ignored, or even forgotten. I argue that a more complex spatial imagination – a topological approach – is needed to catch the spatialities of elsewhere which are at work in policy mobilities. It is these more complex spatialities of elsewhere which I also hope will inspire us to recast the comparative gesture at the heart of studying cities in a world of cities.

Theorizing the Urban in a World of Cities

A significant challenge for urban studies today resides in the observation that accessing the "urban" as a general phenomenon requires building knowledge through particular cities, or particular elements of cities – "the urban" is only ever to be found in this city, this street, this square.[2] The imperative, then, in urban studies, is towards a comparative gesture – we come to theorize cities through specific cities, and "the urban," or the idea of cityness in some general sense, can only be grasped through interpretations and narratives which build out of diverse urban contexts.

For much of the recent history of urban studies, this comparativist challenge has been rather muted. A world of differentiated cities has been seen as somewhat incommensurable except within carefully circumscribed bounds. This was the burden of the analysis I offered in *Ordinary Cities* (2006) – that the concept of modernity performed a delimitation of which cities counted towards broader theorizations of the urban, and then, later, developmentalism served to differentiate this urban according to levels of (national) development. Marked by their difference, cities in poorer parts of the world, and cities in formerly socialist contexts, for example, did not substantially contribute to the broadest accounts of the urban for some decades.

This has, thankfully, changed and the task of building international urban studies today can perhaps move away from this postcolonial critique – although I expect we are a long way from being finished with the unpicking of the continuing historical influence of colonial hegemonies and parochialisms in urban theory. We also need to remain vigilant against the other wing of the colonial present, those hegemonies and exclusions which are produced in the now. The moment is certainly propitious for moving from a postcolonial critique to producing urban theory for a globalized world. However,

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2   Or, to follow Deleuze, "the essence is nothing, an empty generality, when separated from this measure, this manner and this study of cases", 1994, p. 230).

while Ananya Roy's advisory to move beyond the "colonial wound" is well made (2011: 231), I am less certain that we can confidently inhabit the "post-postcolonial" which Aihwa Ong (2011) embraces: the difference, perhaps, in my imagining cities through the Southern parts of Africa and her engagement with the rather ambitious cities of East Asia, which are most likely to be producing some of the new hegemonies of the urban. My reservations here also arise because within urban studies itself there remains an urgent need to develop effective ways to escape and contest the power relations and exclusions of the colonial present of our own theorizations and practices of knowledge-building.

Nonetheless, this is an exciting moment for experimentation and innovation in the world of urban studies, and many different scholars around the world are developing responses to this analytical challenge from a range of theoretical and methodological starting points (Huyssen 2008; Edensor and Jayne 2012; McFarlane 2010; Roy 2009; Simone 2004; 2011). The provocation which I have found rewarding is the potential contribution of comparative urbanism to this project (Robinson 2011a; 2011c). Faced with a world of cities, thinking comparatively across the diversity of the urban condition (distributed both across and within particular cities) seems essential if scholars are to be able to find some purchase on the form and dynamics of contemporary urban society. The invitation of the term "ordinary cities," then, was to look anew at this diversity, to move beyond the categorizations and differentiations which have fragmented and divided our engagements with the urban. Most particularly, the relegation of what is now most of the urban world to the status of the theoretical exception, effectively excluding the experiences of those cities marked by informality and poverty from theoretical reflection, is impossible in the face of current urban trends. Thus what we think of as urban, how we imagine cities to function socially, politically and economically, and the kinds of futures we hope for or propose for cities all require a thoroughgoing, properly international, reconfiguration.

Revitalizing the comparative gesture

As we turn to the project of composing an internationalized field of urban studies, though, the potential of the comparative gesture has been significantly hampered by the methodological presumptions and conventions which have come to shape its operation within the field of the urban. The identification of suitable comparators on the basis of national-level indicators (level of GDP, political order) or city-scale criteria (city size, form of local government)

has limited the scope of comparability. And theoretically-driven hypothesis-testing based on parochial theoretical propositions, such as those of the US-based regime theory, have limited the reach of formal comparative methods, with great concern amongst scholars about conceptual "overstretch" (Pierre 2005). Instead, I have proposed a new experimental approach to comparativism, flexibly based on specific processes, urban elements or even connections between cities rather than conventional territorial entities (Robinson 2011a). Fundamentally, thinking about cities across the great diversity of urban experiences can benefit from a fresh view from elsewhere, disorienting ethnocentric assumptions and parochialisms (Pickvance 1986).

My concern in this chapter is to press this agenda further. Formal comparative methods draw on quasi-scientific analyses of causality – very much at odds with complex understandings of urban outcomes which predominate in urban studies. Most formally, variation-finding methods rely on the highly restrictive composition of comparative experiments through selection of cases with many variables in common in order to isolate those variables which differ and thus explain differing outcomes. However, in urban environments "variables" are highly interrelated: most independent and dependent variables will mutually affect one another, creating significant problems of endogeneity and multiple causality (Franzese 2007). Many urban outcomes are a result of complex compositional or contextual dynamics, not to mention being a product of wider connections and relations with other places, making the problem of endogeneity multisited. A relational comparativism – the ability to think across interconnected and multiply determined differentiations – requires a quite different range of methodological starting points and strategies (see Ward 2009 and McFarlane 2010). Amongst these, I suggest, should be a sustained engagement with how we understand the place of "elsewhere" in the making both of urban outcomes and of conceptualizations of the urban; an exploration of how cities work with elsewhere can inform methodological experiments in comparative urbanism.

In this chapter I particularly seek to take inspiration for comparative methods from the interconnectedness of cities: the place of elsewhere in shaping urban outcomes. One of the significant ways in which cities are made through elsewhere, and which has attracted a lot of recent scholarly attention, is the circulation of urban policy. The analysis of urban policy mobilities opens up an opportunity to think about the radical exteriorization of the urban under conditions of globalization. Circulating policies provoke us to explore specifically how it is that elsewhere makes cities, and how cities work with elsewhere to produce distinctive (particular) outcomes. My sense, then, is that

as scholars we could learn much about how to prosecute comparative think-ing about cities from the world of policy makers. Scholars have often been very critical of the form of interpretation implied in policy circuits – from fast policy too easily applied in a ready-made form, to inappropriate imposition of stylized policy ideas by powerful agents, or poorly executed comparisons – "benchmarking" – across vastly differing contexts on the basis of limited and weak information. The tone of academic writing on the policy process is most often very negative. Instead I would like us to consider what we can learn from the ways in which policy makers work with elsewhere as we struggle to recompose our methods for understanding a world of cities.

A focus on policy mobilities also entrains a series of debates concerning the broadest ontological persuasions of urban scholars which, helpfully for the purposes of this chapter, have significant implications for how we might pros-ecute a comparative agenda, for how we think about what the urban does, and indeed for what we think the urban might be. If comparison can be formulated, following Raewyn Connell (2007: 225) as "thinking beyond the single case" and thus bringing elsewhere into view, then a useful inheritance from formal comparative methods might be the expectation of using this engagement with elsewhere to explain outcomes, to seek out some sense of causality. Why did this, and not that, happen? For "assemblage" thinkers, the answer is to be found in a committed narrative description of heterogeneous associations amongst various kinds of objects and technologies gathered together in particular urban spaces (McFarlane 2011). Understanding how assemblages or actor-networks are composed will enable us to understand why certain outcomes resulted (Bender 2010). Helpfully eschewing the depth analyses of much social theory, but struggling with the compositional effects of multiple overlapping networks or assemblages, the limits of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) for building inter-pretations of the emergent forms of cityness and the broader urban imaginaries which frame our experiences of cities have been noted (Bender 2010; Brenner et al. 2011). Farías's hunch is that the element missing from ANT which might enable attention to be placed on the emergent forms of the urban is a focus on the virtual. I will return to this at the end of the chapter.

By contrast, in his heterodox Marxist account of the urban, Henri Lefeb-vre poses the urban as the level of "mediation" between near (private) and dis-tant (worldwide, or global) orders (2003: 80; see Schmid 2011). For him, the work of the form of the urban (centrality, simultaneity, assembly) in relation to the various elements assembled in urban space is not neutral but contested and productive of new meanings and practices. Here the rich engagements with Lefebvrian analyses of social space which have inspired urbanists and

geographers for some decades opens up for us, in a more complex way than ANT can, the moment in which the city (space) operates to produce something new (e.g., Allen 2003: ch. 7; Pile 1996; see Goonedewarna et al. 2008). Rather than this emerging from the assemblage-without-change of objects according to pre-given ontological formulations (see Guggenheim 2010 for a critique of this assumption in relation to the single building), the resignification and transformation of assembled and experienced elements is crucial. This can be understood as occurring through the production of urban space, and as Lefebvre (2003: 132) comments, "This is the source of a major theoretical problem: the reuse of signifying units detached from their initial context" (it is a problem for his application of theories of language – see Schmid 2008). As Simone (2011: 356) comments, "what is made use of cannot carry a specific value in advance"; in the production of meaning in relation to elsewhere, the work of the city space itself is substantial.

In both cases, though, the concept of "the urban" is unknowable in advance – an unpredictable product of "creatings" in a Deleuzian framework, or a "virtual" "possible-impossible" object still to come within the Lefebvre-inspired theorizations (Schmid, 2011). Thinking through elsewhere and the mobility of urban elements (such as policy) exposes the conceptualization of the urban to a radical revisability – essential to the comparative project of internationalizing urban theory.

The example of policy mobilities, then, poses for us this question of what the emergent work of the urban is. And, as the examples I will discuss here will demonstrate, in seeking to explore this a consideration of policy mobilities presses us beyond the overly physicalist ontology which ANT tends to entrain and which has resonated very well with wider extant theorizations of space in geography (see McCann and Ward 2010). It brings into view the need for new theorizations of space and power (and causality) which direct our attention away from the production of urban space through networks or connections per se and towards the effective spatialities of the relationalities which they enable (Allen 2008). In terms of our thinking about comparative methods it could perhaps help us extend our repertoire for critical comparative urban thinking. Some new directions for comparisons might involve, for example, (dis)locating core concepts – a postcolonial move, as in Robinson (2006); tracing trajectories of concepts as they change across different contexts, for example the travels of urban neoliberalism (Peck et al. 2009; Robinson 2011d); and putting ideas which have emerged in one context into motion elsewhere (e.g., using informality in different contexts; see Borraz and Le Galès 2010). Moving on from Ward's (2010) very general comment that

cities might be brought into conversation with one another in the interests of relational comparativism, can we perhaps be inspired by the spatialities of policy mobilities to develop some new repertoires for bringing here and there together to explain urban outcomes and to enable new conceptualizations of the urban?

Spatialities of Policy Mobilities

The intrinsic spatiality of the process of policy mobility is self-evident; less clear, though, is the extent to which our conventional spatial vocabularies are helpful for understanding the specific dynamics of urban policy circulations. At stake in policy "transfers" – to take for a moment the traditional political-science term – are territories from which policy flows, routes or trajectories which they follow, and places which are shaped then by the insights and experiences of other places (see, e.g., Stone 2004). Initial approaches to policy transfer in urban studies followed this model, with a clear accounting for the ways in which new policy ideas arrived somewhere, the agents and institutions involved and the particular documents, journeys, events and meetings which made this transfer possible (Peck and Theodore 2001; Ward 2006). More recently, McCann's (2011) agenda for research in policy mobilities stretches these concerns to emphasize the embodied, performative, and material nature of the process whereby ideas are put into motion, and the settings which facilitate ideas being taken up in new places. Such sophisticated and careful theorization of the trajectories and tracks of urban policy helps to capture the specificity of the movements of ideas, people, and things which make up policies in different places; it is directed to explaining how policy arrives in new places and is transformed in the process, thereby emphasizing the relational nature of urban politics (see also Cochrane 2011 for a useful account of this; Healey and Upton 2010 and McCann and Ward 2011 for collections of interesting studies).

There is, however, a growing tendency in writing about urban policy mobilities to grapple with the complexity associated with the proliferation, speed, and extensive transformations wrought by and to policies in motion. Peck and Theodore's succinct introduction to a collection of papers on policy mobilities expresses the complexities of these spatialities of policy mobilities very well:

> The spatiality of policymaking is not flattened into some almost-featureless and inert plane or transaction space, marked only with jurisdictional boundaries, across which transfers occur, but in terms of *a*

three-dimensional mosaic of increasingly reflexive forms of govern-ance, shaped by multi-directional forms of cross-scalar and interlocal policy mobility. In this context, policies are not simply transiting intact between jurisdictions, but evolve through mobility, while at the same time (re)making relational connections between policymaking sites. (Peck and Theodore 2010: 170; italics are mine)

In the same way, perhaps, as with the complex interscalar and recombinant spatial language needed to recount the geographies of globalization and which increasingly fails quite to capture the spatial relationships at work (Allen 2008), there is a need for urbanists to examine in some detail what exactly is included in the rather sweeping and all-encompassing concept of "relationality" in urban policy mobilities. Exactly what kinds of relationships are these? And how might we adequately formulate the spatialities at work in shaping them? My concern here is with the overwhelmingly materialist – in the sense of "matter" – emphasis of much relational thinking, which frames spatial relationships as trajectories and connections which come together to make distinctive places (Massey 2005).

Ideas and practices arrive from elsewhere or emerge in particular contexts in all sorts of ways – through forgotten conversations at meetings, long-distant reading of publications or reports, unpredictable friendship, and collegial networks, as well as formal or informal associations in which taken-for-granted understandings might be confirmed. It is important to consider, contra the ANT focus of much discussion of policy assemblages and mobili-ties, that the infrastructure of policy transfer (as with many other aspects of urban life) is significantly immaterial (see Simone 2001, on the idea of ephem-eral publics; Saunier 2002 in relation to policy circulations).

My proposal for starting to question this form of materialist relational-ity is to suggest that we invert the problematic – both our question and our methodology. Rather than tracking connections and following where they go, which seems to be the preferred mode of operation in urban policy mobili-ties studies (Peck and Theodore 2010), I suggest that we might take as our lens the question of how urban policies are arrived at, rather than tracing how they arrive from elsewhere. It is in seeking to answer this question, I think, that topological spatial imaginations become essential to our analyses, and the effective work of the urban in relation to elsewhere – its mediating function – becomes more clearly evident.

McCann and Ward direct our attention to the importance of attend-ing both to the circulation of policies and to how they are "made up" locally

(2010: 2) and embedded in a particular context. But as we turn to try to under-
stand this, many of our analytical metaphors seem to lack purchase. We can
search for the entanglement of different agendas in one context, or the making
local of specific policy ideas which can be traced. But we also quickly need to
account for more ephemeral spaces of interaction and communication, half-
forgotten meetings, fleeting encounters, rumors, and long-buried memories
of policy terminology. Academic analyses start to escape the bounds of the
materialist relationality which underpin much contemporary spatial thinking
and search for new vocabularies: as in Peck and Theodore's (2010: 170) com-
ment on Ward and McCann's piece, "stylized versions of the Barcelona model
possess a certain kind of representational power, operating as a subtly trans-
formative policy imaginary, in urban-policy networks, in peripatetic practice,
and across distant sites of inspiration if not emulation."

Here topological spatialities, concerned less with tracing physical
mobilities and connections and more with exploring ephemeral processes of
presencing and proximity, accounting for the interminglings of interiority and
exteriority, or exploring how institutions and agents might secure influence
at a distance, are, I would suggest, crucial if we are to be able to investigate
many of the spatial dynamics operative in determining policy outcomes (Allen
2008; 2009)[3]. Consideration of how "parts of elsewhere" make up local places
(Allen and Cochrane 2007: 1171) has the potential to stretch our analytical
capabilities and vocabularies.

I want to argue, then, that the "arrival" of policy ideas from elsewhere
is something of a misdirect in explanatory terms. An overly physical account
of policy transfer locates causality in a duality – connections and places; net-
works and territories. Building on a conventional topographical imagination
of space, we can account for how places are made through the assemblage of
things, people, and ideas, as bits of elsewhere move around the globe, arriv-
ing somewhere to make that place the way it is; they are translated, embedded
or territorialized – the trajectories of things make the stories of places. This
approach certainly offered a radical opening of the idea of place to the possi-
bilities of a politics of assemblage (McFarlane 2010), of contestations amongst
different processes and practices, and to a quite proper internationalization of
the economics and politics of cities (Smith 2001; Sassen 2001; Massey 2007).
However, in this view it is also the case that important aspects of the policy
making process remain opaque partly because of the physical spatial imagi-

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3   I follow John Allen here in thinking topologies spatially – see also Barnett et al. (2008).
     I am aware of a range of other efforts to think topologies, but find these provocative of new
     vocabularies rather than careful in attending to the specific spatialities of social relations.

nation which subtends this approach, and partly because of the assumption that elsewheres arrive somewhere by traveling, being translated, territorialized, hybridized, used or not. In fact, the assumption that policy ideas even arrive is rather misplaced – at the very least we lose sight of the policies that were already there, or which never arrive, that are thwarted or ignored, or run aground amidst alternative agendas or stern resistance, or become something completely unrecognizable, or whose influence is quite forgotten (Robinson and Parnell 2011; Jacobs 2011). Rather, I want to open up investigations into the precise ways in which elsewheres figure in "arriving at" urban policies in specific places. This will enable a sharper focus on the incredibly messy, often untraceable processes of policy formulation (Robinson 2011b), including some of the ephemeral dynamics underpinning the differentiations of repetition (Jacobs 2011). It will hopefully illuminate the spatialities of how policy ideas are arrived at in the midst of the many elsewheres and also the very present exigencies of place which shape policy making.

The question which arises, then, is, how are elsewheres made present in the formulation of urban policy? Or, from the other end of the problem, how are urban policies "arrived at" in the midst of here and elsewhere. I will offer a discussion of the development of various versions of Johannesburg's long-term city strategy between 1999 and 2011, as well as the experiences of policy makers associated with these policies, in order to explore this. The example will then hopefully help us to propose some directions for considering how, as scholars, we might learn from this in understanding how we "arrive at" the urban in our engagements with cities, here and elsewhere.

Arriving at Policies: Johannesburg's Growth and Development Strategy

The development and implementation of city-wide strategic planning in Johannesburg – I will focus here on the Growth and Development Strategy (GDS) (City of Johannesburg 2006) and the GDS2040 (City of Johannesburg 2011) – offers a useful platform for thinking through the spatialities of policy mobilities. The various planning documents produced in the context of this policy process take the city as a whole as the object for long-term strategic thinking with a strong statement setting out the broadest ambitions for urban development – Johannesburg's planners and politicians are eager to promote their city as a (or perhaps, the) "world class African city." But city strategies are far more than slogans and competitive ambition; they entail detailed

and complex proposals for aligning the mundane practices of city government with long-term ambitions, including economic growth, urban sustainability, and quality of life (Healey 2007; Pieterse 2008; Robinson 2011b). These three themes shape city strategies across the world, from Kuala Lumpur to Recife and Melbourne, and are a very good example of the perplexingly same-yet-different quality of much urban policy (and other urban outcomes, such as buildings and urban design) across the world of cities (Robinson and Parnell 2011; Jacobs 2011).

Johannesburg's version of the apparently generic concerns of city strategy formulation leads to a focus on addressing the extensive apartheid-linked backlogs of services for the poorest residents while trying to support economic growth to finance this delivery program and to encourage job creation in the face of exceptionally high adult and youth unemployment rates (Parnell and Robinson 2006; Ballard *et al.* 2007; Robinson 2008). The plan outlines an array of governmental responsibilities which necessitate careful policy preparation and complex negotiations amongst different constituencies and interest groups. In the most recent version the strategic priorities are carefully focused into four priority areas with political leadership: economic growth; governance; human and social development; environment and services. All of these are drivers of the overall ambition of achieving resilience, sustainability, and livability (City of Johannesburg 2011).

These strategic documents come out of a family of strategic planning initiatives which have influenced city government around the globe (Healey 2007; Robinson 2011b). Johannesburg's GDS is an outgrowth of local consultative processes which have shaped urban government through the transition from apartheid, as well as being influenced by private sector consultants and international development agencies that had minor roles in shaping the process. It was very much an innovative response to the need to reimagine metropolitan-scale government at the end of apartheid and the beginning of strong citywide municipal systems (see Parnell and Robinson 2006). National legislation has subsequently been developed to frame the preparation of long-term development strategies within the context of five-year and annual integrated development plans for cities (Harrison 2006). The city strategies involve extensive review of current policy across the areas of local government competence, and beyond. They draw extensively on the expertise and professional aims of city officials and consultants, and involve popular participation of some kind as well as electoral oversight in the form of Johannesburg's elected city council. By virtue of their breadth of scope, the strategies are inserted into multiple circuits of urban policy making (e.g. environmental, housing, regulatory, man-

agement, and economic development), and their architects have ambitions to launch them into the world in turn as exemplars of city-wide strategy.

Johannesburg commissioned a study of their city strategy making process for publicity to promote the idea that they helped to invent the model for city strategies now propagated across poorer country contexts by the Cities Alliance (an organisation founded to promote international collaboration on urban policy and development, initiated in the late 1990s by the World Bank, United Nations, international donor countries and Southern partner countries and more recently expanded to include civil society groups - see http://www.citiesalliance.org/about-cities-alliance). They have certainly been part of national and international networks promoting this idea in the Southern African region, and beyond. Through the efforts of the Cities Alliance, eager to promote strategic planning as a way of building governance capacities across poorer city contexts, there is a systematized model of how to do a city strategy which circulates widely internationally (Cities Alliance 2006). Thus city strategies themselves are good examples of "models" which circulate, informally, more formally through international or national networks, or very strictly in the form of legislation. This results in strong resemblances in city strategies across different contexts and amongst cities, but it takes very little excavating to establish that the elsewheres of city strategies are recomposed significantly as the policies themselves are arrived at in particular places (Robinson 2011b).

In Johannesburg, initiators of the process of strategic planning there had deep roots in local politics and were drawn to certain forms and styles of preparing the strategy – a quasi-corporatist consultation amongst major parties (business, community, labor, and government); a strong sense of the post-apartheid governmental mission; and, alongside a creative engagement with the demands of this city, a range of explicit links to other contexts where good ideas were to be found (Robinson and Parnell 2006). The Johannesburg 2006 GDS opens with a statement about why there is a need for a GDS, asserting that "There is a growing trend for larger cities, in many different parts of the world, to develop long-term City strategies to inform their medium- and short-term planning" (City of Johannesburg 2006: 1), followed by a lengthy discussion of the trends in urban policy and planning across the world which inform the idea of doing a city strategy. References to trends in urbanization across the world, notably Africa as well as other developing countries, worldwide urban trends and research, economic analysis from Australian cities, reflections on the (a)synchronicity of the South African economy relative to others, and awareness of how other economies might impact on the growth of the city interweave with careful reflection on trends in the city, based on various

sources, and linked to legislation and policies across national and regional bodies as well as wider development thinking and experiences.

Although clearly the bulk of the reports concern the city of Johannesburg itself, with careful exposition of prevailing legislative requirements, national policy context, relevant data, and responses to earlier policy outcomes, there is an explicit engagement with other places and ideas to draw relevant conclusions and insights for the city itself. The principles shaping the plans are strongly focused within the challenges of the local socio-economic and political arena: "Proactive absorption of the poor; balanced and shared growth; facilitated social mobility and equality; settlement restructuring; sustainability and environmental justice; innovative governance solutions" (Johannesburg City Council 2006: 52). Overall the plans seek to balance insights and understandings of urban processes in Johannesburg set within a wider world of knowledge about cities, and it is useful to trace some of these links and their influence. But for our purposes it is important to explore in more detail the specific ways in which policy makers understood the processes of engagement with the elsewheres which shaped the development of their city strategies.

Starting points and returns

In recalling the influences on their city strategy development, the origins of policy ideas are often opaque to policy makers, and there is an uncanny overlap between borrowing ideas and inventing them: both versions of the narrative seem to be true at the same time. The storying of policy development as a trajectory with origins and destinations is confounded then in the more topological spatiality of people's experiences. Johannesburg policy makers have a strong sense of inventing the idea of a long-term city strategy for themselves – and even being involved in establishing the concept for wider circulation through the World Bank–Cities Alliance:

> They [the World Bank] were debating what a city development strategy is and, and we gave them a case study, pretty much at the same time. I presented what we were doing in Johannesburg at […] their Urban Forum, whenever it was, a couple of years' ago. And they said, that's a City Development Strategy, and I said, yes? It is? Oh, okay! (Laughs). But they, they had the sort of basic framework in mind, and essentially it's about trying to look at a city comprehensively […] And 2010 was probably the closest attempt at trying to do that, when we were doing it. Maybe other people had done it, you just didn't find any evidence of it. And we learned lots, lots, lots of lessons from trying to do it in

Joburg. But I think if we were doing it again, and we should, it would be a much better process. (Former senior city official, Johannesburg, February 2002)

And in time, the continuing experience in Johannesburg feeds into shaping the wider model:

We've built up very good relationships with cities alliance and UCLG in Barcelona and Metropolis in November in Porto Allegre, to showcase our gds as best practice […] In India around the 10th anniversary we said you need to revise the approach, and they did. (City official, Johannesburg, September 2011)

Another example reinforces this sense of overlaps between borrowing and invention. Here a prominent urbanist and policy maker who initiated the South African Cities Network explains how they arrived at their analytical framework for doing city strategies around 2000, when new unicity metropolitan governments had just been formed, and in the wake of Johannesburg's first city strategy exercise. He is referring to the framework in Figure 1.1:

A: And we created that framework then (sustainable, productive city, inclusive city and well governed city) – and that was an adaptation of things we'd learnt from all over the world, I mean we didn't invent it ourselves but those were four good pegs to hang the discussion around.

Q: these are sometimes referred to now [in Cape Town] as the Cities Alliance (CA) quadrant […]
A: Oh that's […], they were ours!! It was an iterative process, I mean again there's no proprietal ownership here, CA were learning and developing things and I'm sure we adapted from elsewhere, but we definitely very clearly said those are our 4, for better or for worse, you can't choose 10, a quadrant's nice because it talks about it's a matrix approach its x-cutting, let's just go with those 4 – it's good enough for us.

Q: This seems to be very much like the World Bank's 1999 statement[4] – seeing cities as bankable, liveable etc.
A: I remember that, we looked at that and our stuff was definitely an adaptation of that thinking. (Former South African Cities Network official, Cape Town, May 2009)

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4   See World Bank (2000).

Figure 1.1 The City Strategy Quadrant (Source: South African Cities Network 2006).

More than simply forgetting, here the hard work of capturing the core elements of what mattered to post-apartheid cities drew on a wide range of different thinking about cities, only to arrive at something that might seem uncannily like a widely circulated World Bank framework. According to this policy maker this had had some influence on their thinking, which he had forgotten, but on the basis of the details of the State of South African cities report for which this figure provided an organizing framework, it is clear that the quadrant in Figure 1 was a hard-won analytic distinctive to the South African context. Later efforts to mobilize this framework to plan for similar State of Cities reports in other African contexts found it difficult to apply elsewhere, and revealed quite how South-Africa-centric this framework was.

In another example, one of the key architects of Johannesburg's 2006 Growth and Development Strategy explains how policy ideas came together for him in this process:

The way the stuff works in truth is that a small team of people and almost always, one or two individuals within that team are engaged in policy debates more generally, read incredibly widely on all sorts of issues and it just becomes part of the amorphous mass of their thinking and then as they engage with what people are saying within the city, engage with stakeholders, engage with communities, a synthesis process happens by which the thoughts become a particular policy statement or a particular

program of action, but if you were to say now where did that idea come from, you'd say well it came out of the work we were doing in this particular department but in truth actually the idea probably came from somewhere else. (Former city policy writer, Johannesburg, July 2009)

In this view, the policy and analytical ideas which are "in motion" within a trajectories perspective are already there. They did not "arrive." The local context of Johannesburg has already made its own many of the different available ways of thinking about cities. These might have been learnt in academic or policy contexts, but they are already profoundly local. Although international in some registers (and they may well have been written with South Africa in mind) they are already local as they are read and understood in the context of a profoundly specific engagement with that city. I would then suggest that Johannesburg itself – the policy makers and analysts – already owns the available international urban and policy literature informing its policies. In this context, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to track the topographical provenance of ideas – and in my view this may not be the most interesting dynamic to explore, either politically or in terms of understanding the spatialities of cities in globalization.

Working with ideas … making ideas work …

On the one hand then there are many moments in which the trajectories of policy ideas cannot easily be known – and when for policy makers an array of complex local and learned ideas come together to enable them to respond to specific challenges. As one policy maker noted:

Not everyone in a place like Joburg necessarily has the same appetite e.g. those involved in electricity provision for example tend to be very engineering focused […] but since ours is a policy and strategy job, ideas is what we are dealing with on a daily basis and *you know with ideas you often don't have any idea of where they come from, you know they just creep in*, like new words and terminologies you know like you don't say as of this day I'm adopting this concept […] but you hear it one day etc. and then you realise you've adopted it. (Senior city official, Johannesburg, September 2011)

This might reinforce the problematic nature of some aspects of circulating policy – as super-"fast" policy perhaps (taken up so easily its origins are already forgotten!) – and it certainly highlights the dangers which might ensue

from incapacitating local policy expertise through the slick insertion of good practice examples and policy learning. Myers (2008) offers a salutary warning of the negative outcomes of this scenario based on the experience of Scandinavian donor roles in East Africa in relation to land-titling initiatives. Even well-intentioned partnership-based exercises, such as the C40 network of large cities seeking to share good practice on climate change responses, have the self-defeating potential to undermine the capacity to search for innovative local solutions which might of course become the global solutions which are so needed.

On the other hand, the Johannesburg policy makers also work very consciously to build distinctive approaches to their context out of the array of resources available, despite the strong efforts to promote certain approaches within international policy circuits. As one policy maker observed in relation to the concept of resilience:

> Resilience is my favourite one, you know it was nowhere and then suddenly like you hear it once or twice and then there's an avalanche […] of course we have to be resilient, but now at every world urban forum or habitat conference, at the latest cities network conference – they were launching their new state of cities report […] it was about resilience and the conference was about that […] it's like the circulation of ideas is what happens, the circulation could emanate anywhere from an individual, consultants, university academics, world bank, multinational organisations, it can originate anywhere […] or even government, and then it just starts bouncing around, you know like climate change […] you know obviously we have to […] I'm not challenging the science at all, but if you don't talk about climate change you're a heretic, and the interesting thing in the SA conference […] the politicians say […] mmm […] – it depends on whether the politicians have been to different international meetings […] for example, one provincial politician, because she's gone there she understands the issues etc […] but perhaps other people have not been, they might think, well we have 40% unemployment perhaps we could address that. (Former senior city official, Johannesburg, September 2011)

And another:

> honestly it's been really difficult, very very challenging […] it would have been easy if we'd had agreement around the concept and theories of change (concept of resilience) but at the same time […] I guess the challenge has been trying to bring together the political imperatives,

national and provincial priorities and then this theory stuff together. (City official, Johannesburg, September 2011)

Certainly, then, there is evidence of a strong engagement with even powerful circulating ideas from elsewhere in order to deal with the specific challenges of a particular city. However, these policy makers also remind us that borrowing from and engagement with other places might take place in a far more haphazard and unpredictable way. The ideas that find their way into policies include quite trivial and minor learning, drawing on examples from other places to return to well-known ideas, as well as some quite some quite accidental encounters and, importantly, the circulation of elements of policy that are frequently hidden or unspoken.

One senior policy maker cites the example of learning from the city of New York in relation to their consultation process in the long-term plan where he was reminded of a very basic point: "the one thing I took home is to simplify stuff – we tend to overcomplicate things […] earlier versions were too overly difficult even convoluted […] what they were saying to us that if you want to engage with stakeholders etc. across the board you have to take the stuff in a form that people can engage with" (former senior city official, Johannesburg, September 2011). He continued to consider his experience of policy learning in general: "it kind of tends to be fragmentary in a way, it's not like people throw a body of knowledge at you, it's kind of like bits and pieces of ideas and so on and it builds up over time."

At times, policy makers note the ways in which unspoken or highly improbable, even shocking truths which are often hidden within the formal policy transfer process might become crucial to understanding their context. In this example, a usually hidden, even alarming piece of information from one context resonated in an intense and surprising way with the policy challenges facing South African cities:

Well you know you never import one model, you don't say because Barcelona did that it will necessarily work for us, that's what people tend to assume, that because BRT [Bus Rapid Transit] underpinned loads of work in Bogotá it will necessarily work here, but the key learning, for example when he said to me well did you know that I had to call in the national guard and I had them patrol the bus rapid transit routes for 6 months to make sure the taxi guys didn't undermine it [Q: Bogotá?] ja, he called in the army, the national army, [Q: you don't hear that – laugh] ja, the only way they got it through the taxis is to call in the army and impose it and ban the taxis from them […] now, that's

radical stuff, I think, hmm, that's interesting, let's, now that's reality in a tough rough environment, where taxis ran the public transport system and were mafias. (Former South African Cities Network [SACN] official, Cape Town, May 2009)

Based on these examples, my sense is that the process of making policies local – and of making up local policies (Ward, 2006) – needs to be understood through some quite new spatial imaginations. Arriving at policies involves far more than assembling the discrete different entities, ideas, or objects which we can trace as they move from there to here: complex, topological spatial imaginations are needed to interpret these processes of the mixing and folding of here and elsewhere into distinctive local policies.

Learning from Policy Mobilities:
New Geographies of Theorizing the Urban

The travels of urban policy invite us to attend to the prolific ways in which cities already inhabit one another imaginatively and are connected through myriad flows and appropriations, in both familiar and unpredictable directions. This highly internationalized landscape – this topology – of intricate and subtle engagements across cities could offer us some methodological inspiration and could serve as an exciting spatial model for a more general practice of theorizing the urban: no longer beset by a cavernous divide between wealthier and poorer cities, but rather crosscut by intricate filaments of connection, transnational communities of knowledge and understanding, and intellectual and political affinities and proximities which defy apparent physical differentiation and distance.

In relation to the broader project of conceptualizing mobilities, we have noted the dependence of policy transfer and adaptation on spatialities of proximity and presence which are not easily reduced to physical flows which can be traced on a map. Circulations, then, are not specifically about traversing physical distance or traceable connections, but might often be more convincingly understood through the concept of topological space (Allen 2008; 2009; Amin 2002). Rather than pulling us back to the physical routes or the co-presences and alliance-building that enable flows (although these, as with the details of trajectories, are certainly relevant and interesting), topological accounts of space direct us to attend to the specific spatialities at work in the drawing of people, ideas, and activities into proximity, into closer relationships, or not

(Allen, 2008). Thus simply focusing on things that move – mobilities – might lead us to ignore some of the important ways in which elsewhere shapes cities.

In policy circulations, then, one has something altogether organizationally looser (untraceable, even) than the heterogeneous networks pursued by actor-network theorists, or even the generic relational geographies which subtend contemporary accounts of space. Allen and Cochrane (2007: 1163) draw our attention, suggestively, to "the mix of distanciated and proximate actions that constitute more recent forms of networked regional governance." However, it is to the language inspired by Johannesburg, and other cities in Africa often written out of the scripts of worlding cities, the "embeddedness in multiple elsewheres" (Mbembe and Nutall 2004: 348) of cities like Johannesburg that we could turn to consider the many different complex ways in which those elsewheres are made present, and also forgotten, so mixed up they cannot be traced, stubbornly sticking to national tracks of policy influence, hanging around to haunt policy making without being able to be named (see McCann 2011). The different ways in which elsewheres shape strategic policy making deserve more attention: circulating policies might never arrive, be ignored, be imagined, be retold a lot, be worked on with great effort, be already here, imaginative recompositions, pure repetition, involve multiple ownership of ideas (already mine, overdetermination), be used in drawing comparisons, forgetting, losing sight of interiority and exteriority in a delirium of localism (or deferential internationalism) – these, then, are some of the topologies of transnational urban policy.

Can these topological spatialities of policy mobility inspire us in terms of how we narrate the urban – how we "arrive at" theories of cities? Firstly, I would prioritize the insight that the procedures and relationships through which urban theory is generated, coordinated and disseminated are as political and power laden as those which frame the circulations of other forms of urban understandings. We, too, *are* the circuits of urban policy; the producers of the mobile and agile stories which both retell cities and remake them, which presence themselves in cities in unpredictable ways. As such our practices and circuits demand as much attention as those of the powerful institutions, policy makers, and gurus we love to criticize! The politics of our own relationships with elsewhere should properly concern us.

Secondly, we can be inspired by policy makers' agility in reworking and reimagining urban futures to learn that it is possible to reconceptualize the "urban." Rather than new geographies of theory (Roy 2009) which suggest a static distribution of ideas across different places, once again potentially incommensurable, we need to look for new geographies of *theorizing* which

destabilize the terms of the urban and set in motion conversations towards an ongoing reinvention of the term "urban." This chimes with current ontological debates within urban studies. Confronted with the profound exteriority of the production of cities, and the indefinability of the physical object-extent of the urban, the category of the city is practically an impossible object.

Both ANT and Lefebvrian analyses, for example, expose the need for new and revisable conceptualizations of the urban (Farías and Bender 2010; Schmid 2011). Neither approach sees the urban as an object which we can assume to exist in any particular form. To date, ANT has focused its attention on the "actual," the narrative description of how objects and people align themselves in emergent agent-ful assemblages. As Farías comments, "ANT makes out of Deleuze's philosophy of creation an empirical project focused on the generative capacities of actor-networks and the new entities (objects, technologies, truths, economic actors) and dimensions (times, spaces) brought into being" (Farías and Bedner 2010: 7). What is missing in his view is an appreciation of the virtual – the emergent vitality of "creatings" actualized in different cities.[5] Could this open up avenues to imagining the productivity of the concept "urban"? For Farías, thinking the city requires attention to the virtual, as it "involves the enactment of an object otherwise inexistent" (Farías and Bender 2010: 15); although his assessment of the possibility of thinking with "virtuality" ties it to a more limited domain of urban tourism rather than to the "global" concept of the urban.

For Lefebvre the urban also emerges as a "virtual" object – in one version it can be analytically deduced, like the rules of language, from the range of processes at work in cities (2003: 50–54). For him, though, it is important that the urban is also a political and practical achievement – the urban is to be made through political contestation. Lefebvre's sense of this as a "possible-impossible" again ties the emergence of urban society to the unpredictable dynamism of urban space. Thus, as Schmid (2011: 59) insists, Lefebvre's urban is both a conceptually and a politically open space in which "urban

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[5]   Hallward: "The error that Deleuze never tires of correcting, after Bergson, is that which mistakes a creative movement for a relation between actual terms instead of seeing in it the actualization of something virtual" (2006: 50). Deleuze, (2004: 28): "We must understand that the virtual is not something actual but is for that no less a mode of being, and is, moreover, in a way, being itself; neither duration, nor life, nor movement is actual, but that in which all actuality, all reality, is distinguished and comprehended and takes root. To be actualized is always the act of a whole that does not become entirely actual at the same time, in the same place, or in the same thing; consequently, it produces species that differ in nature, and it is itself this difference of nature among the species it has produced."

society is not an already achieved reality, but a potential, an open horizon."[6] For Deleuze scholars, however, this more determined sense of the "possible" is rather different from the "utterly unpredictable force" of creations which is characteristic of the virtual for Deleuze (Hallward 2006: 38).

Narrativizations/theorizations of the urban, if they are to respond to the interconnectedness and emergent unpredictability of the diverse forms of cityness in a world of cities, require this capacity – in Deleuzian or Lefebvrian idiom – to think the virtuality of the urban, and to engage with the everyday productions of specific urban spaces which at the same time disclose the potential for realizing an emergent if as yet unknowable urban society. As Maliq Simone (2011: 356) puts it, "the urban is always 'slipping away' from us, always also somewhere else than where we expect it to be."

Thus, as we anticipate a practice of theorizing which is committed to such an open sense of what the urban might be, we can return to the final challenge which theorists share with policy makers, that of producing our understandings of the urban through particular cities but always in relation to elsewheres: to speak of an "urban" beyond the single case necessarily entrains elsewhere. The analytical impossibility of the object-urban, therefore, is not only to be located in ontology as such but also in the challenge of building a theorization of the urban across a world of cities. Thus, in a world where cityness is reimagined and remade in a myriad different contexts, the spaces and forms of the city which "press" on our interpretations will be diverse, differentiated, for example, through the creative compositions of here and elsewhere, or through the always differentiated repetitions which are the outcomes of the sociotechnical achievements of far-reaching urban processes and their imaginative reworkings (Jacobs, 2006). An open and revisable conceptualization of the urban, willing to work with, puzzle through and make room for the differentiation and diversity of urban life is essential.

As is the case for the policy makers we have spent some time with here, our interpretations and interventions in the cities we inhabit and work with, read about and learn from, will increasingly take place in a plane of analysis which draws on here and elsewhere. The practices of comparative urbanism, then, might learn from the work of arriving at policies. Certainly I hope we will continue to trace the provenance of different conceptualizations of the

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6   Lefebvre also seems to be alert to "virtuality," as he observes "the theoretical approach requires a critique of this "object" [the city] and a more complex notion of the virtual or possible object" (Lefebvre 2003: 16). "This is the essential feature of the method already considered and named 'transduction,' the construction of a virtual object approached from experimental facts. The horizon opens up and calls for actualization" (Lefebvre 1996: 165).

urban (especially to (dis)locate hegemonic ideas); we could also be alert to the ways in which ideas of the urban might have been packaged to travel better (to have impact, set agendas or catch the imagination – as with the concept of global cities, for example). But equally scholars in many places who work very hard to engage with, critique, and localize certain prominent traveling ideas should inspire more sustained comparative reflection and theoretical revision. More generally we could be encouraged by the creative and agentful work of conceptualization which is carried out across diverse specific cities – all of which indicates different possibilities of the comparative imagination.

Following the discussion of Johannesburg's city strategies here some of these possibilities might include: cutting across here and there to compose possibilities through surprising – perhaps at first sight hilarious – affinities (and here the example of the military's role in BRT might be set alongside the initially astonishing but now quite sensible idea that one might take analyses of informality and ungovernability to think through wealthier contexts); doing the very hard work of imaginatively recomposing and grounding dominant terms in relation to specific histories and political moments (such as was required with the idea of resilience, for example); or allowing a ferment of untraceable ideas to produce something new and resonant (as in the background work for GDS 2006); and there is also of course that well-known academic condition, forgetting where you heard something, which highlights the unpredictable processes of learning (as in the SACN quadrant).

The ontological and geographical impossibility of the object-urban invites us to work in these and many other creative comparative ways along the tracks of the cities we think through – to work with both their topographical and topological spatialities – to be open always to reframing our conceptualizations (after ANT) of how they have come to be or, following Lefebvre, what they might become.

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What Traveling Urban Types Do: Postcolonial Modernization in Two Globalizing Cities

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> We have to behave more civilized than before. Hanoi is developing and I think this kind of shopping mall should be widely built.[2]
>
> It makes me modern to live here.[3]

Urban forms have politics. Norms are, as we know, inscribed in forms (Rabinow 1989). However, urban forms not only reflect, but also enact, power relations. They do so through their capacity to shape and modify social practices. In other words, urban forms are urban pedagogies: they "teach" their users forms of living. This was particularly obvious in the case of colonial

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[2] Interview with a man aged around 40 in a shopping mall, Hanoi September 26, 2009.
[3] Interview with a man aged around 60 in a new housing area, Hanoi September 26, 2009.

cities when "traveling urban types"[4] were imported from elsewhere, leading city users "from tradition to modernity." This process has been now well documented (Myers 2003; Hosagrahar 2005; Harris 2008; Guggenheim and Söderström 2010). In this chapter, I would like to push this line of argument further in two ways: first, by looking at modernization in contemporary postcolonial cities; and, second, by looking at traveling urban types beyond pedagogy. In the context of this book, this chapter thus critically analyzes a quite specific form of mobility: the role of imported urban types in cities of the global South.

Drawing on science studies and governmentality literature, I argue that unpacking and analyzing urban pedagogies of modernization is central for understanding how cities globalize. These mundane transformations of cities bring globalization from a vaporous "up-there" made of intangible capital flows and political ideologies, to a series of "in-heres" in the shape of urban and architectural types or forms. More specifically, I look at the discipline these traveling types impose and at the resistance, domestication, or subversion strategies developed by their users. However – and this is rarely studied in the literature – the power of urban forms resides not only in their capacity to discipline their users, but also in the fact that they enable them to practice the city differently and to position themselves in society by experiencing and expressing in words or deeds new senses of themselves. Therefore, the main claim of my contribution is that a critical understanding of the mobility of urban types should consider, on the one hand, how they enact and convey pedagogies and, on the other, how they provide new "affordances," that is, new possibilities of action.

These arguments stem from empirical work done in globalizing cities rather than from theoretical considerations. Doing fieldwork on newly created places in the cities of Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Palermo (Italy), and Hanoi (Vietnam), in the context of a larger project on comparative urban globalization (Söderström *et al.* 2009; Söderström 2013), we realized how insuf-

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4   I define "urban types" as a larger category than "building types." Building types, such as the bank or the railway station, are generic spatial patterns of buildings elaborated to host specific activities (such as taking the train). Urban types encompass not only buildings but also generic spatial patterns of infrastructures (like the road interchange) or developments of specific urban areas (like waterfronts). Urban forms, specific actualizations of urban types (like the shopping mall around your corner), very rarely literally "travel" or can be said to be 'mobile', but urban types do. For instance, we can see how shopping malls as a type of building have been introduced in certain areas where they did not exist before. For more elaborate discussions on these different points, see Guggenheim and Söderström (2010).

ficient a disciplining/educative perspective on the form/society relation was. Clearly, our interviewees were not only "configured" by or resistant to the "educational program" of these spaces: they also used them, sometimes quite playfully, to explore new ways of being in society. To make this point, I draw on some of this material and especially look at the uses of two types of infrastructure that were recently imported in two of these cities: road interchanges in Ouagadougou, and shopping malls in Hanoi.

There is an important literature on how homes (Blunt 2005; Tolia-Kelly 2004) and housing (Flint 2003; Jacobs and Cairns 2008) participate in shaping identities and communities. Jacobs and Cairns in particular have convincingly shown how "modernist high-rise housing came to be one of the key sites through which the post-independence Singapore subject was made and made themselves" (Jacobs and Cairns 2008: 591). However, little work has been done on how other nonresidential urban forms, such as the ones I look at here, play similar (or different) roles (but see Merriman 2004; Farías and Bender 2010; Rentetzi 2008). Even less frequent are urban studies that have looked at urban forms as affordances. Drawing on and extending the literature regarding the educative function of built forms and their affordances, I therefore, in the first and conceptual part of this contribution, propose ways of analyzing the relations between urban forms and subjects in everyday situations.

Subjects and urban forms are always embedded in structured contexts. The process and discourse on modernity and modernization is one central aspect of this context, especially in the cities of the South that I consider in this chapter. In the narrative of their promoters (developers, state officials, designers), modernization is the "promise" accompanying the introduction of new urban types. This narrative is also often present in users' discourse regarding urban change in those cities. I will therefore first clarify what I mean by modernity and modernization. I maintain that modernization is a form of morality and power that manifests itself in discourse, practices and material forms. I also reflect on the shifting geographies of modernity: how the reference of what it is to be modern is related to different regions and places. I then try to specify the role of traveling urban types in everyday use as both pedagogical and enabling. Shifting from this conceptual part to fieldwork, in the second part of this chapter, I look at the importation of traffic infrastructures and shopping malls in the cities of Hanoi in Vietnam, and Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso. I conclude on the necessity to develop further a critical cultural analysis of the everyday consequences of the mobility of urban types.

Modernization as Morality and Power

Modernity is "a normative attitude constructed in the extreme inequities of colonialism" (Hosagrahar 2005, 1). In other words, historically speaking, the very idea of modernity and modernization has been an instrument of power, legitimizing change and domination.[5] However, Euro-American thought was for long blind to the moral content of European modernity, developing the idea that social change all over the world converges towards a similar rationality, and projecting Western cognitive categories on other societies and other periods in history (Taylor 1995). Taylor (1995: 28) argues that we need to escape from this "ethnocentric prison" in order to understand "the full gamut of alternative modernities in the making in different parts of the world." This call has been heard.

In recent years, a series of important contributions have deconstructed classic theories of modernity, unpacked the moral power of the idea of the modern, and explored a series of alternative processes of modernization.[6] Chakrabarty (2000) in particular has been influential in insisting on the temporal imagination underlying the European idea of modernity. Historicism – seeing phenomena as entities maintaining their unity and gaining their complete identity through time – is, he argues, central to European modernity and should be superseded because it does not allow us to see non-European societies as varieties of modernity instead of societies lagging behind, hampered by a series of archaisms (Chakrabarty 2000: epilogue).

However, the idea of modernity is also shaped by a geographical imagination. If, following Chakrabarty's invitation, we need to step out of a teleological vision of social change through time, we also need to recognize the spatial variety and complexity of modernity. Doing this implies not only

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[5]   The first uses of the term "modern" as referring to a feature of the current period appear with the constitution of the colonial world system in the sixteenth century (King 2004: 66).

[6]   The idea of multiple modernities has been suggested to contest two central tenets of classical theories of modernization: the equation between modernity and the West, and the assumption that modernization leads to the convergence of societies undergoing it (Eisenstadt 2000) (for a critique of the concept of multiple modernities, see Schmidt 2006). Arjun Appadurai has also proposed a broader conception of modernity considering the complexities of contemporary globalization (Appadurai 1996). Similarly, Shalini Randeria has investigated the "entangled modernities" in the postcolonial situations encountered in a country like India (Randeria 2006, Randeria 2007). See also Therborn (2003).

looking at how modernity is conceived differently in different regions or locales, but also investigating shifts in modernity's reference points, which leads us to see how the Euro-American world should not only be provincialized, intellectually speaking, but *is* actually provincializing in a very concrete geographical sense. In many parts of Asia and Africa, modernity is no longer associated with Europe or North America but with Asia or the Middle East. In recent years, postcolonial urban studies have, as we will now see, contributed to further reconceptualize modernity precisely in that direction.

Postcolonial urban modernization

Different contributions within postcolonial urban studies have shown that a simple diffusionist conception of the history of urban modernity is historically inconsistent. First, because a series of features generally considered as characteristic of European modernity, like multiculturalism, initially appeared in cities of the global South like Calcutta or Jakarta and not in the North (King 2004: 74); second, because features of urban modernity theorized in the North, such as the modern movement in architecture, did not simply follow a North–South route (Robinson 2006: 74); thirdly, because certain colonial cities have been laboratories for European modernity and in that sense "ahead" of cities in Europe instead of "behind" (Rabinow 1989; Wright 1991; Bishop et al. 2003); fourthly and finally, because when modernity was not "home-grown" in cities of the South, it was more than simply imported and copied: it was adapted and indigenized (Nasr and Volait 2003; Hosagrahar 2005).

So in brief, urban modernity from the nineteenth century onwards was not simply rolled out from cities in the North to cities in the South. It was multi-polar and relationally constructed. Today, urban modernity has become even more multipolar because of the diversification of geographical references to what modernity is. Emergent economies, especially in Asia, have not only transformed global geopolitics and geoeconomics, they have also imposed new coordinates for where the avant-garde of modernity is situated. In cities of the South, modernity is increasingly seen as being located in non-Euro-American cities. If, as Robinson (2006) argues, modernity has for long been another word for "the West" (and still is for most people in the West), it is increasingly less so in cities of the South. This is true, for instance, of lifestyles in a city like Hanoi, where young people tend to be primarily influenced by trends from South Korea (Geertman 2007). It is also true for urban policies.

Kuala Lumpur's development strategy, for instance, has become a model for other Asian cities, such as Hyderabad in the 1990s (Bunnell and Das 2010).[7]

The concepts of urban modernity and modernization have thus been thoroughly revisited by recent postcolonial approaches. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss whether this has deprived modernization theory of its value as a general theory of social change altogether. I am more interested here in the persistent performative effects of these concepts outside academic debates: how they work as emic categories in the discourses and actions of developers, state officials, or city users. Classical ideas of modernity and modernization indeed continue to shape their narratives and justify their actions. These ideas continue to frame urban change, especially in globalizing cities. Tools such as the City Development Strategies promoted by UN-Habitat and the World Bank since 1998 are for instance accompanied by a narrative assuming that "modern, gleaming skyscraper-filled cities, with adequate networked infrastructures in place to support them is the only and ineluctable way into the urban future" (Pieterse 2008: 108). In order to understand how modernization narratives are articulated with urban forms, it is useful to turn to governmentality studies.

Pedagogies and affordances in modernized urban forms

Foucauldian inspired governmentality approaches have informed a range of studies of the relations between built forms and society (Rabinow 1989; Osborne and Rose 1999; Osborne and Rose 2004). Geographers in particular have looked at asylums (Philo 1989), the workhouse system (Driver 1993), or the city as a whole (Legg 2006)[8] as tools for governing conduct. In these historical studies, built form is seen as regulating behavior mainly within punitive and disciplining forms of government. Drawing on the work of Rose, some recent analyses have also begun to look at contemporary (Flint 2003) and postcolonial urban situations (Jacobs and Cairns 2008) showing in particular how housing consumption is framed by moral state discourses,

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[7]   These transformations in the geography of urban modernity have been encouraged by a series
      of political initiatives. In recent years, international organizations, such as the World Bank, or
      networks of local governments, such as United Cities and Local Governments, have stimulated
      increasing levels of South–South exchange regarding urban development strategies. Created
      in 2004, the United Cities and Local Governments' network has as one of its main goals the
      development of exchanges among its over 1000 member cities situated in 95 countries. In 2008,
      the World Bank Institute created the South–South Experience Exchange Facility, which has a
      broad development agenda.
[8]   See Huxley (2007) for a general assessment of governmentality studies in geography.

or "ethopower" (Osborne and Rose 1999), which translates into interiorized "grammars of living" (Flint 2003: 614). State institutions and officials teach city-dwellers how to behave like virtuous and responsible citizens through an involvement of tenants in the management of their housing. In other words, urban forms are endowed with a pedagogic (rather than a disciplining) role in a process of social modernization.[9] In Hanoi and Ouagadougou this pedagogy acquires, as we will see, a specific meaning as the shopping malls and road interchanges are new types of built form and correspond to norms of conduct unknown to most of their inhabitants.

As a response to such ethopower, users are generally considered to be capable of developing a counterpower defined as resistance or subversion. While I do not wish to deny the importance of actions opposing the changes brought by new urban forms, or "action against," I think we should pay more attention to "action with," in other words to actions that use new built forms as opportunities. "Affordance" is the concept that best captures this role of built forms. For the psychologist James Gibson (1979), who theorized the term, ecological reality, as opposed to physical reality, is made of meaningful things providing humans (and other animals) with affordances or possibilities to perform an action. An obstacle on a path affords a possible action of collision, for instance (Gibson 1979: 36). This simple idea opens up fruitful ways of looking into the materiality–society nexus. However, few authors in urban studies have looked at this aspect of the power of built form.[10] I thus look at the shopping malls and road infrastructures of Hanoi and Ouagadougou in this light to show how they offer possibilities for forms of action that did not exist before, how they are resources for new forms of urban living and "arts of being global" (Roy and Ong 2011).

Methodologically, my interpretation is indebted to Actor-Network Theory and especially "script analysis" as developed in the study of innovations in industrial design (Akrich 1992). In script analysis, technology is considered to be the materialization of a program of action that prescribes certain types of uses. Fruitful for urban studies is the principle of following a script from its

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[9] Two recent papers have explicitly looked at urbanism as pedagogy: Simpson (2011) interprets Macao as a space where mainland Chinese learn to become neoliberal subjects, and Berney (2011) looks at the role of public-space policy in Bogota in attempts of the state to reform civil society.

[10] Among them, Borden shows how skateboarders use affordances of the urban environment, like sidewalks for sliding, that are not taken advantage of by other city users, in a way that "makes us rethink architecture's manifold possibilities" (Borden 2001: 1). In another context, McFarlane shows how Mumbai slum-dwellers use what they have at hand to improvise sanitation facilities (McFarlane 2011: 40).

conception, to its inscription in artifacts, and finally to its adoption or rejection by its users (Söderström, 1997). These perspectives on the technology–society nexus can be extended to understand how buildings and other categories of urban forms (public spaces, for instance) shape human action. Here I will not systematically follow how these scripts have been elaborated, turned into material form, and received by users, but will rather more loosely conceive of traveling urban types as programs of action.

In brief then, my analysis draws on postcolonial urban studies, governmentality studies, and Actor-Network Theory to study a series of recent urban interventions in the cities of Ouagadougou and Hanoi.

For most of the twentieth century, both cities were on the margins of the world economic and political system until they reestablished more intense international exchanges two decades ago.[11] With such a common history of closure and reconnection to global flows of capital, people, goods, and knowledge, they constitute interesting laboratories to study processes of modernization mediated by urban artifacts. In the next sections I look at one specific type of built form in each city, which is in each case representative of the important recent physical and social changes in these cities. I describe how they bring both new norms and new opportunities to urban life. In the case of Ouagadougou, I focus on traffic pedagogies, while in the Hanoi case I focus on the affordances and pedagogies related to shopping malls.

Traffic Pedagogies in Ouagadougou

Economic development means access to new forms of mobility: cities like Ouagadougou and Hanoi have seen a spectacular increase of motorized transport since 1990.[12] In Ouagadougou, the arrival of cheap Chinese motorcycles in the early 2000s has led to a significant increase of motorcycle traffic. In

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[11]   In 1992, with the reform of the Vietnamese constitution, and two years later, with the end of the US embargo, Hanoi's economic development and international relations began to take off. Since economic reform and political decentralization in Burkina Faso in the early 1990s, Ouagadougou has developed a dense web of international collaborations (Söderström et al. 2012).

[12]   During the past fifteen years alone, Hanoi has gone through two transitions in traffic. The first transition was from bicycles to motorcycles, the second is from motorcycles to cars. In 1990, over eighty percent of trips were made by bicycle. Fifteen years later, in 2005, nearly sixty-five percent of daily journeys were made on motorbikes. The constant increase in motorcycle ownership is now paralleled by a growing number of cars. In 2005, only two percent of households in Hanoi owned cars, but between 2004 and 2007, new vehicle registrations in Hanoi increased at a two-digit rate, reaching twenty percent over the last two years. Only ten years ago, the city still had no traffic lights (Söderström et al. 2010).

both cities, the obvious correlates of increased mobility are air pollution and traffic congestion. Other less obvious changes appear when one looks at the "scripts" embedded in traffic infrastructures, and at the ways in which they are domesticated by their users. This is particularly visible in the case of road interchanges in Ouagadougou.

Ouagadougou is the capital of Burkina Faso, a former French colony (independent in 1960).[13] During the socialist regime of Thomas Sankara (1983 and 1987), the capital became a central site for the government's revolutionary project, which included the nationalization of land property and a struggle against traditional chiefdoms. The head of state is, since the coup against Sankara in 1987, Sankara's former ally Blaise Compaoré. First elected in 1995, Simon Compaoré[14] is to this date the (very active) mayor of Ouagadougou, a city counting 1.9 million inhabitants in 2011. Both the municipality and central government intervene in the planning of the capital, which is not without tension (Söderström et al. 2012). In June 2008, the southern road interchange was inaugurated with great solemnity. It was the first of a series of interchanges planned by the state. Two other interchanges in the east and west were finished in 2010. The state's aim with this important and costly infrastructure is to improve traffic conditions, to anticipate future developments of the city, and to improve its image.[15] The system of interchanges was conceived by the Ministry of Infrastructures[16] on the basis of a study done by a Canadian agency.[17] However, the President himself has been involved in the conception of the interchanges, which are classified as "presidential infrastructures."[18] The development of the interchanges is also part of a regional competition between national capitals.[19] Bamako, for instance, started constructing road interchanges in the early 2000s, and has been ahead of Ouagadougou in that respect, whereas Niamey lags behind. Funding for the interchanges in Ouagadougou comes from a series of donor countries: Taiwan for the eastern

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[13]   The country ranked 161st out of 169 on UN's 2010 Human Development Index. The same year, forty percent of Burkina's urban population lived in Ouagadougou. The city's average demographic growth rate was 4.7 % per year between 2000 and 2010.

[14]   Despite the name, he is not a parent of the President of State.

[15]   Interview with the official responsible for presidential infrastructures in Burkina Faso, February 9, 2010.

[16]   Ministère des Infrastructures et du Désenclavement.

[17]   Interview, municipal official, December 1, 2009.

[18]   Interview, state official, February 9, 2009.

[19]   In particular with neighboring Mali.

interchange, Japan for the western one, and Libya for the southern one.[20] The southern interchange is of particular interest, as it is used by the state as an instrument of functional and symbolic change for the city (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Southern Interchange, Ouagadougou (photograph: Jonas Haenggi).

Symbolically, it is part of a governmental narrative of modernization. The President himself intervened to make sure that the southern interchange would be the first to be completed. This interchange connects the new presidential palace to the south, located in the elite neighborhood of Ouaga 2000, to the circular boulevard around the city. The Memorial to the Heroes of the Nation is situated halfway along that axis, between the palace and the interchange (Figure 2.2). The monument was erected after three years of political unrest following the murder of the journalist Norbert Zongo in 1998.[21] In an

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20   Eventually, Libya covered only part of the costs (1 billion CFA instead of 12). Still, the avenue Southbound has been baptised "Boulevard Mouammar Kadhafi" as an acknowledgement of Libya's contribution to the infrastructure.

21   Norbert Zongo was the director of the news magazine *L'Indépendent* and in 1989 one of the founding members of the Burkinabè movement for human rights. He was assassinated while investigating the mysterious murder of the driver of the President's brother: Francois Compaoré. Zongo's death triggered a strong emotional reaction in Burkina Faso and was followed by police repression of protests throughout the country.

effort to improve his image, Blaise Compaoré decided in 2001 to erect two monuments – one for the Martyrs and the other for the Heroes of the Nation – as acts of contrition. The Memorial for the Heroes of the Nation was built in two phases: the first between 2007 and 2009, and the second between 2010 and 2012. It is forty-seven meters high and supported by four pillars representing the four periods of the country's history since the precolonial period.

The axis leading from the presidential palace through the memorial to the city, of which the interchange is an important part, can therefore be interpreted as symbolizing an attempt to establish a new type of relation between the head of state and the country's population in a context of political turmoil.[22] This segment of road infrastructure represents the first (and for the moment, only) monumental piece of urban planning in the city since independence. Such monumental perspectives find their origins in Rome during the Baroque period when avenues where created to valorize its main churches. Considering the continuous influence of the former colonial metropole, it is likely that this axis in the south of Ouagadougou was inspired by the Champs Elysées.[23] This piece of urban planning can therefore be seen as a piece of European modernity that has been "indigenized," as the monument for the heroes in Ouagadougou is (of course) dedicated to figures of Burkinabè history and its architectural language uses emblematic local forms such as the calabash.[24]

In Burkina Faso, this axis, inspired by prestigious European capitals, is used as a manifesto of a nationalist modernization process. The interchange, in particular, has become one of the main icons of Ouagadougou, standing as a synecdoche of the city. It is present on numerous official documents: governmental publications and websites, touristic brochures, and in the opening images of the news program of the national television network.[25] These urban forms are more than symbolic devices though. They change the ways in which cities are practiced.

Functionally, the southern interchange facilitates access of people and goods to the city center. With the interchange, access for trucks from Ghana to the city's main road station has become easier. It is also part of a road belt

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22 Interestingly, the Boulevard is a dead end: it terminates at the portal of the President's palace, which no ordinary inhabitant of the city would dare to approach.

23 The French presidential palace is situated close to one end of the Champs Elysées, the other end being the Arc de Triomphe, which celebrates the soldier-heroes of the French nation. After the Arc de Triomphe the axis continues to the northwest (as the Avenue de la Grande Armée) to the circular Boulevard Périphérique.

24 On the concept of indigenized modernity, see Hosagrahar (2005).

25 The news program begins with images of the globe and then zooms in to the country and to the interchange (http://www.rtb.bf).

Figure 2.2 The Memorial to the Heroes of the Nation, Ouagadougou
(photograph: Jonas Haenggi).

around the city allowing for faster traffic and transport because the bumpy
and narrow streets of Ouagadougou's internal road network can thereby be
avoided. For the central government, the interchange is also a pedagogical
tool: through such new infrastructures users should learn how to take part
in a more fluid and high-speed form of urban modernity.[26] To insure fluidity,
only certain types of users are permitted on the interchange system. The plan
was initially to ban bicycles and motorcycles from using the interchange, but
ultimately only pedestrians and animal-powered carts were forbidden. Former
roadside users such as fruit vendors, cigarette vendors, and *colleurs* (literally
'gluers': mechanics mainly repairing motorcycle tires) have also been evicted
from the area, officially for security reasons.

   Users are thus filtered and selected. After (rather unsuccessful) attempts
to exclude them from the city center, informal activities are now being
excluded at its margins. Finally, those allowed to access the interchange are
actively taught how to use it: police officers are posted along the road to insure
that the infrastructure is "correctly used" and that no unwelcome activity is

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[26]   Traffic lights, another recent technology in Ouagadougou, play a similar role. They are considered
       as another instrument for the modernization of urban practices. The installation of traffic lights
       by the Commune at important crossroads is therefore ritualized via an official inauguration
       ceremony.

taking place. This was necessary since drivers often have no reading skills. In addition, a two-minute instructional video was shown on the national television channels to explain how to use this complex new infrastructure.[27] Interviews with users showed that accepting the new rules was not easy. Some tried avoiding the interchange by using alternative routes, some avoided using the bridge, some used it in the wrong direction, while others did not manage to go where they wanted – at least not during the first months after inauguration.[28]

Ouagadougou's new southern interchange is thus an operator of the city's modernization as much as it is one of its symbols. It helps to inscribe a form of modernity in daily urban practices as much as in the city's visual landscape. By importing an urban type that previously did not exist in the local urban environment, the state introduced a monumental grandeur' that the city did not possess. It also contributed to speeding up the pace of the city and to educating its inhabitants by separating slow and rapid users and by teaching them how to smoothly move through a "'modern' city."[29] The state is thus using urban infrastructures to rationalize the city and configure its users (Woolgar 1991).

Despite occasional accidents, people in Ouagadougou are progressively getting used to these new infrastructures and the forms of mobility they imply. Another transformation regarding street-use during the same years (2008–11) has been less successful. It shows, as we will now see, that different scripts and different conceptions of urban modernization contained in built forms often compete and sometimes clash.

In 2003, the city's central market, Rood Woko, was destroyed by fire. Financed by the French Development Agency and conceived under the guidance of the French planning agency, the Groupe Huit, a new central market was rebuilt and reopened in April 2009 (Figure 2.3). In July of that year, barriers ensuring that the surrounding streets remained for pedestrian use only were destroyed and police surveillance sheds were set on fire by users of the area opposing the new design of the market. They were protesting against the lack of motorized access to the market and against the interdiction against using the streets for commercial purposes. Controversies around the introduction of pedestrian areas are common throughout the world, but usually take

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[27]   See http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x5r6im_spot-echangeur_shortfilms (last accessed July 22, 2011). The video-clip, financed by the Ministry of Infrastructures, aims at facilitating the acceptance of the interchange and raising money for the other interchanges (interview, municipal official, December 1, 2009).

[28]   Interviews with users conducted between December 2009 and February 2010. At the time of writing, more than two years later, the same observations could still be made.

[29]   For an analysis of airport spaces, along similar lines, see Aaltola (2004).

place only before or shortly after the inauguration. However, in Ouagadougou it has been ongoing, with continuous acts of resistance against the new regulation and continuous negotiations between vendors and the municipality. In 2011, the merchants seized the opportunity of more general protests against the government to reintroduce traffic and parking in the area. As a result, negotiations now revolve around the introduction of one-way streets and speed bumps. In other words, the Municipality has given up the fight for a pedestrian area.

Figure 2.3 The pedestrian area around the central market (2010), Ouagadougou (photograph: Jonas Haenggi).

The pedestrian area was initially planned to be much larger, in order, as one of the architects of the project put it, "to get people used to walk[ing], even though it is not a city where it is easy to walk" (interview architect, July 5, 2012). The idea was introduced by Groupe Huit, but embraced by their local partner, who firmly believed it was a good idea:

I am shocked that there is not yet an area in Ouagadougou where one can shop, walk with one's wife and kids holding hands and where there are no obstacles. There are so many obstacles everywhere. I thought, if people taste this pleasure once, other streets would be contaminated by this approach. But I was totally wrong. (Ibid.)

This controversy indicates that there was a serious gap between the project's embedded "program of action" and many of its actual users' expectations. In this case, the importation of a design for a commercial space from France – the market surrounded by a pedestrian belt – was heavily contested. This type of design is representative of a contemporary French conception of urban modernity characterized by a concern for public space and walkability.[30] What happened around the central market of Ouagadougou can therefore be read as a clash between this version of urban modernity and another one related to functionalist planning and characterized by a priority on access, consumption, and motorized traffic (Figure 2.4). The latter version has been embraced by users of the city of Ouagadougou who make a living from informal commerce in the streets of the center. As a result, the script contained in the new market area, where a series of nonhuman barriers and human policemen were supposed to ensure that motorized traffic was banned, became the target of contestation.

Figure 2.4 The victory of motorized traffic (2012) (photograph by the author).

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[30]   The City of Lyon, Ouagadougou's main partner in urban planning over the past fifteen years, has, since the 1980s, been particularly well known for its public-space policy.

Globalizing cities in the South are cities where different planning cultures meet, where different scripts and injunctions related to different traveling urban forms clash with each other, or – to put it in other words – where different versions of urban modernization are entangled and played against each other.[31] However, traveling urban forms also provide users with new types of resources, as we will now see in the case of the importation of another urban type – the shopping mall – in the city of Hanoi.

Staging New Social Identities in Hanoi's Shopping Malls

The shopping practices of globalizing cities are transformed by the rise of living standards and the investments of retail firms eager to extend their markets to new yet unexploited areas.[32] As a result, supermarkets and shopping malls are built where they formerly did not exist, changing former ways of selling and buying. Like the interchanges in Ouagadougou, these urban types, accompanied by narratives of urban modernization, have a deep impact on everyday life.

A former French colony (like Burkina Faso), Vietnam declared its independence in 1945 and eventually defeated the French in 1954. Capital of a reunified Socialist Republic of Vietnam since 1976, one year after the victory against the USA, Hanoi had in 2011 a population of 6.3 million. The country's transition to a market economy was initiated in 1986 with the economic reforms known as *Doi Moi* (or "renovation").[33] The most important impacts of reform in the city of Hanoi have been observed since 2000, after the end of the US embargo (in 1994) and after the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.[34] These changes are to a large extent related to economic globalization and notably to foreign investments stimulated by successive measures of economic liberalization. In 2006 in particular, measures of deregulation

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[31]   On the idea of entangled modernities, see note 6.

[32]   Per capita income in Vietnam rose from $220 in 1994 to $1168 in 2010.

[33]   Vietnam ranked 113th of 169 countries on the UN's 2010 Human Development Index. Eighteen percent of the country's urban population lives in Hanoi, Vietnam's second largest city (after Ho-Chi-Minh City). Hanoi's average demographic growth rate 2000–2010 was 2.3 percent per year.

[34]   Employment in foreign firms in Hanoi increased by 350 percent between 2000 and 2007. Remittances from the Vietnamese diaspora, mainly used for consumption by parents and friends in Vietnam, went up in the same proportion during the same period of time.

led to a dramatic increase in foreign direct investments.[35] In the absence of a strong industrial base in the Vietnamese capital, these investments have primarily targeted real estate in Hanoi's central areas. The recent emergence in the city of housing high-rises and shopping malls is a direct expression of these economic changes. Like the interchanges in Ouagadougou, these urban types have been imported and indigenized[36] and they are related to discourses and strategies of urban modernization that have had a deep impact on the social life of the city. Because they are more easily accessible than private apartments, I will here focus on shopping malls and their scripts, which can be seen as both constraining and enabling.

In Hanoi, supermarkets began to appear in the 1990s and shopping malls in the early 2000s.[37] Their development is not only due to the initiatives of the retail industry but also to governmental policy as, in 2007, the municipality of Hanoi launched a large project aiming at the replacement of wet markets by shopping centers and malls (Geertman 2010). Pre-dating this policy, Big C and Vincom are among the first shopping malls in the city: the former is a lower-end mall, the latter caters for more affluent consumers. Located at an important crossroad in the rapidly growing southwestern part of the city and facing the recently built National Convention Centre, Big C (Figure 2.5) was built between 2004 and 2005.[38] It belongs to Casino, a leading European retailer with more than 9500 stores worldwide. Casino began its activity in Vietnam in 1998 and this particular Big C – designed by a Hanoi-based French architectural firm – was the first to be built in Hanoi.

Vincom (Figure 2.6) is a complex of three high-rise towers. The first two towers were completed in 2005 with investments from a Ukrainian company owned by a Vietnam-born entrepreneur and a large Vietnamese real-estate company. The third tower opened in 2009 and was developed by Vietnamese companies. Centrally located south of the French quarter, this shopping mall offers a large variety of shops and brands as well as cinemas, restaurants and game halls. Big C and Vincom not only represent new forms in the landscape

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35   In 2006, the government removed the obligation for foreigners to invest in partnership with Vietnamese companies. As a result, Foreign Direct Investments went up by 300 percent in Vietnam between 2006 and 2007.

36   Before economic reform, shophouses and wet markets were the traditional spaces for residence and shopping in Hanoi. It should be noted that these forms are also the result of former imports and local adaptations. The Asian shophouse, of which the Vietnamese one is a version, is related to the Dutch presence in the region since the late sixteenth century.

37   The first shopping mall in Hanoi, Tang Trien Plaza, was built in 2000 in a very central location.

38   Big C is more like a US shopping mall, with a large department store and a series of other smaller outlets around it, whereas Vincom is closer to the Asian model comprising a variety of different shops of approximately equal size.

Figure 2.5 Big C, Hanoi (photograph: Chu Giap).

of Vietnam's capital, but are also important mediators in the transformation of Hanoi's urban culture.

In functional terms, going to the mall implies the development of new spatial practices, especially for women. Traditionally, Hanoian women went (many still do) every day to a wet market to buy fresh food. Women shopping at Big C or Vincom buy food once or twice a week. They also tend to mix different activities in one visit to the mall: buying food, clothes, eating out, etc., and make shopping more of a family event by going with their husbands and children rather than on their own, as they did previously. In other words, changes in shopping practices imply more general changes in the spatial and social patterns of urban practices in Hanoi. Malls also change the meaning of "doing shopping" both for the shop-users and the shop-workers.

For the users we interviewed, the idea of modernity was prominent in how they described the malls and what they do there. Our respondents used qualifications belonging to a common semantic field: the malls are described as "clean," "cool," and especially "modern." It makes Hanoi, they told us, "more modern," "more beautiful," "more professional," and "more civilized." As in other emerging Asian countries, "being modern and civilized" is a common trope of state rhetoric in Vietnam. It is endlessly repeated in the political posters found in the streets of the capital. This rhetoric is also recurrent in ordinary citizens' ways of talking about urban and social change. In the case of the malls, this modernity discourse frames users' experience of them: "it makes me feel

Figure 2.6 Vincom, Hanoi (photograph: Chu Giap).

more civilized," "it makes me feel more modern," "more stylish" were the most frequent replies when we asked why people were going to these two malls.[39] They also told us that they come to "learn" what is modern and "new." See-ing lavish shops, new brands (or just "brands"), observing how others – more accustomed to such places or pretending to be so – go around doing shopping is described as part of a learning process. Shopping malls are, in other words, portrayed by the users as operators of the modernization of selves.

The emergence of this new urban type also has important implications for the other side of the commercial transaction: the shop-workers. Tradition-ally, shop-workers in Hanoi lived and worked in the same space (and many of them still do). In the shophouses of the historic center, the boundaries between public and private spaces are very fuzzy: shopkeepers often eat or take a nap in the front, or "shop area," and not in the back, or "house area" (Figure 2.7). In these traditional shops, spatial but also temporal, distinctions between work and nonwork are difficult to establish.

In the malls, the situation is quite different. Spaces and times of work and family life are clearly distinct: workers commute to the malls at fixed hours during the day. Malls also modify the interaction between customers and shop-workers: fixed prices are the rule and bargaining, increasingly seen as an archaic practice, disappears. Users of Big C for instance, express dis-trust of traditional shops: the mall offers "more comfort," they say, products have fixed prices and can be returned in case of problems. The shop-workers we interviewed said that in the malls they "learned how to behave," mention-ing that they are not allowed to sleep and eat in the shop or to talk to other shop-workers. They also said they learned to "manage money," "to know the price for good quality," and to interact with a wider spectrum of customers, including wealthy foreigners.[40] In the characteristic language of Hanoians, they told us that acquiring these new skills make them "feel more confident as individuals."

Hanoi malls, like Ouagadougou's interchanges, are therefore pedagogi-cal tools. They are places where new shopping practices are learnt. However, the malls are also places of experimentation. Users come even if they cannot afford to buy, in order to get an experience of a world which is still unknown to them. This is especially true for Vincom that offers not only shops, but a variety of different activities (cinemas, game halls, etc.). For people from rural

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[39]   Interviews with users in both places in September 2009 undertaken by Vietnamese researchers. The fact that interviewers were nationals shows that this discourse cannot simply be considered as being produced for foreigners.

[40]   Interviews with shop-workers in both malls in September 2009.

Figure 2.7 Shop and shop-keeper in Hanoi's historic center
(photograph by the author).

areas "a trip to Hanoi includes a visit to Vincom. These people come for all the services, eating, drinking, shopping, going to the movies"[41]. They tend to come once a month and stay for much longer than other users: five to six hours.[42] These users explain that such regular visits enable them to meet a diversity of people and ways of being that they otherwise are not exposed to. For instance, a twenty-two-year-old student who moved to Hanoi from a rural area told us that "Coming here helps me to see how people behave, how people think, how people act and then realize how people here live." Another respondent said that this confrontation with diversity made his life "more interesting." When respondents say that they "feel more modern and civilized" when they come to the shopping mall, it is therefore not only the result of internalized propaganda, it can also be understood literally as a sensorial experience of social change: they encounter new colors, odors, and sounds compared with those of more traditional areas in Hanoi and its surroundings. Malls are, in other words, perceived as places where new cultural capital can be gained.

Experimentation also includes trying out new social identities. In a paper on the uses of shopping malls in another globalizing city, Cairo, where this urban type appeared in the 1990s, Abaza (2001) shows how malls afford users with spaces where new gender roles and relations are tried out. What makes Cairo malls interesting, she writes, "is not shopping but rather that they are a locus and meeting place for groups of young girls" (Abaza 2001: 117) who use them for flirting or conquering the right to use public spaces without a male presence. For the groups of young people we observed and interviewed in Hanoi, Vincom and Big C provide similar affordances.[43] Playing video-games, wearing a branded T-shirt and "doing 'looking cool'" (Figure 2.8) are ways of staging themselves as urbanites and as radically different from members of their family who often work in the suburban or rural paddy fields.

These affordances have a very material and atmospheric character. The above photograph shows a place in Vincom with undefined and flexible possibilities of use. It offers space for hanging out or flirting that traditional markets rarely provide. Moreover, a large number of our respondents, regardless of age, told us that air conditioning, clean air, as well as tranquility and silence (compared to Hanoi's very busy and noisy streets) were one of the reasons they were going to the malls. Thus, the "atmospheric" quality of malls is not

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41   Interview with a shopkeeper, June 19, 2009.
42   Ibid.
43   This part is based on fifteen interviews with users, and six short interviews with shopkeepers.

Figure 2.8 Doing-looking cool in a Hanoi mall (photograph: Chu Giap).

only appreciated but supports specific (and sometimes new) social practices.[44] These young users of Hanoi shopping malls are therefore certainly internalizing new "grammar of living the city" and are, more specifically, learning how to be consumers of mass-produced goods. But they are also accessing a wider range of urban practices and identities. Put differently, if shopping malls have scripts teaching their users to act in ways that are beneficial to their owners and promoters, they are also spaces of learning, open to "interpretive flexibility" (Gieryn 2002) that thereby do more than just shaping neoliberal subjects.

In the conclusion, I try to summarize what traveling types do to urban ways of living and how we can analyze such processes critically. For that purpose, I first return to the theoretical resources I introduced in the first part of this chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the role of the mobility of urban types in social transformations taking place in cities of the global South. I have more

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44   This atmospheric dimension of places has been theorized in interesting ways by Peter Sloterdijk (2004).

specifically analyzed the introduction of road interchanges and shopping malls in the cities of Ouagadougou and Hanoi. In the first part of my text, I argued that *governmentality*, *modernization* and *script* are useful heuristic concepts for such an analysis. Together they enable the unpacking of the relation between discourse and artifacts in the practices of different types of urban actors.

In general terms, a *governmentality* perspective means looking at the organization of conduct through rationalities and technologies (Miller and Rose 2008: 15). Compared with the more narrow concepts of government or governance, governmentality ("the conduct of conduct") leads us to see that urban types and forms are technologies used by the state and private enterprise to govern society and its transformations, but also used by ordinary citizens to govern themselves. For the state and private enterprise, built forms are tools that allow configurations of new uses of the city and new subjectivities adapted to aims such as commodity consumption and the political steering of social change. The road interchanges in Ouagadougou categorize users according to the function of their transport mode and induce a speeding up of the city's everyday rhythms. Users learn how to change their practices by engaging with the infrastructure and through state-sponsored pedagogical videos and policing. Supported by the state and developed by foreign investors and companies, shopping malls train consumers and shop-workers in new forms of commercial exchange. In these new urban spaces, users get accustomed to the triggers of mass consumption: the seduction of brands and the delights of social distinction. But, as we saw with the troubles generated by the new central market of Ouagadougou, such processes of social transformation mediated by urban forms can also be resisted when they are perceived as too disruptive of former types of spatial practices.

However, to put it in the words of Osborne and Rose (1999: 740), the liberal city cannot be reduced to discipline and tactics of resistance: it is "the milieu for the regulation of a carefully modulated freedom." Modulated freedom, or what I referred to previously in this chapter as "acting with," is manifest in how many users self-consciously use shopping malls as spaces in which to encounter and experiment with ways of life or to try out new social identities. In other words, in these new urban spaces, users are shaped and governed by exterior forces, but they also use them as occasions of self-government and learning.

Although heavily criticized in recent social theory, the concept of *modernization* has helped me here to understand both the rationalities behind urban change and how this change is experienced by city users. Outside aca-

demic debates, the rhetoric of modernization, justifying change in the name of progress, remains a powerful narrative. Not surprisingly therefore, in Ouagadougou and Hanoi, modernity and modernization are ubiquitous in governmental discourses accompanying the construction of malls or road infrastructures. However, in neither city do ordinary citizens buy into that rhetoric in the way the state assumes they will. Respondents in Hanoi tend to celebrate the introduction of new building types and systematically associate urban change with positive values: beauty, civilization, modernity; whereas respondents in Ouagadougou are generally much more critical.[45] In Ouagadougou, several urban development projects have thus been contested during the past twenty years (Biehler and Le Bris 2010). The ambitious modernization of the city center, in particular, has been the target of different oppositional actions led by civil society since 1995.

Moreover, as postcolonial critiques of modernization theory have insisted, we should consider the different "geographies of modernization." These differences between the two cities also illustrate, as Africanist Ferguson (2006) has argued, that Asian and African popular attitudes towards modernization tend to be quite divergent: they are associated in the first case much more than in the second with hopes for a better future.

Finally, the notion of *script* has been used to understand the relations between "rationalities" and "technologies" (in this case, new urban types). In this perspective, interchanges and shopping malls are seen as materialized programs of action and their physical shape as tools for channeling their uses and users. The power of such scripts becomes particularly visible when developments are contested, as in the example of the barriers and police sheds built to make sure that users acted according to plan in Ouagadougou's new market area, which became the main target of protesters. In this case, protesters were contesting scripts that had traveled (from France) to Ouagadougou with a new urban type for that city: the pedestrian area. So, one of the important things traveling types do is to transport social norms from one place to another and this may create tensions as the conditions of production and acceptance of such norms vary from place to place. French uses of public space as embodied in French public-space design are not easily transferred to other parts of the world. More generally, a focus on scripts leads us to consider that globalizing

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45   The successful mobilization of Hanoi's civil society against the construction of a Disneyesque entertainment park in the large and centrally situated Thong Nhat Park in 2007 shows, however, that some sectors of the population are progressively becoming more critical and more vocal. On this controversy and more generally on issues of public space in Hanoi, see Söderström and Geertman (forthcoming).

cities are cities where different planning cultures meet and where different injunctions related to different traveling urban forms clash with each other.[46] The scripts embedded in traveling types are therefore not perfect predictors of how urban forms are used. They are resisted, as in the case of the Ouagadougou market, and open to interpretive flexibility, as we saw with the ways in which groups of young people use shopping malls in Hanoi.

In summary then, traveling types shape new uses of the city and new forms of subjectivity. In globalizing cities such as Hanoi and Ouagadougou, they are technologies which make everyday urbanism more amenable to business and economic growth. Most of the new forms related to imported types – malls, interchanges, but also high-rise office towers or the creation of heritage streets – can be seen as enacting a progressive micro-scale and business-friendly process of cultural change. A critical cultural analysis of mobile urbanism should therefore consist in detailed studies of the pedagogical programs of traveling urban types and their local consequences. However, I have insisted in this chapter on the fact that this is not enough. A careful and nuanced critical analysis of urban form change should also show how traveling types provide urbanites with new affordances and possibilities for autonomous action and self-reflection.

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[46]   With numerous international partners for different aspects of its urban development, Ouagadougou is a particularly interesting example of such phenomena. For more developments in transnational urbanism in Ouagadougou, see Söderström et al. (2012).

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Mobile Institutions of Higher Education: The Construction of New University Spaces in the United Arab Emirates, an Illustrative Case Study

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Academic Institutional Mobility and the Rise of Branch Campuses

The rapid growth in international branch campuses within the last decade is a noteworthy phenomenon within the internationalization of higher education. Over this period, many, even most, North American and European universities have sought to advance an internationalization agenda through a series of activities that include internationalizing study curricula, encouraging student and staff mobility, fostering international research collaborations, and participating in international university networks (Knight 2004; Scott 2005). Yet, the development of a branch campus as a form of *institutional mobility* that creates a transnational degree-granting presence in a foreign country represents a profound shift and controversial development within higher education. Proponents argue that international branch campuses are an ambitious but responsible institutional response to the increasingly "global" educational and research perspectives required by its graduates and faculty (e.g., Sexton 2010). Critics instead suggest branch campus developments are emblematic of the "crisis" in higher education wherein universities have become more responsive to

entrepreneurial opportunities and a corporate value structure that prioritizes global visibility at the expense of serving their traditional national public-service role (Readings 1996; Biesta 2011).

These differing perspectives can in part be understood by recognizing that definitions of what constitutes a branch campus remain slippery (Altbach 2010). McBurnie and Ziguras (2007), for instance, suggest an international branch campus is defined by a university's "bricks and mortar" presence in a foreign country with the aim of catering to a new student population, namely students from the host country or its surrounding region.[1] However, such a definition masks the existing complexity in institutional modes of operation and cooperation and the various mobilities these entail. Developing a branch campus involves a series of decisions regarding what elements of a university's educational and research offer can (or cannot) be broken down into "parts" and made mobile through travel to the overseas location. Considerations range from the corporeal travel of staff, students, and academics, the immaterial transfer of knowledge and ideas, to the physical movement of educational and research infrastructure, thereby shaping the fixity and flow of branch campus operations: Will a standard curriculum or research agenda be packaged up and reproduced, or will it be altered to reflect local cultural and political norms? Will the esteemed faculty who contribute to the reputation of a university travel to the branch campus – and if so, through temporary, repetitive or permanent movements? – or will new (local?) faculty be hired? Will the university transplant its institutional norms, governance structures, and academic traditions and freedoms when operating in a different cultural, social, or legal environment? These decisions and the resultant "moorings" and "mobilities" that they entail (Urry 2003), both literal and metaphorical, have profound implications for the form and function of the overseas campus, for the wider social space into which the campus is moving, as well as for the mission of the home institution.

The complexity of these decisions and the challenges they represent make the fact that branch campuses seem to have become the "flavor of the month or, perhaps, the decade" in higher education all the more intriguing (Altbach 2011: 7). And while there are "no reliable statistics concerning the

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[1]   Branch campuses differ from study-abroad centers that are primarily attended by home students on short-term exchange, or institutions that have been modeled on foreign education systems through state support for diplomatic or development assistance objectives. For example, the American Universities of Cairo and Beirut were developed to replicate the American-style liberal arts education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries respectively, but are independent institutions.

extent of the phenomenon" (Rumbley and Altbach 2007: 1), a recent survey by the Observatory of Borderless Higher Education suggests that the number of existing branch campuses has increased from forty-three in 2006 to 200 in 2011, with another thirty-seven expected to open over the next two years (OBHE 2012). Yet despite the speed and scale of these developments, little remains known about the process and the strategic stakes contributing to this growth. Most existing studies consist of broad surveys among university presidents stating their institutional motives (Green and Koch 2009), or tend to characterize the developments as the result of various local and global push–pull factors (Verbik and Merkley 2006; Becker 2009). The push factors are considered to be the rising need among universities from predominately developed and English-speaking countries to seek additional sources of revenue due to state disinvestment, or the desire to enhance their global prestige due to the increasingly global competition between universities in response to ranking tables. The pull factors are depicted as government initiatives introduced in East Asia and the Middle East, the most common host sites, to attract foreign universities through state-sponsored "education hubs" or lucrative education-oriented economic free zones (Olds 2007; Mok 2009; Knight 2010; Sidhu et al. 2011).

Missing from the analysis, we argue, is consideration of how the institutional mobility process is contingent on developing consensus between diverse actors with their different, potentially incompatible, interests. How is coordination achieved over what parts of a university travel and are reproduced at a new campus given the different perspectives that actors bring to branch campus developments? We argue that an approach inspired from the "science, technology, and society" studies (STS) literature and the "boundary object" conceptual framework in particular, advances critical studies of academic institutional mobility by developing a fuller understanding of the process that shapes this emerging activity. Through the boundary object framework, we examine the intentions among the actors involved and identify the articulating mechanisms that enable coordination. Such an approach provides insight into the succession of moments, decisions, and linkages that mold and form university mobilities, and also reveals the complex and uneven interconnections and interdependencies of actors involved across multiple spaces. Greater attention to the objectives and interpretations of those involved not only yields insight into how branch campus movements take shape, but also yields crucial insight into the potential precariousness of such assemblages. Given concern over the tensions and fractures that can arise in branch campus developments, a risk illustrated by the recent high-profile failed ventures of Michigan

State University in Dubai, George Mason University in Ras al'Khaimah, or New South Wales in Singapore (O'Keefe 2007; Mills 2009; 2010), this perspective offers the potential to alert us to the fragility of the consensus upon which such projects often rest.

To develop our argument, we first briefly review the "boundary object" approach. We then draw on multisited fieldwork conducted into the experience of one university, the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology of Lausanne (École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, EPFL) that is in the process of establishing a branch campus in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE, a small petroleum-rich Gulf country of 8.2 million residents (of which ninety-two percent are foreigners), now hosts thirty-seven branch campuses, or roughly one-fifth of the global total (NBS 2011; OBHE 2012). We then move to identify the key actors involved in the ongoing development of the EPFL Middle East campus, delineating the connections between the actors and describing their main objectives. Next, we discuss the key role that boundary objects serve to enable communication among these diverse social worlds to advance the branch campus project. To conclude, we reflect on the sustainability of this form of institutional mobility, suggesting that these developments reveal a concerning situation given the implications for the home institution and the faculty and students involved.

Boundary Objects and Branch Campus Developments

The notion of a boundary object was first developed within the social studies of science literature by Star and Griesemer (1989) to examine the early development of a museum at the University of California, Berkeley. Star and Griesemer sought to understand how different categories of actors – representing distinct social groups involved in the construction of the museum's collection – were able to work together despite holding different perspectives on the task at hand. To bridge the different understandings and objectives held by these communities defined by their occupational roles, ranging from university administrators to amateur field naturalists, Star and Griesemer identify the boundary object as a theoretical structure that enables communication, coordination, and interaction between social worlds without requiring complete consensus. In their words:

> [Boundary] objects may be abstract or concrete. They have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common

enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation (Star and Griesemer 1989: 393).[2]

Put alternatively, boundary objects enable social worlds to connect while maintaining the multiplicity of their viewpoints and objectives.

As an heuristic tool that enables an understanding of cooperation between different communities, the boundary object has since "achieved a degree of uptake and visibility in domains outside its traditional remit" (Woolgar et al. 2007: 307), crossing over into the history and philosophy of science, organization and management studies (Brown and Duguid 2001; Yakura 2002; Bechky 2003; Sapsed and Salter 2004), geography (Demeritt 1996; Harvey and Chrisman 1998; MacEachren 2001), ecology and wildlife management (Granjour and Mauz 2009), and policy and health studies (Kelly 2003; van Egmond and Zeiss 2010).[3] The analytical power of its approach lies in the ability to delineate the diverse actors networked or assembled in a project or phenomenon, and to identify the objects, concepts, or practices that mediate the exchanges between them. Moreover, boundary objects can take multiple forms and several may exist in any given project.[4] As such, boundary objects act as critical translational bridges in the realization of projects and developments, particularly those in complex institutional settings (Trompette and Vinck 2009). While the concept has not been previously employed by critical mobility scholars, we engage with it to map the multi-sited and novel assemblage of actors and partnerships producing institutional mobilities in the form of international branch campuses. By focusing on the interests of actors in the case of EPFL's campus in the UAE, we illustrate how

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[2]   The term "social world" is used to refer to a group that does not have a formal organization or clear boundary, but is a group of similar individuals defined by shared patterns in "social interactions" or shared activities and perspectives.

[3]   Zeiss and Groenewegen (2009) and Trompette and Vinck (2009) have both recently questioned the "successful" uptake and engagement of the concept outside its STS origins. Particularly in fields such as organization and management studies where a boundary object is often considered a concrete object that is normatively assessed for its utility, there is growing tension around the diverse uses of the term. We aspire to remain faithful to the heuristic power of the original concept with its social constructivist approach to understand communication between different social worlds, extending it to understand the emerging institutional mobilities.

[4]   In their museum case, Star and Griesemer (1989: 410–11) identified four types: repositories ("piles" of objects indexed in a standardized fashion, such as a library), ideal types (objects that that do not accurately describe any one thing; they remain abstract and fairly vague, such as a diagram), coincident boundaries (common objects with the same boundaries but different contents, including common geographic boundaries, such as the state of California), and standardized forms (devised as methods of common communication across dispersed work groups, such as standardized data collection forms).

the connections and interdependencies between the social worlds shape this form of institutional mobility.

EPFL: A Swiss university with global aspirations

EPFL's experience in developing a branch campus in the UAE is one particular case, but offers wider lessons into the growth of new cross-border university models in the region and the mobilities they entail. Many of the earliest branch campuses established in the UAE were founded on a "franchise" model, wherein the home campus's curricula was packaged up and reproduced at the host campus site in a unidirectional move. Courses tended to be taught by visiting professors from home, or more commonly, by locally hired teaching staff with minimal back-and-forth movement or exchange of resources between the home and branch campuses, with the exception of the repatriation of profits (Wilkins 2010). The vast majority of degree programs tended to be at the undergraduate level in business administration and information technology, representing programs that could be quickly set up and required little capital investment in teaching infrastructure or research equipment. Within the last five years, however, several science and engineering oriented universities involved in research at the graduate level have begun to emerge, illustrating the involvement of new actors who pursue different strategies through branch campus developments (Miller-Iriss and Hanauer 2011).[5]

EPFL's historical institutional development provides an interesting context against which to consider its branch campus pursuits. Now a prominent, midsized, research-intensive university with study programs in Engineering, Basic Sciences, Computer and Communications Sciences, Architecture, Life Sciences, and Management, EPFL began as a small engineering school in 1853 as the École Spéciale de la Suisse Française to support the industrial modernization objectives of the French-speaking community of Switzerland.[6] In 1969, EPFL assumed its current name, and joined ETH Zurich (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich) as one of the two Swiss federal institutes of technology. Together, ETHZ and EPFL serve as federally funded tech-

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[5]   Other examples include the University of Waterloo in Dubai, the Rochester Institute of Technology in Dubai, and the Masdar Institute of Science and Technology in Abu Dhabi that is being developed with assistance from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

[6]   The school later become attached as a technical engineering faculty to the University of Lausanne as the École d'ingénieurs de l'Université de Lausanne in 1869 and then the École polytechnique de l'Université de Lausanne (EPUL) in 1944.

nical universities intended to develop science and engineering education and research, as well as to advance scientific and technological developments in collaboration with industry for the country.[7] The relationship between these two institutions can be characterized as both cooperative and competitive, but with ETH Zurich long maintaining the position of the preeminent science university of the country, if not continental Europe, while EPFL is viewed somewhat as the "younger francophone sister."

More recently, EPFL has undergone considerable changes in an effort to emerge as a more prestigious and influential institution in its own right. Prioritizing research activities and graduate-level studies, it has nearly quadrupled in size over the last 30 years, disproportionately expanding enrollment at the masters, doctoral and postdoctoral levels, and bringing the total number of enrolled students to 8442 in 2011–12 (EPFL 2011b).[8] Most bachelor level students continue to be of Swiss origin, but the graduate community has been deliberately transformed to be primarily international in composition. For example, over two-thirds of incoming doctoral students conducted their previous studies outside Switzerland.[9] In parallel, EPFL has also become increasingly recognized for its work in technology transfer. During 2001–10, EPFL is credited with having submitted 399 patent applications (of which 237 patents were awarded), announced 758 inventions, launched 129 start-up companies,[10] and attracted close to 100 start-up companies to a new Science Park on the Lausanne campus (EPFL 2010). These growth dynamics, along with a push towards increased scientific publication outputs, have led the EPFL to improve its position considerably in global university rankings in recent years.[11] EPFL's endeavor to build a branch campus in the Emirate of Ras al'Khaimah must be viewed in relation to this competitive reform.

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[7] The ETH System is funded by the Swiss Federal Council through the Federal Department for Home Affairs and the State Secretary for Education and Research. Universities, by contrast, are funded largely by cantonal level authorities. In 2011–12, EPFL's operating budget was close to CHF 750 million, of which CHF 530 million comes from the state and over CHF 200 million comes from external research councils.

[8] The proportion of students at the masters, doctoral and postdoctoral levels increased from 37.5 to 49 percent of the student body during this period.

[9] The top five source countries for nonresident students are Italy, France, Germany, Iran, and the United States (EPFL 2011b: pp. 66–67).

[10] Source: http://information.epfl.ch/chiffres.

[11] For example, in 2010–11, EPFL was ranked as second in Europe (twentieth in the world) by the Shanghai Jian Tong Academic Ranking of Work Universities among "Engineering, Technology, and Computer Science" institutions, and eleventh in Europe (forty-eighth in the world) by the *Times Higher Education Supplement*. In 2011–12, EPFL was ranked first in Europe on the Leiden Crown Ranking Indicator, which is based purely on bibliometric measures, surpassing its longtime competitor ETHZ.

To investigate the process contributing to the EPFL Middle East initiative, this chapter draws on a combination of ethnographic and direct interview research methods in multiple sites. Both authors are currently based at the EPFL, one as a senior administrator and the other as a research fellow.[12] As such, in varying capacities, both have been able to assume positions of external observers to formal and informal discussions regarding the early development of the project, as well as to attend various events as members of the institutional community, such as the Swiss-Emirati Friendship Forum hosted at the EPFL in June 2011. They have also undertaken fieldwork in the UAE, and at the EPFL Middle East campus in particular, conducting interviews with relevant UAE state officials and other university branch campus administrators and academics. These sources have been supplemented with interviews within EPFL and with Swiss state officials, the reading of official institutional communiqués, internal documents (where available), media reports, and observations of internal actions. All research has taken place between August 2010 and January 2012. Through these various qualitative sources, we chart the ongoing transnational development process, identifying the motives and responsibilities of the social worlds involved, the agreed-upon institutional procedures, as well as the issues of disagreement and subsequent changes to the development plans.

Assembling EPFL Middle East: Different Social Worlds and Their Perspectives

Several key actors are involved in the (ongoing) development of the EPFL Middle East campus in Ras al'Khaimah. As EPFL is a midsized university in a small country, these actors can be easily identified and relations between different parties quickly become personal and on a first-name basis. Our interest, however, lies not in the individual personalities. Instead, we wish to engage with a "symbolic interactionism" approach that views individuals as representatives of their social world (Trompette and Vinck 2009) and the dynamic articulation of these social worlds as an illustrative case of how a midsized university grows to undertake a branch-campus expansion project. These are

[12]   Panese is currently Director of the School of Humanities (Collège des Humanitiés, CDH), as well as Associate Professor at the University of Lausanne, affiliated with the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (SSP-ISS-Labso) and the Faculty of Biology and Medicine (IUHMSP-DUMSC-CHUV). Geddie is Postdoctoral Research Fellow affiliated with the EPFL and the University of Lausanne through the MOVE Network, the Swiss Network for Mobility Studies.

the social worlds that we will review: the Swiss State Secretariat for Education and Research, the presidency of EPFL, the Ras al'Khaimah investment body, the government of Ras al'Khaimah, the presidency of the Swiss Confederation, Swiss high-technology companies, EPFL Middle East senior administration, EPFL faculty, and (future) EPFL students.[13]

We begin with the former *Swiss Federal Secretary of Education*. In office during 1997–2007, this Secretary had the political vision to advance the EPFL as an international institution during a time of considerable change for higher education in Europe. His aim was to position EPFL in a way that would best enable it to contribute to the development of a dynamic knowledge society for the French-speaking part of the country, as a counterpart to the activities of ETH Zurich for the German-speaking community. A main component of this vision was to permit EPFL to engage more easily with universities across Switzerland's borders. Partly driven by the policy discussions of the Bologna Process at the time and the construction of a European Higher Education and Research Area, the State Secretary also hoped to encourage interactions on a larger geographic scale. This involved changing regulations to give EPFL greater autonomy in its cross-border activities:

> The knowledge society has to be built here and it has to cross over the border […] EPFL must have the liberty, the conditions, and be competitively mobile to exist and interact outside Switzerland. (Personal interview, June 21, 2010)[14]

This Secretary connects directly to the *President of EPFL,* whom he was instrumental in hiring to steer these new institutional ambitions.[15] Named to the position in 1999, the chosen president has been a dynamic, influential, and occasionally controversial leader for EPFL. Born in Switzerland, and a physician and neuroscientist by training, he worked for ten years at a prominent American university prior to returning to take up EPFL's presidency. During his decade-long tenure at EPFL, the president has instituted an ambitious agenda of reforms that have significantly shaped institutional practices and expanded the activities and reputation of the university. One early example was developing a regional consortium on "Science-Vie-Societé" in 2004,

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[13] In several instances, the social worlds we review are reduced to individuals. These individuals belong to communities defined by the shared occupations and types of social interactions and represent these wider social worlds for the purpose of our analysis.

[14] Research interviews were variously conducted in English, in French, and some in a mix of English and French. Where required, the authors translate all French interview quotes to English.

[15] In contrast to Swiss universities that elect their rectors, the Swiss Federal Council nominates the presidents of the two federal institutes of technology on the EPF Council's proposal.

coordinated between EPFL and its neighbor universities, the University of Lausanne and the University of Geneva (Henchoz 2004). Initiated as part of a wider process of restructuring and regrouping disciplinary competences among the universities in the region, EPFL's taking over of the teaching responsibilities of several basic science departments such as math, physics, and chemistry from the University of Lausanne and its creation of a Faculty of Life Sciences (Faculté des Sciences de la Vie) illustrated the president's intention to expand EPFL's institutional activities well beyond its traditional engineering and architecture remit, and his willingness to challenge local institutional and political actors in the process (Leresche et al. 2012). The president also introduced a contentious American-inspired faculty tenure system that places considerable emphasis on scientific publications in highly ranked journals for career advancement (Zuppiroli 2010). These measures have been matched by a campaign of hiring internationally recognized faculty, particularly targeting midcareer Europeans employed at top American universities with an offer to return to Europe. In short, the president's objective has been no less than to make EPFL a globally recognized scientific research university, with many attesting that his particular entrepreneurial and development politics are now bearing fruit (e.g. Passer 2010).

The president's interest in branch campuses therefore forms part of his global positioning and competitive aspirations for the university. Responding particularly to his concern that the school is not well known outside Switzerland, his interest in developing an offshore presence in the Middle East is driven by a desire to make EPFL, in his words, "a global brand." By making EPFL better known in the Middle East and neighboring Asia through a branch campus, his expectation is that EPFL will develop wider international visibility. This interest in gaining more expansive geographic recognition for the university is combined with the strategy to position EPFL as a peer to globally known American universities also developing overseas campuses.[16] Aligning EPFL with these universities should, he reasons, help in his endeavor to make EPFL more visible and attractive to the top European academics working in the United States that he would like to lure back, and to attract higher quality European and Asian graduate students:

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[16]   When discussing EPFL's emerging interest in developing a transnational presence, the president recounted participating since the mid-2000s in the annual Global University Leaders Forums (GULF) held within the World Economic Forum (WEF) activities in Davos, Switzerland. Among this group described by the WEF as "25–30 heads of top global universities," the president described that "off-shoring and branch campuses was one of the main topics."

If I want to get the best brains, I need the school to be known. It has to be a brand […] So what I want is two things. How can we build a brand in Europe to get the best European students, and how can we get known in Asia? (Personal interview, June 6, 2010).

From the EPFL president in Lausanne, we link to the *CEO of the Ras al'Khaimah Investment Authority (RAKIA)*. As one of the seven UAE emirates, Ras al'Khaimah is the fourth largest and the northernmost emirate, has few oil reserves, and is not nearly as wealthy as its two powerhouse brother emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai (Heard-Bey 2005). The majority of its population of 241,000 lives in the capital coastal city, also named Ras al'Khaimah, located two hours by car east of Dubai across a mainly desert landscape. Despite its remote location and small size, it is the only emirate to have developed a substantial manufacturing base by capitalizing on the limestone deposits in the region, becoming a lead producer of construction materials, particularly through cement, steel, and glass manufacturing (OBG 2011). Yet even with steady manufacturing output and the corresponding growth in construction work from locally expanding industrial forms, Ras al'Khaimah struggles to provide a solid environment for business growth. Existing infrastructure is unstable and the region suffers from frequent power blackouts and water shortages. It is also experiencing extreme levels of unemployment among its resident UAE nationals, with some estimating that unemployment is as high as sixty percent among local Emiratis (Davidson 2011: 171). Compared to the rest of the country where Emiratis comprise an elite minority, the fact that nationals comprise close to half of the population in Ras al'Khaimah and most remain disengaged from the labor market makes the economic context even more troublesome (OBG 2011: 10).[17]

The CEO of RAKIA is tasked to manage the emirate's major investment entity with the aim of encouraging industrial diversification for economic development. This CEO links directly to Lausanne and the president as he is an alumnus of EPFL[18] – as well as founder and CEO of RAK Ceramics, the largest producer of ceramic and porcelain tiles in the world. RAKIA's interest in a branch campus, therefore, has been to have the local presence

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[17] The UAE's national income in terms of GDP (current prices, USD) is estimated to be $301,880 billion (IMF 2010), although these revenues are matched by oil-financed overseas investments and sovereign wealth funds, which combined are believed to be valued in excess of $1 trillion (Davidson 2011: 73). Abu Dhabi's ruling family controls the majority of these funds.

[18] He received his MSc in Mathematics from EPFL and a PhD in Geophysics from the University of Lausanne.

of a research-intensive university that can spur local spin-off companies and innovations for regional industrial economic development. This personal connection and EPFL's strength in science and engineering orientation – viewed particularly favorably as these fields are thought to be most likely to generate practical economic application and to boost local productivity – laid the foundations for branch campus negotiations.

Through this CEO of RAKIA, the connection can be drawn directly to the then-*Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler of RAK,* who has recently become the Crown Ruler.[19] The CEO of RAKIA is also the special advisor to the Crown Prince, and on his behalf, brokered a special deal in December 2008 between EPFL and the government of Ras al'Khaimah to create a graduate research oriented campus to develop the emirate's educational infrastructure. The terms of agreement were for the government to finance fully the joint initiative including all staffing, infrastructure and operations development costs.[20] This included the agreement to build a state-of-the-art new sustainable energy campus in the Al Hamra region with requisite technological and research equipment, as well as to fund five newly hired professors to be based in Ras al'Khaimah and five "mirror labs" in Lausanne. However, as the Crown Prince became the Crown Ruler, he assumed greater direct responsibilities in overseeing emirate-wide projects and services, and his position shifted within his social world. This shift in leadership may significantly have altered the security of EPFL's funding as the campus funds came to be in competition for other state initiatives.

When the cornerstone was laid for the Ras al'Khaimah campus in May 2009, the then-*President of the Swiss Confederation* accompanied the EPFL President for the ceremony. The Swiss President's symbolic presence underscored Switzerland's geo-economic and diplomatic interests in the UAE, and the state's strong support for the EPFL branch campus (Cherif 2009). Even now in his retirement, this former head-of-state continues to represent the Swiss government's bilateral diplomatic and commercial relation interests in the UAE by acting as the honorary co-chairman of the Emirati–Swiss Friendship Forum (ESFF) (Majalis 2011). This diplomatic agreement between Switzerland and the UAE involves Swiss and UAE Chambers of Commerce and ambassadors from both countries. The ESFF recently hosted its first meeting

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[19]   The Crown Prince became the Crown Ruler in October 2010 when his father the Sheikh passed away. The eldest son, who was removed from position of crown prince by his father in 2003, contested this succession but the UAE Federal Supreme Council supported the named Deputy Ruler.

[20]   This differs considerably from the arrangements of the institutions in RAK Education Park, which is an economic free zone, similar to the economic free zones in Dubai (see Geddie 2012). The free zone universities tend to be self-financed after initial set-up assistance.

at the EPFL campus in June 2011 with the motto "Transfer of Innovation into Society and Business." While these entities are not directly involved in EPFL's branch campus, the interests of the business community in both countries in the project is high, anticipating EPFL to serve a role of profitable "radieuse diplomatie scientifique" (radiant scientific diplomacy), as one Lausanne newspaper suggests (Mamais 2011). In particular, *Swiss high-tech companies* are interested in the UAE as a site for new technology experimentation, the testing of research innovations, and as a potential commercial market. The recent announcement that a Swiss 'cleantech' company is planning to build test houses in Ras al'Khaimah to illustrate energy-efficient building standards is one such example (Olson 2012).

To manage these ongoing institutional developments, the position of *EPFL Middle East Senior Administrator* was created. The first man hired to be dean is a Swiss chemical physicist by training. His motivation to "uproot my family to live in the middle of the desert" is largely driven by a commitment to strengthen EPFL as an institution and for individual career progression through senior administrative positions. Responsible for overseeing infrastructure, research, and teaching plans for the new campus, this is the actor that most frequently travels between the home and branch campus sites and shapes the pattern of wider mobilities flowing between them. One of his first tasks was to finalize the selection of research fields that would underpin EPFL's scientific and educational activities at the new campus. The selected fields would need to maintain the support of the Ras al'Khaimah government for perceived investment value in educational training and economic development opportunities, to attract Swiss companies to participate in an innovation park, and to generate enthusiasm from EPFL's home academic community by suggesting that EPFL was advancing an academic agenda that addressed "the most important global challenges of this century" rather than simply providing a service function to a foreign region.[21] The following fields were determined to satisfy these criteria: energy management, water resource management, transportation, sustainable architectural design, and wind engineering (EPFL 2011a).

The depiction of planned research activities and facilities as mutually beneficial to the university and the emirate has been a particularly important element for engendering support for the branch campus within the EPFL community and Swiss society. The proposed construction of a 100-meter wind tunnel (intended to be the world's longest) that is frequently cited in EPFL communications serves as one such example. Whereas common public per-

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[21]   http://www.epfl.ae/content/about-epfl-middle-east/president-message.

ception is that a wind tunnel in the desert enables the study of naturally occur-
ring desert winds, in practice a wind tunnel is a highly controlled laboratory
that produces and controls airflow to test velocity around and pressures upon
structures, irrespective of the conditions outside the construct. The location of
a wind tunnel in Ras al'Khaimah is therefore less about the physical context,
but rather reflects the emirate's wish to support research in wind energy to
develop a clean energy industrial sector (Conroy 2011b). For EPFL adminis-
trators, the wind tunnel is a valuable oopportunity to add a 'unique facility' to
its stock of research infrastructure, one that would be much more difficult and
expensive to construct in Switzerland. It is important to note that the construc-
tion of the wind tunnel and the planned campus have not yet begun, consider-
ably behind the initial planning schedule.

For *existing EPFL faculty,* a group that is crucial to the success of the
EPFL Middle East campus, enthusiasm to participate has been uneven and
tentative. A few professors are interested in being able to conduct applied
research in the UAE's desert geographies and at the proposed research facili-
ties, while remaining based at the Lausanne campus. One prominent example
is the work of an electronics lab that has invented a chip that manages varying
power supplies on a power grid (Conroy 2011a). Plans are now underway to
implement this chip for a large-scale trial in an entire village of Ras al'Khaimah
in conjunction with RAKIA's Al Hamra power plant and Electro RAK, a large
local power infrastructure firm (OBG 2011). However, the lead professor has
no current plans to visit this distant research site. The UAE is thus appreciated
as a novel testing ground to run practical application experiments and trials;
some technological expertise may be transferred to Ras al'Khaimah if this
testing goes ahead, but most of the corporeal and knowledge flows are either
minimal, or focused on bringing data back to Lausanne, thereby reinforcing
the unequal knowledge production powers of the two sites.

Some existing EPFL faculty have also become involved in flying over
to deliver two- or three-day executive education courses at the EPFL Middle
East's temporary office tower location.[22] These small fee-paying courses are
targeted at local companies or government professionals on issues such as
"e-governance" and "intelligent urban transport." While some courses were
newly developed, others were not, and they generally illustrate a one-way
flow of knowledge and technology transfer through the short, infrequent trav-
els of a small number of EPFL faculty and other professional experts.

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[22] A staff of approximately nine people work in this office, including the dean, a director of
executive education courses, as well as locally hired administrative staff.

For the *newly hired faculty*, at the time of writing, only two of the five mirror-lab professors have been hired – in architecture and wind engineering. These faculty are motivated by the potential to develop their own laboratories with state-of-the-art facilities at a relatively early career stage while retaining an institutional safeguard through EPFL affiliation. However, given the delayed construction of the new campus and research facilities, these professors face some uncertainty with their research horizons in the UAE. The other five new faculty members to be based at the Ras al'Khaimah campus have not yet been hired. It seems that there have been challenges to recruit faculty given Ras al'Khaimah's remote location, the uncertain building plans, and seeming financial difficulties.

Lastly, the greatest unknown so far has been *the students*. The original strategy was to attract an elite group of 100 MSc and PhD students from diverse origins but primarily from the Middle East and Northern Africa. Thus far, only the inaugural course for a Masters in Energy Management and Sustainability (MEMS) has been launched. Beginning in September 2011, the student applicants had academic records and represented a mix of national backgrounds that was comparable to typical EPFL Masters students. Of the twenty who were offered admission spots, most were from the Middle East and South Asia, with the remainder coming from East Asia and Eastern Europe. No students applied from the UAE itself. Based on the MEMS application data for the second cohort (for which demand has nearly tripled), these geographic mobility patterns seem similar; there is high interest among students from India, Iran, Lebanon and China, but as of yet, none from the Gulf States. While we have not interviewed participating students, we presume at this point that their interest stems from wishing to work with specific faculty members and conduct fully sponsored cutting-edge research;[23] in short, to pursue their individual education. However, as the new campus has yet to be built, the first cohort of students will only travel to Ras al'Khaimah for two eight-week-long internships, reducing considerably the time that this group will spend in the UAE.

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[23]   The Ras al'Khaimah government is providing full scholarships for all students in the first few cohorts, with the intention to secure industry sponsorships for students in following years. In contrast, regular EPFL Masters-level students usually pay nominal tuition fees of CHF 633 (US$ 678) plus CHF 16,000–22,000 (US$ 17,000–23,500) for living expenses, according to EPFL Student Affairs.

Boundary Objects: Bridging Social Worlds and Shaping Campus Mobilities

By delineating the web of connections between the multiple actors and their respective interests in EPFL's Middle East campus, we are able to make several observations. The first is the large number of social worlds involved; some hold more central and powerful positions within the network and are located across a range of spaces. But despite bringing different constraints and access to financial and political power, it is through their collective engagement that development has been possible to date. The questions that remain, however, are: How do these diverse groups establish sufficient overlap in their objectives and understandings to support and enable this initiative? And, how does the alignment of these social worlds create and shape this form of academic institutional mobility? A key component of the answer, we argue, is the role two boundary objects have served as articulating mechanisms.

The first boundary object we identify draws on what Star and Griesemer define as an "ideal type." Ideal types serve as general models; as abstractions, they abandon local or singular specificities and are adapted or *filled in* differently by the different parties. We suggest the "university" acts a critical boundary object in this way. Participants discussed EPFL as a university, but with different understandings or emphases regarding the particular activities that the university conducts and the forms of knowledge it produces. Examples from the different social world perspectives and objectives presented above described varying conceptions of the university as a creator of knowledge for a regional "knowledge society," as the producer of research to feed industrial spin-off activities, as an institution of epistemic infrastructure for national prestige, as a brand, as a tool for (scientific) diplomacy, as a node in a global network of research ideas and knowledge, and as a site to advance an academic career or pursue one's education or obtain credentials. While these perspectives are not necessarily incompatible, they also are not identical. It requires an abstract and general conception of the university to achieve sufficient overlap and enable communication and coordination among the social groups to continue moving forward with the branch campus development.

A second type of boundary object is one defined as having "coincident boundaries." Having coincident boundaries means objects share a similar border or periphery, such as a conventional borderline of a region, but have different internal forms. We propose that the "UAE" acts as a boundary object for the EPFL Middle East in this way. The constellation of actors involved in EPFL's development were each able autonomously to refer to and com-

municate about the benefits of developing a presence in the UAE, yet what the internal contents of this common regional referent meant differed for the cooperating parties.

For the presidency, the UAE represents a strategically placed country that will enable the geographical expansion of EPFL's reputation. Among professors, the UAE is conceived of primarily in terms of the desert geographies and the climatic conditions it offers, serving as a "lab in the field" when useful for specific applied testing, or in terms of the problematic technological or physical infrastructure that exists there. For Swiss companies, the UAE is an open canvas for applied research and an untapped consumer market. For state officials, the UAE represents potential state hosts for diplomatic relations that would politically and economically position Switzerland more broadly in the Middle East, and the EPFL more broadly in the world. Through interaction around the UAE as a boundary object defined by coincident boundaries, the different social groups can work towards the resolution of their different goals, while working within a similar abstract referent.

The fashioning power and flexibility of these boundary objects therefore affects the particular physical, corporeal, material and virtual forms of movement between and across Switzerland and the UAE. Through the conjunctures and connections between these worlds, our brief history of the ongoing campus development highlights how various decisions and rationales have shaped and continue to reshape this emerging form of institutional mobility: financial capital has travelled from the outset of the project in a predominately unidirectional flow from Ras al'Khaimah to Lausanne. Corporeal mobility, by contrast, has involved more back-and-forth movement in limited numbers, primarily involving many of the key senior administrators and politicians described above; some students and some faculty have also begun to move between the sites, but in smaller numbers, at irregular intervals, and for shorter periods than originally expected. The small amount of student mobility also closely resembles typical incoming EPFL student mobility patterns and has not significantly shaped movements within the Gulf region. Immaterial mobilities, such as EPFL's educational system for graduate studies and its institutional norms, including the associated governance structure and academic values, are intended to be transported, but as of yet, little movement has occurred due to the narrow scope of academic activities and the lack of a solid physical presence with facilities. The flow of knowledge through the provision of executive short courses and the few examples of company-driven technology transfers are also largely unidirectional. In short, our brief review of the campus development illustrates the mobilities between Lausanne and

Ras al'Khaimah to be currently limited and tentative, with few moorings to permit these movements to change from temporary, one-way, and insular to repetitive, back-and-forth, and integrative.

Concluding comments: Sustainability versus Fragility? Strategy versus Opportunism?

How can a boundary-object lens help us understand the rapid growth in branch campuses as a form of academic institutional mobility? As an alternative to the conventional listing of push–pull factors, we have considered how the connection of actors and objects facilitates the variable construction of this mobility. Drawing on multisited ethnographic research into the experience of one institution, we illustrate that branch campus developments are contingent on a complex convergence of social worlds with their respective and often diverging objectives. The boundary objects that serve as crucial intermediaries in enabling communication between worlds decisively give shape to the paths and patterns of material and immaterial flows in the operation of branch campuses. As the diverse forms and functions of overseas campuses and the complex mobilities they represent remain poorly understood – yet highly significant in terms of changing practices, spaces, and forms of knowledge production – we suggest that the boundary-object perspective holds much promise for further illumination of this rapidly developing phenomenon.

We have also shown that the boundary-object framework permits us not only to identify how sufficient coordination is achieved, but also to recognize that differences remain between the goals and perspectives of social worlds involved, thus creating tensions within the assemblage. As the full operation of a branch campus is contingent on this assemblage remaining intact, we wish to reflect, in conclusion, on the potential vulnerability of branch campus arrangements by pointing to Callon's (1992) theorizations on the strength of a network for the successful adoption of a new project (or technology or idea). Callon suggests that as actors become more engaged and as mediating boundary objects become more stable in an assemblage, the more resilient or "irreversible" the total network becomes. In contrast, if the assemblage is contingent upon actors with shifting or weak engagement (for example, due to a change in political leadership, as evident in this case), or are brought together through fragile or overstretched boundary objects (such as a multilayered and changing conception of what a "university" means, as we have argued), the common project may be at risk of "reversibility," meaning that it becomes vulnerable to

cancellation. The fragile nature of assemblages, such as in the case of EPFL, demonstrates that coordination can be precarious, putting into question the general sustainability of branch campus developments (Altbach 2010). While no university wishes to face the grave damage to academic reputation and financial losses that might arise in the case of failure, it is important to emphasize that the students who have invested their education in these institutions bear disproportionate personal burdens in cases of abandoned campuses.

More broadly, the precarious nature of academic institutional mobility through branch campuses points to troubling trends with respect to the internationalization of higher education. As our boundary-object analysis has shown, the university is a malleable concept, increasingly adopting entrepreneurial rationales and actions, particularly as it reaches beyond its traditional geographical roots. We have illustrated this entrepreneurial nature by considering transnational firm-like behaviors in the development of an overseas campus. This behavior includes creating a global web of branches to develop an international brand and seeking to benefit from lower locational costs to undertake new research projects, such as the reduced construction and operating costs for a wind tunnel. These sorts of actions echo and exacerbate the longstanding and widely criticized practice of engaging with overseas sites and communities to gather data that will be taken back "home," reinforcing the powerful position of the sending institution. While branch campuses and the mobilities they engender need not necessarily reinforce such unequal spatial relations, developments to date clearly indicate that there is cause for continued scrutiny.

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Citizenship in Worlds of Mobility[1]

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The citizen, I argue, is a legal, cultural, and social figure who stands at the intersection of three geographical imaginations – the imaginary of a rooted and sedentary nation with clear and unambiguous boundaries, the imaginary of a dense and heterogeneous city, and the imaginary of free mobility in an interconnected world. This triple imaginary presents us with some paradoxes in the mobile world of the twenty-first century (Cresswell 2006a). Below I chart what happens to the citizen in changing constellations of mobility. I outline the figure of the denizen and the shadow citizen in order to reveal how place and mobility are implicated in the process of making up the citizen and its others.

At the heart of what I have to say are the geographical imaginations at work in the process of making up the legal figure of the citizen. I am interested in how people are made up, to use Ian Hacking's terms, and how this process of making up is informed by forms of knowledge about things such as space, place, territory, and mobility (Hacking 1986). I start from the point of thinking about people as both fleshy human bodies in the material world and

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as figures in a representational landscape. It is possible to think of us humans as individual packages of living tissue moving though abstract space. In this sense, we can be mapped or tracked as dots on a map. However, we are never only this. We are always also figures of one kind or another. I, for instance, am any number of figures as I make my way through the world. I am, among other things a man, an academic, an employee, and a citizen. All of these are figures. Moreover, the spaces we move through are not abstract. They are always meaningful; and their meaning is constituted within particular arrangements of power, some of which are inscribed through legal definitions (Blomley et al. 2001; Delaney 2001).

Spaces are continuously interpreted as we enact them. We read them and act in them and by acting we reconstitute them as particular kinds of social space (Cresswell, 1996). In Bourdieu's terms they form part of our extended "habitus" (Bourdieu, 1990). What, then, are we interpreting as we enact space? At one level, we are interpreting commonsense by not walking in the middle of a busy street or avoiding neighborhoods where we may not be welcome. At another – more formal – level, we are interpreting law when we are enacting space.

One way in which spaces can be performed is as a citizen. As I move through the world, I do so both as an experiencing being-in-the-world and as a citizen in a legal landscape. A citizen (in the twenty-first century) is conventionally defined as a member of a nation-state who carries with him or her a bundle of rights and is expected to fulfill particular obligations. But defining the citizen in this way is to get ahead of ourselves as this chapter is an investigation of *how* the citizen came to be so defined and an exploration of alternative forms of citizenship that lay, in part, outside of political/legal discourse. The figure of the citizen emerged from "citizen spaces" (such as the city, public space, and the nation-state) and continues to inhabit worlds that are inscribed with forms of citizenship. These are in a constant state of becoming as notions of citizenship morph and alter. The citizen is a figure who sits at the intersection of a view of the world that roots people in particular, clearly specified, places (citizens are citizens *of* somewhere) and a view of the world that insists on the central role of geographical mobility (citizens have the right to travel within and across borders) (Cresswell 2006a; Malkki 1992). This positioning of the citizen as both rooted and routed presents us with some interesting problems in the mobile world of the twenty-first century – problems to which I will return towards the end of this chapter. Any consideration of the citizen figure now, however, necessitates a trawl through the history of the citizen figure and the citizen spaces associated with this figure.

Citizenship, the City, and the Nation-State

The citizen as a figure emerged alongside and as part of a new form of society in new kinds of space. The first of these was the city space of the Greek polis.

> The polis was a complex hierarchical society built around the notion of citizenship. It was made up of hundreds or even thousands of independent peasant households, which neither paid impersonal dues to a centralised government, nor depended on the state for the means of life. […] The equation of the polis with the whole citizen body, even if governmental functions were often reserved to a smaller group, marks it off from other ancient states. All citizens had a share in the polis, which in its most developed form was based economically on the institution of chattel slavery. If the citizens became subjects, their community ceased to be a polis. (Morris 1991: 26–27)

The emergence of the polis in Athens, Sparta, and Thebes went hand in hand with a notion of the citizen – a legal figure who carried rights and had obligations. The citizen, famously, was male and a resident of the polis. There were residency requirements that made it impossible to become a citizen as an immigrant. Citizenship was a product of birth. Women, children, and slaves could not be formal citizens. In Aristotle's terms, the polis was a natural phenomenon and men as citizens were naturally city-dwellers who belonged to the polis. There is a tight connection between a clearly bounded territorial city-state and the figure of the citizen – a connection that appears as natural. Citizenship was undergirded by a notion of attachment and fixity in time and space. It came with the rootedness of birthrights. So here, at the point where the citizen came into being, being a citizen went hand in hand with the space of the polis. The polis, in other words, was a space of citizenship.

The other city space associated with the genealogy of citizenship is the medieval occidental city. In the medieval city, particular kinds of "urban law" emerged and were enforced by the burghers. These laws gave certain new freedoms to a citizen class that made them distinct from the mass of peasants living under conditions of feudalism (Berman 1983; Sassen 2008). Urban law varied from town to town but was essentially secular. The point of the law was to promote peace and justice. The law allowed the development of a nascent mercantile class as well as a new notion of the citizen. Under urban law, citizens were protected from arbitrary arrest and they had certain rights including the right to have a say in the constitution of urban government. Importantly for the rise of capitalism, urban law also assured the possibility of

property ownership and exchange by a wider class of people than had previously been possible.

The link between the rise of urban law in the occidental medieval city and the formation of the citizen is most famously made by Max Weber (Weber 1960). He argued that while pre-urban societies were characterized by tribalism, the new urbanism of European cities encouraged new forms of association and the status of the town-dweller as a citizen. In the occidental medieval city, Weber argued, there emerged the notion that "the city air makes man free" and an urban citizenry could develop that was free from the obligation of feudal bonds. The freedom of the citizen distinguished the occidental city. Serfs could escape the bonds of lordly rule and avoid military service by moving to the city and becoming part of a municipal corporation that was legally autonomous (Berman 1983; Weber 1960). In what Engin Isin has identified as an orientalist move, Weber argued that in the oriental city the individual maintained their tribal identity and failed to develop a properly urban form of association, and thus citizenship did not arise (Isin 2002). The possibility of owning and exchanging property was central to Weber's definition of the citizen in the medieval city. The citizen was, as several commentators have observed, economic in character (Barbalet 2010; Marshall 1973). This economic aspect of the citizen however, also included an imaginary of a new kind of association with the world described as property. Property is both a legal concept and a cultural signifier of attachment and sedentarism (Blomley 1994). While in the polis the citizen is a citizen by birth, in the occidental medieval city it became possible to become a citizen by moving to the city and through the acquisition of property. This was not possible for everyone, however. Jews, for instance, were often located in ghettos such as those in Venice and Florence and were not given citizenship rights until well into the nineteenth century.

By the end of the nineteenth century, citizenship was most commonly associated with the nation-state. Over the last 300 years or so, we have seen nation-states replace city-states as the major spatial units of citizen-identity. Legally we are still defined as citizens of nation-states. The strength of this association has been succinctly put by James Holston and Arjun Appadurai:

> Since the eighteenth century, one of the defining marks of modernity has been the use of two linked concepts of association – citizenship and nationality – to establish the meaning of full membership in society. Citizenship rather than subjectship or kinship or cultship has defined the prerogatives and encumbrances of that membership, and the nation-state rather than the neighbourhood of the city or the region established

its scope. What it means to be a member of society in many areas of the world came to be understood, to a significant degree, in terms of what it means to be a rights bearing citizen of a territorial nation-state. (Holston and Appadurai 1999)

Part of the process of nation building was to enact this transformation from local forms of citizen identity to national ones – from a citizenship of cities to the national forms of citizenship we take for granted today.

Towards the end of the twentieth century, however, we have seen a return to the city as site of citizenship as the nation-state has arguably diminished in its importance (Sassen 2009). New spaces of citizenship include the global, the local, and the spaces of flow that connect them. The global, the local, and spaces of flow come together, perhaps more than anywhere else, in the global city, where the very identities previously subsumed by the nation-state – race, ethnicity, class, religion, etc. – come once again to the fore (Sassen 2001):

But with their concentrations of the nonlocal, the strange, the mixed, and the public, cities engage most palpably the tumult of citizenship. Their crowds catalyze processes which decisively expand and erode the rules, meanings, and practices of citizenship. Their streets conflate identities of territory and contract with those of race, religion, class, culture, and gender to produce the reactive ingredients of both progressive and reactionary political movements. Like nothing else, the modern urban public signifies both the defamiliarizing enormity of national citizenship and the exhilaration of its liberties. (Holston and Appadurai 1998)

Holston and Appadurai have noted how notions of national citizenship have frequently been rooted in some notion of the rural, with the city seen as a strange and threatening hybrid monster where the purity of identity could never be maintained, partly because of its associated high levels of mobility. They also note how cities now often appear to be cut off from their national context, and it is easier to make sense of cities as part of a wider network of the globally urban. It can certainly be argued that London is part of a culture and economy that is separate from the rest of the United Kingdom. Similar arguments could be made about New York, Paris, or Zurich. One argument, therefore, is that the city (reconfigured for the twenty-first century and vastly more mobile) is once again becoming an important site for the production of the citizen (Holston 1999a; Sassen 2009).

Mobility and Citizenship

As we have seen, the main spaces in the history of the production of the citizen have been the city and the nation-state. Citizenship is often thought of as a particular kind of relationship between the figure of the citizen and these kinds of representational spaces.

There is, however, another geographical imagination at work in the production of the citizen and that is mobility. My main argument here is that the capacity to move is central to what it is to be a citizen and, at the same time, the citizen has to be protected from others who move differently – the vagabond or the "alien." Mobility does its work as both self and other (Cresswell 2006b; Honig 2001).

It is tempting to think of this construction of the citizen as a mobile figure as a relatively new one – a symptom of an increasingly mobile world. To be a citizen is to be able to move both within a particular space and across its borders. In the centuries between the Greek polis and the rise of urban law in the medieval city, the figure of the citizen hardly existed. In the world of feudal Europe, few had the ability to move more than a few miles from their place of residence and work. Peasants and serfs belonged, legally, to both the lords and the land (Dodgshon 1987). The mechanization of agriculture led to laborers being freed from the land and the emergence of a new class of wanderers – the vagrants and vagabonds – masterless men who threatened to undo the local, place-based, geography of order that had made life legible (Beier 1985; Groebner 2007). There had always been some mobile people – crusaders, religious wanderers, and minstrels among them. These outsiders had always been met with suspicion. Minstrels and troubadours, for instance, were thought of as thieving lechers in the medieval period (Southworth 1989). Similarly, there had always been poor, homeless people who had been dealt with through local charity.

The vagabonds, however, presented a new problem. Arriving in ever-larger numbers from the fifteenth century onwards they were not easily locatable (it was not easy to say where they "belonged" or where they were "from"). They needed to be made legible through the nationalization of the definition of legitimate mobility (Cresswell 2011). The almshouse, the passport, the poor laws and even the creation of the nation-state (the new home of the citizen) were all parts of a concerted process to understand, regulate and discipline this new mobility (Torpey 2000). Part of this legibility process was the development of new notions of identity. This has been outlined by Groebner in his book *Who Are You?*, where he charts how the very notion of identity in a

modern sense was invented in fifteenth-century Berne, Switzerland, where the supposed threat of the new mobile people led to the poor being issued identity documents to prove they were worthy of alms (Groebner 2007). If you had this document you possessed a form of identification that suggested you were worthy of alms. If you had no papers then you did not. Mobility was central here as it was only the mobile strangers arriving in ever-larger numbers that provoked the need to be certain who someone was. The emergence of a class of wandering poor went hand in hand with the emergence of the merchant as a figure at the heart of new forms of trade over long distances. The mercantile class depended on new forms of legitimate mobility and circulation (Simmel 1950). Our notions of belonging and citizenship changed as the scale of authority over correct and incorrect mobility moved from the city to the new nation-state.

Zygmunt Bauman gives vagabonds starring roles in the historical transformation from feudalism to capitalism, calling them "the advanced troops or guerilla units of post-traditional chaos" (Bauman 1995: 94). There were, however, a number of other "mobile subjects" who arose with this new *constellation of mobility* (Cresswell 2010). In his book *Mad Travellers*, for instance, Ian Hacking charts the diagnosis of "fugue" – a disorder marked by aimless wandering and loss of memory that was commonly diagnosed in nineteenth-century France and that was connected to the simultaneous prominence of vagrancy and tourism in the national imagination (Hacking 1998). The new figure of the national citizen arose alongside marginalized and excluded wanderers who often acted as the citizen's constitutive other. These mobile subjects formed part of an assemblage of regulations, forms of surveillance and material and imaginative geographies that, according to Bauman, arose with the nation-state as a response to new forms of mobility (Bauman 1987). The rise of the citizen accompanied the rise of the nation and the simultaneous emergence of a new constellation of mobility in early modern Europe.

Recent discussions of citizenship and the rights that the citizen bears note that citizens (and rights) are universal abstractions whose universality is belied by the fact that they rely on the simultaneous production of the noncitizen (Isin 2002). In the work of Engin Isin, in particular, we see how the noncitizen is a necessary part of any understanding of citizenship (Isin 2002). Citizenship and rights are based on particular arrangements and imaginations of space associated with liberal democracies under capitalism. The division of public and private, for instance, forms the bedrock for notions of things such as "citizen" and "alien." The figure of the citizen inhabits a particular concrete and imaginative geography. This is a point made well by Lisa Lowe:

Insofar as the legal definition and political concept of the citizen enfranchises the subject who inhabits the national public sphere, the concept of the abstract citizen – each formally equivalent, one to the other – is defined by the negation of the material conditions of work and the inequalities of the property system. In the United States, not only class but also historically sedimented particularities of race, national origin, locality and embodiment remain largely invisible within the political sphere. In this sense, the legal and political forms of the nation have required a national culture in the integration of the differentiated people and social spaces that make up "America," a national culture, broadly cast yet singularly engaging, that can inspire diverse individuals to identify with the national project. (Lowe 1996: 2)

Much of the critical discussion of citizenship arises from considerations of immigration and the immigrant. The immigrant provides an excluded other who, by their exclusion, confirms the value of the citizen (Honig 2001). The immigrant is often seen as someone who tries to be a citizen and in so doing confirms the idea that the citizen identity is valued. Bonnie Honig has argued that the mobility of the immigrant both valorizes and threatens citizenship. The citizen evokes the absence of the noncitizen (in order to make the citizen make sense). The mobility of citizen (wanted mobility) is constructed in relation to mobilities that are other (unwanted mobilities).

Historically, the emergence of the citizen as a national figure was twinned with the emergence of the vagrant, the tourist, and a host of other mobile subjects. In the twenty-first century, the citizen continues to be twinned with threatening others. As the nation-state became cemented, the control and regulation of mobility was increasingly conducted at national level (Torpey 2000). By the end of the twentieth century, the threatening other was less likely to be the vagrant and more likely to be the alien or immigrant – labels that refer to mobilities that cross the borders of nation-states. Behind both of these lay geographical imaginations of the relations between place and mobility, between fixity and flow.

In what follows I move away from the historical constitution of the citizen and consider groups of people who call the national citizen into question. The first are "denizens" – people who are not legal citizens but are residents – and the second are those who are legal citizens but remain culturally different and rarely receive the benefits of being a citizen.

The Denizen: A Paradoxical Geographical Subject

It should be clear by now that the figure of the "citizen" depends on a paradoxical geographical imagination. On the one hand, it refers to a form of legal belonging to a particular place – the nation-state (or, earlier, the city). It defines a relation between the individual and the space of the nation-state that brings with it certain rights which are defined within that space. In a Western liberal democracy these includes the right to assemble, to speak, and to vote. They usually also include the right to free movement. This is where the paradox emerges. As well as defining a form of sedentarist identity based on a mapping on to a fixed place, the citizen is also defined by his or her mobility – the right and ability to move both within national space and across national borders (a citizen is entitled to a passport and the protection of host nation-states while moving). Such a notion of the citizen has been confirmed in a number of ways. In American legal history, for instance, there have been a number of cases in which the Supreme Court has stated that impediments to mobility between states are unconstitutional as they restrict the unwritten rights of citizens. As early as 1865, Crandall, an operator of stage coaches into and out of Nevada, was arrested for refusing to pay a $1 tax imposed by the State Government on all passengers leaving the state on public transport. The case eventually found its way to the United States Supreme Court where it was overturned as the Supreme Court majority opinion stated that the passengers on Crandall's coaches were citizens of the United States and, as citizens, they might need to travel through the country in order to discharge their obligations as citizens – such as to participate in active service during times of war. To be a citizen, they argued, you need to be mobile. This case was reaffirmed in a number of cases up to the present day (Cresswell 2006b).

The link between citizenship and mobility has also been repeatedly underlined within the space of the European Union in which there has been a concerted attempt to produce a new transnational European citizen through, primarily, the production of free mobility within EU space (Balibar 2004). The right to move freely in Europe has gradually expanded from things such as coal and iron to workers and economic capital. More recently, it has expanded to the new notion of the European "citizen" including students and retirees. The founding documents of the EU have repeatedly put the right to mobility up front in lists of rights in order to create the notion of citizenship that transcends the nation (Verstraete 2009). Once again the space of citizenship is on the move as the nation-state ceded the monopoly on the control of mobility to supranational forms of authority.

The coming together of these geographical imaginations of fixity (belonging) and flow can also be seen in the figure of the "denizen." Denizens have been defined as those "who are foreign citizens with a legal and permanent resident status" (Hammar 1990: 15). This definition immediately highlights geographies of mobility (the denizen is from elsewhere – foreign) and the geographies of place (the denizen lives here – is a resident). The denizen has deep roots in history but rather shallow roots in law, being a category used in (English) common law. The word denizen is often used in colloquial English to refer to people who appear to be deeply associated with a particular place. If we talk of the "denizens of the lower east side" or the "denizens of the 100 club," we are referring to people who habituate these places, who are connected to place through regular everyday practice. Generally, the kind of place referred to in such statements is not a nation-state but something more local, even a particular building or public square, for instance.

In legal terms, denizenship can be seen as a pathway to full citizenship if an immigrant desires eventual naturalization. In this sense, a denizen is an inferior kind of legal subject who has the right to be in a place and some other rights such as free speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to move depending on the will of the nation-state, but not the right to vote in national elections. (Some denizens in countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands do have the right to vote in local elections – as do Irish citizens in United Kingdom national elections.) Generally denizens are granted civil rights but denied the right to participate in their own governance (Castles and Davidson 2000). Hammar outlines three "gateways" to becoming a citizen: the right to enter and stay for a brief period, the right to permanent residence, and finally the process of naturalization. A denizen has not passed through the last of these gateways. In this sense, the denizen is an imperfect citizen who pays taxes, works legally, sends children to school, contributes to the life of a place, but cannot vote. They represent a halfway point between the category "alien" and the category "citizen."

Not only transformations from national to supranational space have an impact on the citizen figure. There are also transformations in the microspaces of the city and particularly "public space." Public space, following Hannah Arendt, is the space in which citizens, as bearers of a bundle of rights, enact their citizenship (Arendt [1958] 1998). The nature of public space is changing in the contemporary city with seemingly public (open and accessible) space being increasingly privately owned, policed, and regulated. Cities in the "West" are being divided into "capsules" and "fragments," including security enclaves such as gated communities or shopping malls (Davis 1992; Graham and Marvin 2001; Minton 2009).

If citizenship, as Arendt has claimed, is performed in public space then the transformation of space that is truly public surely means the demise of a certain kind of citizen. For the privileged few all kinds of new spaces have opened up where it has become possible to be member through private contract. Others, meanwhile, are excluded from these spaces (gyms, gated communities, country clubs, exclusive shops, etc.) due to poverty, race, or some other identifiable characteristic (Christopherson 1994).

In addition to a world of enclaves, many city-dwellers now live in a world of "splintered urbanism." In many cities mobility opportunities are being reconfigured through the development of infrastructures of mobility (fast lanes, express services, and closure of public transport) and communication that separate and regulate mobilities in new ways (Adey 2004; Graham and Marvin 2001). How we move though space is increasingly monitored and segregated, subjected to integrated surveillance and security systems which allow the smooth passage of the "kinetic elite" between important nodes in the "network society" (Castells 1996). As these mobility opportunities are enabled, parts of the city are progressively cut off from these urban "tunnels." A train travelling from airport to city center, such as the "Heathrow Express," will often bypass swathes of the inner city without allowing access. The kinetic elite inhabit these infrastructural spaces, such as when they stay in well-known hotel chains when visiting, or live in secure and isolated enclaves in the city when at home. This is a point made by Manuel Castells:

> Thus there is the construction of a (relatively) secluded space across the world along the connecting lines of the space of flows: international hotels whose decoration, from the design of the room to the colors of the towels, is similar all over the world to create a sense of familiarity with the inner world, while inducing abstraction from the surrounding world; airports' VIP lounges, designed to maintain the distance vis-à-vis society in the highways of the space of flows; mobile, personal, on-line access to telecommunications networks, so that the traveller is never lost; and a system of travel arrangements, secretarial services, and reciprocal hosting that maintains a close circle of the corporate elite together through the worshipping of similar rites in all countries. (Castells 1996: 417)

Lieven de Cauter has labeled this kind of kinetic urbanity a "capsular civilization" (de Cauter, 2004). People, he argues, live in capsules which separate and protect them from an outside they perceive as hostile. Marc Schuilenburg describes such a landscape:

Everything is organized in capsules of isolated entities. This landscape
is articulated, in terms of architecture, as a series of heavily protected
and isolated spaces: shopping malls, special urban design districts,
gated communities, Community Improvement Districts (CIDs), amuse-
ment parks, cultural zones, historic districts, and Business Improvement
Districts (BIDs). To allow the spatial and social segregation to function,
they are armed with an architecture that is subject to permanent super-
vision. (Schuilenburg 2008: 360)

While this perspective possibly overemphasizes life in the American
city, it is nonetheless an increasingly true description of a large number of
cities around the world. This is particularly the case in global cities – the very
spaces in which citizenship, according to Sassen, Appadurai and others, is
being reconfigured. The inhabitants of these capsules and enclaves might be
described as denizens (Schuilenburg 2008; Shearing and Wood 2003). They
are denizens in the sense that they inhabit local worlds in which privatized
sets of regulations and privileges become more salient than those offered by
national citizenship. Inhabitants of these worlds may well be "alien" members
of the kinetic elite, but their alien status is no longer the most relevant status.

We have a multitude of memberships and affiliations, each with its own
kind of governance. This demands at least a partial rethinking of citizenship.
We live our lives across a number of spaces as we move through the splin-
tered city. We attend a gym that we are a member of, we enter and leave
gated communities policed by private security, and we pay for access to busi-
ness lounges in airports. We belong to many groups that rarely intersect. We
are governed in all kinds of ways. It may be the case that our identity as a
national citizen is increasingly less likely to be most important one (Shearing
and Wood 2003: 406).

The question is whether it is possible to stretch the definition of citizen-
ship (rooted in the nation-state and its associated geographical imaginations)
to account for these new forms of regulations (and their associated geographi-
cal imaginations) or to abandon it in favor of other terms such as "denizen."
We (that is inhabitants of Western liberal democracies) all have multiple deni-
zenships that are determined by the kinds of regulatory domains we inhabit.
When we are in the gym, we are a denizen of the gym regulated by the rules
of that private space. On a more permanent basis, when we live in a gated
community, we are an extremely well-regulated denizen of that small area of
the city. This kind of denizen is no longer an imperfect, not-quite, citizen, but
a privileged member of a particular group and its associated spaces. There is

nothing particularly progressive about such a status and in many cases it can be extremely reactionary.

However, there may be a more progressive potential in the category and concept of denizenship. Rather than being seen as a legal category that resides between alien and citizen, or, on the other hand, as a denotation of privileged membership, we might think of it in an affirmative way. It is easy to imagine a case in which an individual (whether immigrant or not) wants to be located in a particular place (an example of Harvey's "militant particularism" perhaps (Harvey, 1996)) but does not want to identify with the space of the nation-state. This might be true, for instance, of particular immigrant, political or religious groups.

There is a history of case law arguing that the status of denizen carries some rights of a citizen character. In 1892, Fong Yue Ting, a resident of New York State, was arrested for not being in possession of an identity document. He had lived in the state since 1879 and had entered legally. In the meantime, however, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act had been passed followed by the 1892 Geary Act, which made it unlawful for a Chinese laborer to enter or live in the United States and demanded that all Chinese citizens carry an identity document on them. Fong Yue Ting had never applied for such a document. He was arrested and scheduled for deportation. He was an alien and not a citizen. Fong Yue Ting's attorneys made the argument that while he was not a citizen, his long-term residence made him something other than an alien – a denizen. The defense was unsuccessful but it did prompt a spirited dissenting opinion from Justice Brewer. Brewer agreed with the "denizen" defense and force-fully argued that Fong Yue Ting's residence meant that he was not merely a "traveler." He noted how "there are 100,000 and more of these persons living in this country, making their homes here, and striving by their labor to earn a livelihood. They are not travelers, but resident aliens."[2] Brewer noted that Ting was a long-term resident with connections to the community. He argued that "there is force in the contention of counsel for appellants that these persons are 'denizens,' within the true meaning and spirit of that word as used in the common law." He cited English legal history in which "A denizen is in a kind of middle state between an alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them."

Although the "denizen defense" failed in this instance, it does point to the progressive potential of a subject position that is not identified with the space of the nation-state. In addition to the reactionary forms of membership

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2   Fong Yeu Ting v. United States 149 U.S. 698 (1893), 734.

in privileged urban enclaves that constitute one form of denizenship, there is at least some possibility of a more familiar form of belonging in place that has the capacity to carry some legal force. It breaks the stranglehold of the either/ or nature of the citizen/alien binary.

Shadow/Barely/Insurgent Citizens

While it is possible to imagine people who are not citizens but are denizens of privileged enclaves of the city, it is also clear that there are many people who are legally citizens but do not benefit from many of the rights associated with that status. Citizen as a legal identity and citizenship as lived are often at odds. Homeless people, nonwhite people (in many majority white nations), travelers, gay people, lesbians and bisexuals, disabled people, and many others are frequently treated in ways that make citizenship a dubious notion. Engin Isin has noted how the citizen figure is produced through a logic of othering rather than a logic of exclusion:

> The logic of exclusion assumes that the categories of strangers and outsiders, such as women, slaves, peasants, metics, immigrants, refugees, and clients, preexisted citizenship and that, once defined, it excluded them. (Isin 2002: 3)

The logic of othering, on the other hand, suggests that the citizen and its others came into being as part of the same logic, simultaneously. Thus "slaves were not simply excluded from citizenship but made citizenship possible by their very formulation" (Isin 2002: 4). Even within the logic of othering there is a binary of citizen and other. In the citizenship literature a number of other figures have been formulated to interrupt the either/or logic of citizen/alien. "Shadow citizens," "barely citizens," and "insurgent citizens" are all ways of describing people who are legally citizens but are not treated as such – they all focus our attention on notions of spatial justice (Soja 2010).

Critical geographers have subjected the abstractions of citizenship and rights to a number of critiques (Blomley and Pratt 2001; Bullen and Whitehead 2005; Chouinard 2001; Desforges et al. 2005; Kobayashi and Ray 2000; Painter and Philo 1995; Peake and Ray 2001). The observation that the seemingly universal figure of the citizen operates within particular spaces links these different critiques. Critical geographers argue that we need to take into account the uneven distribution of citizenship rights as they are lived in situ, paying attention to how the spatiality of social life places some individuals

"at the margins of visibility for justice" (Peake and Ray 2001: 184). In addition to this are the realities of the material production of different mobilities (Cresswell 2001; 2010). The entanglement of citizenship and rights naturalizes mobility as the property of individual, moving, able-bodied citizens. The idea of a freedom to move, for instance, assumes a certain kind of normal body with access to the resources to do so. These assumptions produce "shadow citizens" such as the mobility-impaired, disabled person. Vera Chouinard has outlined the spaces of shadow citizenship where the "law as discursively represented and law as lived are fundamentally at odds" (Chouinard 2001: 165). Disabled people frequently inhabit these spaces. While disabled people are symbolically central to an imagined geography of rights and citizenship that is blind to geography (in Canada), Chouinard argues, they are frequently marginalized by the blindness of rights discourse to the spatiality of disability. Indeed, the geographical imagination that informs notions of citizenship and rights – one that includes able-bodied, locomoting bodies – actively marginalized those who move differently. A citizen is (culturally, if not legally) in possession of a mobile body that fits into norms of fitness, health and independence from the world around it. Assumptions about the body's capacity to move are rooted in a universal disembodied subject-citizen.

Disabled people are not the only shadow citizens who experience disruptions in the mobility–citizenship–rights nexus. Race is often a key factor. Black people in major cities across the West are far more likely to be stopped by police due to racial profiling and the mythical crime of "driving while black" (Harris 1997). In post-9/11 London, people of middle-eastern appearance are increasingly stopped by the police on suspicion of activities associated with terrorism. Racial profiling also appears to take place in airports in Western nations where nonwhite people are frequently stopped and searched at customs or before boarding a flight.

The shadow citizen is not just an inhabitant of the first world. A similar process can be seen in the emergence of what James Holston has called "insurgent citizenship" in the context of the Brazilian city. Holston's work suggests that the citizen is far from a universal figure but rather a series of specific ones that are enacted in everyday life in ways that reinforce, rather than undercut, difference. He speaks of the "barely citizens" who inhabit the peripheries of the Brazilian city demanding such necessities as plumbing and daycare – these people, he argues, are constructing new cities and new notions of insurgent citizenship at the same time.

These insurgent forms are found both in organized grassroots mobilizations and in everyday practices that, in different ways, empower,

parody, derail, or subvert state agendas. They are found, in other words, in struggles over what it means to be a member of the modern state – which is why I refer to them with the term *citizenship*. Membership in the state has never been a static identity, given the dynamics of global migrations and national ambitions. Citizenship changes as new members emerge to advance their claims, expanding its realm, and as new forms of segregation and violence counter these advances, eroding it. The sites of insurgent citizenship are found at the intersection of these processes of expansion and erosion.

These sites vary with time and place. Today, in many cities, they include the realm of the homeless, networks of migration, neighbourhoods of Queer Nation, autoconstructed peripheries in which the poor build their own homes in precarious material and legal conditions, ganglands, fortified condominiums, employee-owned factories, squatter settlements, suburban labor camps, sweatshops, and the zones of the so-called new racism. (Holston 1999b: 167)

While the categories of denizen, shadow citizen and insurgent citizen overlap, there is more of a sense of agency in the world-making activities of the insurgent citizen. In the majority of cases, the shadow citizens and the insurgent citizens may be legal citizens but the inhabitation of this category and the rights that come with it is mostly meaningless in everyday life. Shadow citizens and insurgent citizens are actively produced by the same spatial arrangements that produce the privileged denizens of the city's secure enclaves. The shadow citizen is neither citizen nor alien in their ideal forms. The shadow citizen inhabits a world which is neither the polis of the citizen nor its excluded other. Their legal status of citizen makes little difference and seems ineffectual in the face of the possibilities open to the denizens of the gated communities and elite spaces of flow. They are a product of an uneven material geography of power.

Conclusion

What do emerging constellations of mobility mean for the twenty-first-century citizen? There is a considerable body of work on the rise of the global city and the decline of the nation-state and new forms of citizenship (Holston 2008; Sassen 2008; 2009). Similarly there is work that focuses on more local forms of cultural and ecological citizenship (Bullen and Whitehead 2005; Desforges

et al. 2005; Painter and Philo 1995). In each case, the focus is on the nature of the citizen in relation to particular spatial formations. Little work has focused on the necessary mobilities of the citizen and the ways in which they are being reconfigured. In this chapter, I have traced the role of mobility both as a positive aspect of citizenship and as an alien threat to citizen identity through a number of historical constellations of mobility.

Paying attention to the geographies of citizenship means a lot more than noting the changing nature of the nation-state and the city. While it is true that the modern citizen figure is rooted in the constitution of the nation-state as a space, this is not the only changing space that the citizen inhabits. I have explored a number of geographies that form part of the way in which the citizen is made up. These include, in addition to the nation-state, the changing geographies of mobility, the local geographies of place, and the splintering of public space in the city. All of these are part of the production of splintered citizenship in the modern world. The kinetic elite, denizens and shadow citizens all illuminate aspects of the new geographies of citizenship and rights in the liberal democratic nation-state.

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Chapter 5

The Perplexities of Mobility

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It is almost impossible, even now, to describe what actually happened in the United States on September 11, 2001, enshrouded as those events are in virtually instantaneous, mass-mediated mythmaking. That mythmaking served as the pretext for a new global state of exception, which was unabashed in its exorbitant recourse to "preemptive" war and the "preventative" detention of suspected enemies (De Genova 2007). The days before and the days after the events associated with that extravagantly fetishized date are separated not like the end of an old and the beginning of a new period, but like the day before and the day after an explosion. Yet, this figure of speech is as inaccurate as are all others: first, because these events took shape around actual explosions (they were not merely metaphorical); second, because those events were nevertheless not reducible to their overt form as explosions (mere acts of bombing); third, because treating those events like some sort of rupture in historical time is precisely part of their larger fetishization, part of the problem, part of the game. Yet, it is indisputable nonetheless that the effectiveness of that ideological operation has in fact instituted an epochal shift at the material and practical level of security-state formation, on a global scale. Furthermore, to treat the monumentality of those events as something akin to a ghastly explosion remains insufficient because the quiet of sorrow that follows such a

catastrophe was never given the chance to settle upon those who witnessed it (in this case, virtually the whole world). Instead, it was followed by a rising crescendo of global war-making and the hysteria of the putative War on Terror, which did not relent for several years. Still worse, when quiet did finally come, it was in the ghoulish form of protracted military occupations, the banalization of ever-expanding horizons for new military interventions, and the routinization of an amorphous and seemingly infinite state of emergency (De Genova 2010a). The metaphysics of antiterrorism have now permeated the very fabric of everyday life (Bigo 2002; De Genova 2009; 2012). Those explosions appear indeed to have touched off a chain reaction in which we have been caught ever since, and which nobody seems able to stop. Such are the manifold global ramifications of the politics of securitarianism.

It will be evident to any reader well acquainted with Hannah Arendt's account of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) that I have crafted this opening paragraph in a manner that deliberately evokes and commemorates the opening lines of her much-celebrated chapter, "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man" ([1951] 1968: 267–302), while adapting and reconfiguring them. Indeed, the title of this essay is itself an analogy to the closing section of that chapter. For, the paradox that Arendt famously elaborates with regard to "the perplexities of the Rights of Man" was made abundantly visible only in and through the sociopolitical conditions attendant upon an unprecedented mass *mobility*. From the outset, however, it ought to be made plain that this chapter is emphatically not an exercise in anything as grandiose as trying to account for "the origins of securitarianism." It ought to suffice to say simply enough that the securitization of human mobility indubitably preceded the so-called War on Terror, and this chapter is neither directly concerned with sketching that genealogy nor with accounting for the historical specificities of the ensuing sociopolitical regime of antiterrorism. Paul Virilio has suggestively coined the term "globalitarian" to refer to a "topological reversal of erstwhile imperialist geopolitics," whereby the proverbial "backyard" of the United States is now coequal to the entire planet ([2004] 2005: 73). No longer restricting its field of political, economic, and military dominance to a mere (more or less circumscribed) "sphere of influence" alongside those of competitor colonial powers or in opposition to that of a single rival "superpower," the United States emerged from the Cold War to contemplate the scope of its imperial ambitions in a "unipolar" world. Apparently resolving some of the vexations of an empire without a plausible enemy, it is indeed the metaphysics of antiterrorism that have crucially rendered such a "globalitarian" project inextricable from one of "security." The *securitarian*

project is precisely one for which there is no outside: asserting and sustaining itself on a genuinely planetary scale, its military interventions are refigured as mere police operations while its matrix of securitization has become a whole way of life.

In this chapter, I endeavor to discern the larger outline of human mobility – and migration, in particular – as a central if largely unrecognized figure constituting the contemporary global social formation and its hegemonic politics of "security" (what I am calling securitarianism). In particular, I seek to begin to comprehend the simultaneous and seemingly discordant discourses in favor of "open borders" and a putative "right to mobility," and the promotion of an ideal of an uninhibited "freedom of movement," on the one hand, with an effectively worldwide escalation of rather draconian efforts to control migration and regiment human mobility.

Although perhaps counterintuitively, Arendt's meditation on "the Rights of Man" (or what in a less classical idiom would be termed "human rights") is particularly resonant and pertinent here, because it is deeply preoccupied by precisely this question of mobility. Arendt confronts a crisis for "human rights" instigated by the mass displacements of whole populations expelled from their natal homelands and coercively set in motion, whereby rightlessness presents itself as an inexorable effect of statelessness. The refugees whose predicaments she contemplates were *mobilized* by their expulsion into the no-man's-land between one imperial camp and that of its rivals. Today, however, although refugee movements may continue to reveal many of the same fundamental dynamics and dilemmas that Arendt identifies, the mobility of migrant labor within the global arena of capital accumulation presents a striking contrast. Migrant mobilities, which are predominantly self-activated and autonomous, forfeit natal homelands and traverse nation-state borders in order more or less to deliberately inhabit the no-man's-land of protracted rightlessness that prevails under the bleak horizon of prospective expulsion (deportation). Notably, while such predicaments are excessively characteristic of the condition of undocumented migrants, they are in no sense exclusively so. What for Arendt was a paradox of refugees whose mobility had been inflicted upon them like a curse and which stripped them of the presumptive protections of any state, therefore looms now ever increasingly as the banal and matter-of-fact condition of migrants whose mobility inescapably exposes them to the presumptive punitive recriminations that ensue from an excess of superintendence by state power.

In her Preface to the first edition of *Origins*, Arendt memorably characterized the twentieth century in terms of "homelessness on an unprecedented

scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented depth" ([1951] 1968: vii). The true ramifications of this formulation only become fully explicit in the chapter to which I have already alluded, where the tumultuous succession of cataclysmic events that supplied the defining features of the first half of the twentieth century are chiefly distinguished, in Arendt's account, for having provoked "migrations of groups […] who were welcomed nowhere and could be assimilated nowhere," who "once they had left their homeland […] remained homeless […] [and] became stateless" (267). Arendt is most directly concerned with the dilemma of the deprivation of the civil rights of these dispossessed people and, following their forced displacement, the consequent transmutation of these initial travesties into the prolonged and irremediable condition of their veritable rightlessness. This conundrum surrounding the questions of "human rights" provides an instructive backdrop for my own questions, but the aim here is not to debate the virtues or shortcomings of Arendt's account. It is especially revealing, nevertheless, as she incisively remarks, that this process allowed for the totalitarian regimes (particularly that of Nazi Germany) to convert their victims into precisely what they had always-already alleged them to be – namely, "the scum of the earth" (267). That is to say, by means of an utterly and devastatingly effective "factual propaganda," they were delivered across nation-state frontiers as "unidentifiable beggars, without nationality, without money, and without passports" (269). Hence, we may detect at the heart of Arendt's prescient inquiry into the perplexities of "human rights" a question about human mobility in an extreme form. Its extremity nonetheless bears a striking resemblance at the dawning of the twenty-first century to the plight of an ever-growing and ever increasingly prominent mass of restless denizens: migrants and asylum-seekers, presumptively susceptible to administrative detention and all manner of police measures with little or no recourse to any semblance of legal process, existentially homeless, inassimilable, and deportable all.[1]

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[1]   I deploy the term "denizen" here to encompass the full range and extent of heterogeneous categories of noncitizen, in noteworthy contradistinction to Tomas Hammar's usage of the term to refer to "a new status group," whose members are neither naturalized citizens nor "regular and plain foreign citizens anymore," with more or less secure residence status and a variety of rights and entitlements to social access and benefits (1990: 12–13). My contention ought not to be misconstrued to presumptively encompass all juridical categories and statuses of noncitizenship within a universal condition of abjection, but rather to underscore a *tendency* whereby all of the exquisite distinctions that comprise the variegated spectrum of "legality" and "illegality," for the diverse categories of "foreigner" under the jurisdiction of any given state formation, may be recognized to be precisely unstable and effectively without decisive protection from the ultimate severities of detention and deportation.

Here, of course, it has become a convention to speak of deportation with reference to migrants and other noncitizens confronted with the imperviousness of nation-state sovereignty to any claims on their part, as mere "foreigners," to "rights" or "entitlements" of cross-border mobility. But as we are reminded by Arendt's discussion of statelessness, deportation was a crucial technique of state power for the disposal of diverse populations of "undesirables," to be subjected sometimes to serial expulsions and displacements, or alternately, to be targeted for extermination (cf. Walters 2002). The problem in her era, of course, was what Arendt astutely calls "the undeportability of the stateless person" ([1951] 1968: 283) and the perennial dilemma of *how to make refugees deportable* yet again (284). As Arendt notes, in her exposition of how the very concept of statelessness degenerated into one of mere "displacement," the refusal to acknowledge statelessness "always means repatriation, i.e. deportation to a country of origin, which either refuses to recognize the prospective repatriate as a citizen, or, on the contrary, urgently wants him back for punishment" (279). The more vexed the predicament of such "undesirables" and the states that did not desire them, furthermore, the more the "internment camp" emerged as "the routine solution for the problem of domicile of the 'displaced persons'" (279), "the only practical substitute for a nonexistent homeland […] the only 'country' the world had to offer" them (284). Inevitably, these same vexations generated a crisis for immigration and "naturalization" regimes in receiving states, and undermined the status of migrants who had been previously naturalized, such that "living conditions for all aliens markedly deteriorated" (285). Confronted with those who had been stripped of their citizenship (de-nationalized) and deported by another state, finally, these receiving states came increasingly to render an ever-widening cross-section of their own lawfully resident aliens and citizens as themselves susceptible for de-naturalization or de-nationalization. Thus, these states became embroiled in the sorts of "lawlessness organized by the police" that threatened them with a subtle but ever more seemingly inexorable "danger of a gradual transformation into a police state" (288). In Arendt's account, therefore, between an incapacity "to treat stateless people as legal persons and […] the extension of arbitrary rule by police decree," on the one hand, and a "temptation to deprive all citizens of legal status and rule them with an omnipotent police" (290), on the other, it is *deportation* that figures as the decisive pivot.

The Deportation Regime and the Spectacle of Enforcement

At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was commonly considered to be frankly unconscionable, even by many immigration judges, to inflict the plainly punitive hardship of expulsion upon "unauthorized" but otherwise lawful long-term migrants and their families (Ngai 2005:A21). By century's end, deportation had become utterly banal. Indeed, despite the inevitable and irreducible historical specificities of particular states' legal bulwarks concerning the regulation of immigration (De Genova 2002), the practice of deportation has emerged as a definite and increasingly pervasive convention of routine statecraft. Deportation seems to have become a virtually global *regime* (De Genova 2010b; Peutz and De Genova 2010; cf. De Genova and Peutz 2010; Fekete 2005; Kanstroom 2007; Hing 2006). It seems indisputable that this transformation of deportation from the exception to a presumptive norm across the intervening decades with which Arendt was concerned owes a great deal to the wholesale degradation of the global status of "aliens" in light of the mass deportations and forced population movements of the era she describes.

By the end of the twentieth century, the dramatic expansion of deportation was probably nowhere more pronounced – in terms of sheer numbers – than in the United States (Kanstroom 2007; Hing 2006). In the aftermath of the promulgation of a so-called War on Terror, literally any and all matters concerning immigration and naturalization in the United States were subordinated officially – both discursively and practically – to the explicit mandate of securitarianism. One of the signature techniques of this new formation of security state has been a strategy of targeted policing, whereby an ostensible pursuit of identifiable "suspects" (with standing orders of deportation) has facilitated raiding operations in which large masses of otherwise nondescript and random "illegal aliens" could be apprehended, blandly affiliated with "criminality" in mass-mediated spectacles, and summarily subjected to "removal" proceedings (De Genova 2007; 2009).

Between 1997 and 2007, following the enactment of both anti-immigrant and "antiterrorist" legislations in 1996, US immigration authorities deported 897,099 noncitizens as so-called "criminal aliens." Notably, this category refers only to those who were deported *after* they had already served prison sentences – usually for nonviolent offenses (seventy-two percent), many of which were classified as "felonies" only for *noncitizen* perpetrators – and quite commonly, after these migrants had already lived in the United States for decades. In fact, twenty percent of these "criminal alien" depor-

tees had been in the country as "legal" residents prior to their deportations.[2]
Thus, even "legally" resident noncitizens, often with families that commonly
included US-citizen children or spouses, were expelled and barred from reen-
try, and thereafter confronted long-term or permanent exclusion from the
country following their deportations – in most instances, for having commit-
ted only petty crimes such as shoplifting, possessing stolen property, or pos-
session of small amounts of narcotics (Human Rights Watch 2009). That is to
say, it was their mere status as noncitizens – regardless of migrant "legality"
or "illegality" – which ensured that these individuals would be made to suffer
the double punishment of incarceration for their criminal offenses and then
summary deportation.

     The aggregate numbers of deportations from the United States during
this recent period were, of course, much higher, and have risen steadily every
year. Between 2000 and 2008, the number of deportations annually nearly
doubled. In 2005 alone, the immigration authorities deported or otherwise
"removed" 168,900 noncitizens; by 2010, following significant increases for
every intervening year, the number had increased to 392,862. (Here, I refer to
the total numbers of persons "removed" from the United States by immigra-
tion authorities, annually, even when there was no criminal indictment or con-
viction; in the absolute majority of cases, therefore, these figures indicate the
routine deportation of run-of-the-mill "illegal aliens"). Throughout the period
prior to 2010, 65–75 percent of these deportations were of the *non*-criminal
variety. Nonetheless, the actual numbers of migrants apprehended and for-
cibly turned around by the US Border Patrol is far greater still. In 2008, for
instance, in addition to the nearly 359,000 who were formally subjected to
"removal" proceedings, there were another 811,263 who were arrested and
then immediately returned to their countries of origin without the formalities
and penalties of actual deportation or "removal." Here, we refer not to people
who were merely denied entry at a border checkpoint but rather to those who
were apprehended either in the act of crossing a border without authorization
or otherwise within the zone of operations of the Border Patrol and "voluntar-
ily" (albeit coercively) returned. That is to say, in 2008 alone, taken together,
nearly 1,200,000 people were forced to leave the United States. In addition, by
2009, the number of noncitizens indefinitely incarcerated in detention facili-
ties for *non*-criminal immigration violations had more than doubled from the

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2   As with the term "illegality," I deploy quotes wherever the terms "legal" or "illegal" modify
     migration or migrants, in order to sustain an emphatic concern to denaturalize the reification of
     this distinction. To question migrant "illegality" adequately, it is necessary likewise to destabilize
     the presumed validity and sanctity of "legality" itself.

number ten years earlier – reaching 369,483. Over the five-year period (2005–9), the total detainee population grew by sixty-four percent, and this rapid rise in the number of individuals in detention was comprised almost entirely of noncitizens who had no criminal record whatsoever. While the number of "criminal" detainees barely changed between 2005 and 2009, the number of detainees without any criminal conviction nonetheless doubled. Thus, the immigration enforcement authorities had seemingly focused an inordinate amount of energy on merely filling detention beds (http://trac.syr.edu). Thus, these unprecedented proclivities toward migrant detention served apparently to justify the dramatically increased investment of state funds in the political economy of a largely privatized imprisonment industry.

Yet, for these untold millions of migrants detained and deported, there remained many more millions of undocumented (and deportable) migrants, whose numbers never cease to flourish. Therefore, every accounting of the proliferation of deportation must be accompanied by a critical scrutiny of the ever-widening purview of migrant *deportability* for all who remain, un-deported (De Genova 2002; 2005; 2010b). For, it is the susceptibility of migrants, both "illegal" and "authorized" alike, to deportation that is finally of rather more profound consequence than actual deportations alone. Indeed, the actual deportations simply verify the veracity of the prospect of deportation as a defining and definitive horizon for migrants whose laborious condition is thus rendered ever more exactingly and excruciatingly to be one of prolonged precarity and vulnerability to the recriminations of The Law. In this respect, the material practices of immigration enforcement serve to generate a complex but always repetitive and redundant weave of discourse and image – a *spectacle* of "illegality" (De Genova 2002; 2011a; 2011b; 2012; n.d.).

Here, again, Arendt is strikingly relevant. The perplexities of "human rights," in her account, derive in no small measure from a peculiar consequence of the fact that "whether we like it or not we really have started to live in One World." In other words, Arendt's paradox derived from the consolidation of what she deemed to be "the new global political situation": "a completely organized humanity" in which there is "no longer any 'uncivilized' spot on the earth." Paradoxically, as this newly comprehensive degree of global integration became self-evident (largely as a consequence of European colonization), there arose the conditions of possibility for millions of people to have been shorn not only of particular "rights" but of even the "right to belong to some kind of organized community," such that "the loss of home and political status became identical with expulsion from humanity altogether" ([1951] 1968: 297). As the consequence of "a problem not of space but of political organiza-

tion," that is, "national" and colonial state formation, they were simply "far too numerous to be handled by an unofficial practice destined for exceptional cases" (294). Out of such mass dislocations from the jurisdiction of particular ("national") states, there thus arose the abject figure of the stateless, right-less subject of "human rights" and nothing more – "the abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human" (297).

The vexed notion of inalienable "human rights" which had been predicated only on "an 'abstract' human being who seemed to exist nowhere" (291) – but which had always been practically inextricable from notions of popular sovereignty, nationhood, and democratic citizenship – came during the crisis of Arendt's era to confront ever greater numbers of flesh-and-blood human beings. These repudiated minorities and stateless refugees, in Arendt's account, no longer had any recourse to their putative "rights" as natal members of their "national" polities, and could resort to nothing but the eminently mundane and hollow abstraction of their "humanity." For present purposes, it is especially instructive to see how the emergence of this awful "specimen of an animal species, called man" – this "human being in general […] without a citizenship" (302), and thus, without even a guaranteed "right to have rights" (296) and deprived of all legality as such (295) – coincides for Arendt not merely with the loss of a home but the unprecedented "impossibility of finding a new one," a situation in which there is now "no place on earth where migrants could go without the severest of restrictions" (293). Much as "human rights" turned out to be "unenforceable […] whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state" (293), Arendt contends tellingly, the bearers of such equivocal and treacherous "rights" found themselves "out of legality altogether" (294), in a worse predicament than common criminals or even designated "enemy aliens."

Utterly unprotected and at large in a global community of state powers that had come to resemble a "barbed-wire labyrinth" (292), Arendt's stateless refugee has by now in our present era acquired the dubious distinction of a still more perverse ubiquity – the "illegal" and presumptively deportable migrant, whose abstract humanity is synonymous with her abstract labor, the perfectly disposable commodity that is her labor-power (De Genova 2010b). Although there is of course a substantial difference between the sort of literally state-less subjects who can truly be deported nowhere and the routinely "illegal" migrants who are deported in always greater numbers, Arendt's depiction of a paradoxical juridical condition of effective banishment from legality itself – the utter degradation of legal personhood, as such, for countless migrants – remains poignant and pertinent. Beleaguered by the spectacles of immigration

enforcement and border policing that generate the fetish of her putative unde-sirability, this "illegal" migrant becomes exceedingly desirable (for capital) – but only insofar as she remains excruciatingly disposable. In the end, for the great majority of "unauthorized" migrants, whether or not they can be or are in fact deported is less relevant than the prolongation and superintendence of their more general and presumed sociopolitical predicament of deportability (De Genova 2002).

"Imagine a World Without Borders"

The veritable ubiquity of deportation, proliferating spectacles of increasingly militarized border policing, and a global fact of massive and comparably unparalleled securitization in virtually all aspects of travel and transit were among the chief distinguishing features of the first decade of the twenty-first century, overburdened as it was by the feckless and reckless War on Ter-ror (cf. Bigo 2002; 2006; De Genova 2007; 2009; 2010b; Huysmans 2006). Nonetheless, a parallel regulatory discourse regarding the ostensible "freedom of movement" and the putative "right" to mobility has risen to an extraordi-nary prominence in recent years (Bigo 2011; Rygiel 2011). Unsurprisingly, scholarship has likewise witnessed an efflorescence of interest in mobility (Cresswell 2006; Cresswell and Merriman 2008; Friese and Mezzadra 2010; Kleinschmidt 2003; Moulier Boutang 2001; Papastergiadis 2010; Sheller and Urry 2006; Squire 2011; Urry 2000; 2007). With reference to that scholarship concerned with "issues of movement, of too little movement for some or too much for others or of the wrong sort or at the wrong time," John Urry sug-gests, "there is we might say a 'mobility' structure of feeling in the air" (2007: 6). As the salience of transnational migration in particular has achieved an unprecedented visibility, an often inchoate notion of the human freedom of movement seems indeed to be indisputably in the air.

In its 2009 Human Development Report, the United Nations Develop-ment Programme (UNDP) "explore[s] *for the first time* the topic of migration" (UNDP 2009: 1; emphasis added). The report, titled "Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development," cheerfully announces that migration tends to be an overall good from the standpoint of "human development," and therefore identifies "human mobility as a core component of the human devel-opment agenda" (vi). Furthermore, the UNDP report characterizes "mobil-ity as vital to human development and movement as a *natural* expression of people's desire to choose how and where to lead their lives" (18; empha-

sis added). In this light, it proposes "a bold set of reforms" with a view to "expanding people's freedoms rather than controlling or restricting human movement" (v). The report audaciously announces that its "concern […] is not only with movement in itself but also with the freedom that people have to decide whether to move." It affirms: "Mobility is a freedom – movement is the exercise of that freedom" (15).

The UNDP's report may have the ring of a refreshingly humane perspective in the midst of a dismal and vociferously belligerent climate of securitarianism. Yet, a more instrumental impulse driving the UNDP report reveals itself rather candidly. The text declares quite unreservedly that "migrants boost economic output, at little or no cost to locals" (UNDP 2009: 3). Moreover, upon closer scrutiny of its package of reform proposals, the report resorts to a rather conventional understanding of how the exercise of such a freedom to move should finally be decided: "Destination countries should decide on the desired numbers of entrants through political processes that permit public discussion and the balancing of different interests. Transparent mechanisms to determine the number of entrants should be based on employer demand" (4). In this vision, then, people apparently should be "free" to migrate in a manner that will best satisfy the demands of capital, and the "local" political determination of how to manage that mobility will be reserved for (and subject to the authority of) the national states of "destination countries." Thus, in spite of the ostensible advocacy of free movement, what remains paramount is the presumed separation, autonomy, integrity, and sovereignty of territorially defined ("national") states. Likewise, the rigid and fetishized distinction between "the political" and "the economic" is upheld as an a priori, effectively unquestionable, and naturalized presupposition. Migrants (as laborpower) and their employers remain safely cordoned off in the space of The Market, the purely "economic" sphere. The disputation of how best to regulate migration, on the other hand, is presented as strictly a matter of Politics, presumptively an exclusive realm with no space whatsoever for the migrants' "freedom of movement" and "right of mobility." In the end, therefore, we find ourselves still haunted by the UNDP's concern "not only with movement in itself but also with the *freedom* that people have to decide whether to move." The freedom of movement, it seems, remains an elusive one.

Anticipating the UNDP report, UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) published in 2007 a compilation of academic papers edited by Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, under the title *Migration without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People*, as an effort "to better understand the theoretical issues surrounding

'open borders'" (Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2007: 1). "Imagine a world with-
out borders" is the exuberant injunction that opens the foreword to the vol-
ume, authored by Pierre Sané. He continues: "Today […] this sounds like
Utopia. But […] is it not *natural* to let people decide where they wish to live?
Is it not *natural* to give people equal rights to move more freely throughout a
globalizing world?" (viii; emphases added). In their official capacity as UNE-
SCO's coordinators of "expert" knowledge (ix), the editors of the collection
further affirm in their introductory remarks that it is "time […] to question the
moral basis of restrictions on people's mobility" (11). Despite Sané's (or more
recently, the UNDP's) rhetoric regarding what may or may not be "natural" to
the human condition, however – and the editors' concomitant presentation of
the freedom of movement as a matter of "morality" notwithstanding – there
is a definite *instrumentality* that once again reveals itself here. "In a world
of flows," Pécoud and de Guchteneire continue, "mobility becomes a cen-
tral *resource* to which all human beings should have access." They therefore
contend that "a comprehensive right to mobility […] stems from the increas-
ingly global and multicultural nature of today's world" (11; emphasis added).
This depiction of mobility as a "resource" implies a distinctly more histori-
cally conditioned relation between mobility – as a "right" – and the practical
requirements of what the editors blandly consider "a world of economic glo-
balization" (11). Other ostensible "human rights […] already acknowledged
as fundamental," such as the "free choice of employment" and "an adequate
standard of living," the editors worry, "seem hard to achieve in the absence of
mobility *opportunities*" (11; emphasis added). Hence, the freedom of move-
ment is subtly presented as a de facto economic resource, and mobility is fig-
ured as a kind of opportunity to be calibrated and commensurated in a larger
global process of exchange.

Mobility is likewise enveloped within a progressivist teleology in the
UNESCO publication. "The world is actually progressing towards more, not
less, freedom of movement," the editors assert, and thus they propose "a new
vision, according to which nations should […] support [migration flows] and
recognize the *opportunities* they offer" (Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2007:
2; emphasis added). From this perspective, mobility appears therefore to be
an opportunity for *both* migrants and those who might avail themselves of
what migrants bring – a proverbial "win-win" arrangement. It is instructive, of
course, that the latter party to this exchange relation is depicted rather ambigu-
ously as "nations" – prompting the question: Who indeed are the presumed
beneficiaries on the "receiving" end of migration? Nation-states? Their citi-
zenries? Employers? Against what they characterize as the "incoherence" of

contemporary state policies that aim at perfect migration control but invariably "fail" to supply any clear and consistent means for "managing migration" (7), then, Pécoud and de Guchteneire opt instead to identify international migration, more simply, as a glaring "exception in the globalization process," and indict restrictive migration policies as contrary to "the spirit of […] liberalization" (13). Simultaneously, the authors assume an admittedly agnostic posture with respect to the question of "the impact of free movement on world inequalities" (13). Thus, their earlier preoccupation with morality seems rather more subdued here, as what was first posited as a problem of "morals" now emerges as one of *management* and "opportunities." Inequalities, the authors seem to conclude, need not trouble us too much, after all, for we are about the business of "freedom" in a liberalizing world economy, which is to say, "freedom" in the spirit of (neo)liberalization.

Some of this recent enthusiasm for mobility as an elementary dimension of human freedom seems in fact to derive from the remarkably recent "discovery," so to speak, of migration as a "a topic that has moved to the forefront of national and international agenda." So it was announced, when the Population Division of the United Nations' Department of Economic and Social Affairs proclaimed in 2002 that "the number of people residing outside their country of birth is at an all-time high of about 175 million, more than double the number a generation ago" (United Nations 2002: 1).[3] In this context, the 2002 International Migration Report plainly characterized itself as "*the first of its kind*" (iii; emphasis added). Indeed, the report confirmed, "the number of governments adopting new measures to influence migration has grown rapidly. In particular, the number adopting policies to lower immigration rose from 6 per cent in 1976 to 40 per cent in 2001" (2). "The aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001" seemed, moreover, to be only a self-evident harbinger of what the report predicted would be a further tightening of nation-states' policies towards migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers (1).

Hence, transnational migration had come by the turn of the twenty-first century to supply a new kind of global horizon, with its management a new kind of global problem – and securitization was plainly the order of the day. Yet, in response, as I have briefly sought to demonstrate, we have been

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[3]   The Population Division's 2002 International Migration Report was a response to the UN General Assembly's resolution (#56/203 of December 21, 2001, included as an appendix in United Nations 2002: 50–53), which called upon the United Nations system and other relevant organizations more energetically to address the issue of international migration, as well as being an attempt to satisfy the subsequent recommendation of the UN Secretary-General that "it is time to take a more comprehensive look at the various dimensions of the migration issue" (Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/387).

witnessing an unprecedented efflorescence of gestures regarding human mobility as a question of "freedom." How then do we comprehend the simultaneous and seemingly incongruous injunctions for "open borders" and a putative "right to mobility," and their ideal of an uninhibited "freedom of movement," on the one hand, with an effectively worldwide escalation of efforts to control migration and regiment human mobility? How might we make sense of the inducement to "imagine a world without borders" in the hideous face of a deportation regime run amok? Are these – as they might appear – merely two utterly incompatible and warring outlooks? Alternately, does this seeming paradox disclose a more profound complementarity?

Migrant Mobility as Menace

One crucial clue to dissecting this tangled conundrum – indeed, perhaps the most revealing – has been the central figuration of mobility in the hegemonic discourse and practice of antiterrorism. The cataclysmic ascendancy of security-state measures worldwide following September 11, 2001 was of course coercively promoted by the United States through its promulgation of a *Global* War on Terror. What is especially noteworthy for our purposes is that the White House's *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (White House 2003: 7) explicitly affirmed that it was formulated in response to "a new global environment" chiefly distinguished by "*unprecedented mobility and migration*" (emphasis added). This document unabashedly sought to promote the ideal of "a seamless web of defense across the spectrum of engagement to protect our citizens and interests both at home and abroad" to be achieved by "providing our operating forces […] foreign and domestic – with a single integrated operating matrix" (25). Thus, in the same breath as it enunciated its characteristically parochial nationalism – and characteristic of the double-voiced nature of sovereignty for the United States, as always simultaneously a mere nation-state (just one more among all the rest) and nonetheless the ultimate arbiter of military force for the imperial order of capital accumulation on a global scale – the US Homeland Security State avowed its unmistakably *globalist* ambitions (De Genova 2010a; 2012). In this manner, it signaled what can only be deemed an incipient Global Security State, with unprecedented human mobility as its central target.

From this standpoint, human mobility and the freedom of movement might arguably seem to be beleaguered as never before. Yet, what came first was precisely "unprecedented mobility and migration"; the purportedly "anti-

terrorist" strategy was explicitly fashioned as a "response." Furthermore, it is notable all the same that the so-called War on Terror, as formulated by the United States, openly (indeed, extravagantly) endorsed the vision of a kind of "world without borders." This is precisely what is at stake in a vision for which the very distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" would be effaced in favor of "a seamless web," "a single integrated operating matrix." The antiterrorist worldview projects the ideal of a quasi-borderless state formation, global in scope and planetary in reach. From the standpoint of state power, therefore, it becomes conceivable to exalt mobility even as it comes to be subjected as never before to an intricate overlay of controls and surveillance (Bigo 2011). Mobility and securitization, then, may be understood to operate here in web of tensions and torsions.

In light of the simultaneous configuration of mobility as a problem of economic resource management and the coordination of opportunities for maximizing "output," nevertheless, it ought to be clear that we are in the presence of migration as, first and foremost, a transnational formation of *labor* (De Genova 2002; 2010b). Its securitization, then, can only be apprehensible as a matter of labor subordination. Migrant labor is plainly the irrepressible ghost in the machine of the antiterrorist security state (De Genova 2009; 2010c). While the machinery of antiterrorism conjures up the phantasm of "terrorism" as its overt pretext, the real effects of its machinations are directed disproportionately (and systematically) against innocuous migrant workers. If these manifestations of securitarianism predictably serve the ends of labor subordination, moreover, it is necessary to recall the primacy of labor's autonomy and subjectivity in the larger politics of the capital–labor relation. From this perspective, these are not merely "unanticipated" or "unintended" consequences of simply misguided policies or their overzealous implementation. In spite of the bombastic rhetoric of securitarianism, we may scrutinize and assess the objective empirical evidence of the real (and quite predictable) effects that it has in fact produced. If this is so, furthermore, it must be recognized nonetheless to be so on a *global* scale (De Genova 2011a). The spectacles of border enforcement have long served not to eliminate or exclude so much as to produce migrant labor, as much as possible, as a docile and disciplined object. Similarly, the spectacle of terror and its concomitant spectacle of security work to exert a productive force upon the subordination of the restless global formation of laboring humanity and all of its creative capacities and productive powers (De Genova 2012).

Human mobility (and specifically, transnational migration) – which is to say, the cumulative force of countless actual migrants – has been a central

protagonist in the creation of "a new global environment." But what has compelled the forces of antiterrorist securitization to figure migrant mobility as a menace? Here it is instructive to consider hypotheses regarding migration as a manifestation of labor's subjectivity, and specifically as a form of "escape" or "desertion" (cf. Mezzadra 2004; Papadopoulos et al. 2008). From this critical standpoint, scholars have promoted the concept of the autonomy of migration as a kind of social movement.[4] Seen as a social movement, migration entails an unpredictable autonomy and mobility of labor that exceeds and subverts the capacities and competencies of territorially defined states and their border policing apparatuses ever to regulate and regiment humanity's vital energies and productive powers into fully manageable and thoroughly disciplined populations of docile citizens and subjugated "foreigners." These uncontrolled and uncontrollable "excesses" of transnational labor mobility provoke anxieties and sometimes instigate outright crises of state sovereignty (Andrijasevic 2010; Nyers 2003). In addition, they expose the profound limitations of citizenship itself, as supposedly rightless denizens defy the jurisdiction, authority, and presumed sanctity of state power to grant rights, disburse entitlements, provide protection, command allegiance, and monopolize many of the quintessential modern coordinates of identity itself (De Genova 2010b; 2010c). As James Scott suggestively notes, albeit with reference to a different sociohistorical context altogether, "State rulers will find it well nigh impossible to install an effective sovereignty over people who are constantly in motion, who have no permanent pattern of organization, no permanent address, whose leadership is ephemeral, whose subsistence practices are pliable and furtive, who have few permanent allegiances, and who are liable, over time, to shift their linguistic practices and their ethnic identity" (2009: 38–39). Thus, the well-ordered and regulated subjection of mobility as a distinct variety of "freedom" (indeed, the object of management by capital and the state) repeatedly and inevitably comes into confrontation with a more elemental and elementary freedom of movement that is the existential predicate for the autonomy and subjectivity of labor (De Genova 2010b).

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4   For contributions to the elaboration of this critical perspective, see Mezzadra (2001; 2004; 2006; 2011); Mezzadra, in Bojadžijev and Saint-Saëns (2006); Mezzadra and Neilson (2003); Moulier Boutang (1998; 2001); Moulier Boutang and Garson (1984); cf. Bojadžijev and Karakayali (n.d.); De Genova (2009; 2010c); Karakayali and Rigo (2010); Nyers (2003); Papadopoulos et al. (2008); Papastergiadis (2000; 2005; 2010); Rigo (2011); Tsianos and Karakayali (2010).

The Freedom of Movement

At times, the objective social movement of migration becomes articulate and rebellious, and migrant subjectivities express themselves as outright insubordination. During the unprecedented mass mobilizations of millions of migrants (and their children and allies) in the United States in 2006, for instance, there was a resounding and consistent manifestation of a fundamental and irreducible defiance with regard to a social and political climate of escalating hostility against migrants, "legal" and "illegal" alike. This spirit and sensibility were poignantly captured in a slogan (notably, in Spanish) that has been persistent and pervasive: *Aquí Estamos, y No Nos Vamos* (Here we are, and we are not leaving). This same slogan was sometimes accompanied by a rejoinder: *Y Si Nos Sacan, Nos Regresamos* ([…] and if they throw us out, we will come right back). Indeed, the theme of *presence* – the profound and inextricable presence of migrants, and especially that of the undocumented, within the U.S. social formation – which was exuberantly affirmed in this recurrent chant, signaled a crucial flashpoint for both sides in the struggle over "immigration" in the United States. For the undocumented migrants engaged in this struggle, their "unauthorized" presence figured as the definitive social and political "objective" fact, and its audacious affirmation – its reinscription as sheer insubordinate subjectivity – almost seemed to signify an end in itself (De Genova 2009; 2010c). Notably, beginning in April 2008 (and escalating in October 2009), a wave of strikes by several thousand undocumented migrant workers demanding legal residence in France articulated the themes of migrant presence and labor in remarkably similar terms; their principal slogan was: *On Bosse Ici, On Vit Ici, On Reste Ici!* (We work here, we live here, we're staying here!) (Barron et al. 2011).[5]

These slogans may be readily apprehensible within the national contexts where they erupt, explicitly addressed as they are to the specific immigration regimes of particular nation-states. However, it is also useful to reframe such affirmations of presence – both literally physical and socially substantive presence within the space of one or the other nation-state – as also the enunciation of a global *mobility*. The chant from the United States overtly proclaims itself to be unapologetically "here," but the promise to return in spite of deportation also boldly signals, by implication, a kind of *ubiquity*, which is accomplished in and through mobility. Migrants exposed themselves as "illegal" and openly challenged the state to deport them, audaciously asserting:

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[5]   I am thankful to Sébastien Chauvin for bringing this analogy to my attention.

"You can expel some of us, but more of us will always come back to haunt you – you can never eliminate us"; in effect, they declared: "We are every-where." Indeed, the defiance that migrants asserted and the resilience that they celebrated were tantamount to announcing "We are free in our movement and through our movement – and by means of our mobility, we elude your efforts to control our movement and contain our freedom" (De Genova 2010c). The slogan from the French strikes was more directly attached to the project of demanding "legalization" through employer sponsorship for residence per-mits, and therefore may seem even more pronouncedly committed to a project of claiming a place "here." Nonetheless, as a proclamation by migrants of the prerogative that derives precisely from their labor, there is an abundant affirmation of a kind of entitlement to live (and remain) *wherever* they may desire. The ubiquity of migration, therefore, can be understood by implication to affirm an autonomous relationship of laboring humanity to the space of the planet.

Contrast this sense of the *freedom of movement* now to the gestures of liberal magnanimity cited earlier, as when Pierre Sané invites his readers to "imagine a world without borders," and poses the delicate questions: "Is it not natural *to let* people decide where they wish to live? Is it not natural *to give* people equal rights to move more freely throughout a globalizing world?" (Sané, in Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2007: viii). Whom exactly does this UNESCO official address? Who precisely is presumed to be authorized "to let" people decide where to live and make their livings? Who, according to the authorities and experts at the UN, may be assumed to have the power and sanction "to give" people the putative "right" to free movement? The veritable social movement of "illegal" migrants did not ask for permission to migrate. The occasionally vociferous self-expression of migrants as political movements (especially as they articulated themselves in the unprecedented mass mobilizations of 2006 in the United States), furthermore, did not wait for any authorities to "give" them their freedoms and disdained to beg and plead for any "rights" to migrate again, if necessary, should the deportation regime sweep them up within its machinations. For these migrants, particularly the undocumented but not exclusively so, their mobility is not a "right" ordained and anointed by the sovereign power of constituted authorities; rather, it is realized as a *practice* of freedom; its very exercise manifests its own vital and autonomous power, its subjective potentiality, and its open-ended creative capacity.

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Chapter 6

Mobilizing Against Mobility: Immigration Politics in a New Security World[1]

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Immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the USA shut down its air traffic system for several days, and rerouted an estimated 45,000 passengers to Canada, which shut down its own airspace in order to serve as an American proxy landscape. The creation of Operation Yellow Ribbon by Canada's Department of Transport not only stood as testament to spectacular international cooperation, but also revealed the growing participation of foreign states and non-state actors, (e.g., airlines, private security forces, communications companies) in managing mobility and border control.

The surge of policy instruments at the national and international levels captured the dramatic realization of new world threats emanating from human mobility, which include terrorists, migrants, drug traffickers, human smugglers, and foreign students. They visibly exposed the changing nature of threats, while masking some of the dramatic qualitative changes and policy challenges incurred since 9/11.

The involvement of migrants, foreign networks, and ethnic minorities in terrorist attacks across the United States and Europe consummated the link between security and mobility. It not only gave pause to a global world of people on the move (Zolberg 2001), but also challenged the liberal paradigm of human mobility, embedded in the post-World War II international order (see Hollifield 1992 for a discussion of embedded liberalism). The events sparked concerns that open economic borders and liberal immigration policies were increasingly at odds with the core responsibilities of liberal states and governments to provide security for their citizens. Signing the US Homeland Security Act, President Bush (2002) presented a new mobility framework aimed to "keep open the borders for tourism, business and even 'good' immigrants while closing them shut for terrorists, drug-dealers, and criminals" (in that order). Implicit in these claims were three assumptions: (1) that democratic governments could adopt strategic means to close their doors in a global world; (2) that security interests could be tied to mobility considerations; and that (3) liberal democracies could reconcile the cross-pressures between their liberal market and human rights norms with those to protect themselves for security (e.g., from terrorist threats, crime, deterritorialization, etc.) or for political interests (more commensurate with their publics).

This chapter addresses these assumptions. It argues that globalization facilitates new modes of regulation that trump other considerations when security looms large. Focusing on the migration case in the US and EU, the chapter disaggregates the triangulated neo-corporatist relationships between states and non-state actors. It assesses the comparative responses of liberal democracies to the mobility 'trilemma' between rights, markets, and security interests. To what extent can liberal states go to pursue their competitive interests in higher education, medical tourism, and global cities, for example, while simultaneously securing their borders, civil liberties, and citizen freedoms? Based on a neo-institutional analysis of formal and informal norms, I argue that national policy makers in a new security era have been able to overcome competing domestic constraints (e.g., civil liberties, economic costs, threatened publics) and mobilize against mobility.

Human Mobility in a New Security Context: What's New?

Although the security ramifications of human mobility and international migration have been evident for a long time, the changing scope and impact

of recent security perceptions has reframed the regulatory agenda.[2] Prior to the 9/11 "juncture," the debate primarily involved economic and cultural fears aroused by mass immigrant settlement of ethnically and racially diverse minorities. It was not until the general public's anxieties about "societal security" (Wæver 1998; Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993)[3], and quality-of-life issues (see Alexseev 2005: 66–67) intersected with its fears about immigration as a threat to physical safety during the 1990s (Huysmans 2000: 752) that the social construction of migration as a security issue became firmly embedded within the domestic and foreign politics of advanced liberal democracies (see Lahav and Messina 2005).

This so-called "securitization of migration" exacerbated in the aftermath of 9/11 reinforced linkages previously drawn between immigration, crime, law and order, and security (Bigo 2002; Huysmans, 2005), and catapulted migration issues squarely onto the center stage of the foreign policy agenda (see Rudolph 2006; Geddes 2005, Pastore 2005; Adamson 2006). Epitomizing the changing political landscape, dominated by "new security" issues (e.g., ethnic conflict, terrorism, migration) on the political agenda (see Wæver 1998; Buzan et al. 1998), the migration issue was notably transformed from a traditional economic or cultural threat – associated with migration in post-World War II – to one of national security and physical security of the post-Cold War period. The dramatic events of 9/11 vividly reinforced the shift in migration issues from the predominantly technical domain of "low politics" (e.g., economic and social questions) to what international relations scholars refer to as "high politics" (e.g., issues pertaining to political and national integrity and security).

This salience of migration on the foreign policy and security agenda coincides with some notable institutional and normative developments in the policy environment of liberal democracies. As in other areas of mobility, noted in this volume, the framing of migration threats in a national security framework has invoked institutional changes, which reflect shifting values

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[2] The "securitization of migration" may be traced back to the infamous US trial of Italian anarchists and communist immigrants, Sacco and Vanzetti, during the repressive period of the "Red Scare" of the early 1920s. Notwithstanding, few scholars systematically developed the link between international migration and security until the 1980s. While Myron Weiner (1992; 1993; 1995) was the first political scientist to address the relationship between immigration and security issues, several scholars indirectly captured this linkage in their work on immigration and refugees in US foreign policy (Teitelbaum 1984; Zolberg 1995).

[3] According to Waever (1998) and Buzan et al. (1998), immigration may threaten the sustainability or the identity of a society by causing the composition of society to shift in a manner that may undermine the hegemony of the prevailing socio-cultural model (Buzan et al. 1998).

and attitudes (Lahav 2004). As neo-institutionalists would suggest, mobility policies in this context could be understood to derive from changing cultural or national norms related to the dynamic process it has unleashed (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992).

First, while the terrorist bombings of 2001 in the USA and 2004–5 in Europe notably hastened the policy initiatives discussed earlier, they more importantly crystallized a shift in how the immigration debate was framed and perceived in Europe and the United States (see Huddy et al, 2005; Lahav and Courtemanche, 2012).[4] As public opinion captured, electorates identified immigration not only as a serious problem, but as a "threat" (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). Political discourse around migration increasingly invoked talk of invasion, insecurity, loss of identity, sovereignty, control, and terrorism. In the United States, media content analysis of immigration coverage before and after 9/11 epitomized the changing context of the immigration focus. Before 9/11, immigration concerns were largely linked to the concepts of rights and integration; after 9/11, immigration-related news stories significantly focused on criminalization, borders, justice, and legal matters (see Figure 6.1).[5] Assuming that media coverage broadly affects and is shaped by underlying attitudes and norms, such changing discourse is suggestive of shifting preoccupations related to immigration and human mobility.

Furthermore, the prevalence of "new politics" and "new security" issues (e.g., migration, terrorism, identity politics, environmentalism) on the public agenda reflect a changing political landscape, with new patterns of contestation (see Dalton 1988; 2008; Franklin 1992). Although partisan lines have been blurred since the 1980s, when ideological differences between parties became obscured (Schain 1988; Messina 1989; Simon 1989), ideological or partisan alignments have become decidedly more elusive. Broadly speaking, whereas on most issues programmatic distinctions among parties generally serve to organize political debate and ultimate policy resolution, on immigration the process has appeared less clear.

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[4]   The securitization of migration triggered by 9/11 has been said to have reverberatde well beyond US borders. The European analogue to the 9/11 "turning-point" has often been described as taking place after 2004, with the Madrid (March 11) and London (July 7, 2005) bombings. Though years apart, and following different policy contexts and a different trajectory of historical explanations, the cases are here linked by their association to foreign networks, expression in public discourse on national security, and their link to foreigners (see Lahav 2010).

[5]   The securitization framing of migration in the media varies across time and space. Media analysis in Europe has shown that the frames did not change immediately after 9/11, but had delayed effects after the Madrid and London bombings on European territory (see Ettinger and Imhof 2011).

Figure 6.1a Word Cloud: Pre-9/11 Media Content.

Figure 6.1b Word Cloud: Post- 9/11 Media Content.

The tendency of immigration politics to straddle the ordinary liberal–conservative divide (Tichenor 2002) has been exacerbated by the securitization frame. The growing 'trilemma' has exposed policy conflicts and value trade-offs between distinct economic, security, and cultural threats and interests – especially around the security–rights axis (see Sasse 2005). In contrast to a liberal rights-approach to mobility, the security approach has emphasized more control and exclusionary migration practices. Thus, on the one hand, the realist pursuit of state sovereignty to protect national territory has envisioned

more protectionist approaches to international mobility. On the other hand, global economic imperatives of open markets, trade and tourism coupled with societal interests of civil liberties, social cohesion, democratic values, and constitutional guarantees have promoted liberal norms and practices (see Lahav 2004).

This security–rights debate has created a battle line between liberal interest groups and civil libertarians (and some conservatives) concerned about privacy and freedoms on one side, and conservatives who worry about the social moral fabric, national security, and terrorism, on the other. The first camp considers "Big Brother" – the central government – not terror to be the greatest threat to the preservation of security and especially democracy (Etzioni 2004). The retort from the conservative camp is that freedoms and liberties are protected when security is strengthened. To these groups, the enlistment and collaboration of new actors in migration regulation is all-encompassing and intrusive. The migration axiom compounds and mitigates these divisions in interesting ways as it brings to the fore its own issue publics and "strange bedfellows," as Zolberg calls them (2000) – between business groups on the right that rely on cheap labor but fear social dilution, and those on the left, including trade unions, where competition with native labor force is fiercest, and those more open to migrants, such as ethnic lobby groups and liberal interests. The proliferation of "strange bedfellows" coalitions on reforms has been particularly applicable to the US lobby structure, as opposed to Continental Europe, where business interests are more closely linked to the State.

In generating strange bedfellows, and new patterns of contestation, the framing of migration in a security context has not only inhibited traditional party and ideological alignments from structuring issue positions, but has inadvertently promoted party consensus. Indeed, as immigration scholars have previously noted, when immigration policy becomes more psychologically and/or politically linked to physical security, attitudes towards immigration tend to coalesce – especially around a more restrictive immigration policy (Hammar 1985).[6] In an era of increasing security threats, the tendency of governments to tie immigration to law and order and to frame the immigration debate in that context has yielded restrictive and exclusionary immigration practices (Koslowski 2001; Bigo 2002). Paradoxically, the salience of migration on the security agenda serves to depoliticize the immigration issue by limiting ideological polarization. As the research in political psychology and

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[6]   Empirically, there is a link between countries that have experienced terrorist attacks and those that experience border restrictions, as illustrated in the Israeli case of cyclically preventing Palestinians from working in the country (Bartram 1998; Arian 1995).

behavior has corroborated, attitudinal convergence around exclusionary and protectionist norms is more likely to occur when migration is conceptualized as a security issue than as a threat to the economy, national identity, or culture (Lahav and Courtemanche 2011). The "securitization of migration," because it touches on physical safety, promotes cohesive opinion.

Such issue framing does not mobilize the ideological conflicts and values that fuel cultural threats, which in contrast, tend to polarize public opinion, which stems from prior ideological predispositions or values (Feldman and Stenner 1997). Thus, while in Europe, extreme-right parties have been able to capitalize on anti-immigrant sentiment with considerable success, they were quickly coopted (e.g., in Finland, Belgium, and Sweden) or eclipsed by the momentum towards securitization among their mainstream flank. Ironically, the securitization of migration may have somewhat displaced the fringe groups who long fought the perceived immigrant menace. In some of the European countries where the anti-immigrant extreme-right movements were most prevalent in the aftermath of 9/11, extreme-right party support has precipitously dropped (e.g., in the Netherlands, Spain, and Austria). A similar decline of protectionist or radical right parties after their 2004 peak was also evident in the "second-order national elections" (see, Eijk, Franklin, and Marsh, 1996) at the European Parliament, a popular outlet for these parties given their constraints at national level (see Figure 6.2). Some observers have suggested that the horrific terrorist attacks may have moderated these reactionary sentiments by introducing them to the mainstream political agenda (Lahav 2009). The securitization of migration and border control was embraced by mainstream parties (who in many cases stole the thunder of the radical groups after their initial peak in 2001–4). The reframed discourse on mobility and migration seemed to broaden and widen xenophobic attitudes (Chebel d'Appollinia 2008: 220), and lend support to more invasive regulatory schemes in an anti-mobility agenda.

Finally, these normative shifts reflect institutional developments, marked by the growth of institutional collaboration, comprehensive policy reforms, and the proliferation of diverse policy actors to implement them. The involvement of foreigner networks in terrorist attacks visibly disturbed an immigration policy equilibrium, which until the events of 9/11 appeared as relatively separate "epistemic communities" (Sassen 1996). In that setting, security, economic and rights/incorporation dimensions could be crafted and implemented in relative isolation from one another. Policy decisions along one dimension of migration did not much affect or circumscribe policy decisions along other dimensions (Lahav and Messina, 2005). While this changing

Figure 6.2 "Far right" seats in the European Parliament (1999–2009).

equilibrium was evident before 2001, it became formally manifest in institutional reforms to streamline and consolidate what were once separate axioms of the migration equation.[7] Across the board, liberal democracies responded by pursuing a comprehensive approach which conflated the three policy dimensions (security, rights, markets), with increasing burden-sharing philosophies to migration control.

Against the backdrop of the increasing intersection of the three dimensions of migration, a key question was how far could liberal states go in adopting a comprehensive approach that balanced national security interests with human mobility? More specifically, how has the mobility playing-field changed, in this context? By focusing on both formal and informal structures

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[7]   A vivid example of such institutional collaboration was the changes fostered by the 2002 US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), permitting information sharing between intelligence agents and criminal investigations (Etzioni 2004: 31). While not completely eradicating turf battles, it fostered a new culture, removing barriers between various intelligence agencies and law-enforcement agencies (e.g., CIA, FBI, NSA, and DHS).

(institutional/policy and attitudinal responses), the next section shows that liberal states have reconciled these competing demands, and reinvented some control over human mobility by forfeiting certain democratic practices. They have done so by shifting the level of policy making and by enlisting a range of players that include private, local, and international actors, and sending or transit countries, who have assumed gatekeeping functions. The analytical framework below broadly delineates the new playing-field and the logic behind it.

Analytical Framework: The Institutional Expansion of the Migration Regulatory Playing-Field

In the aftermath of 9/11, the most radical institutional changes were captured by the organizational restructuring of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the creation of a Department of Homeland Security which could be responsible for overseeing the multiple dimensions of migration. Bringing twenty-two federal agencies under one umbrella to coordinate activities, the formation of a new Office of Homeland Security represented the first significant addition to the US government since 1947, when Harry Truman merged the various branches of the US Armed Forces into the Department of Defense to better coordinate the nation's defense against military threats (US Department of Homeland Security, www.dhs.gov). Pursuing a comprehensive mission, the DHS Strategic Goals and Objectives identified its objective being to ensure all-encompassing "protection" (see US Dept. of Homeland Security 2004).[8] In defining its mandate to protect from both physical harm and compromise of "freedoms," the American state exposed the contradictory challenges posed by the mobility trilemma.

In Europe too, the pursuit of a balanced and comprehensive approach to migration control was institutionalized in the Amsterdam provisions on migration and asylum (Council of the European Union, 1997). The Treaty laid out the European Union's objective for a vast area of justice and home affairs – now referred to as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – "to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and

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8   It outlined that protection entailed "safeguard[ing] our people and their freedoms, critical infrastructures, property and the economy of our nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies" (objective 3.7). But, in safeguarding ports and borders, the Agency noted that "the most innovative analytical tools can be ineffective or even harmful if implemented and deployed without regard to security and privacy considerations" (US DHS, 2004) p. 157).

justice by developing common action among the member-states in the field of police, judicial cooperation and criminal matters *and* by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia." The conflation of market, security, and rights interests, generated by such a comprehensive mission coincided with a flurry of policy initiatives focusing on human mobility.

Among policies developed towards containing human mobility in Europe, for example, were tighter border controls, increased visa requirements, readmission agreements, carrier sanctions, buffer zones, Eurodoc fingerprinting and Schengen Information System databases, "safe third country," and accelerated return procedures and coordination. In the United States too, increasing border patrols, employer sanctions, and labor enforcement, work authorization verification procedures, detention and removal of criminal aliens, changing benefits eligibility, and computer registration systems were adopted by the late 1980s, but activity soared after 9/11. The Patriot Law of 2001 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act in 2002 paved the way for electronic innovations, visa screening, racial and ethnic profiling, acceleration of asylum hearing procedures, and unprecedented security checks. The modernization of immigration controls included the latest technology, such as the use of biometrics, the SEVIS database for foreign students, as well as the reorganization of the entire INS under the umbrella of a central coordinating institution (the DHS).

While these initiatives represented the most obvious legislative responses to security concerns, what has gone largely unnoticed in all of these policy developments has been the marked reliance on the incorporation of non-state or private actors, who provide services, resources, technology, and nonpublic practices that are otherwise unavailable to central government officials (Gilboy 1997; 1998; Lahav 1998; 2003). Actors such as airlines and transport companies, travel agencies, hospitals, universities, employer groups, and foreign states have been coopted in an extended regulatory framework of migration and border control. The momentum towards a comprehensive approach has coincided with a sweeping expansion of the migration regulatory regime. This notably includes the widespread proliferation of actors (e.g., private, local, and international) involved in restrictive policy implementation (Lahav 1998; 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; 2006). In the literature, they have invariably been understood as "deputy sheriffs" (Torpey 1998), "agents" (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000) and public–private partnerships in processes of "remote control" (Zolberg 1998), delegation (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), venue-shopping (Guiraudon 2000; Lavenex 2001a–b), externalization (Lavenex and Uçarer 2002; 2004; Lavenex 1999; 2006; Boswell 2003), and

Central States Courts Interest groups Executive Legislative politics Civil service Ministries/admin Customs agencies Law enforcement agencies (fed) Public opinion	**International/Transnational Actors** EU NAFTA Schengen Consulates/visa Foreign countries

International/Transnational Actors

EU
NAFTA
Schengen
Consulates/visa
Foreign countries

Central States

Courts
Interest groups
Executive
Legislative politics
Civil service
Ministries/admin
Customs agencies
Law enforcement agencies (fed)
Public opinion

Private Actors
Airlines
Security agencies
Transport carrier
Employers
Families/sponsors

Local Actors
Jails
Mayors
Detention centres
Police

Figure 6.3 The new gatekeepers and the extended migration regulatory field: non-state (international, private, local) actors and control sites.

devolution and privatization (Lahav 1998; 2000; 2008). Since these non-state actors have the economic, social and/or political resources to facilitate or curtail entry and return, they provide states with different sites and tools to control mobility at the source (see Figure 6.3). Together with the state, they may manage the mobility control trilemma in ways that balance the multiple interests of the parties involved.

While the constellation of actors with diverse interests reflects the complexity of an extended regulatory playing-field, the dynamic is similar. In almost all cases, they are encouraged by states to promulgate extremely protectionist norms. Actors at different levels are reined in either through incentives or constraints (e.g., sanctions). Clearly, the effectiveness of such an expanded migratory regime depends on the nature of the relationships that keep these dynamics in motion, and the degree of collaboration, cooptation,

or level of autonomy of each actor. The logic involves both a political desire to control movement, and agents willing and able to play on the link between mobility and security (see Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; 2006).

Through processes of decentralization, for example, national governments have delegated significant decision-making powers to local actors, such as elected officials, mayors, and police in ways that have been considered to be exclusionary and detrimental to foreigners' rights and civil liberties. In France, for example, mayors have been actors in migration control through their authority over marital and residential certificates (see Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Weil 1997). A major motivation behind this kind of decentralization is that nationally elected officials concur with and depend on locally elected officials, who are at the intersection of central governments and private persons, and who may be under financial and political pressure to attract more funds and votes by adopting exceptionally harsh measures against immigrants.[9] While the role of local actors in implementation functions has become pivotal, as immigration regimes fortify their ties to criminal justice systems (see Stumpf 2006, Lee 2009) and state and local enforcement officers are better placed to compete for limited budgets (Bigo 1996; Miller 1995) in order to provide screening services, central states have protected their policy authority.[10]

The aspirations of local actors to partake in gatekeeping functions is sometimes more enthusiastic than politically feasible or acceptable for national policy makers. Given that local actors are generally major fiscal and political stakeholders of immigration (Spiro, 1994), they are often eager to assume control over traditionally unfunded mandates. While such incentives have enabled national actors effectively to enlarge immigration control through burden-sharing, in some cases, collaboration has incited competition.[11] In the US federal system, the Supreme Court consistently supports the exclusive federal prerogatives in the area of immigration regulation, via the plenary power doctrine, and the dangers of state encroachment. The recent, controversial Ari-

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9   A 1993 law granted mayors the option of referring a marriage involving an alien to the Procureur de la République (state prosecutor), who can delay the marriage for a month and then, if they see fit, prevent it.

10   In the US federal system for example, since 9/11, it may be argued that a shift towards a centralized model of security has occurred, as the TSA has assumed responsibility for setting and monitoring standards of key airport security. Similarly, the creation, under the Patriot Act of 2001 and Enhanced Border Security, of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) has been part of the effort of DHS to streamline and centralize control over mobility.

11   The conflict over mandates is not new in the USA. Until the Civil War, local states carried a number of prerogatives in the area of migration as a way for those with slave populations to maintain control over nationality

zona legislation, SB 1070, which was held up by the Supreme Court, epito-mized the struggle between local and central state actors in monitoring human mobility. Although deemed unconstitutional in January 2011, legislators in more than twenty US states announced plans to introduce bills modeled after Arizona's controversial immigration law. Such political wranglings are seen not only to heighten turf wars, through the contradictory goals of different arms of the state (i.e., the police, judiciary, and public administration), but also to blur the lines between national and local mandates (and supranational, in the EU case). The costs of decentralization and incorporation of local actors for immigration flows are more diverse local outcomes and uneven integra-tion strategies, which often give the semblance of policy incoherence. More substantively, such complicity between national and local actors, especially in cases of foreigner surveillance, has resulted in opportunities for inappropriate racial profiling, institutional discrimination, and the exchange and/or misuse of private personal information.

Through processes of externalization (Lavenex 1999; 2006; Cassarino 2005), liberal states have been able to "shift liabilities" outwards to third-party foreign states (Lahav, 1998) and international or supranational actors. In this way, they can extend their borders, well before immigrants even arrive and even after, by circumventing more liberal national jurisprudence (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). The abolition of routine checks at EU internal borders have been somewhat offset by the proliferation of intergovernmental and suprana-tional actors who promote a more effective migration control regime. Border extensions may be said to exist in Europe as a result of the European Neigh-borhood Policy (ENP), or "Schengenland," which potentially makes each member country the beneficiary of police-screening efforts of the others, long before incomers arrive at national borders. The launch of the ENP established by the 2003 Wider European Initiative on the eve of enlargement preparations reflected the new security environment of the post-Cold War.

In efforts to address both "soft" and "hard" security threats (economic and social development, political unrest, and military proliferation), the EU pursued readmission agreements with third countries, and widened the num-ber of actors in border and migration management. By outsourcing the moni-toring of mobility to less accountable countries in the Mediterranean, such as Libya or Morocco, EU states were seen to circumscribe their more democratic domestic constraints. Bolstered by the European project of regional integra-tion, many regulatory actors and types of arrangements have now evolved in the image of the Schengen Group, representative of the administrative culture of traditional immigration decision making, where decisions have typically

been made behind closed doors, with little or no formal debate in a public forum. Intergovernmental actors or foreign states do not have to answer to a more representative body or to international courts such as the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice. The lack of transparency of these negotiations not only makes it difficult for certain national actors to oversee the process, but may be used to circumvent even the most liberal national constraints on migration control (Bunyan and Webber 1995; Guiraudon 2000).

To a lesser degree, but in the same vein, the joint United States–Mexican border patrol taskforces have attempted to coordinate strategies to deal effectively with illegal migration as NAFTA has been consolidating (Andreas 2003; 2009). While negotiations between American President Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox on the eve of September 11, 2001 for an amnesty program came to a crashing halt, a new focus was directed at the Canadian border. The revelation that several hijackers entered surreptitiously across the Canadian border led the USA to opt for some type of "joint security perimeter" in lieu of compromising a friendship and economic interest by resorting to physical and administrative barriers along the border (*NY Times*, September 27, 2001). In an effort to get the Mexico deal back on the table, resumed talks with President Fox also proposed the inclusion of Mexico in a security perimeter that covered all NAFTA territory.

The externalization of migration control, as it has been called (see Cassarino 2005), by incorporating third countries or international spaces might not only be interpreted as a border shift *outward* (coupled with a strategy shift from apprehension after crossing to deterrence before entry). These measures also mean that governments may rely on "remote control" immigration policy (Zolberg 1999) or the creation of transnational zones (i.e., cyberspace, airspace, seas) or international zones (i.e., in airports) of juridical "no man's land" where intervention by lawyers and human rights associations is almost impossible and thus foreigners' civil rights are less transparent (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). Human rights groups have claimed that these types of spaces "create a corporate equivalent of Guantanamo Bay" – a virtual rules-free zone (*NY Times*, May 24, 2006, A16).

Finally, through privatization or outsourcing strategies (Lahav 1998), private actors, or independent authorities who rely on market forces, have become crucial immigration agents in extending the area of "remote control" immigration policy. These actors include airlines, shipping carriers, transport companies, security services for entry, employer groups and trade unions for work, universities, propriety schools such as language or aviation facilities, hotels, health care services and civic actors, such as churches and families

for immigrant stays. They also include detention centers, for-profit security services and space for deportation and exit. Often compelled by international agreements, these actors are either incorporated by the state or contracted out. To the extent that their functions have evolved from contractors into regulators – from the public to the private sphere, we can speak about these processes as a "privatization of regulation" (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994). That they are compelled to cooperate, through economic incentives and sanctions or fines, means however that these private actors serve to renationalize and extend the reach of the state, rather than abdicate control. Thus, with little training investments, private carriers and agencies partake in an enlarged migration control as agents of the state. In return for government cooperation, they are assured a smoother flow of business, trade, labor, and tourism.

In all cases, the development of the relationship between states and non-state actors in meeting security and mobility goals captures a global era marked by intense pressures for collaboration and cooperation. Invariably, the dominance of the state in orchestrating and overseeing such compliance of non-state actors has become more pervasive. Of course, the proliferation of such control mechanisms does not necessarily mean that states have become more efficient in their overall response to migration. On the contrary, intensified regulation and limitation of entry access may in fact serve to dislocate the pressure for mobility and have unintended effects, such as perpetuating the phenomenon of irregular migration, compromising states' capacity to satisfy economic demands (Castles 2004) and to fulfill humanitarian obligations, and undermining civil liberties (Lahav 2003). Notwithstanding, the dynamic is driven by the desire of liberal states to diffuse the costs of regulation, to derive substantial leverage in managing the migration trilemma, and thus to regain any legitimacy they may have lost since migration became securitized.

Non-state actors (such as civil libertarian groups) may have gained more visibility, but have also incurred significant expenses in the expansion of the migratory regulatory regime. For example, the organizational and technological challenges, introduced by innovative technologies, and new procedures in mobility have substantially increased costs to carriers, who are forced to bear the financial brunt of staffing, cockpit-door reinforcement, security training and insurance, surveillance, and general training.[12] In a corporate culture, travel industry groups have voiced concern that new airport security systems

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[12]   It is a telltale sign of security and civil liberties priorities that a large part of increased air-carrier security expenditures does not go to personnel training. A study of European airlines revealed that among additional expenditures for 2002, more than fifty percent was delegated to insurance premiums, compared with two percent for training (European Commission, 2004 23).

could hurt the industry (*CNN*, October 29, 2003). Private actors have been disproportionately penalized, economically.[13] Similarly, the focus on security concerns in regulating foreign student mobility has been seen to compromise the higher education industry in Europe and the USA, and to have diverted student flows to alternative entrepreneurial markets (Altbach 2004; *The Economist* 2010). For example, the creation of a Student and Exchange Visitors Program (SEVP), as part of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement to centralize the control and monitoring of international students and scholars, has been seen as inefficient, costly, and intrusive. It has thus been deemed by some to have compromised the competitiveness of the American education market.[14]

Security concerns have laid the grounds for collaboration and the enlistment of non-state actors in ways that not only undermine mobility and market interests, but rights norms as well. A major concern around the increasing participation of non-state actors stems from the fact that legal regimes governing privacy- and personal-data protection vary for public and private agencies. Another key concern for civil rights advocates is the application of standards of intelligence and information sharing for terrorism to issues of mobility.[15] Furthermore, the enormous responsibility given to untrained border agents, educators, or administrators of private agencies to sort out potential terrorists from legitimate asylum-seekers, foreigners, or legal residents has outraged civil libertarians and human rights groups. Finally, the security prevalence over mobility has challenged traditional human rights norms. In the United States, for example, critics claim that new security regulations requiring passengers to show identity proof before boarding flights is tantamount to an internal passport, and several lawsuits have been filed against the FAA, the Department of Justice, and others over the constitutionality of these meas-

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[13]   For example, the centralization of aviation security has spawned a whole new industry of surveillance, personal identity, and remote sensing technologies, with estimates reaching $7 billion by 2007 (Lahav 2008).

[14]   At a time when most countries worldwide have been experiencing dramatic growth in their overseas enrolments, the growth in foreign students in the US stopped in 2002–3, and has since plateaued (Altbach 2004). The UK, the world's second market in higher education, with an industry that generates $39.4 billion of revenues (*The Economist*, August 5, 2010), has also been seen as victim of the UK Border Agency, which revoked the sponsorships of approximately twenty percent of the higher education sector (*The Guardian*, November 1, 2011). Controversial reform of the student-visa system to stop bogus student was said to have reduced the numbers of foreign students by 11,000 and to have led to more than 450 colleges pulling out of the market (*The Guardian*, November 1, 2011).

[15]   In the USA, critics of FISA's provision for information sharing have questioned the use of special powers and information sharing among government agencies for one pretext (e.g., catching terrorists) to pursue individuals for other crimes, including illegal migration (Etzioni 2004: 31)

ures. Broadly speaking, as controlling mobility has largely become synonymous with national defense, the enlistment of non-state actors represents a shift away from public or collective debate towards private decisions (Moore 2003). Such potential for abuse or non-transparency of decision-making authority over mobility unsettles democratic norms. The emphasis on collaboration has involved a complicity of actors that, while offering to streamline mobility concerns, has further threatened civil liberties.

The ability of democratic states to manage such trade-offs depends not only on the compliance of non-state actors, but also on their capacity to overcome certain normative constraints and to garner public support. The following section thus considers public opinion as a measure of democratic legitimacy.

Normative Shifts: Public Opinion Constraints

The discussion above revealed that well before 9/11, but particularly after, with shifting security-driven norms, liberal states have been oriented not only in rhetoric but also in capacities toward more control over mobility. This section argues that in an era dominated by a security agenda, liberal democratic states can go fairly far in regulating mobility, not only by the modes of implementation they have adopted, but also because they are sanctioned by their consensual publics to compromise their rights-based norms in these processes.

As security threats have risen to the fore, it is not surprising to expect that publics would support increasing mobility regulations, and especially, greater curtailment of immigration. But under what conditions would they agree to compromise civil liberties in order to achieve more controlled mobility? The effectiveness of states to manage the migration trilemma is largely dependent on the ability to respond to these liberal norms and overcome certain normative constraints.

While the impact of public opinion has been much debated in the literature (see Lahav 2004), concerning the degree to which democracies are accountable to their citizenries, the role of publics is unavoidable. Clearly, the ultimate source of oversight is the public or citizenry that may be informed and alerted by a free press and civil liberties groups. Some observers even argue that although civil libertarians typically prefer courts than government administrations, they fear judges who are publicly elected or politically appointed and thus subject to the influence of public opinion (especially since 9/11) (see Etzioni 2004).

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, public opinion polls suggested that the role of civil liberties and human rights were seen as a price of shifting security concerns. In the United States, Americans reported support for racial and ethnic profiling of Arab Americans (through greater surveillance), greater FBI invasion of citizens' privacy, and a close monitoring of legal immigrants (Time Polling Report 2001). They were more likely to entertain national identity cards and to be inconvenienced by surveillance schemes for more security. Among a random sample of 1,234 telephone interviews conducted in the United States between September 30 and February 3, 2002, public opinion revealed increased support for government, and for migration restrictions (especially for Middle Eastern migrants).[16]

Among all security measures, Americans expressed unanimous consent to the regulation of mobility. At the height of the "War on Terror," ninety-four percent of Americans identified that they were strongly in favor or willing to accept restrictions on air travel (including requiring earlier arrival at airports, metal detectors, random passenger searches, etc.). Only five percent of those surveyed reported such initiatives to go too far (Princeton Survey Research Associates, 2002). When Americans were asked about the ability of federal government agencies to obtain private telephone records, sixty-nine percent reported it acceptable because "fighting terrorism is more important, even if it violates civil liberties" (Gallup/*USA Today* Poll, May 2006). By 2010, American public opinion polls revealed support for full-body scans at airports (Poll Watch, November 21, 2010), as well as support for the Arizona immigration law, giving police increased powers to stop and detain people who are suspected of being illegal (Gallup, April 29, 2010). European publics have wittingly accepted the rights contractions accompanying mobility restrictions incurred by security-driven regulations (see Zureik et al. 2010) as well. Approximately forty-three percent of respondents in countries such as France, Japan, the US and Spain (forty-nine percent) agreed to extra airport security checks for visible minorities (Zureik et al. 2010: 33).

In Europe too, the events of 9/11 and particularly 2004 affected popular attitudes toward monitoring foreigners and minorities, especially European Muslims. Survey research showed that respondents were less likely after 9/11 to support the accommodation of Islam in state-run schools (Fetzer and Soper 2005). Public opinion polls in November 2001 (exactly 2 months after 9/11) revealed that despite national variations, Europeans overwhelmingly

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16   This is based on a six-month NSF-sponsored telephone survey (rolling cross-section); see Huddy et al. (2005).

delegated to EU authority in some form or other (either exclusively or with national authority) the fight against terrorism (the EU average was eight-eight percent).[17] Notably, European masses became increasingly poised to defer greater powers to law enforcement following the deadly attacks that killed more than 300 people from November 2003 onwards in Turkey, Spain and Britain (Concord On-Line Monitor, January 23, 2005). As a large study on the British Identity Cards Scheme (LSE's Identity Project) revealed, public opinion towards increased regulation has not wavered. While media attention on issues of privacy and surveillance issues increased dramatically, and the impact of civil liberties has been catapulted on to the mainstream media agenda (Whitley 2008; 13), the decline in public support for a "surveillance society" has been rather inconsequential. The salience of a security–mobility link has served to reframe the liberties debate but has not generated much politicization, in terms of public reaction (see Zureik et al. 2008). The emphasis on surveillance (or social sorting) of movement since 9/11 has substantially reversed the order of priorities of free movement and travel over security within the context of "area of freedom, security, and justice." Ironically, as noted above, these rights trade-offs and such public acquiescence were not accompanied by a noticeable surge in populist movements.

Several reasons may explain the informed consensus behind an extended mobility regime that devalues rights. First, as previously mentioned, when immigration policy becomes linked to physical security, the public becomes more consensual and favors more restrictive immigration policies which coalesce around a common national interest (Hammar 1985; Lahav and Courtemanche 2011). In contrast to cultural and economic threats, which result in greater internal divisions (and politicization) because they derive from prior political outlook and values, physical safety is a unifying threat that may result in cohesive public opinion (Feldman and Stenner 1997) Indeed, over the last decade, an era marked by relative physical security in most Western nations, national opinion over migration has been polarized and politicized. Thus, as immigration has shifted from a cultural to physical threat, immigration issues have become increasingly more salient (on the political agenda) but less politicized (divisive) (Lahav and Courtemanche 2011).

Second, even in the USA, where corporate culture has been traditionally strong, "big government" receives more support over business interests during times of heightened threat (Etzioni, 2004). Moreover, though most people

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[17] This derives from a short flash survey by the European Commission, *Eurobarometer* 114 on "International Crisis," conducted during November 13–23, 2001.

across various democracies express skepticism of both government or private companies' abilities to protect their personal information (see Zureik et al. 2010: 13), they are more likely to support information sharing between private actors and national governments than all other combinations.[18] Although attitudinal data varies according to question phrasing, there is ample evidence to support what de Tocqueville had presciently noted about democracies in the late 1800s. That is,

> [T]he increasing love of well-being and shifting character of property make democratic peoples afraid of material disturbances. Love of public peace is often the only political passion which they retain, and it alone becomes more active and powerful as all others fade and die. This naturally disposes the citizens constantly to give the central government new powers, or to let it take them, for it alone seems both anxious and able to defend them from anarchy by defending itself. ([1840] 1969: 671)

As more recently corroborated by empirical research, the willingness to compromise civil liberties and curtail freedoms in order to protect safety is great under conditions of perceived heightened threat (Davis and Silver 2004; Lahav and Courtemanche 2012; Huddy et al. 2005; Gibson 1996; 1998; Sniderman et al. 1996). According to Etzioni, the correlation between strong safety measures and democracy is the opposite of what civil libertarians may argue – that is, democracy is endangered not when strong measures are taken by government to enhance safety and to protect and reassure the public, but when they are not taken (Etzioni, 2004: 21). For example, in order to preserve democratic freedoms that include privacy, protection of innocents and fraud, new tools and actors may create less arbitrariness, and more reliable means of identification.

Third, consensus is promoted by security-biased mobility regulations, which tend to depoliticize civil liberties concerns. Such emergent norms yield a recalibrated mobility equation. Indeed, there is compelling aggregate evidence to suggest that policies towards human mobility and civil liberties may inextricably hinge on how closely they are linked with security. Preliminary studies have shown that issue-framing and media discourse can substantially

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[18]   According to the Surveillance Project survey, 34% of Americans, 40.6% of Spaniards, and 37.8% of French state that "under no circumstances should a private sector organization share information" with their national government, compared with 53%, 61% or 56% of respondents who thought that private companies should not share with other private companies, respectively (Zureik, et al., 2010: 28).

influence mobility regulations. For example, in focus group analysis tested in an LSE study, presumptions that drive public opinion on biometrics are highly variable; "security" was a keyword for those who support the technology, while "surveillance" and "control" were key negatives for those concerned about technology (Hosain 2005: 140). As migration experts have noted, if migration is linked to security, we may expect more limited debate on democratic values or civil liberties, and ultimately depoliticization to take place (Liberatore 2005: 2).

Finally, in this security context of limited public scrutiny and debates, institutional dynamics related to mobility may reflect weak demand structure or client politics. The promotion of the EU as a foreign policy actor in mobility, for example, has coincided with the institutional dominance of security-dominant JHA, which has emerged as a pivotal actor in EU migration regulation. The democratic shortcomings of institutions include the marginal role of national legislatures and the European Parliament (EP), the non-accountability of Eurojust (EU Justice cooperation) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the isolation of police cooperation (Europol) from the publics. The suspension of legal norms in light of the war against terrorism or security interests has been seen incrementally to reverse the institutional hierarchies of democratic political systems in favor of executive branches (Liberatore 2005, 2). An institutional security network gains the upper hand over the due process of law and powerful bureaucracies emerge with their own corporate agendas. Often shielded from scrutiny for operational reasons, these agendas elude routine parliamentary oversight. To a large degree, the activity generated by a migration security regime has been determined by bargaining among networks of bureaucrats and professional elites – seemingly disconnected from publics.

By placing mobility on the security agenda then, liberal states have been able to mobilize a hostile anti-immigrant public opinion, skew and defuse political debate, diffuse the costs of regulation, and overcome liberal constitutional and market constraints. More importantly, these regulatory strategies enable liberal democracies to neutralize the contradictions between open borders for goods, capital and services and limited borders for the movement of people. The innovative technological support gained by democratically unaccountable non-state actors provide states the capacity to regulate borders more securely, in more flexible ways that can depoliticize the rights fall-out, and short-circuit public scrutiny. In the practice, liberal democracies have been able to deploy draconian policy instruments that are legitimized by widespread public opinion – thereby reconciling the trilemma between rights, security, and markets.

Conclusions

The renewed and intensified linkage between mobility and security issues in a global world has put into question the notion of citizen "protection." The protectionist requirements of security are often at odds with the openness of the political process, the liberal market, or rights-based order, and the trade-off for citizens often involves a security versus civil liberties calculus. Since free trade requires a degree of openness that impedes calls for tighter border controls, liberal states concerned with promoting modern trade and commerce and with protection of minorities cannot embrace policies that hinder or discriminate the movement of people across borders – in the form of racial profiling, deprivation of due process of law, extraditions, personal data collection, and data sharing mechanisms. Or can they?

Based on a neo-institutional analysis of formal policies and informal norms, this chapter suggests that liberal states in a new security framework *can* and *do* reconcile the mobility trilemma by shifting liabilities and sharing the burden with an array of non-state actors. Developed almost uniformly in the countries of Europe and the United States, liberal states have compellingly applied a security heuristic to mobility and adopted more collaborative strategies with diverse actors, based on more stringent deterrent methods such as sanctions. As this chapter has shown, the deference of border regulation to security interests has enabled states to mobilize against mobility by more effectively diversifying their arsenal, intensifying the incentive structure for compliance, and generating public support or legitimacy.

Two sets of factors condition the effectiveness of these dynamics. First, the ability of states to enlist, outsource or privatize control functions by depending on market forces for the pursuit of social goods, has allowed states to extend their realm of action, despite divergent motives. While the dispersal of responsibility among actors whose interests do not necessarily coincide may be seen to compromise the effectiveness of the entire mobility regime, the increasing role of the state to absorb all the moving parts has been a key feature of this new regime. In contrast to traditional pluralist politics that tend to yield liberal norms or outcomes, a neocorporatist model suggests that as the state negotiates with interlocutors or stakeholders, it may expand, as links between officials and social groups proliferate. Indeed, the increasing density of gatekeepers is a testament to the "webbing" of the state apparatus, and may be interpreted less as an abdication of state authority and more as renationalization of mobility. These gatekeepers rely on strategies which operate *before* the border or at the control site to facilitate the movement of tour-

ists and businessmen while preventing unwanted migrants. New procedures adopted by the White House and the FBI under Robert Mueller after 9/11 to prevent terrorist attacks *before* they occur rather than conducting prosecutions *afterwards* has facilitated the complicity of non-state actors, including local law enforcement, foreign states, and private agencies (Etzioni 2004: 33) In this way, liberal states can respond to the costs, benefits, imperatives, and consequences of globalization: sustained migration pressures, tourism, free trade flows, and global terror networks.

The second condition facilitating this new mobility regime stems from public opinion and lies in the emergence of new norms. These norms reflect higher levels of sensitivity and broader definitions of potential 'security' risks, but they have potentially negative implications for civil liberties. Thus, while non-state actors have facilitated mobility and control (i.e., the 'good' – lucrative migrants, tourists, and students) as a result of their situational position, and sophisticated new technology at their disposal, the bias of security over privacy has given them leverage and legitimacy due to the support of threatened publics. Security is a powerful issue that motivates voters to transfer such authority to bureaucracies and other non-state actors in the name of law and order. Although the proliferation of non-state actors in controlling mobility represents a trade-off of certain democratic values, it is sanctioned by citizens who exhibit a ready willingness to exchange civil liberties and personal freedoms for a greater sense of security from human mobility, immigration, terrorism, and globalization.

The increasingly complex web of actors, and incorporation of non-state, private, or third-state actors is not necessarily new, but its novelty lay in the traditional context of liberal norms (Lahav 1998), and particularly in the reversal of twenty-first-century priorities. The increasing formalization and institutionalization of the security agenda in migration regulation has challenged the normative framework of what Hollifield (1992) called "embedded liberalism." The irony of the mobility–security link is that many of the control and surveillance techniques such as the census and civil registration which have developed as a way of granting civil rights, have become means for liberal states to gain more information and control over their citizens. Whereas the transformation of borders has been the mantra of "frontier-free Europe," for example, today's EU has witnessed a more systematic reappearance of passports or national identification cards as prerequisites for air travel – in many cases, for internal travel. The creation of the Amsterdam Treaty's 'area of freedom, security, and justice' under a loose singular body captures the serious efforts to institutionalize a comprehensive approach, which substantially

reversed the order of priorities of free movement and travel over security. In this way, the EU, like the USA (with its enlarged DHS) has opened opportunities for more controls to occur in the name of freedom (Guild and Bigo 2005: 223). Clearly, the elevation of migration from an economic and cultural threat to a physical threat has shed new light on the effects of threat perception on competing mobility norms and democratic values.

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(Re)thinking Transnationalism and Integration in the Digital Era: A Shift Towards Cosmopolitanism in the Study of International Migrations[1]

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Tonight, I'm babysitting. When my wife is home alone and has to cook, for example, she turns the camera on the children and goes down to the kitchen to take care of the meal. I keep an eye on them, and if one of them starts crying, I send her a text message. (Stefan[2], computer programmer, 43 years old)

Nowadays, using a camera to look after one's children is hardly out of the ordinary – or it would not be, if the Romanian computing professional in the opening quote were in the next room. But he is in his apartment in Toronto, several thousand kilometers away from his wife and sons, who are spending a few months in their second home in Romania. This is a telling story about how the Internet and other information and communication technologies (ICTs) are changing the transnational experiences of migrants and nonmigrants, creating the feeling of living in a smaller world.

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[2] Names cited have been changed.

Once seen as a "double absence" ("not here, nor there") (Sayad 1999), the contemporary migrant is developing new ways of being together within a web of social ties that span borders. He is able to master new geographies of everyday life and strategically use his multiple belongings and identifications within a ubiquitous regime of co-presence engendered by the technological developments of the twenty-first century. In a world transformed by increasing various border-crossing mobilities and complex globalization processes, the digital revolution transforms in complex ways the dynamics of international migrations, by generating a multiplicity of flows characterized by the simultaneity and intensity of transnational exchanges. Indeed, the above quote by a Romanian migrant living in Switzerland illustrates the chasm between such modes of communication and early twentieth-century letters sent by the Polish peasant in the United States to stay in contact transnationally (Thomas and Znaniecki [1919] 1998), or the audio tapes with which Algerian migrants living in France used to communicate with relatives back home in the 1980s (Sayad 1985).

Today, the Internet facilitates the co-presence of mobile actors in multiple locations and allows the emergence of new transnational habitus. It also enhances new connected ways of mobilization and cohesion at a distance, although there are still many (unskilled) migrants that cannot benefit yet on a large scale from the digital revolution. These phenomena reflect into new power asymmetries and inequalities, while significantly transforming how individuals perceive their place in the world. The resulting social change reveals a new meaning of migrants' transnational practices, as well as the challenges faced by host states and the policy projects they implement to integrate these migrants.

Complex and deep interconnections between global dynamics and local processes are part and parcel of this social change. This ontological reality challenges social sciences both theoretically and methodologically, as not only does globalization alter the relationship between nation-states and their societies, but it also changes societies from within, through what Ulrich Beck (2002) calls the "cosmopolitanization of nation-state societies." Scholars that talk about a "mobility turn" in social sciences (Urry 2007; Hannam et al. 2006) consider mobility as the main new paradigmatic approach to study society and social transformation; that is, social scholars should adopt a mobile lens, one that "connects the analysis of different forms of travel, transport, and communications" (Urry 2007: 6).

As a primary form of border-crossing movements, international migration appears as a first-choice object to study through a "mobility lens," Nevertheless, while the mobility paradigm is gaining momentum (Cresswell 2010), this chapter takes a different epistemological argument and aims at opening the way to a new (cosmopolitan) approach to transnationalism and migrant integration in the digital era. It argues that migration studies could make a significant contribution towards a post-nation epistemological shift when related to a broader debate of the "national" limits of social sciences' conceptual tools. I will begin by unpacking the complexities of such a research perspective based on empirical considerations. Choosing ICTs as a lens through which transnational processes may be read, I will put specific focus on three types of technology: digital and satellite media, the Internet and computer-mediated communication, and mobile telephones. In line with the topic of this book, the study of the social impact of these technologies in migration context will open discussion on a different aspect of mobility paradigm, as "the more television, but also the mobile phone and the Internet, become part of the fittings of homes, the more the sociological categories of time, space, place, proximity and place change their meaning. Because this domestic information technology interior potentially makes those who are absent present, always and everywhere" (Beck 2002: 31).

Articulated around the banal cosmopolitanization of social life and the emergence of new transnational social habitus (Nedelcu 2012), the empirical evidence offers arguments for a critique of the limits to migration theory that methodological nationalism imposes. After a brief overview of the transnational studies approach, I propose to revisit the national–transnational nexus by putting into perspective the debate raised by Ulrich Beck's "cosmopolitan vision" to reframe the question of transnationalism. By expanding on Beck's general social theory (Beck 2006), which is based on a cosmopolitan and ambivalent "new social grammar," I will set forth a new avenue for research that makes possible a doubly inclusive approach. This approach allows pushing past the limits of methodological nationalism and beyond traditional dichotomies such as mobile/sedentary, native/foreign, or included/excluded in order to provide a different explanation for the coexistence of local and particularistic movements with more global and universal orientations. In conclusion, I will sketch out the principal avenues for a new research approach to the study of international migrations.

Information and Communication Technologies –
A New Key Reading of Transnational Migration

In 1994, in his article *Welcome to Cyberia,* Arturo Escobar drew anthropologists' attention to the need for "cybercultural studies" that could describe, analyze, and help explain how our construction of reality is changed and negotiated by the adoption of ICTs at all levels of social life (Panagakos and Horst 2006). Pushing past the initial dialectic of technological and sociological determinism (Jouët 1992), numerous scholars have turned their attention to the impact of the Internet and online interactions on identity, order, and social control; the structure and dynamic of virtual communities; and forms and principles of collective action (Kollock and Smith 1999; Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002; Wellman and Gulia 1999; Proulx and Latzko-Toth 2000; Miller 2011). Today, digital media, Internet-mediated communication, and so-called "virtual" practices cannot be dissociated from offline practices and from individuals' daily lives (Miller 2011; Miller and Slater 2000). De facto, intense online sociability also reinforces close-range social contacts and ties, and vice versa (Wellman and Gulia 1999; Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002; Ellison et al. 2007).

This is particularly striking in the case of mobile individuals (Silverstone 2003) and migrant communities (Nedelcu 2003; 2009a-c; 2010) who combine various modes of interaction, information, and long-distance and close-range communication to mobilize resources and weave a dense fabric of (transnational) social ties.

I will thus take a closer look at three technologies that have contributed to a profound transformation of the processes of identity (re)construction in migration, to the mixing of cultural models, and to the establishment of new relationships among immigrant and native populations, as well as to an intensification of transnational exchanges and flows. Namely: (1) digital and satellite media; (2) the Internet; and (3) mobile telephone communications.

Digital and satellite media

Starting in the 1990s, ethnic media burgeoned thanks to new digital compression technologies and the arrival of Ku-band satellites that could broadcast large numbers of radio and television channels. So-called "diaspora broadcasting" for "minority" and "delocalized" audiences grew exponentially (Karim 1999). What was the impact of such broadcasting on identity processes, on the

emergence of new "imagined communities" in the diaspora, and on migrants' social cohesion, citizenship, and social integration?

Several studies report cultural changes brought about by expanded access to mass media (radio, television, and newspapers) produced and distributed in both host and origin countries. Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins, in their study of the media and cultural practices of the Turkish diaspora in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, show that satellite television systems make it possible for migrants to "routinely watch television from Turkey, and to be thereby in synchronized contact with everyday life and events in Turkey" (Aksoy and Robins 2002: 6). This possibility transforms the way in which separation and distance from the country of origin are experienced. Further, the authors deconstruct an approach that has been framed too "nationally," intensifying fears that satellite broadcasting of Turkish television threatens efforts towards unity, cohesion, and integration in German society (Robins 2001). Such an approach emphasizes the emergence of a "global diaspora culture" in which ethnic, national, or religious identities tend to be reinforced and essentialized. By proposing a different reading of this "banal transnationalism" (Rigoni 2001), Aksoy and Robins (2002) show that, to the contrary, such television programming offers direct contact with the reality of life in Turkey, and, consequentially, provides "cultural demythologization" that balances and corrects conservative tendencies individuals may feel with regard to their cultural identity. Thus, migrants can develop a critical attitude toward their original cultural heritage (Robins 2001). Hence, culture emerges "as a way of thinking, not of belonging" (Robins 2001: 33). This approach offers an innovative research perspective that accounts for the experiences of the "empirical people," going beyond the "fictive unity" (Robins 2001: 30–32) of the "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991).

In her work on Turkish and Kurdish media in Europe, Isabelle Rigoni (2001) underlines the role of ethnic media in the exercise of "total citizenship," defined as "a key word in debates over desirable combinations of rights, responsibilities and competences" (Rigoni 2002: 1). Among other things, she notes the role of satellite television programming in updating perceptions of "territorial, cultural, social, and political belonging," and encouraging transnational practices among the second generation.

For parents of migrants who move abroad to join their children ("generation zero," Nedelcu 2009b), satellite television also helps to overcome social exclusion in the host society. Called upon to care for their grandchildren, they are thrust into mobility without necessarily possessing adequate social and linguistic capacities. By listening to the radio, reading newspapers online

in their mother tongue and attentively following Romanian satellite television broadcasts, these migrants succeed in preserving sociocultural stability (Nedelcu 2009c; 2009b).

The Internet

Emailed photographs, webcam images, communication via MSN, Skype, work teleconferencing, and more recently, social network sites – all of these are examples of co-presence and continuous participation that allow users, however geographically distant they may be, to remain in phase with a given world from a sociocultural standpoint. Discussion forums and email have become the most rapid and inexpensive means to communicate with friends and relatives, whether in one's country of origin or spread out across the globe. They also allow expats to network. Romanian computer programmers, for example, have used the Internet, and in particular the website www.the-bans.com, to create a central migratory platform for Romanian professionals in Canada, and a privileged tool for reproducing social capital and community grouping. Indeed, online migrant networks have served as a crucible for community, making it possible for migrants to acclimate from a distance to the realities of the host society and facilitating their integration into the Canadian job market. While helping new migrants to establish roots in the host society, this website also encouraged the reproduction of the culture of origin through the creation in Toronto of a Romanian association and a Romanian school (Nedelcu 2002, 2009).

ICTs also make it possible to act on and be present in the national space from a distance. Romanian academics have used the Internet to create an e-diaspora network, and contribute to public debates as full members of Romanian civil society. Their international expertise has allowed them to have a significant impact on the process of education and research reform in Romania (Nedelcu 2009a).

It is also worth noting that social ties among migrants and nonmigrants are currently undergoing a significant transformation as ICTs have set in motion complex processes of transnational socialization. Innovative practices offer a glimpse of changes in long-distance family dynamics. The following story evokes the emergence of a co-present world in which intergenerational ties between a grandmother in Romania and her granddaughter in Toronto are reproduced in a surprising manner:

When my mother-in-law goes to Romania and my daughter cannot go with her, we've found an ingenious way for them to spend time together. They daily connect via webcam and talk to each other; my mother-in-law helps her and keeps an eye on her when she does her homework. It's convenient, and comforting to us, because we know she's not getting into trouble at home; it's a way for us to keep an eye on her, as well. (computer programmer, 35 years old)

Thus, intergenerational transmission may be (re)produced across long distances in entirely new ways, leading to the emergence of new transnational habitus (Nedelcu 2009c; 2010; 2012). Henceforth the internet is a resource of sharing in everyday life in which geographical and emotional boundaries seem considerably to diminish; a Romanian migrant in Switzerland describes how communication with the family left back home evolved through ICT's daily use:

I am always online: while I am cooking, the webcam is on and we talk, I can look at them at odd moments […] With my mother, I can talk and do other things, I plug in loudspeaker, I iron, I do the cleaning, I talk to her […] It forms a part of my everyday life […] I don't feel as if I had left Romania. I feel so close to them as I would live over there, as a unity. (female dentist, 40 years old)

Moreover, ICTs are no longer the exclusive domain of highly qualified migrants. They are used innovatively by broad categories of mobile populations, even as new inequalities – of access and of knowledge – are emerging that discriminate against migrants who lack computer literacy (e.g., those who are under-qualified, elderly, or come from Southern-hemisphere countries) (see Wellman and Haythornthwaite 2002; Georgiou 2005; Mattelart 2009). Indeed, several studies are showing that ICTs can be resources for migrants living in precarious situations; for example, the Internet has provided new spaces for social self-expression, struggle, and integration for marginalized migrant populations. It has become a community space for Ethiopian refugees in the United Kingdom (Georgiou 2002), for example, and was a new ground for activism in the Tunisian, Mauritian, and Chinese dissident communities (Egré 2002). Burmese refugees (mainly based in India and Thailand) have appropriated the Internet as a privileged space for their political activism; at the same time, it has also served to help reinforce their identity as refugees, by essentializing certain traits and values in exile (Baujard 2008).

The Internet has also allowed the Kurdish diaspora to reinforce a space for collective memory and to express its territorial claims (Georgiou 2002).

All of these examples demonstrate that poor, undereducated, and elderly migrants, as well as those living in highly precarious situations (socially, economically, or legally) can also appropriate and use sophisticated technologies.

Mobile telephones

Mobile telephones and inexpensive prepaid phone cards have an impact on reproducing social ties in migratory situations by adding to the "social glue" that binds transnational migrants to family, colleagues, and friends who have remained in the country of origin or who reside elsewhere in the world (Vertovec 2004b).

These technologies are often associated with private usages; nevertheless, they simultaneously penetrate the public and private spaces. Claire Scopsi (2004) has studied so-called "communication shops" in Paris, in particular in the Château Rouge neighborhood, which has a high concentration of immigrant populations concentrated around the Marché Africain (African Market). She has shown how "the trade in collective access to digital networks" which combines international phone service, mobile phone service, fax services, and Internet access, has participated in the constitution of a public space for migrants and in the development of transnational economic activity that reflects a "multifaceted vision of integration: conscious belonging to multiple geographic spaces that is constantly reactivated by contemporary communication technologies" (Scopsi 2004).

Dana Diminescu (2002) showed how undocumented African migrants in Paris made use of mobile phones as tools of mobilization for regularization; she also described the case of Romanian street vendors of newspapers for which mobile communication was the key for networking to find work. Heather Horst (2002), while investigating the lifestyles of Somali refugees in camps in Dadaab, in northeastern Kenya, discovered the role of mobile phones' ICT in money transfers. The refugees relied on aid from support networks and "clan" solidarity. They received constant help from peers living abroad and in particular through a semiformal system of communications and banking services operating via phone, fax, and, more recently, text messages and emails (Horst 2002).

Compounding ICTs

Current advances in digital communications combining the Internet and mobile phone technologies have opened the way for new usages. Wireless connections have turned computers into portable communication tools; they have also facilitated online channels for interactive communication that are accessible through an ever-increasing number of devices. Mobile telephones are now as multifunctional as computers, providing continuous multimedia connectivity with which users can surf the web, check email, watch television, and access medical services. The resulting opportunities for mobile individuals to proliferate their ties to different worlds of belonging are becoming ever bigger.

New technologies also make it possible to reproduce interactions resembling face-to-face communication by combining written, vocal, and visual forms of expression. An interviewee in Toronto, for example, communicates with her sister via email and text message on a daily basis. They email each other every morning, and may send each other multiple text messages in the course of the day (often via the Internet to avoid expense) to share immediate feelings or offer a quick answer to a question. In this way, over a great distance, they reproduce and extend the complicity that has linked them since childhood. At the same time, audiovisual conversations over Skype bring together their extended family, spread out across Canada, Romania, the United States, and Switzerland. Family members may thus make quick collective decisions on family issues and problems, for example regarding aging parents (Nedelcu 2010). Are such delocalized "family councils" held in a virtual "non-space" a prototype for new transnational social structures? At the very least, we can affirm with some certainty that these new modes of interaction – through rapid, frequent communications – provide what Christian Licoppe calls a "connected presence." "It is through the frequency and continuity of this flow – in which the fact of calling counts at least as much if not more than which is said, and which a presence is guaranteed by expressing a state, feeling or emotion rather than by constructing a shared experience through relating past events and giving one's news – that the strength of the interlocutors' mutual engagement in the relationship is guaranteed" (Licoppe 2004: 152).

Madianou and Miller (2012) have noticed the importance of the "shift towards a situation of multiple media"; they propose the concept of polymedia to capture, on the one hand, the "new emerging environment

proliferating communicative opportunities" and on the other hand, "the social and emotional consequences of choosing between a plurality of media rather than simply examining the particular features and affordances of each particular medium" (Madianou and Miller 2012: 8). These authors show "how the existence of multiple alternatives within an integrated communicative structure leads to a different environment for relationships themselves" (Madianou and Miller 2012: 14). The compound use of ICTs thus constitutes an important strategy for "constructing or imagining a 'connected relationship', and enabling them to overlook their physical separation – even if only temporarily" (Wilding 2006: 132).

Unpacking Transnationalism: Complex Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives

For the past twenty years, studies of international migrations have been influenced by the paradigm of transnational mobility. The notion of transnationalism, most developed by American sociologists and anthropologists, points to the emergence of a "social process in which migrants establish social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders" (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992: ix). The migrants here are therefore "living lives across borders" (Grillo 2000). Their sociability networks weave a strong social fabric that stretches beyond national borders, inscribed – at the very least – in the host and home country (Potot 2007), while their identities are defined with regard to more than one nation-state (Glick-Schiller et al. 1994). This has given rise to new analytical models, as well as a resurgent interest in the use of older ideas, such as the diaspora, to describe new realities (Chivallon 2006; Schnapper 2001; Dufoix 2008). The transnational approach has also made it possible to deconstruct the image of the uprooted and "doubly absent" migrant (Sayad 1999), who, it was supposed, broke with the country of origin in order to assimilate with the host society. Instead, this approach highlights the virtues of imagining a "connected migrant" (Diminescu, 2005), one who is an actor in multiple exchanges between host and home society, flexible enough to switch between "here and there," to alternate, and even to become co-present.

Nevertheless, migrant transnationalism is not a recent phenomenon (Thomas and Znaniecki [1919] 1998; Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 1999; Schnapper 2001). Indeed, migratory movements, long-distance exchanges, and the multiple identifications of migrants pre-date the modern era and the political organization of the nation-state. However, in their contemporary

form, transnational practices largely benefit from contemporary technologies. The Internet, mobile telephones, and digital media have all engendered possibilities for co-presence that were difficult even to imagine few decades ago. They enabled new forms of migrant transnationalism characterized not only by the growing intensity of transnational exchanges and activities, but also by a ubiquitous system of communication that allows migrants to connect with multiple, geographically distant and culturally distinct worlds with which they identify and participate on a daily basis (Vertovec 2009; Nedelcu 2010). As a result, the intensity and the simultaneous nature of current, everyday transnational activity have led to the emergence of new ways of being in the world, as well as to the transformation of social structures and the emergence of transnational habitus (Vertovec 2004a; Nedelcu 2009c; 2010).

These new technological capabilities are transforming the significance of the territorial rooting of migrants' social life. Many migrants move easily within transnational social spaces and frame new social configurations by creating new social and political geographies. Online migrants thus embody many complexities resulting from the cosmopolitanization processes of interconnected social worlds: multiple, overlapping spaces of belonging; multipolar systems of references, loyalties, and identifications; increasingly complex citizenship regimes; interconnected lifestyles; and the ability to act at a distance in real time (Beck 2006; Nedelcu 2009; 2010; Georgiou 2010).

Integration projects and transnational projections of the nation-state

Transmigrants witness a tension between host states' expectations regarding their integration and "long-distance nationalism" that is maintained through forms of social and political participation in which they can engage from outside national borders (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001). This reality has caught the attention of countries of origin while raising concerns in host states. Until now, social scientists have taken a greater interest in the reactions of states of origin,[3] which often revisit their policies to include citizens living

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[3]   In order to account for the diversity of origin states' policies, Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick-Schiller (2003) propose the following typology: (1) The *transnational* nation-state, which treats emigrants as long-term, long-distance members: the state grants them double citizenship and their socio-economic and political participation is entirely taken into account in national policy; (2) the *strategic, selective* state which, while encouraging certain forms of long-distance nationalism, prefers to maintain full control of how its citizens are invested; and (3) the *disinterested* and *denouncing* state, which treats its citizens as non-nationals, and as even as deserters and traitors.

abroad (Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Numerous states have adapted legislative tools and extended their range of action through measures such as consular and ministerial reforms, new investment policies intended to attract emigrant funding and regulate emigrant remittances, extension of political rights through dual citizenship or dual nationality, extension of state protection and public services, implementation of policies intended to reinforce emigrants' sense of belonging, etc. (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2003). Far from reflecting the dilution of the nation-state, these initiatives signal a redefinition of state prerogatives beyond territorial borders (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). This redefinition talks about "global nations' policies," "long-distance nationalism," "deterritorialized nations," "globalization of domestic politics," or "globalization of grassroots politics" (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001; Vertovec 2001; Glick-Schiller et al. 1994; Smith 1994).

Models implemented by host states to spur migrants' social and political integration often confront a broad range of transnational practices and modes of belonging. In reaction to this reality, most states fall back on valorizing national identity and reinforcing the instruments by which they control international migration. Their discourse may go as far as expressing fears that the effects of transnational allegiances threaten immigrants' assimilation and integration, and therefore jeopardize economic stability, cultural homogeneity, and social cohesion (Portes 1999).

While migrants' transnational practices challenge the national political sphere, one can nevertheless note a systematic absence of studies that examine the relationship between migrant transnationalism, politics, and civil society within host states (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). This lack is manifest in the academic scholarship, which runs the risk of focusing exclusively on the positive effects experienced in areas of origin, at the expense of occluding changes to host spaces brought on by transnationalism. This observation raises a more general argument, which deplores the absence of a transnational political framework that would allow a different political approach to the question of migratory movements and individuals' dual or even more multiple loyalties (Beck 2006).

Methodological nationalism and the epistemological limits of migratory theories

The heuristic value of the transnational paradigm resides precisely in its ability to encapsulate the disconnection between state, national, cultural, and

geographical borders. Furthermore, by deconstructing the territorial equation between State, nation and society, transnational scholarship puts forward serious arguments for changing the lens through which social scientists perceive and analyze the world. As Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick-Schiller observe, "we have been able to begin to analyze and discuss transnational migration and long distance nationalism because we have changed the lens through which we perceive and analyze the world" (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002: 322).

The debate surrounding the limits of methodological nationalism has expanded since the end of the 1990s, mainly within the Anglo-American and German academic communities (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002; Chernilo 2006; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2003; Beck 2006; Sassen 2003). Methodological nationalism relies on the "territorialization of social science imaginary and the reduction of the analytical focus to the boundaries of the nation-state" (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002: 307). Social practices in spheres as diverse as production, culture, language, work, education, etc. are defined and standardized with regard to "their container," the nation-state, and are at the least designed as "national" (Beck 2000). Nevertheless, the question arises of how to approach the plural identities, multiple allegiances, and transnational actions increasingly characterizing mobile lifestyles. Territorial correlation seems no longer to be a precondition for defining and expressing national belonging (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2003; Faist 2000); transnationalism should be considered as an integral part of the process of redefining what is national. This approach marks an epistemological turning point in sociological research (Beck and Lau 2005).

The Epistemological Contribution of the Cosmopolitan Approach to the Sociology of (Transnational) Migrations

Academics seeking new interpretations of the transnationalization of the social life have focused on the articulation of regional dynamics within global processes (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003), and on the production of the global in local contexts as well as at the core of national processes and institutions (Sassen 2003). Contrasting perspectives are produced as scales of observation alternate, placing the global and the local at two extremes of the same ontological continuum (Roudometof 2005; Sassen 2003). Not only does globalization alter the relationship between nation-states and their societies, but it also changes societies from within, through what

Ulrich Beck (2002) calls the "cosmopolitanization of nation-state societies." This transformation highlights the importance of the local/sub-national scale in the analysis of global phenomena, since a large number of institutional components – identified as national from a national perspective – are operating grounds for dynamics previously identified as global. Saskia Sassen calls this process "denationalization," and points to the heuristic limits of conceptualizing the local within a pyramidal hierarchy of scales (local → regional → national → global) based on the criteria of physical and/or geographical proximity (Sassen 2003).

Ulrich Beck (2006) takes another epistemological approach, arguing for a cosmopolitan sociology that would push beyond the dualizing opposition of the nation-state and the inter/trans/multi-national. "Politically ambivalent, reflexive" (Beck 2006: 23), and "vernacular" (Werbner 2006), the cosmopolitan perspective is based on the principle of "additive inclusion" – "both […] and […]," rather than "either […] or" – or, put another way, on "including the other's difference," or "the other's otherness." Oppositions such as national/international, and within/outside are thus supplanted by the idea of cumulative order. The internalization of difference and otherness makes possible the coexistence of global and local dynamics, as well as nationalist and transnational orientations. It produces a pluralistic vision of belonging that takes into account the possibility of occupying different social positions in relation to different national societies. In this way, "the cosmopolitan model is about being equal and being different at the same time. This is the 'cosmopolitan grammar;' it's not about saying, there is no longer distinction between us and them" (Rantanen 2005: 258). This approach aims at providing a general theory that requires sociological concepts, methods, and traditional debates to be reformulated (Latour 2003). The key characteristic of this model resides in the dialogic imagination, that is, in the ability of social actors to creatively perceive and appropriate the contradictions and similarities of different cultures while at the same time contributing to the emergence of a new value, that of respecting others' cultures (Beck 2006).

This "methodological cosmopolitanism" (Beck and Sznaider 2010) is particularly inspiring when it comes to research on transnational migrations, and sheds new light on the multitude of interdependences that exist between states and individuals, at different levels and scales of aggregation. It provides an interesting alternative to "ethnocentric nationalism" and "particularist multiculturalism" (Vertovec 2001). It places the following concepts at the core of analysis: (1) internal globalization (Beck 2002), glocalization (Robertson 1994; Roudometof 2005), and cosmopolitanization (Beck 2002;

2006) of social reality expressed through the change in everyday life experienced by those exposed to global stimuli, whether or not they are transnational migrants; (2) emerging forms of transnational social life that create transnational social structures (transnational communities, transnational spaces, and social fields) and transnational habitus; (3) a continuum or spectrum of attitudes and positions with regard to these changes, with cosmopolitan attitudes at one end and local attitudes at the other, based on individuals' degree of openness to other cultures and of the strength of their cultural and territorial attachment to specific places, traditions, and institutions (Roudometof 2005; Beck 2006).

This sociological template seems particularly promising, and should lead to a better understanding of the consequences of glocalization processes on individual mobility and to a deeper comprehension of the multiform, multiscale interdependences created between migratory processes and globalization.

The Challenges of a Cosmopolitan Reading of Migrant Integration and Transnationalism in the Digital Era

The empirical data described in the first section of this chapter shows that the impact of ICTs on migratory processes and migrants' transnational practices is dialogic (Morin 1990); that is, it generates complex realities combining different, dual logics. These logics are based on complementary, contradictory, and even opposing principles, which "are not simply juxtaposed, but actually necessary to one another" (Morin 1990: 99). Indeed, ICTs may help preserve particularism and reinforce cultures and identities of origin while at the same time enabling a critical position with regard to these same cultures. They may help migrants understand their host society and integrate into it. ICTs also make it possible for migrants to create new ties with their places of origin; to engage in economic, social, and political activities in a transnational space; and to forge cosmopolitan identities.

This, however, raises new questions. How can the nation-state's ideal of homogeneity and cultural belonging be reconciled with transnational migrants' ability to move within widened social spaces, manipulate multiple identity references, and act beyond state borders? How can persisting tensions between migrant aspirations and practices, and between state principles and rationales be interpreted? What direction is the political project of migrant

integration taking, and what challenges do nation-states face in an era when many individuals live in a state of constant connection with the broader world?

From the cosmopolitan perspective, examining migrants' use of ICTs points towards a couple of key dimensions of the glocalization of social experiences and the transnationalization of social structures. First, this area of study raises the question of the transformation of the national sphere of social experience as well as the emergence of new transnational habitus. Globalization and localization are processes that feed one another and which result in significant shifts in relationships among individuals, job markets, nations, and state structures. The nation-state is no longer the unique repository for cultural norms and values, nor is it the sole regulator of social and political belonging. On the one hand, ICTs offer individuals the opportunity to appropriate cosmopolitan values, to develop deterritorialized biographies, and to act from a distance in real time. On the other, they make it possible to cultivate and defend particularist values and to continue identifying with a culture of origin while living in the broader world (Nedelcu 2009c). Cosmopolitan orientations thus appear at the same time that local rootedness is established (Gustafson 2009). However, this dialogical reality generates new social tensions, as well as mobilization against the changes brought about by this "internal globalization" (Beck 2002).

Second, the internal globalization questions immigration and integration policy with regard to the everyday practice of migrants as well as with regard to strategies of identity. It also returns the attention of political and academic communities to the question of global governance for migration. It highlights the need to define an overarching conceptual framework for the management of migratory movements, in order to balance the economic needs of markets with the expectations and well-being of migrants as well as the forms of inclusion and civil participation to which they have access. It is evident that mobility has become a major issue, one that "should mobilize all the actors involved in the management of migratory flows" (Badie et al. 2008: 60). Certain analysts are forecasting a path – as inevitable as it is inexorable – towards a "cosmopolitan integration […] based on a paradigm shift in which diversity is the solution, rather than the problem" (Beck 2007).

Conclusion

Revisiting the national–transnational link from a cosmopolitan perspective, two important ideas come to light. First, migratory theories cannot be dissoci-

ated from broader epistemological debates. In this respect, the "cosmopolitan lens" and more specifically "methodological cosmopolitanism" seem to be heuristically interesting alternatives for the "mobility paradigm" when looking at the complexity of transnational dynamics within migration processes. Second, transnational processes and integration processes cannot be properly understood without taking into account their intrinsic dialogical interdependence (e.g., the coexistence of dual logics and processes that coexist, and even feed one another).

A cosmopolitan approach makes it possible to understand the dynamic propelling the emergence of public spheres that bring migrants and nonmigrants together around collective claims and demands, be they local or transnational. It also implies dismantling the binary opposition of the transnational paradigm and multicultural and assimilationist models (Vertovec 2004a; Portes 2001). This becomes possible by adopting a multi-perspectival, multiscale approach through which to "observe and investigate the boundary-transcending and boundary-effacing multi-perspectivalism of social and political agents through very different 'lenses'. A single phenomenon, transnationality, for example, can, perhaps even must, be analyzed both locally and nationally and transnationally and trans-locally and globally" (Beck and Sznaider 2010: 398).

From this angle, using ICTs as a cosmopolitan lens for interpreting the articulation of integration and transnationalism opens up new avenues of research that can be organized into at least four main axes:

– Co-presence. The role of ICTs (internet, mobile phones, digital and satellite media) should be studied in relation to the densification of transnational social spaces and the emergence of new transnational habitus. What impact has been created on the appearance of co-present, connected, transnational, and even cosmopolitan lifestyles by the instantaneous nature of communications and long-distance social interactions' new regimes of ubiquity? What forms of social reproduction and participation do ICTs encourage? How do they fashion the everyday lives of interconnected migrant and nonmigrant populations?

– *Multiple identities*. What impact do ICTs have on different forms of identification and identity construction in migratory situations? What meaning do migrants using ICTs assign to their transnational practices and how do they locate themselves with regard to their host and home societies? What effects do transnational dynamics mediated by ICTs have on nonmigrants? Do ICTs help essentialize feelings of belonging to a culture of origin, or, on the contrary, do they contribute to the emergence of a new kind of identification with a cosmopolitan culture?

   – *Participation*. What modes of social, economic, and political participation do online migrants develop within the country of origin? As they encourage the consolidation of "nations unbound" (Basch et al. 1994), do transnational online practices hinder the acquisition of the skills needed for integration in the host country, or do they, on the contrary, make it possible for migrants to diversify their resources and to participate in all spheres of social, economic, and political life? What effects do transnational participative dynamics have on the world of nonmigrants?

   – *The management of migration*. Do new alliances exist among actors able to participate in the global governance of migratory movements? What roles do ICTs play in controlling migratory flows? What changes can they bring about in the polarized relationships between northern- and southern-hemisphere countries? What future can be imagined for integration models while accounting for the cosmopolitanization of the everyday lives of migrant and nonmigrant populations?

   These are questions that have only begun to be explored; yet they are crucial in researching international migrations, and presage much work and reflection in the years to come.

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Pharmaceutical Mobilities and the Market for Women's Reproductive Health: Moving HPV Vaccines and Contraceptives through NGOs and the State in India

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[R]egions considered – wrongly – to be on the margins of the world, the domestication of world time henceforth takes place by dominating space and putting it to different uses. When resources are put into circulation, the consequence is a disconnection between people and things that is more marked […] the value of things generally surpassing that of people. (Mbembe 2001: 23)

'[B]iopolitics' was not just a proper activity of nineteenth- and twentieth-century governments. Efforts to shape the quantity, "quality" and mobility of populations constitute the quintessential state-building project. (Connelly 2006: 193)

Introduction: The Bio-economy of Pharmaceuticals

Anthropologists have long drawn attention to the mobilities of "norms and forms" of medicine, medical technology, and health care practices (Rabinow 1989). Anthropological scholarship has also explored the transnational circulation of body parts (Scheper-Hughes 2001), as well as border-crossings by patients in search of therapies either unavailable at home or available at

a lower cost abroad (Bharadwaj 2008; Bashford 2006; Smith-Morris and Manderson 2010). Recently Roberts and Scheper-Hughes (2011) have advanced the concept of "medical migrations" to capture the complex personal, political, and economic factors influencing these movements, often in the grey zones of legality, across regulated borders. The term is intended to replace formulations such as "reproductive tourism" (Inhorn 2011) or "medical tourism" (Pennings 2002: 337), which they consider to be pejorative or normatively loaded. Studies of "medical migration," like those of "reproductive tourism," focus on traveling clients, who cross borders in order to access medical technology, expertise, biological tissue, or organs.

Our focus on pharmaceutical mobilities foregrounds instead the intra- and international trajectories of the movement of reproductive technology itself. This chapter not only traces the paths and patterns of mobility of two specific reproductive health technologies, the vaccine against the Human Papilloma Virus (HPV) and contraceptives (expensive branded oral pills and condoms) to India and within the country to rural areas and to the poor, but it also maps the new constellations of public and private actors that enable such mobilities. We analyze the kinds of new partnerships between public institutions, international donors, multinational corporations, and NGOs, which are being established in order to facilitate pharmaceutical flows. We are concerned here with the large-scale distribution of new contraceptive technologies or the HPV vaccine through the public health system that is advocated in the name of women's reproductive health. The claim that contraceptives reduce the risk of maternal mortality and thus improve the reproductive health of women is used to legitimize these partnerships in the area of population control. While poor women of reproductive age have been the target of population control interventions in India since the 1960s, current research on, and testing of, the HPV vaccine requires access to the bodies of adolescent girls. The provision of such access through state institutions and NGOs is justified by arguing that the HPV vaccine minimizes risk of cervical cancer. Although the Indian state retains control of both programs, it has entered into direct partnership with pharmaceutical companies for the purpose of testing and marketing the HPV vaccine just as it had earlier accepted massive foreign aid from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to market contraceptives. We thus show how the state is actively involved in furthering pharmaceutical mobilities and channeling them in specific ways to reach certain population groups. But we also point to the resistance encountered in the process.

Contemporary processes of (re)shaping institutional infrastructure for the purpose of promoting pharmaceutical mobilities illustrate the ongoing

reconfiguration of the state–market nexus in India. Or rather they point to the very creation of a market for certain pharmaceuticals with the active support of the state and non-state actors, be they local NGOs or philanthropic foundations operating globally. In sum, we show how these processes of furthering pharmaceutical mobilities blur the very distinction between private/non-state and public/state actors, or that between the market and the state. Similarly the distinction between the national and transnational scale is rendered fuzzy as often the same actors operate at both scales. New policy instruments as well as institutional arrangements have also been crafted that bridge both scales. Our material shows that the state continues to be pivotal to the formation and implementation of norms and regulations in the field of health and population control despite the proliferation of powerful assemblages of non-state actors and the growing strength of public–private partnerships. It is the constrained but indispensable role of the state in furthering mobilities within and beyond the state that we thus draw attention to.

Our two case studies of vaccine and contraceptive mobilities in India during the last couple of decades need to be contextualized within larger transformations in the landscape of "global health" care in which transnational private–public partnerships increasingly shape how norms and standards are formulated and domesticated. The pivotal role of the World Bank in international health policy making, along with the activities of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have, for example, contributed to a shift in the way health issues are framed in the global South. Moreover, the discursive shift from "international health" to "global health" is, in part, a reflection of the World Health Organization's (WHO) transformed position within the landscape of population and health policies and practices. On one hand, the authority of the WHO has been decentralized to organizations like UNAIDS, and the Global Fund. On the other hand, new partnerships have been formed between bilateral donors, like the USAID, and multilateral or international organizations (e.g., the World Bank), philanthropic organizations (e.g., the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), service and advocacy NGOs (e.g., the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health, or PATH), transnational pharmaceutical companies, and public and private universities in India to enable the diffusion of drugs and medical technologies.

The transnational mobilities mapped in this chapter demonstrate how medical infrastructure built with public sector investments in India is being transformed to primarily benefit private companies. While institutions and practices in the governance of populations are reconfigured in the process, the boundaries between the "public" and the "private" become increasingly

fuzzy too. We map how the mobilities of pharmaceuticals are predicated on the equally mobile accompanying policy and/or regulatory framework, the norms of drug trials and program cost-effectiveness, and forms of mass service-delivery. A detailed case study of the HPV vaccine, which draws on research conducted by Fouzieyha Towghi within the MOVE project[1], examines the scientific controversies surrounding the biology, epidemiology, and etiology of cervical cancer as well as trials of the HPV vaccine. We focus here primarily on the Post-licensure Observational Study of the Human Papilloma Virus (HPV) vaccine, which is pivotal to the testing and marketing of the vaccine in India. In fact the very distinction between testing and marketing as two separate phases is blurred in the way this project has been designed and implemented. Rather than the earlier practice of testing pharmaceuticals before sale, whereby trials and marketing were carried out sequentially in clearly marked phases following one upon another, the experience with the HPV vaccine program in India shows that these two activities and phases become increasingly indistinguishable. The diffusion of the vaccine and the circulation of medical norms of cervical cancer etiology simultaneously draw on, but also partially bypass, state institutions and the public health sector.

But this is not such a new trend, as the material generated by Shalini Randeria's fieldwork on the USAID-funded State Innovations in Family Planning Services Project Agency (SIFPSA) launched in north India in 1992 amply shows. The SIFPSA material is used here selectively to illustrate earlier assemblages of private–public partnerships between the state, donors and NGOs, which underlie efforts to further the flows of branded contraceptives. It points to the continuities as well as discontinuities in the paths and patterns of pharmaceutical mobilities today as well as the constellation of actors enabling and resisting these. The project did not test contraceptives but experimented instead with novel delivery systems on a vast scale. Similar to the project to promote the HPV vaccine, it too sought to create a new market for branded condoms and oral contraceptive pills using mainly NGOs working at the community level. Whereas new public and private alternative channels for the

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[1]   Research on the HPV vaccine was conducted over a period of ten months by Fouzieyha Towghi between 2008 and 2011, and all quotations regarding the program are from interviews conducted by her. This research was funded by the CUS and SNF-supported MOVE Network for Mobility Studies project. It included fieldwork across India (in Delhi, Mysore, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Bombay, Andra Pradesh, and Pune), interviews with scientists at the WHO in Geneva and in the United States. Shalini Randeria conducted seven months of fieldwork on the workings of the USAID–Government of India's SIFSPA program in the cities of Lucknow and Kanpur and in villages of Kanpur district (Uttar Pradesh, north India) as well as in New Delhi and Washington DC in 1999–2001, as well as in 2003 and 2007.

delivery of contraceptives were set up in the USAID-funded program, the HPV vaccine demonstration projects were inserted into existing public health programs. The SIFPSA case enables us to trace the history of some of the assemblages and practices evident in the HPV vaccine testing and marketing program in the 2000s but also to highlight differences, for example, in the role of pharmaceutical corporations. A limited comparison with the SIFPSA in the 1990s thus enables us to highlight more general trends in the circulation of state policies and practices of governance of populations over time.

We argue that pharmaceutical mobilities in both cases are predicated on specific institutional mixes put into place to facilitate the access of international donors and pharmaceutical manufacturers to certain segments of the country's rural and urban populations. Both projects exemplify the rapid privatization of parts of the public medical services system through novel assemblages of actors and partnerships formed for service delivery and marketing. These systems of delivery and marketing tested in the Indian context are then used for the scaling up of such programs all over the global South. Our Indian case studies thus illustrate tendencies that are more widespread, with the caveat that where the state is weak and aid-dependent and its medical infrastructure often nonexistent as in Africa, international NGOs and foreign donors play an even more central role. Our ethnographic material points to the spatial rescaling of policy formulation as well as the implementation of programs, in at least three important ways: (1) the formation of complex and wide-ranging private–public sector partnerships in policy making and project implementation from the local to the national and international; (2) scalar shifts in regulatory norms of medical research along with the sale and marketing of pharmaceuticals and medical technologies; and (3) the scaling up of public health projects in numbers and spatial reach both within and across national borders.

The emerging global "bio-economy" is characterized by the outsourcing of organ collection and transplantation (Scheper-Hughes 2001; Cohen 2001; 2005), pharmaceutical transfers (Ecks 2010; Jeffery et al. 2007), and clinical trials (Petryna 2009; Sunder Rajan 2006) in which risky clinical labor is outsourced to economically poor populations of the global South.[2] However, the unequal distribution of such risks is not entirely new. For it is equally evident in attempts to test and market contraceptives globally since the 1950s. For instance, women's bodies in the global South have long been testing

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[2]   Waldby and Cooper (2008) employ the term "bio-economy" to refer to the biomedical economy as a whole, including transnational commerce associated with medical drugs, medical devices, body parts (organs and tissue including blood), and medical and clinical research.

grounds to assess the risks and acceptability of contraceptives such as the oral pill, or injectables like Norplant, NetEn, or Depo provera prior to their being marketed in North America and Europe, a point which we return to below. But risky new contraceptives meant primarily for use in the global South, like the vaccine against pregnancy and Quinacrine, were tested, for example, in India as well until strong protest by women's organizations successfully put an end to such trials.[3] Moreover, as past experience with the testing of new contraceptive technologies shows, clinical trials in the non-Western world were not carried out by manufacturers of pharmaceuticals alone. They almost always elicited the willing cooperation of the state and non-state actors for purposes of testing contraceptives as part of the global quest for population control. Interestingly, while several Indian regional governments enshrined the so-called "two child norm" into laws banning parents of more than two children from standing for elections in local self-government institutions (Randeria 2007a), private providers continue to offer a wide variety of services to the urban middle class for assisted reproduction (Bharadwaj 2006). Ironically, the "cunning state" (Randeria 2007b), which seeks to reduce the fertility of its poor citizens through persistent and pervasive, demographically driven, top-down interventions, also promotes, or at least permits, the country's evolution into a global hub of "reproductive tourism," and, especially, commercial surrogacy for both the Indian diaspora and foreign nationals (Vora 2009; Pande 2009).

Contraceptive technologies are but one example of pharmaceuticals that have successfully circulated transnationally using networks of scientists, women activists, philanthropists, and international and local NGOs in addition to the state apparatus. The development of, and clinical trials for, the oral pill, for instance, saw the movement of scientists, their research technologies, and capital from the United States to Puerto Rico, a country with lax regulatory norms. Puerto Rican women were used as experimental subjects in the trials to evaluate the safety and efficacy of a contraceptive pill developed at the time mainly for a white US market. From there, contraceptive technologies were transported to other continents, India and Pakistan being the first countries in Asia where they were tried out on a large scale in government population-control programs funded by foreign donors (Bandarage 1997). Demographers

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[3]   The vaccine against pregnancy is a new form of immunocontraceptive (Richter 1996). Unlike currently available methods that work either mechanically as a barrier (condom, diaphragm), chemically (spermicidal foams and jellies), or hormonally (the pill, Depo-Provera, Norplant), immunocontraceptives are designed to operate like vaccines. Quinacrine is an antimalarial drug, which has been used in experiments on poor women in several countries including India as a contraceptive to be injected for the purpose of sterilization (Rao 2004).

and politicians alike nationally and internationally held the high fertility of poor women in south Asia, Latin American, Africa, and Latin America to be responsible for "overpopulation" and "underdevelopment." The establishment of an institutional infrastructure to enable smooth flows of contraceptives in target-driven, top-down, population control programs involving an assemblage of public and private actors (NGOs, pharmaceutical corporations, international organizations, and philanthropic organizations) is thus not new, as Connelly (2008) has shown while tracing the long and complex global history of population control. It is the postcolonial state in India that has planned the size and composition of poor families since the 1950s (Mamdani 1972; Ali 2002; Randeria 2006; Towghi 2004). Transnationally designed, funded, and implemented, these programs represent mobile models or forms of interventions, which are experimented upon in a region, and then replicated and scaled up both within and beyond the nation-state (Bandarage 1997; Connelly 2008; UNFPA 2003).

India has become an attractive destination for individuals, pharmaceutical corporations and medical institutions from around the world for purposes of medical research, drug trials, or treatment. Lower costs of medical care and the availability of specialized services, such as stem-cell treatment (Bharadwaj 2006; 2010), attract patients from all over the world as do lax and poorly implemented regulation that permits body parts to be harvested from the poor for organ transplantation (Cohen 1999; 2001; 2004) or makes available bodies of poor women for surrogacy (Vora 2009). We argue, however, that it is not only the bodies of the poor in the global South that are sites for intervention and experimentation. Systems of pharmaceutical marketing and service delivery, which can be replicated and scaled up, are being tested in these settings too, as we show below. Moreover, in the name of advancing "global health," research data for the use of academic institutions and corporations is collected on a large scale in these sites as well. Countries of the global South are thus important new markets for the production and consumption of evidence on the efficient distribution of drugs to large populations. For instance, one of Africa's exports consists of data collected for university-based researchers and pharmaceutical companies in the North, in ways that often bypass the ethical and regulatory norms established and enforced in North America and Europe (Rottenburg 2009; Janes and Corbett 2009; Nguyen 2005). The rapid rise in the number of clinical trials in India, Africa, and Eastern Europe demonstrates a similar trend.

Anthropologists have analyzed the cooperation between scientists in academic institutions, pharmaceutical companies, NGOs, and multilateral

donors in enlisting human subjects for participation in drug trials in order to facilitate the rapid approval and marketing of drugs and other diagnostic and therapeutic technologies meant primarily for use in the North (Nguyen 2010, Petryna 2009). The facilitating role of private contract research organizations (CROs) has enabled North American and European pharmaceutical companies to outsource often risky clinical trials, as populations rendered surplus by economic restructuring have become available as bodies for testing drugs primarily for markets in the global North (Sunder Rajan 2007). Our case studies point, however, to yet another trend, namely the attempt to expand and secure markets for certain pharmaceutical products like the HPV vaccine and contraceptives in the global South. Multinational pharmaceutical companies with their local subsidiaries and contract research organizations are collaborating within a vast network of private medical institutions in India to this purpose. These new partnerships have transformed the landscape of biomedical research and clinical practice by blurring, for instance, the distinction between clinical trials and marketing, as the HPV vaccine case study shows. Studies of this rapidly changing landscape have hitherto either focused on the mobilities of patients or on scientists as well as on biomedical research administrators in the case of CROs and clinical trials. We use our empirical material instead to understand, on the one hand, the infrastructure that allows certain pharmaceuticals to travel, that is, we ask how the conditions of possibility for pharmaceutical mobilities come into being. On the other hand, we examine the forms and mechanisms through which the Indian state and the public health system (upon which the poor are forced to depend despite its woeful inadequacy) have become new actors in enabling the creation of markets for vaccines and contraceptives produced by US multinational corporations. And we analyze the role of Indian and globally operating NGOs within this new assemblage as they facilitate or contest these flows.

But before we turn to a detailed discussion of the HPV vaccine, and the transnational networks and legal frameworks involved in furthering its mobility, we first consider the conceptualization of pharmaceutical mobilities more broadly, in terms of the circulation of norms and forms.

The Circulation of Norms and Forms as Preconditions of Pharmaceutical Mobilities

The mobilities paradigm represents an epistemological shift. It conceptualizes mobility not only to be a result of social processes, but as that which also

forms the social world (Sheller and Urry 2006; Cresswell 2006). In this view it is movement in time-space, rather than manifestations of stable and time-less locations in space, or structures, which ought to be the focus of theory building in the social sciences (Urry 2007; Cresswell 2006; Cresswell and Merriman 2008; Kaufmann 2002). Stasis and structure are deemed inadequate to explain the social world. Instead, Urry (2000), for instance, argues that modern societies must be analyzed through the lens of movement. The simul-taneous, overlapping, and interdependent migration of people, objects, and ideas/knowledge across multiple borders and spatial scales (local, national, and international) reshape social interactions and institutions. Various mobile forms (both material and immaterial) interact to transform, or perhaps even to reconstitute, older forms of social interactions. The mobilities paradigm thus challenges the dominant territorial and sedentary conceptualization of society in the social sciences. In order to understand how movement and the social are co-produced, it proposes to study that which occurs en route, rather than focus on points of departures and destinations alone.

The anthropologist Aihwa Ong, for example, has argued that "mobili-ties – with its accompanying language of flows, deterritorialization, net-works – has become [simply] a new code word for grasping the global" (Ong 2006: 121). Historians like Kapil Raj (2007) have rightly suggested that the idea of "circulation" captures better the dynamic, trans-spatial, back-and-forth in the past and present mobility of people, objects, and ideas. Con-sequently, contemporary pharmaceutical mobilities must be analyzed against the histories of earlier colonial and postcolonial flows of medical models and technologies, policies and institutional designs to control fertility and govern populations; but such an exercise is beyond the scope of this chapter. While domestication of the HPV vaccine in India today certainly involves a range of new private actors (transnational corporations and philanthropic foundations), the forms of interplay between non-state actors the state evinces interesting parallels with earlier and extant assemblages involved in the circulation of population policies and programs of population control in India. Moreover, for some feminists, population control programs mark one of the first explic-itly postcolonial examples of the global circulation of reproductive technolo-gies involving the colonization of women's bodies, which has been enabled through the interplay of private and public, commercial and philanthropic, geostrategic and feminist, Malthusian and eugenic interests (Bandarage 1997; Clarke 1998; Hartman 1995). Small wonder that contraceptives remain the reproductive technology most widely diffused globally (Bandarage 1997).

From their very inception in the 1950s, "national" policy and programs of population control in India were part transnationalized and part privatized. Private US American foundations like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Population Council, the bilateral aid agency of the US government (USAID), and the UN Family Planning Agency (UNFPA) all contributed to initiating, designing, and funding state policies and programs to control fertility in the country (Connelly 2008). The ideological and programmatic influence of these transnational players, however, far exceeded their financial contribution. The USAID-funded SIFPSA program was the most ambitious such externally funded program. It aimed to reduce fertility rates in India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, with a population of some 195 million in the 1990s. It concentrated on popularizing spacing methods and creating a market for branded oral birth-control pills and condoms manufactured in the private sector after the attempt to introduce the controversial injectable contraceptive, Norplant, was foiled by women's groups in the country, a point we return to below. The program was a response to the belated realization that spacing methods needed to be promoted instead of sterilizations to achieve the goal of rapid fertility reduction. To this end the hitherto largely unsuccessful free distribution through the state family-planning machinery of pills and condoms produced in the public sector was sought to be replaced by expensive branded contraceptives. These were distributed free to begin with in so-called "social marketing" programs, which involved door-to-door delivery of pills and condoms by community-based women NGO workers. To achieve this both the machinery of the state (ranging from primary health centers in villages to the state cooperative dairy channels for daily milk collection from the villages) as well as community-based NGOs were systematically incorporated. In contrast to SIFPSA, the HPV vaccine program reflects the importance of India as a site for experimentation and drug testing. But both programs remind us that the country also constitutes a lucrative and expanding market for vaccines to be sold mainly to the urban middle classes and contraceptives aimed at the poor rural and urban masses. Both programs thus seek to create new demand for specific pharmaceuticals as well as to experiment with establishing marketing channels and sustainable service delivery mechanisms using novel public–private partnerships.

A comparative focus on pharmaceutical mobilities of contraceptives and HPV vaccines over time thus enables us to explore the interdependent mobilities of technologies, regulatory frameworks and institutional designs. Like vaccines, contraceptives do not move alone. Pharmaceutical mobilities are predicated on certain kinds of legal frameworks that facilitate transna-

tional transfers. The administrative–legal frameworks underpinning both programs are numerous Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs). For example, the Science and Technology (S&T) Umbrella memorandum of understanding between the Indian and US governments in 2005,[4] the TRIPS (traded related aspects of intellectual property rights) agreement of the WTO, which India signed in 2004, the MOU signed in 1992 between the Indian government and USAID on the establishment of SIFPSA to control population growth in the most populous north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, and the MOU between the multinational pharmaceutical company Merck and the Indian government in 2005 to conduct a series of "pre-introductory" HPV vaccine clinical trials and eventual marketing in India.[5] The latter MOU falls under the S&T Umbrella agreement that enabled a host of public–private and private–private MOUs in 2005, including the Indo–US Vaccine Action Program to address viral hepatitis, typhoid, E. coli, rotaviral diarrhea, acute respiratory infections, tuberculosis, leishmaniasis, malaria, and HIV, as well as HPV-related cervical cancer. Other related MOUs signed in 2005 include the Indo–US Program on Contraceptives and Reproductive Health Research with priority areas such as new reversible male contraceptive methods, long acting injectables for women, the development of contraceptive vaccines and clinical research in reproductive health, projects on disease, surveillance, and emerging infectious diseases.

Moreover, the formulation of new "population policies" as administrative guidelines, at the behest of USAID, was another notable feature that enabled norms and forms established abroad to travel to India and also within it between various regions. The increasing use of policy rather than the law as an instrument of the governance of populations is significant. For in contrast to laws, policies are formulated by the executive without legislative deliberation or public debate. Rule by policies thus not only circumvents parliament and shifts power to an unelected executive, which is not accountable to citizens, but enables much greater influence by equally unaccountable external international actors as well as corporations on domestic decision making. Policies, like other "soft law" instruments, are not justiciable either. Not surprisingly, population policies formulated by several Indian regional governments ensured the mobility of identical norms of so-called "population stabilization," which was to be achieved utilizing similar methods of social marketing and public–private partnerships all over the country.

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[4]   In February 2006, the President of India signed the "Instrument of Ratification" in order to implement this Agreement. http://www.indianembassy.org/india---u.s.-science-&-techonology-relations.php.

[5]   See http://www.icpo.org.in.

These "public" policies were formulated by a handful of consultants working behind closed doors for the POLICY Project, a global program funded by USAID between 1995 and 2006, in order to influence the content and direction of population policy worldwide. The lucrative contract for this project of multinational policy formulation was awarded by USAID to a Washington DC-based private firm, the Futures Group.[6] Unknown to Indian citizens its "national," "public" policy on population stabilization advocating the use of spacing methods, and soft coercion in the form of financial disincentives to couples with more than two children was thus formulated by a private US organization funded by USAID. A key area in which international NGOs were involved in the SIFPSA project was in the very formulation of the Uttar Pradesh (UP) government's population policy, which was crafted by consultants, who then obtained approval of the contents by the state administration. Here we would only like to point to the vexed questions of accountability that this mode of policy formulation raises. For in such a situation it is easy for the cunning state and international donors to pass on the responsibility for a policy to each other, leaving citizens without judicial recourse or remedy to challenge its contents, implementation, or effects (Randeria and Grunder 2011). Medical technologies do not move by themselves. Their movement within and beyond the state is carefully planned, financed, implemented and monitored using networks of state, non-state, commercial, and academic actors and institutions. The spatial reach and social valence of pharmaceutical mobility depends thus on what is, or is not, moved with the vaccines and contraceptives, how, and by whom.

Often pharmaceuticals travel best without the baggage of regulatory norms, as, for instance, the testing of the oral pill in Puerto Rico demonstrates. But governments in the global South may also establish regulatory frameworks that mimic international protocols that are de facto observed more in the breach than in compliance. Yet the very existence of the protocol enables both the subaltern state and private corporations or medical providers to

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6   Headquartered in Washington, DC, the Futures Group, a global health-consulting firm, has worked for some forty years in about 100 countries throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe on more than 600 projects, and is currently running projects in over thirty-five countries. It represents itself as having "created lasting solutions to some of the most pressing public health challenges facing nations" (http://futuresgroup.com/about). In 1977, the USAID awarded Futures Group the contract for the RAPID project (Resources for the Awareness of Population Impacts on Development), which focused on the impact of population factors in social and economic development. It provided countries in the global South with so-called "personalized population data" and projected impacts of population growth, giving national teams knowledge and insight in order to "make the data their own" (http://futuresgroup.com/about/our_history, last accessed November 7, 2011).

claim compliance with international standards of clinical trials, surrogacy, or stem-cell research and testing, for example, without losing the competitive advantage of lower costs in locations in the global South. A global constellation of experts, expertise, and capital can be mobilized in the service of a single contraceptive or reproductive technology, which may transform gender norms and conjugal/familial relations, reconfigure women's understandings of their bodies and sexuality, reconstitute the population control agenda of a state, reshape state–civil society relations, and interpellate state bureaucracies concerning biopolitical ends, including migration control. As Connelly (2006: 206) has forcefully argued, the invention of modern contraceptive technology enabled the linking of the desire to globalize its use with agendas of international migration, labor needs of national economies, ideas about optimum size and quality of national populations and fertility control. As Foucault perspicaciously pointed out, biopolitics involved the politicization of the life of individuals and populations and the management of the economy through state-directed population science (Foucault 1973; 1979).

Private–public partnerships in global population programs have a long history. In many former British colonies, including India, population control projects were often initiated by nongovernmental organizations using private funding (Connelly 2006: 202). However, they nevertheless needed the support of the state to advance their aims. Approximately half of all aid for population control programs worldwide has been channeled through private US foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, or NGOs, such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the Population Council, with a quarter being channeled through bilateral and multilateral organizations and programs (Nair et al. 2004). NGOs, such as PATH, an international, Seattle-based nonprofit organization, have specialized in research and the promotion of appropriate health technologies, by bringing together public health agencies and private industry. We suggest that NGOs like PATH, whose role is discussed in considerable detail below, have become conduits through which donor-driven programs establish themselves outside of the realm of direct state control once initial permission to operate has been obtained from the government. The recent entry of philanthropic transnational actors, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, into the field of population control is thus part of a history of transnational interventions on the part of private US foundations since the 1950s. The introduction of HPV vaccines into India (as well as into Vietnam, Uganda, Peru, and Bhutan) provides yet another example of the powerful nexus between the state, the international aid/philanthropic regime, and transnational, nongovernmental organizations in shaping the relationship

between governments and their populations. The vaccine is being promoted not only by using and reinforcing some of the earlier pathways created by the state for the diffusion of contraceptives but also by creating new ones. Ong and Collier (2005: 12) refer to these global–local realignments and their localized effects collectively as the "actual global" or the "global assemblage." These assemblages interact in each setting with institutions and social worlds in ways that are not predictable (Whiteford and Manderson 2000) but are contingent, temporally unstable, and often contested.

One such local mechanism that facilitates pharmaceutical mobilities in India is the ubiquitous medical camp. It is a mobile form that has been increasingly normalized and institutionalized as a model for the provision of all manner of medical services to the poor. The camp, which accompanies both mass sterilizations and HPV vaccine distribution, is a site in which selected tertiary urban-centered health services are temporarily transported to rural populations. Eye camps involving surgery for cataract are a common occurrence as are blood donation camps. Mass sterilization camps are the most frequent form chosen to enforce population control. But the camps also serve as sites for gathering data for the local cancer registries, which is then forwarded to the national cancer registry. Since the end of the 2000s the camp has rapidly become a site where private and public hospitals, as well as pharmaceutical companies conduct research. The camp allows for temporary scaling up by mobilizing large numbers of health care workers, medical experts, and tertiary-level technologies to screen, diagnose, treat, and sometimes even to operate on patients in large numbers and at a low cost. Mobile eye, cancer, or vaccination camps are held repeatedly over time and across regions regularly by the same public authorities or private foundations. Akin to the donation of vaccines and contraceptives, the medical camp is a powerful symbol of benevolence and welfarism. But the camp also marks the structural inequality in India that creates the conditions that could enable institutionalized coercive practices, a point we develop in the final section.

We argue that the local reception of pharmaceuticals depend as much on the type of technology on the move as on the scientific evidence mobilized around it. Together these structure the networks of various private and public institutional stakeholders. The technology itself, and the scientific values mobilized around it, influence the "dynamic transfiguration of forms across circulating matrices" as well (Gaonker and Povinelli 2003: 388), which can simultaneously enable and constrain mobility. "Circulating matrices" in the case of the HPV vaccines include, on the one hand, the actors (e.g., local and international NGOs, transnational corporations, and pharmaceutical com-

panies) partnering with the state to further the market for the mobilities of pharmaceuticals into various national contexts. On the other hand, they also include networks of public health professionals and health activists with transnational linkages, who are challenging the unregulated testing and marketing of pharmaceuticals in India.

Assemblages for the Promotion of the HPV Vaccines and Contraceptives

The diffusion of HPV vaccines reflects the expanded role that pharmaceuticals play in preventative medicine and international public health programs today (Petryna et al. 2006), a tendency which also enables riskier reproductive health interventions and research projects in this domain. Increasing numbers of healthy girls and women worldwide are being targeted in these programs to test drugs and new technologies. Interestingly, contraceptives paved the way here as well. It was the hormonal contraceptive pill that was the first drug to be administered to healthy people in order to achieve the goal of national or global population control (Oudshoorn 2002: 124). More recently the acceptance of drugs such as Misoprostol, and the efficacy of mechanisms for its delivery to large populations have been tested on women who are not at definite risk of experiencing postpartum hemorrhage (Towghi 2009, 2012). Extensive networks of public–private partnerships have been set up in Africa, Latin America, and Asia for this purpose (Population Council 2004).[7] A similar development can be observed in the case of HPV vaccines in India, where public and private institutions have become sites of local and international research and advocacy. Epidemiological, clinical, and laboratory research is currently being conducted to identify efficient channels for its delivery to rural populations even prior to the conduct of proper clinical trials to test for their safety.

International efforts have been underway since 2005 to expand the HPV vaccine market in India through the incorporation of NGOs, public health infrastructure, and rural communities. In July 2009, for example, the Ministry for Health and Family Welfare in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, in association with the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) and Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH), launched a so-called

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[7]   Population Council (2004). See also Towghi (2009) for a critique of the promotion of off-label uses of Misoprostol for labor induction and prevention of postpartum bleeding in Pakistan.

"demonstration project" for vaccination against cervical cancer. The vaccine against HPV was administered to some 14,000 girls between the ages of ten and fourteen in villages of Andhra Pradesh. The quadrivalent vaccine, Gardasil, manufactured by Merck and donated by the company, was used for this purpose. A month later, the government of the western Indian state of Gujarat launched a two-year Demonstration Project for Cancer of the Cervix Vaccine with Cervarix, manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), where the bivalent HPV vaccine, which is also donated by the company, was administered to 16,000 girls. Both projects received funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and technical support from the WHO's International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). In one region, the HPV vaccine was made part of India's National Rural Health Mission program of routine immunization, whereby it was simply added to the list of other vaccines on the familiar immunization card. The symbolic power of this card functioned to present the HPV vaccine as just another government-sponsored immunization activity until the deaths of a few young girls, who had been administered the vaccine.

As stated on the website of PATH, the international NGO involved in the project, and corroborated in interviews Towghi conducted with its program officers in Seattle and Delhi, the "demonstration projects" were described as "post-licensure observational studies" designed to generate critical data on effective strategies for public sector HPV immunization programs, as part of a broader cervical cancer prevention and control strategy. This post-licensure research sought to determine the acceptability, feasibility, and cost of delivery of the HPV vaccine in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, results of which would then be extrapolated to assess how it could be best promoted in other parts of the country. These projects blur the boundary between medical research, clinical trials, and marketing studies. Establishing the HPV demonstration project as an epidemiological and health intervention research rather than as a clinical trial to test drug safety and efficacy has an advantage, for the former is treated as a social science research subject to quite different regulatory norms. Researchers for epidemiological and health studies, for example, are not obligated by Indian law to register their activities with the Indian Council of Medical Research. A new regulation in July 2009 requires clinical trials to be registered with the Council but exempts social science and public health research from strict reporting or registration requirements. Pharmaceutical companies are only too happy to make use of a loophole conveniently created by the cunning state, which formally fulfills its international obligations on paper, while successfully subverting them in practice (Randeria 2007b). The

cunning state thus manages to appease both constituencies, those keen to globalize India rapidly by opening its economy to foreign capital, and those who call for stringent regulatory frameworks.

But the Indian state has turned a blind eye to its own norms being openly flouted as well. The original licensing of Gardasil and Cervarix was on the basis of bridging studies, which did not include the age groups for which the vaccines had been approved. According to Indian law a drug cannot be marketed and administered to children before Phase III of a clinical trial has been conducted with adult subjects. In the case of Gardasil, however, only one trial was carried out using a small sample of just 110 girls (aged 9–15 years). These young test subjects were followed for an unusually brief period of just one month after receiving the vaccination, and that only in order to observe the post-vaccination immune response. The vaccine has also been approved for adult women of up to 27 years in India, though no trials have been conducted for the 15–27 year age-group. This raises important issues about possible risks to those who smoke and who have a high exposure to hormonal contraceptives, risk factors that may increase the risk of blood clots in women who take the HPV vaccine.[8]

In the literature on the subject produced by PATH these studies are called "post-licensure studies" rather than Phase IV Clinical Trials.[9] PATH representatives explained to Towghi that the selection of the two districts for research/marketing in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat was not based on the epidemiology of cervical cancer. The choice of the test districts was determined instead solely on the basis of access granted by the respective governments to their public health infrastructure and local public schools to recruit young girls for vaccination. Moreover, as this was not considered to be an impact study, no baseline data about the incidence and prevalence of cervical cancer at the intervention sites was collected. Rather, the basic aim of the study was to evaluate strategies for the delivery of the vaccine and its acceptance by the population. Results of the study were to be presented to the Indian state health authorities for them to determine the feasibility of incorporating

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[8]   See Rothman and Rothman (2009) for a study reviewing the case of a post-Gardasil death of a young woman in the USA.

[9]   A Phase IV trial is also known as Post-Marketing Surveillance Trial. Phase IV trials involve safety surveillance (pharmacovigilence) and ongoing technical support of a drug after it receives permission to be sold. Phase IV studies may be required by regulatory authorities, or may be undertaken by the sponsoring company. Safety surveillance is designed to detect any rare or long-term adverse effects within a much larger patient population, and over a longer time-period than is possible during the Phase I–III clinical trials. Harmful effects discovered during Phase IV trials may result in a drug being pulled off the market, or restricted to certain uses.

the HPV vaccines into the national health program. PATH and WHO program officers and scientists stated clearly in interviews that their concern was to identify and create a sustainable context based on extant national data for the supply of vaccines to "resource-poor settings" where high rates of cervical cancer prevail. However, since these data are not disaggregated by region it is impossible to assess the direct effect of the vaccine on disease outcomes (HPV infection or cervical cancer incidence) in the absence of regional baseline data. As one representative of PATH explained, the aim of the program was simply to "sell the evidence regarding programmatic efficacy and cost of running such a program," for this is the data governments require for negotiating the price of vaccines with pharmaceutical companies. "We are creating the market for evidence," the representative explained.

The nexus between transnational corporations and the state has been documented often but what our case study highlights are efforts by an international NGO to interpellate the state. The fuzziness of the boundaries between public health and private profit, research and marketing lead to public institutions thus not only being represented as part of the market, but also as in the state furthering the establishment of the market, or itself becoming a part of the market. This is but one example of how the state is being privatized and reconfigured to serve the interests of capital.[10]

Pharmaceutical companies are creating a market for the HPV vaccine in the global South by initially introducing it into public health programs through free donations. Once the drug gains wide acceptance and delivery mechanisms are in place, it is possible for the manufacturers to cash in commercially. Following Sundar Rajan, we suggest that donated vaccines for "post-licensure," or "Phase IV clinical research" as is the case for the HPV vaccine, also operate as a form of "coercive incentive" (Sunder Rajan 2007: 75). The donation of drugs may thus be considered a method to further pharmaceutical mobilities over time and across regions (e.g., donations of HPV vaccines are evident in programs in Uganda, Vietnam, and Peru too). There are interesting parallels here to an attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to introduce an expensive, provider-dependent injectable contraceptive, Norplant, into the USAID-funded SIFPSA project. The attempt to introduce Norplant had several objectives. It was hoped that providing it free on a mass scale would help popularize a new contraceptive technology, which is little used in India. It would have also helped to test for the acceptance, effects, and service delivery

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[10]   See Harvey (2006) on the political and economic implications of privatization of social sectors and the constraints placed on the state due to global neoliberal economic policies.

systems of this contraceptive method on a large scale. For those keen to bring down fertility rates in India, Norplant had multiple advantages. For one, it is a provider-dependent technology over which the user has little or no control. Once the capsules containing the contraceptive are implanted in her upper arm, a woman cannot on her own discontinue its use. Norplant can only be implanted and removed by a trained medical specialist. For another, it is a long-acting contraceptive, which renders a user infertile for a period of three to five years. Moreover, family planning officials deemed it advantageous that a woman could use it without the knowledge of her husband or his family. Further, the SIFPSA project was to provide a fertile ground for testing service delivery mechanisms, which could then be scaled up to other parts of Uttar Pradesh and then to other regions of the country.

Both USAID and Indian officials told Randeria in interviews that it was also felt that spacing methods needed to be propagated on a mass scale in the official family-planning program instead of a terminal method like sterilization, the method most strongly favored by the state and most widely practised by the poor, if fertility rates in populous north India were to be reduced quickly, efficiently, and sustainably. For sterilizations had failed to bring down fertility rapidly to the desired level due to the fact that most Indian women went in for the operation, more or less willingly, only after they had borne the number of (male) children they desired. So sterilizations, despite their popularity and high prevalence, were unlikely to reduce fertility to the planned levels in the future either. It was also argued that Norplant would be a more effective means of curtailing fertility in poor families compared with the oral pill and condoms. Though pills and condoms had been distributed free of cost in state-run programs for years, officials doubted whether the poor actually used them. Therefore, USAID officials attempted to persuade and also pressurize the government of India into introducing long-acting, provider-dependent injectables into the public provision of free contraception.

The USAID proposal foresaw the introduction of Norplant as part of the SIFPSA project to begin with, during which period its costs would be covered through the program budget. But once the USAID-funded program ended, the government of India would have been forced to buy these expensive injectables from the manufacturers abroad, if they were to prove popular and demand for Norplant was to be established. Wary that imported injectables would later hike up costs to the pubic exchequer, officials of the Ministry of Family Welfare were against the introduction of Norplant into the state program. Women's health activists, who had strongly protested some years earlier against the trials of another injectable contraceptive, NET-En, which had been

conducted without proper informed consent or dissemination of information on risks, also marshaled strong support for a nationwide campaign against the planned introduction of Norplant into the state-run family-planning program. Interestingly, Indian bureaucrats, negotiating with USAID, used this vocal protest by women's groups to reject Norplant. They argued that the government could not afford to incur the wrath of the powerful women's movement, as both Indian bureaucrats and USAID officials stated in interviews. Thus the cunning state managed to deflect responsibility onto public protest by civil society actors for the nonintroduction of Norplant into the government program. For the public exchequer, which would bear the burden of incorporating Norplant or HPV into the public health and family planning system, the costs would be considerable. Unlike sterilizations, Norplant would need to be repeatedly implanted every few years. Repeat booster doses of the HPV vaccine would also be required according to Herald Zur Hausen, who won the Noble prize for medicine in 2008 for his discovery of the link between HPV and cervical cancer. Like Norplant, the HPV vaccine too is available in the private health sector. The HPV vaccine is often recommended and administered by gynecologists in metropolitan areas to girls and women. But their introduction into the public health system would be enormously lucrative for their manufacturers as it would not only multiply the demand many times over but would also allow use of public infrastructure to create a vast new market.

The organizational form chosen for the SIFPSA project was entirely new. The donor, USAID, and the recipient, the Government of India (GOI), together set it up as an NGO to run the program in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (UP), the country's most populous region with a high fertility rate. SIFPSA was thus a cross between a DONGO (donor established and funded NGO) and a GONGO (a government established and funded NGO), which was registered as an autonomous body under the Societies Act, under which many NGOs in the country operate. Entirely funded by USAID and staffed by senior Indian bureaucrats, SIFPSA was designed to operate outside the ambit of the UP government and its health and family planning bureaucracy, which was considered by USAID to be inefficient and corrupt, a view GOI officials concurred with off the record. SIFPSA was thus set up in order to circumvent the ministry of health and public health machinery of the state of UP and to channel aid funds directly to the partners, be they community-based NGOs, public health service centers, or private hospitals participating in the program. Of course, the UP government managed indirectly to retain some control of the programs and its funds by appointing some of its senior bureaucrats to key positions within SIFPSA.

In addition to the WHO, the strong presence not only of USAID, the Population Council, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, but also of internationally operating American NGOs with regional offices in Delhi (e.g. the Futures Group and PATH) reflects the mix of actors involved in such promotional campaigns in India. It is also an indicator of the scale of activities of international NGOs and US organizations in India's health care sector.[11] In addition to launching a marketing campaign using local print and visual media, representatives of Merck and GlaxoSmithKline, the two multinational pharmaceutical companies producing the HPV vaccine, directly approached private and public hospitals to persuade them to stock the vaccine in their gynecological and pediatric departments. They also organized promotional camps in city schools, where parents are likely to be able to afford the HPV vaccines. Pharmaceutical company representatives bypassed the central government by directly lobbying local public health officials of the states of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh (e.g., the chief medical officer, district commissioner, and the district magistrate) in an effort to persuade them to use the National Rural Health Mission "flexi-pool" funds to purchase the HPV and other new vaccines at subsidized rates. If successful, this would pave the way for the potential normalization of the HPV vaccine as part of the national immunization program.[12] Besides enlisting public sector health workers and organizing outreach health camps, the representatives of the two companies contacted well-established Indian advocacy and service NGOs in order to access rural communities for the testing of the vaccine, a point we return to below.

In a similar fashion, USAID had sought in the 1990s and early 2000s to create a market for the branded oral pill and condoms through the SIFPSA project. The insertion into the public health system of new brands of expensive oral pills and condoms, and the setting up of parallel private channels of distribution for these, aimed to test the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of service delivery systems using the public health infrastructure, on the one hand, and

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[11]   Other American institutions include the ICRW (The International Center for Research on Women), National Institute of Health, and medical school, and schools of public health of several leading US universities such as the University of California at Berkeley.

[12]   While policy with regard to vaccines is made at the Union Ministry (or the central government) and the Health Departments of the various states together, it is the National Technical Advisory Group on Immunization that finally advises the Central government on the feasibility of introducing a vaccine in India after clearance from the National Drug Authority and a license from the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI). However, each regional state government has the autonomy to introduce any vaccine into its own public health system that is not part of the national immunization program, as several of them have chosen to do with the Hepatitis B vaccine. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, which is India's largest and richest municipal organization, also plans to spend public funds to purchase and administer HPV vaccines.

to set up and test mechanisms of delivery bypassing the state, on the other, through the incorporation of well-established community-based NGOs into the family planning program that villagers in north India had greeted over the years with skepticism if not outright hostility. Moreover, the project sought to create a market for products hitherto unknown to certain segments of the population and to make the oral pill and condom, available free of cost in the public health system, obsolete by replacing them with branded equivalents paired with better service delivery. If successful it would both create a vast new market for these products and also fuel the demand for their incorporation into the public system, an even more profitable proposition for the pharmaceutical corporations. The multi-million dollar program also tested the usefulness of new public management techniques of audit (e.g., performance indicators and benchmarks) in order to monitor and control the performance of program partners ranging from the government of India to local NGOs. These auditing techniques later became standard procedure for other USAID programs in the country, and elsewhere, in addition to being taken over by the government and by other aid organizations in the country. So, the mobility of organizational forms, norms, so-called best practices, auditing techniques, or service delivery systems is independent of a particular program. These can become mobile objects decoupled from the pharmaceuticals, whose movement they initially accompanied.

Unlike the introduction of the HPV vaccine, a completely new product, the challenge in the SIFPSA program was to create demand for expensive branded products (particular brands of the oral pill and condom), the low-cost equivalents of which were already available free of cost in the public health system. So these new products had to be made available initially free of cost as well while ensuring door-to-door home delivery through social marketing programs and partnering with community NGOs. Next it was sought to create brand awareness for the expensive, and hence prestigious brands of both contraceptives. Thus, women community development workers, who were entrusted with the task of creating a lasting demand for these new brands, strove to popularize them and set them apart from the highly familiar and freely available but little used condoms and oral pills manufactured in the public sector. Just as the term "operation" is used as a synonym for sterilization among the poor throughout India, condoms and oral contraceptive pills are referred to simply as Nirodh and Mala-D respectively, the names of the products ubiquitously available free of cost in public primary health care centers. Thus the women NGO workers incorporated into the SIFPSA project struggled to sell, through a parallel private structure, what the Auxiliary Nurse Midwives in the state-run program distributed free of cost. As a result, considerable overlap

and competition developed between these two groups of women, who were forced to duplicate each other's work in their desperate struggle to win over the same village women as consumers. But that is a different story.

Anthropologist Lawrence Cohen (2004) has coined the term "bioavailability" for the making available of organs and tissues of the poor for extraction, redistribution, and transplantation on a large scale. The case study of the HPV vaccine demonstration project illustrates why pharmaceutical mobilities are predicated on bioavailability and how it is put into practice. In order to produce the required evidence of program efficacy transnational manufacturers need to be granted temporary access to the public health system so as to be able to have access to the bodies of young girls in rural areas, where a majority of the country's population continues to live. While the vaccines are donated for the duration of the demonstration projects, there is no established protocol to follow up the vaccinated girls, or to vaccinate the population outside the project areas in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat. If the girls participating in the project require a booster dose in the future, it is unlikely that they would have access to it through the public system. And the high costs of the vaccine on the market will effectively restrict future access for girls from poor families.[13]

The public health apparatus has, over the years, succeeded in normalizing the use of vaccines, which are largely viewed today as benign preventive drugs. The normalization of vaccines as a core, effective, and safe public health provision might well be read as a biopolitical success story. As an Indian epidemiologist in Pune informed Towghi, "Taking vaccines has become a part of a good health culture. One of our important public health messages has been to take the vaccine. So up to now we have been naively welcoming vaccines." As such, the new vaccines in India piggyback on a view of vaccines as an important preventive health measure. People are willing to pay for vaccines, even if the costs are high. So doctors are stocking up on the HPV vaccine as it is easy to convince patients of the need to use it. Due to the highly visible advertising campaign, middle-class women in urban areas are even asking for it. One gynecologist felt that "people who are asking for the HPV vaccine epidemiologically (are) the ones who will probably not develop cervical cancer. They are welcome to the vaccine, but we are not going to make a big impact on our cervical cancer statistics."

If the state is often the "obligatory passage point" (Callon 1986) through which to gain access to the Indian market and to bodies for clinical

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[13]   In the USA the three doses cost $360. In India the market rate of HPV vaccine is Rupees 2000 per dose, approximately $100 for the three doses (*Indian Journal of Medical Ethics*, VII(1), January–March 2010).

trials, international and national NGOs and the public health infrastructure can be considered to be the new value-added passage points. For pharmaceutical companies do not need to invest in creating an infrastructure to ensure the sustained flow of vaccines, their monitoring, and follow-up. This can be left to the state and local NGOs. Moreover, to reach the specific "target" population requires movement through different kinds of networks of public and private actors. However, passage through these nodal points may not necessarily be smooth. For instance, when Merck representatives attempted to enlist the assistance of the Indian NGO, *Action India,* in order to gain access to the rural communities with which it worked, the NGO demanded that the necessary needs assessment and baseline study be carried out by the company. Merck had little interest in doing so. The NGO, in turn, was not interested in the free HPV vaccines offered for a brief period in return for linking the multinational company with the rural communities with whom the NGO had had a close working relationship since the 1970s. The company was forced to look for a more pliant NGO to partner with. Institutional assemblages that underpin pharmaceutical mobilities cannot thus be assumed to be already in place. They need to be carefully crafted, or partially transposed from other successful settings, or scaled up and domesticated in a particular local context.

The enlisting of NGOs to boost program efficacy, achieve greater legitimacy and secure access to poor communities had been tried out in the SIFPSA project as well. In a radical departure from the practice in family planning programs, several well-known NGOs with strong community level ties were incorporated as partners in the project. Working through NGOs, which enjoyed the confidence of villagers, also ensured easy access to large numbers of rural women. Partnering with NGOs, known for their progressive views on women's rights issues, imparted to USAID's family planning efforts much needed local legitimacy for a program dealing with a highly sensitive and fraught issue. For the NGOs, such participation came at the risk of a loss of reputation, and at the risk of cooptation, but with assured international visibility along with an enormous amount of funds over a relatively long period, which could be used for administrative overheads as well as for program budgets and staff salaries.

Contesting the HPV vaccine

In November 2009, Towghi interviewed a gynecologist from Bangalore, who was examining hundreds of women gathered at a cervical cancer screening camp in Andhra Pradesh, south India. Asked whether she had heard about

the HPV vaccine demonstration projects taking place in selected districts in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, she replied, "I did not know the vaccine has been introduced in India. The trouble in India is that nothing is monitored very well; we are all guinea pigs. Globally everybody thinks India is the right place and a new, very ripe place because there is so little monitoring, nobody bothers about the after-effects. It is only later or when some activist group comes into action, and if they are strong enough to bring about the huge change. And who are the activists? They are the 20% sitting in urban areas. You can ensure that it is stopped to some extent. But it is still going to continue in rural areas, which is 80% of our country, where very little monitoring is possible. I had heard about this, that girls had died in the United States. I did not know HPV vaccine had already come to India."

Within a few months of this conversation, women's organizations and women's health groups in India had successfully pressured the Indian government to stop the demonstration projects following the HPV vaccine-related deaths of six girls in April 2010 (four in Andhra Pradesh and two in Gujarat). As in the cases of post-vaccination deaths in the United States, Canada, and Australia, the HPV vaccine manufacturers argued that these cases were not "causally" related to the vaccine. And this despite the fact that a number of deaths in the United States and India have been due to blood clotting and seizure, which are two of the possible serious side effects of the vaccine listed by the manufacturers.[14] According to state officials directly overseeing the demonstration project, as well as the NGO involved, the two deaths in Gujarat were attributed to malaria and snakebite, whereas those in Andhra Pradesh were deemed to be the result of suicides. In contrast to the vaccine manufacturers' package insert, PATH's website indicates that there are no side effects of the vaccine other than irritation at the injection site and fever. The NGO claims that it has been safely administered to millions of girls in developed countries without any complaints. Post-marketing surveillance in other national contexts, however, tells a different story of blood-clotting disorders, autoimmune diseases, respiratory and nervous-system disorders, and even deaths.[15]

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[14]   The Merck website warns of severe side effects, but does not mention the risks.
[15]   Since the introduction of the Gardasil HPV vaccine in the United States in 2006, there have been 32 unconfirmed deaths and thousands of so-called adverse "events" (See US VAERS – *vaccine adverse event reporting system*) prompting a media backlash against Merck. The European Medicine Agency (EMEA) also mentions deaths in Germany and Austria that are allegedly linked to Gardasil. In the UK, where Cervarix, manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline, has been administered, deaths have been reported, too.

Health activists and other women's groups in India demanded an investigation into the six deaths. They called for access to basic cancer-screening technologies rather than the use of an "unreliable" vaccine. As activists have argued, the HPV vaccine protects against only persistent infection of two to four HPV genotypes (WHO 2007). The activists correctly argued that there is little to no scientific evidence that it will actually protect against cervical cancer. It will take forty to fifty years before such a claim can be substantiated, if at all (WHO 2007). Moreover, in order to even evaluate whether and to what extent future changes in cervical cancer rates were due to the HPV vaccine, a prospective study must be in place, but such studies are not being undertaken by the manufacturers in India. Screening is already a proven method of protecting women against cervical cancer in North America and Europe. Interestingly, these norms of preventive screening that have been effective against cervical cancer are not being globalized to the South. The HPV vaccine will be of no benefit to the thousands of women living with first, second, or third stage cervical cancer in India for whom diagnostic or treatment facilities in the public health care system in rural India are highly inadequate. In fact, the WHO (2007: 27) cites a study[16] demonstrating that the introduction of HPV vaccines may affect – positively or negatively – the effectiveness of screening programs. In other words, while the HPV vaccine has the potential (based on laboratory immunogenicity studies) to prevent the two oncogenic or cancer-causing HPVs, the introduction of the vaccine into the public sector could further reduce the already limited access to screening programs, and therefore increase the extant cervical cancer rates in the absence of early detection and treatment. Even in countries with organized screening, the WHO has suggested that it will be important to evaluate the effect of the HPV vaccine on screening programs. If those vaccinated no longer go in for screening because they (erroneously) believe that they are fully protected against cervical cancer, the number of deaths from this type of cancer could even increase, especially if vaccine protection wanes over time.

In addition to the suspension of the demonstration projects, activists also succeeded in pressuring the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) and the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) to stop the television and full-page newspaper advertisements that had sought to popularize the vaccine while the projects were underway. The two multinational vaccine manufacturers sponsoring the advertisements were accused of falsifying the relationship

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[16]   Garnett et al. (2006).

between HPV, the HPV vaccine, and cervical cancer.[17] A major criticism of these advertisements had to do with the representation of the HPV vaccine as a "vaccine against cervical cancer" in the projects in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat, as well as in well-known public and private hospitals in Delhi, Bombay, and Ahmadabad. There are more than 100 known HPV genotypes, of which thirteen are oncogenic (cancer-causing) genotypes. Scientific evidence shows that two HPV vaccines are designed *to prevent infections* from only two of the oncogenic HPV genotypes (HPV-16 and HPV-18) and two of the non-oncogenic low-risk HPV types (HPV-16 and HPV-11) (WHO 2007, our emphasis). However, the WHO scientist, interviewed by Towghi in Geneva, also defended this questionable promotional strategy. She opined that it was necessary to use this strategy in order to overcome the stigma associated with sexually transmitted diseases in "developing" countries with some of the highest rates of cervical cancer. She cited studies conducted by PATH (with WHO technical support, and funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) in Vietnam, Uganda, Peru, and India, which found that mothers could easily be convinced to have their daughters vaccinated against "cancer," as the disease could potentially increase the risk of infertility. Moreover, she remarked that the acronym HPV is too similar to the highly stigmatized HIV, so people were likely to confuse the two, though she could not cite studies or any empirical evidence of such conflation.

The government committee appointed to investigate the post-vaccination deaths in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh found that the active involvement of the entire public health machinery in post-licensure research may have led to the blurring of the distinction between a routine, national immunization program and the experimental, or research nature, of the HPV vaccination study.[18] The investigation also confirmed that such an overlap led to problems with the recruitment and consent process, the inadequacies of which activists and journalists had first exposed.[19] For instance, girls were recruited from remote "tribal" areas and enrolled without the consent of parents. We have

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[17] The aggressive marketing of HPV vaccine in India has targeted young girls and their mothers, depicting them in a loving embrace. Full-page newspaper advertisements highlighted the need to vaccinate daughters against cervical cancer. "It's true! Vaccination can now protect your daughter from cervical cancer," reads one advertisement by a pharmaceutical company. It advised readers to "act today" and contact their gynecologist or pediatrician for vaccination, as young girls were at the highest risk of contracting the infection that might lead to cervical cancer. The advertisements, which failed to mention any side effects, represented the vaccination as a public awareness initiative rather than a marketing campaign. The newspaper advertisements in English dailies were aimed at urban middle-class consumers.

[18] Conversation with Anant Phadke of SATHI-CEHAT, Pune, India.

[19] See *Indian Journal of Medical Ethics*, VII(1), January–March 2010.

little information on either the nature of the procedure for consent followed in private clinics or of the adverse effects, if any, of the vaccines administered there. We do know that in the public health system the consent forms in English were merely translated orally into the local language. In Andhra Pradesh, for instance, hostel wardens and headmasters of schools signed these forms, rather than the parents of the girls. As Sunder Rajan (2007: 77) has argued in his critique of biocapital, under circumstances of such steep inequality as exist in India there cannot be a pure liberal social contract between rational individuals in what John Rawls would call an "original position of assumed equality," which is the assumption underlying the notion of free consent in the recruitment of subjects for clinical trials. The investigation into the deaths also found what Petryna (2005) has termed "ethical variability" at work. There was no insurance coverage to protect the research subjects (the vaccine recipients), which is at odds with the usual practice of post-licensure trials. The committee argued that since this vaccine is newly developed, even though licensed for sale, there should have been provision of insurance coverage for the study participants in case of a potential adverse event or morbidity – including death.[20] In other words, what we have here is the selective mobility, or rather the immobility, of North American and European regulatory norms for post-licensure pharmaceutical research into a setting in the global South.

Controversy continues to dog the vaccine. The PATH website claims that the "HPV vaccine is a major development in women's health. While screening and treatment are feasible in many resource poor settings, it takes years to develop them. It is difficult to reach all women in rural areas. Vaccine offers the long-term potential to bring cervical cancer rates down worldwide to levels experienced in the developed world." Women's health activists and gynecologists interviewed by Towghi share neither this optimism nor this analysis of the problem. Instead, they point out that promoting the HPV vaccine in India overlooks the lack of screening and pap-tests that would prevent the high rates of cervical cancer among poor and rural Indian women. Several Indian epidemiologists also consider that the vaccine is a short-cut substitute for a failed public health system. Yet ironically they too rely on the same system to expand the market for HPV vaccines in India. Against this view, Indian activists opposed to its introduction argue that the high costs of the vaccine would bankrupt an already fragile public health system, further weakening the

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[20]   *Interim Commission Report 2010*, courtesy of SATHI-CEHAT.

limited health care available to the poor. In their view, if women's health were of primary importance, cervical cancer screening could be provided at a fraction of the cost of the HPV vaccine.

Successful protests against potentially harmful reproductive health technologies like Norplant or the HPV vaccine demonstrate that global flows are far from smooth. "Friction" often accompanies such flows, as Tsing (2005) has argued. The framework of mobilities does not assume smooth movement in a seamless world. Movement is the result of planned and funded action, the designs of which may be domesticated or disrupted by various sets of actors. It needs careful ethnographic enquiry to uncover and understand who moves what, how, when, and with the help of what kinds of regulatory frameworks. Availability of funding, or the forging of a coalition of powerful actors, does not necessarily guarantee easy transnational flows of norms, forms, or pharmaceuticals, let alone the implementation of global biopolitical designs. Whereas the oral contraceptive pill could be tested in Puerto Rico prior to its highly successful introduction into the US market, trials in India of injectable long-acting and provider-dependent contraceptives like NET-En or Norplant, as well as of the vaccine against pregnancy (Richter 1996), had to be discontinued after strong protests by women's health and rights groups. More recently, illegal trials of Quinacrine, an antimalarial drug that was being experimented on for the possible purpose of sterilization (Rao 2004), had to be abandoned after the Indian Supreme Court banned them in 1998, following a public campaign, as well as a public interest litigation filed by academics at the Jawaharlal Nehru University and a national women's organization. USAID was, for instance, thwarted in its aim to test Norplant within its State Innovations in Family Planning Services Project in north India, as we have shown above. It was forced instead to market branded oral contraceptive pills and condoms within the project.[21]

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[21] The project authorities claim that the use of modern contraception increased nearly twice as fast from 1992 to 2005 in areas under USAID-funded projects within the SIFPSA framework. The program focused on UP to begin with for, as it stated, one-sixth of the world's population lives in India and one-sixth of India's population lives in UP. Only three other countries of the world, China, the United States and Indonesia have populations larger than that of the Indian state of UP. In 1992–93 only 19 out of 100 currently married women in UP in the reproductive age-range of 15–49 were using modern contraceptive methods. Of these, only 29 percent were using modern spacing methods (the oral pill, IUD, and condoms). USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/in/about_us/history.html (last accessed November 7, 2011). For a trenchant critique of the program, see Menon (2004).

Conclusion

In sum, biopolitical investments vary across population groups, especially among states under external pressure to control population growth or to promote particular pharmaceutical or medical technologies. Steep gradients of inequality mark these biopolitical exchanges, be it the relationship between NGOs and foreign donors as institutional actors, or between individuals as sellers and recipients of organs for transplant, or as donors and recipients of human tissues for stem-cell therapies, or as sperm and egg donors for IVF and surrogacy and those who profit from these practices. Pharmaceutical mobility not only profoundly transforms the relations of people to things, but also the relationships between people, as well as their relationship to their own bodies (Geser 2004). Cross-border circulation of pharmaceuticals and medical technologies are often uneven in their impact on the lives of men and women of different class, caste, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. These mobilities are also intertwined with forms of power in complex and contradictory ways. Mobility itself can become a powerful resource for those seeking medical treatment or reproductive options, for instance, across national borders, but it can also reproduce inequalities and produce new forms of exclusion.

How does the framework of mobilities differ from the classical diffusion approach that marked many decades of demographic studies on the transfer from the West to the rest of the world of contraceptives, educational campaign strategies and practices in family planning programs? One obvious difference is the absence of Eurocentric normative or teleological assumptions of modernization that characterized the earlier studies of such diffusion within a developmental framework. The mobilities approach is neither interested in improving the efficiency of such diffusion, nor does it share the assumption of the earlier studies that norms of small families, technologies of contraception, and program practices travelled in a unidirectional fashion ready-made from Euroamerica to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It traces instead the paths and patterns of circulation, the connections between scales and sites across countries and analyzes the constellations of actors that facilitate or block such flows. But rather than a billiard ball model of the forces of change emanating in the West bringing about transformations elsewhere, we seek to understand these sites outside the West as both pathways for circulation as well as sites for experimentation. We have argued that these are experiments with new pharmaceuticals, with new institutional arrangements, and practices for the governance of populations, which can be scaled up within and beyond a particular country or program.

We have suggested that a reconfigured nexus of state–market relations increasingly shapes the governance of the poor in the global South. Pharmaceutical companies, international donors and nongovernmental organizations rely on the mediation and involvement of the state in the provision and finance of health care in order to facilitate the spread of vaccinations and contraceptives. Our material shows the increasingly blurred boundaries between clinical trials, promotion, sales strategies, medical research, and public health campaigns. It also points to the fuzziness of distinctions between public and private actors, domestic and transnational ones. Despite the proliferation of public–private as well as public–public and private–private partnerships within and beyond national borders, the state continues to be central to the formation of health care norms, policies, and regulations. Through its absence and its presence, or as much through its inaction as through its actions, the state is accountable to its citizens. The state is both an agent and an object of neoliberal globalization (Randeria 2007b). The capacity of subordinate states in the international system to make and enforce rules, as well as to set and achieve policy agendas, is limited from without and contested from within. And yet, though inadequate, the state remains indispensable to pharmaceutical mobilities as its laws and policies play a key role in transposing and domesticating international norms and practices into the national and subnational arena, as is evident both in the case of the HPV vaccine and of population control programs in India. We have shown how the enabling state is in fact involved in creating new markets for vaccines and contraceptives rather than regulating them.

Acknowledgement

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Foreign Operations: Reflections on Clinical Mobility in Indian Film and Beyond

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How might a given medium, the popular Hindi film, offer scenes of instruction for a sociology of mobility in relation to medicine and health? This essay, after introducing some grammar for cinema's approach to the clinic, turns to moments in which surgical operations as plot devices raise particular challenges for a concept of *clinical mobility*.[1] By clinical mobility I mean the extent to which institutionalized practices of therapeutics organize or interrupt the movement of persons or populations. Working between thematizations of popular culture and intertwined histories of medicine, capital, and the state in independent India, the chapter makes a series of claims through this concept: (1) the presumption of peasant and slum-dweller immobility, in 1950s–1970s state planning for health; (2) the offshoring and subsequent partial repatriation of the elite clinic, between the 1960s and 2000s;

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[1] My turn to mobility is indebted to the MOVE consortium: in particular to Shalini Randeria, Gianni D'Amato, Francesco Panese, Didier Ruedin, Ola Söderström, Hans-Rudolf Wicker, and Fouzieyha Towghi. The engagement with the clinic in film draws on conversation with Rachel Dwyer, Tejaswini Ganti, Priya Joshi, Anupama Kapse, William Mazzarella, and Anand Pandian. Amrita Ibrahim, Sagaree Sengupta, and Sanjay Srivastava redirected me at a critical moment: Sanjay also suggested the turn to *Ankahee*.

and (3) the shift, in the imagination of dystopia across the more than half century of national life, from the immobile mass population to the specter of mobile "trafficking."

I engage a "mobilities paradigm" (Urry 2000; Cresswell 2006) to rethink critical work in social sciences of medicine. I will examine how both popular culture and academic prose may presume and naturalize states of mobility in offering a critique of the contemporary clinic and a remedy for its ills.

Towards a Popular Grammar: The Sovereign Doctor, the Split Population

Indian film has staged medicine, from the "classical" or "Golden Age" Hindi-language cinema of the 1950s forward, as a particular figure of sovereignty. Medicine is here sovereign, in the sense offered by Michel Foucault in *The History of Sexuality, Volume One* (1976), as the doctor is cinematically identified as the giver of death under an emergent national dispensation.

We might begin with the 1971 film *Anand*, in which the eponymous hero is dying from what his doctors term "lymphosarcoma of the intestine." Anand is an exuberant man who has formed an ethos to live life to the fullest. His close friend and dramatic foil is a dedicated but humorless "cancer specialist," Dr. Bhaskar Banerjee, who at the film's opening walks through a Bombay slum offering (through voice-over) a painful diagnosis of his, and medicine's, failure. "This many years after Independence," he says, "people still don't have the money to buy salt. How can I ask them to buy medicine?" Medicine, Bhaskar laments, cannot cure poverty. During the slum episode, the film frame focuses on Bhaskar's face as he examines a patient, perhaps a child, and then angrily gets up to leave, frustrated at his inability to prevent yet another death. Bhaskar is played by the actor Amitabh Bachchan, who will famously go on, over the next decade, to become the "angry young man" of the popular Hindi cinema. As Bhaskar leaves, a crying woman pleads with him to do something. Bhaskar turns on her, his eyes cold, and barks out that he is not God. Independence, presumably once imaginable as the promise of life itself, has delivered only abandonment and the gift of death. As he emerges from the hut, Bhaskar encounters a second woman, who offers him sweets in celebration of another child's birth. The doctor cannot rejoice. Not only is he full of self-loathing at his failure to offer anything but death, but we sense his disgust at a desperate carnality in which both births and deaths pile up but life, as he idealizes it, is painfully absent.

Figure 9.1 Dr. Bhaskar Banerjee (Amitabh Bachchan) attempts to treat
Anand (Rajesh Khanna). Still from the 1971 film *Anand*.

The rest of the film shuttles between Bhaskar's clinic and home and
those of his friend Kulkarni. For middle-class patients like Anand, life and
death are played out on a wider circuit – between home and professional
office, between specialists, between cities and national regions. The nation is
conceived as a binarism, to use the deconstructive term, between the relative
immobility of the slum and the relative mobility of middle-class care.

The arguable perversity of *Anand*'s humanism is that this class distinc-
tion of mobile access, despite Bhaskar's anger at the state's failure, does not
matter: death comes as intractably to the middle class, here as a cancer with
a complicated and powerful English name. Anand's first lesson to his phy-
sician, in fact, is that death comes, sooner or later, to us all. When he first
meets Bhaskar, Anand refuses the gift of death. The meeting takes place in
Kulkarni's well-appointed nursing home where Anand has come from Delhi
for treatment and to live out the remainder of his days. Bhaskar is more polite
to this recognizably middle-class patient in his familiar task of having only
death to offer, and at first he defers giving Anand the dreadful name of his
disease. Anand, however, persistently goads the doctor into saying the name

of what ails him, and Bhaskar, vexed, finally shouts out the name: "lympho-sarcoma of the intestine!" But his irrepressible patient turns the name around. Anand laughs: "*Vah! Vah! Kya baat hai! Kya naam hai! Aisa lagta hai jaise kisi Viceroy ka naam!*" (Wow, wow, that's great. What a name! It seems almost like some Viceroy's name!) Reducing the grandeur of his lymphosarcoma to the once powerful names of the former colonial rulers, he goes on to joke that if a woman was given this diagnosis, it would sound like she had adopted some English baby.

If in the earlier scene in the slum Bhaskar can take no pleasure in child-birth, immersed in his sense of the failed nation as a space of death, here Anand turns the clinic itself and its serious English nomenclature into a per-verse figure of family, the Viceroy-diagnosis foisting English babies on Indian women, the monstrous fertility of transnational diagnosis. In troubling the scale of elite medicine's transnational cosmopolitanism, he reorients the clinic to the nation, scaling it down even as Bhaskar would scale up the wretched medicine of the slum. *Women* secure this scale: Anand in his final days reori-ents the clinic and Bhaskar himself by mobilizing women as mothers and partners.[2] If the slum, in this moment of heightened eugenics, is haunted by the morbid carnality of mass birth, the elite clinic maintains its own relation to monstrosity in failing to link the foreign-oriented expertise of the era of planned development to the conviviality of an idealized Indian family life.

The inevitable fact of death is marked in *Anand* by a relay through var-ied technologies of investigation and delay: x-rays, radiation machines, and examining tables. But these assembled instrumentalities do little more than affirm that we near the foreign terrain of death. If medicine in *Anand* is a non-event, only seeming to iterate death's fixity, the film's diegesis cannot depend on the clinic for its drama. Anand escapes the clinic and its rules sequestering him. He shows up at Bhaskar's home, this modest relocation his claim on life. He will go on to break other rules, each move enabling relationships for him-self but especially for Bhaskar. Life demands a kind of mobility, rooted in the generativity of human relationships, that the clinic and its immobilizing care appear to interrupt.

At the outset, then, of our discussion: we have a figure of the clinic, differentially mobilized across class, and a corrective humanism that reduces both the death of immobile underdevelopment on the one hand and transna-tional and ascetic expertise on the other to a common absence of life. The

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2   Anand not only works to bring Anand and a former and beloved patient of his together as a couple, but he transforms the clinic's stern matron by recognizing her as a loving mother: women in these scenes circulate, reorienting men to the nation.

solution is that promise of national life revealed in the auspicious and life-affirming affects generated by the circulation of women as mothers and wives. Proper mobility must be created against on the one hand the immobility of the mass population and its bare, festering life, and on the other the hypermobility of the English diagnosis that produces its bureaucratic immobilization, its failure to acknowledge life amid its fragility. We need concur neither in this ultimate equation of differential mobilities across class as each subject to a condition of immobilization, nor in the very presumption that slum life is immobile and therefore a kind of bare life that must be refused.

Towards a Popular Grammar: the Operation

In many films from the 1950s through the 1980s with hospital scenes, the clinic offers less the certitude of a position on one or the other side of death but a troubled condition of not knowing. Such not knowing is central to the family melodrama: the reorientation of relationships is often staged through the clinic. Whenever the clinic moves from the non-event it is in *Anand* to the dramatic event par excellence, it does so through and as a very specific form organizing time and space. This form is the surgical operation. The Latinate word, operation, asserts itself in Hindi as in most languages globally: a conspicuously modern and highly mobile figure.

The scene I have in mind is one in which the care group of anxious friends or family members stand or sit in an anteroom or hallway outside of a door from which they are barred from entering. Often an electric sign or bulb in alarming red marks the barrier, against the more muted palette of the hallway. Beyond lies the operating room. The film may use jump cuts to move back and forth between the operating room and those barred from it. This care group can do little but wait for a sign from the green-robed physician: life or death. The melodramatic condensation of the scene is driven by the expectation that usually the doctor has little but the gift of death to offer: the waiting is fraught.

The operation collapses the modernity, power, and hope of medicine into a single figure of space and time: unlike the relay of clinical scenes in *Anand*, death haunts the surgical theater but is not a foregone conclusion. If in *Anand* the clinic both immobilizes and deterritorializes the patient, separating him or her from the relational world, in the scenes of waiting that I have in mind the clinic anteroom is stuffed full of all the intensities of life, all its expectations and hurts.

A film that brings out this grammar of the operation as melodramatic concision is the 1985 *Ankahee* (The Unspoken). Variously legible as both popular and "art" film within the hierarchy of Hindi film audiences of its time, *Ankahee* opens and closes with a hospital anteroom scene. A young woman is wheeled into the surgical theater for a minor operation. Her husband waits anxiously in the anteroom, with his friend Nandu and Nandu's father the astrologer Chaturvedi. Chaturvedi, who has never been wrong in his predictions, approaches the doctor with bad news: his horoscopes reveal that the operation will fail and the woman will die. The doctor is unimpressed. The film sets up the encounter as the familiar contest between science and tradition, the latter framed as *Kaal*, Time or Fate. The operation begins. The film cuts between the surgeons and equipment on one side of the door, and the assembled loved ones on the other. The woman dies.

The widowed man and Nandu work at a construction site: their labor involves blueprints and planning and situates them as familiar personages in the film of the first four decades of independence, engineers. Nandu is courting Sushma, an astronomer. The two moderns ride around town on his motorized scooter. But Chaturvedi reveals that he has cast Nandu's horoscope and the planets suggest a perverse destiny: a first wife will die after eleven months of marriage; a second wife will live long. Nandu cannot marry. Sushma dismisses the prediction as superstition; when she sees how seriously Nandu takes it, she tells him she would rather have eleven months with him than none at all. The plot is not that of *Anand*: Sushma cannot bring Nandu to accept Fate and live with the time they have, in part as the question of Fate is not fully secured amid an urban landscape incompletely disenchanted by modern technology.

Intervention comes with the arrival from the village of an old schoolmate of the pandit's along with his mentally disturbed or disabled daughter Indu. Sushma is out of town: Nandu decides to marry Indu, sacrificing her to save Sushma. Sushma though is horrified at what he has done. Nandu avoids sleeping with Indu until one night, depressed and drunk, he joins her. She becomes pregnant and married life heals her madness (which a psychiatrist has diagnosed as hysteria). Nandu, remorseful, reveals to Indu the astrologer's prediction. Indu asks Sushma to forgive Nandu, to marry him when he becomes widowed, and to raise Indu's child as her own. Indu then goes into labor and is rushed to the same hospital. There are complications. The same doctor operates. Chatervedi and his wife wait in the antechamber. Nandu rushes from work on his scooter. While the family waits (and Nandu rushes), a devotional song evokes Lord Krishna, beloved to Indu, and the inexorable figure of Fate in the pandit's cosmology is leavened by the playful uncertainty

of the divine trickster. Nandu arrives at last, the doctor appears, and Indu has against all expectation survived. She and Nandu are given their child. And then a note comes revealing that Sushma has committed suicide.

Romance, in 1985, is mobilized by scooter. The quasi-realist conventions of this "art" film do not use the conventional extradiagetic interruptions (Gopalan 2002) of the song sequences. Instead of recognizing the oneiric and pleasurable quality of love by surreally displacing the lovers to the hillsides of Kashmir or the Western Ghats, Sushma and Nandu are shown moving around the construction sites of the city. Their mobility is no more and no less than the cityscape: rationalized, it is not *dreamt*. It is the second relationship, with Indu, that will reintroduce the imaginary mobility of love, though not through sudden cuts to mountain scenes. Rather, the "oneiric" quality of love – its interruption of family norms in place – appears with Indu's madness, her uncanny closeness to the world of the gods as well as to the terrifying ghosts she experiences. It is this deterritorialization that enables, as Indu regains sanity, the sublime attachment of married love.

In the climactic operation scene, the film cuts repeatedly to Nandu weaving through traffic and then to Sushma alone in her flat. In three of the tableaus – operating room, anteroom, and cityscape with racing scooter, time is marked by a beautiful *bhajan* or hymn to Krishna, its tempo quickening and matching our feelings as the uncertain operation proceeds. Whenever there is a jump cut to Sushma sitting still in her apartment, the song itself is interrupted, stopping dead with only the sound of the clock ticking. The clinic here is not the simultaneously immobile and hypermobile space of death it is in *Anand*, set against the convivial and gendered possibilities of the household. The clinic is simply *the place where operations happen*. Operations, like the scooter and the accelerating percussion of the *bhajan*, move things along (Kaufman 2005). Life or death, Fate or Science: we cannot know how the sovereign decision will fall until the barred door is open. But this waiting, like the love song, intensifies not only the pleasure of the cinema but also its sense of mobility. Life here is set not against the clinic but the dead silence – which the contrastive melody of the operation as Krishna devotion reveals – of that relation which cannot be dreamt.

Between them, *Anand* and *Ankahee* define a universe of discourse. The masses are immobilized by poverty, necessitating a mobile clinic in Bhaskar's movement. This mobility continually fails: in the years immediately following *Anand*, the Indian state will invoke this failure in declaring an Emergency, creating a national regime of mobile operations – sterilizations in government camps – drawing on a similar accusation against the masses' carnal

immobility. But if the modern clinic must intensify the mobility of its penetration of the masses in search of success, the lesson of both films in their regard of the middle-class patient is the need for a *demobilized* clinic and ethics, resisting the hubris of transnational promise for a grounding in nation, family, and the proper circulation of women. This demobilization and calibration of the modern to the nation, in the case of the middle-class subject, along with the intensified mobilization of the medicine of the mass subject, comprise the dominant logic of clinical mobility under the decades of Indian planned development, the 1950s through the early 1980s.

The Impossible Surgery, or the First Cliché

If film repeatedly stages this dominant logic, such repetition allows for reflexivity and second-order observation (Luhmann 1998) through the actions of fans. My method here is to attend to fan literature when it observes particular scenes as being familiar to the point of cliché. In what I will take as my first cliché, an individual or care group faces medicine as a sovereign giver of death in a different sense than the way either Anand or the mother in the slum confront Bhaskar. I refer to scenes that precede and at times preclude the entry into the waiting room. A character or characters approach a doctor in the wake of the serious illness or accident of someone for whom they care. They are told that what is urgently (*fauran*) needed is an "operation." Such a sovereign demand – have this operation or die – is framed as an impasse to the movement of the protagonists through a moral life. The operation is expensive, usually impossibly so: it creates a limit to the moral demand for care. To achieve the impossible and raise the money for it, one may have to depart from the moral life.

Take the 1965 film *Waqt*: like *kaal* in *Ankahee*, *waqt* is usually rendered as the inexorable and astrologically audited condition of Time or Fate. Here Fate is set not against the self-mastery of the clinician but of the businessman and householder Lala Kedarnath, who ignores the warnings of an astrologer in presuming his continued success. An earthquake destroys his home and livelihood: in the chaos, his wife and sons are separated. The eldest, Raju, is brought up in an orphanage and schooled into ill-gotten wealth by Chinoy, a socialite and secret criminal in Bombay. The second, Ravi, is adopted by an elite family and trained as a lawyer. Lala Kedarnath's wife Laxmi and third son Vijay live in a Delhi slum where Laxmi struggles so that Vijay can attend college.

On his graduation day, Vijay finds Laxmi in bed attended by a local doctor who advises that Laxmi can only be helped by traveling (as in *Anand*)

to a Bombay hospital. The two voyage by third-class train and pointedly cannot hire a porter but struggle with their belongings out of the station. Like the hospital and the court, the station forms one of a triad of nodes in the film that move things along in the film. Vijay is committed to taking Laxmi to the elite Tata Memorial Hospital recommended by the Delhi doctor. To afford her examination, he accepts a job unworthy of a college graduate, as a driver, working as it turns out for Chinoy, for whom Raju also works as a society jewel-thief. But Vijay's driver's salary is not enough when the Bombay doctor tells Vijay that his mother's condition is serious, that she has cancer, and that "*fauran operation kara dena chahiye*" (an operation must urgently be arranged). As in the opening scene of *Anand*, medicine seems to fail the poor.

Yet Vijay and Laxmi's situation is not framed as the static condition of the slum. They are offered as the fragile promise of the new nation: with no money, they work hard and "develop," Vijay making it to college, only to have a medical crisis derail their hopes. When still in college, Vijay had been picked up by Renu, a rich girl driving a car while he was walking to school. Renu is the daughter of the family that has adopted the middle son Ravi. Renu and Vijay's contrastive mobility notwithstanding, the shared commitment to *Bildung* of the college classroom links them together and allows a friendship, framed by scenes of co-mobility (driving the car together), to emerge. But the demands of the clinic destroy this promise of co-mobility through development. In a later scene, the socialite Chinoy allows a visiting Renu the use of his car and driver, by chance reuniting the lovers. Vijay points out bitterly that there is no point in a friendship now: Renu is the master and he the chauffeur. Renu climbs over the seat to sit next to him, but he dismisses the gesture. A driver is a driver: co-mobility, and the dream of national development supporting it, is a student's fantasy.

If in *Anand* the poor are immobile and the doctor despairs of a cure, in *Waqt*'s dialectical figure of the driver the shared mobility of rich and poor negate one another. And yet while "automobility" offers no future, the operation is maintained as a promise. If the anteroom scene in *Ankahee* and elsewhere stages the intensification of affect through the uncertainty of an outcome between the sovereign gift of death and the modern governance of life, in *Waqt* the operation is that which *could* secure an outcome if only it were affordable. Vijay cannot even pay the basic medical fees and must negotiate these or hope for charity. Illness dislocates, not only in the sudden rupture it may produce in the integrity or narrative continuity of aspiration and of a life (Becker 1999), but in the sense of forcing one into a monetized world where previous moral norms of getting by are called into question. For Vijay

and Laxmi, illness is the harshest dislocation yet in a series of events that began with the destruction of their town and the journey to the anonymity of the modern city with its unfamiliar and improvisational conditions of getting by. Catastrophic illness, like migration to the city, is staged as a challenge of Fate to the presumptively stable norms of "traditional" village and small-town India with which the film opens. The operation becomes the sine qua non of mobility: of its promise and its limit.

In effect, the city and its clinic allow two modes: *improvisation* (reminiscent of Partha Chatterjee's figure (2004) of informalized "political society" governing urban slum migrants), as in Vijay's efforts to pay for a consultation; and *extremity*, as in the operation's demand that neither the driver's wages nor the physician's charity can enable. Turning Chatterjee around (for whom formal sector participation in the city is termed "civil society"), let us call this second mode the failure of the civil. The operation, that is, stands in this kind of film as a formal structure resistant to the urban migrant's repertoire of improvisation.

Or rather, the improvisational moves across a moral line as the demands of care radically scale up. Chinoy kills his henchman and puts the blame on Raja. Vijay is offered money to save Laxmi if he will testify falsely against Raja in court. Trials, like waiting-room scenes in hospitals, knot together the dispersed relations, scales, and affects of the melodrama. By the end of the courtroom scene, Vijay has been compelled (by Raja's lawyer, the third brother Ravi) to see the error of false testimony and recant; all five family members are reunited. We know Laxmi will now have her operation: but even as the promissory structure of surgery is allowed to guarantee life, and a certain future, Lala Kedarnath has learned his lesson: that blind faith in the future is easily bested.

The lesson is repeated: fan literature comes to note the doctor's demand for the impossible operation as a convention of melodramatic dialogue. With the emergence of Internet-based fan media, websites and postings that chronicle stock lines and clichés include variants of what the doctor told Vijay: that an operation is urgently needed. The pleasures of the affects that gather around the cinematic figure of the operation both intensify its promise and call it into question.

The Operation Moves to Switzerland

The figure of Fate, conditioning the promise of any modern future, marked an intensely future-oriented era, that of the planned development of the decolo-

nizing "Nehruvian" state. Transnational mobility, within the logic of the planning state, emerged simultaneously as necessity and problem. Development presumed the assumption of universal forms of scientific rationality and new forms of (largely unequal) exchange with the Cold War superpowers, that is, exchange of forms and technologies of industrial and social progress. In film's material culture, the United States is most visible as a source of mobile forms: *Waqt*'s wealthy domestic interiors draw upon a host of American references. At the same time, Indian development economics presumed a Keynesian logic of import substitution severely limiting both the transnational movement of money and forms of travel dependent upon transnational monetary flow.

The tension between progressive mobility and import substitution takes on a sexual life in film. In *Waqt*, heroines are young liberated women shown dancing the latest rock numbers with men at parties: still, they do not break from parental rules and even Renu can only imagine life with the driver Vijay in a future of "dream." The mobile forms of consumption these women occupy are marked as the limited and temporary mobility given to daughters before marriage. In the film's final scene, both heroines have become daughters-in-law of Lala Kedarnath and Laxmi, are dressed demurely and act with all appropriate modesty for brides in a small town. The moral order of the extended family is restored: the international retreats under the demands of marriage, to be called forth the next time illness or the life-cycle demands a return to the city and its internationalism. In this sense the operation, associated in *Waqt* with the journey to the cosmopolitan, draws upon an international scale of consumption and comportment without a foreign trip.

By the late 1980s, popular Hindi film's scale of reference is changing, both in the demands of the plot and the extradiagetic organization of the song and its mobile oneiric pleasures. Switzerland becomes a key site replacing the contested landscape of Kashmir as the imaginary space of love. In the 1989 film *Chandni* (Moonlight), the Alpine country also becomes the location of the surgery driving the plot.

Rohit, an adoring lover, tries to impress his far less wealthy fiancée Chandni with a series of gifts, including a trip to Switzerland. But a helicopter stunt showering Chandni with flower petals goes horribly wrong. Rohit is partially paralyzed. Increasingly embittered by his immobility, he rejects Chandni. Chandni moves to Bombay, where she finds a decent job working in a travel agency. Her boss Lalit, who had lost his own fiancée to illness, shares a bond of loss with Chandni and falls for her. Rohit travels to a clinic in Switzerland for an operation. It is successful and mobility turns his thoughts back to love and Chandni. He recovers amid the Alps where he meets and

befriends Lalit, there on business. The two men each sing of the "queen of
their dreams," not knowing that their respective beloved is the same woman.
Eventually, Chandni is forced with a painful choice between the two men, a
problem solved when Lalit graciously backs out, sharing with the film's moral
world a sense that Chandni, despite her relocation, has maintained the immo-
bile values that once bonded her to Rohit.

    Bombay here no longer functions as the international: the promise of
the operation has been scaled up to Europe. The film's director Yash Chopra,
who had earlier directed *Waqt*, was one of several figures responsible for the
"Swiss turn" restaging the Indian dream. Swiss landscapes serve in three inter-
secting ways in *Chandni*, as in the song that Rohit and Lalit share. Rohit has
come for the operation; Lalit for his travel business at a moment when capital
restrictions are beginning to be liberalized; and Chandni appears in both men's
vocalized dreams gamboling through hillsides, glens, and towns conveying
her own promise amid this transnational mobilization of affect.[3]

The Care of the Leader, or,
Cancers of the Keynesian Body

Chandni's novelty, and the popularity of its turn abroad for both oneiric fan-
tasy and surgical melodrama, is set against the ambivalence of a national
developmental promise one begins to trace in *Waqt*. Though the 1970s and
early 1980s, such ambivalence increasingly characterizes the position of the
clinic: on the one hand, a central policy commitment to a medicine of the mass
body characterized by its condition of immobility and symbolically linked,
as in the opening scene of *Anand*, to the bare life of its Malthusian fecundity;
on the other, an increasingly public journey abroad, for exemplary elites, for
foreign operations.

    One site in which to examine this ambivalence is in state and expert
commitment to clinical utopia. By clinical utopia I mean that ideal held out

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[3]   This international mobilization of the cliché of the operation does not lend itself to a shift in
      the conventions of dialogue. Fan websites do not attend to the "foreignness" of the operation
      in any collection of familiar lines I have found. It may be that the pleasures of melodramatic
      cliché and its stock challenges to ethical improvisation are better secured through economically
      compromised characters like Vijay than transnationally mobile ones like Rohit. The foreignness
      of the operation, though, may assert itself unexpectedly within the repetition of the cliché. On
      one of the fan websites, one is reminded of having "heard most of these one-liners a million
      times" (rohitsax 2006): and yet, on the same site the oft-repeated word *fauran* – denoting the
      urgency of the melodramatic situation – is spelled *phoren*, "foreign," a near homonym.

as the idealized condition of clinical futurity: care that can promise, as in *Waqt*, the restoration of an originary condition. The anthropologist Ronald Frankenberg called attention to state ambivalence regarding utopia in 1981, juxtaposing a rhetoric of state commitment to village-level health with the prominence of national politicians going abroad for surgery. On paper, Frankenberg argued, state policy echoed Mahatma Gandhi's various earlier challenges to the unhealthful transnational scale of European scientific hegemony and promised rural care through the development of cadres of village CHWs and CHVs (Community Health Workers or Volunteers, somewhat akin in the language of the time to "barefoot doctors"). But the enactment of policy did more to sustain capitalist inequity: a key example for Frankenberg was the foreign medical care of Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, then India's President.

Frankenberg was writing in the aftermath of Janata Party rule, after the collapse of the coalition that had defeated Indira Gandhi's Congress and its antidemocratic Emergency. Janata's health policy, like that of the Congress government that returned to power in 1979, was publically focused on the challenge of sustaining basic rural health infrastructure. The language and techniques for such a focus emerged out of the international expertise circulating in the planning and aftermath of the 1978 Alma-Ata Conference on primary health care with its utopian promise of "Health for All by the Year 2000" ("Janata Party Conference" 2003). Yet foreign operations of national and regional leaders across party lines were publicized events throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In the case of Reddy, Frankenberg noted that despite official rhetoric championing non-allopathic care as an available resource for the poor, the debate over whether India's medical system could sustain the President's life was framed entirely in terms of allopathy: India's versus the West's. At stake was not only the mobility of the elite individual but of technology and capital, specifically the importing of expensive nuclear technology enabling radiation therapy for the President upon his return. This technology, the bringing of which violated the import-substitution regulations of the Keynesian development state, had to be secured by the Prime Minister. Anthropology's passionate diagnosis, in other words, was that *immobility was the proper condition both of a mass and of its care*. The clinic must be fitted to the (im)mobility of the agrarian nation. Allopathy could not succeed as such an immobile logic of care as its practitioners were inevitably pushed to higher levels of scale by the urbanizing demands of capitalism and pulled by the remunerative patronage of a political class. Mobility of patients, healers, and equipment was the proper condition of an elite, leading it to subvert the project of development.

I am not making claims here for or against erstwhile Keynesian policies of import substitution or for the presumptions of distributed immobility and mobility that these policies entailed. But the foreign operation and the melodramatic cliché that it evokes emerge at the intersection of such distributed (im)mobilities. I am suggesting that clinical utopia and its anthropological defenders mirror film in staging marginal life through the melodrama of its (im)mobility. One might choose, after Frankenberg, to read *Chandni* as the triumph of a bourgeois ideology of international utopia. But we may wish to follow the films in their recognition of a far broader ambivalence toward the expert diagnosis immobilizing the mass and its medicine.

The Five-Star, or the Second Cliché

The ideology along with the entrepreneurial reason of Hindi film production shifts through the 1990s: with new sources of capital, emergent offshore markets, and the idea of a "metropolitan" public willing and able to pay premium ticket prices for a different kind of entertainment, the presumed viewer of popular Hindi film shifts away from the rural male migrant to the city and to the "metro" and NRI [Non-Resident Indian] consumer. One of several films taken to mark the shift, the 1995 *Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge* or DDLJ (The Big Hearted Will Take the Bride), returns us to Switzerland. The film was the debut for Yash Chopra's son Aditya as director. Notable for the film's reception was a shift in global orientation: the two lovers Raj and Simran are both NRIs in Britain who meet in Switzerland on their summer travel. Simran's father wants to return to his home in Punjab and arranges a marriage there for Simran: the European trip is her last moment of hypermobile girlhood before she is expected to settle down, and Switzerland nobly does its part as the intensifier of affect. Unlike the young heroines in *Waqt*, Simran will not end up returning to the local: submitting to her father's will and a marriage to a boor of a man in India, she is in the end rescued not by Raj's (strenuous) efforts or her own mother's but her father's eventual recognition of Raj's far greater capacity for love. Simran and Raj leave the Indian countryside for the future by train. But this countryside remains in memory through one of the film's most captivating love songs set amid the yellow of a mustard field: rural Punjab, like Switzerland, intensifies love's mobile affect.

The Hindi film of the liberalization era is abandoning the faraway mountains as the location of dream. As "home" is recast within the alchemy

of reaching a new and more elite audience, its relation to "faraway" within the economy of film's pleasures is called into question. This reorientation, as much as the massive growth and privatization of neoliberal health care from the late 1980s forward, presents new challenges for the location of the operation as one of the chief figures of film's linkage of mobility and affect. Shift now to 2001, and to the wildly popular film *Dil Chahta Hai* (The Heart Desires). I recall a friend, a graduate student in the United States from Delhi, describing this story of three close male college friends reunited after a painful separation as "the first film that is really about us." *Us* here was presumably her "generation," the latter the dominant figure of difference charting the film's unexpected popularity. Class, by contrast (and enfolded within it, religion and caste), disappeared from explicit consideration. Anything seemed possible: the film's official translation of its title into English was "Do Your Thing." Its exterior as well as interior shots were of a modern urban landscape that did not appear "undeveloped" but reflected a newly confident and risk-taking youth. Siddharth (or Sid), one of the three friends, takes risk to a socially unacceptable level by falling in love with an older woman, an alcoholic divorcée to boot. The film opens with her hospitalization for liver cirrhosis: the friends, estranged over Sid's relationship, reminisce and reunite in the hospital waiting-room while she is under intensive care waiting for the possibility of a liver transplant.

Several things are worth noting in this film's usage of the operation as a figure of mobility. First, the cliché of the operation has been extensively reworked. There is no melodramatic *demand* for an operation creating an impasse. The film opens with a scene of easy mobility: an ambulance speeds along through a Mumbai night emptied of persons. Tara, the liver patient, is rushed into intensive care. The doctor, another older woman, warns Siddharth that this is a dire case, and that finding a liver takes *time*, time Tara may not have. Space is not the problem, and nor apparently is money.

Despite this official new economy of time, the waiting room is not a tense scene of waiting for a sovereign decision. The waiting room's time, too short for Tara, expands through flashback into a capacious space of reminiscence for the three men. The hospital is comfortable and quiet. It exemplifies the so-called "five-star" hospital (Cohen 2011) of the era of clinical privatization and expansion, a classification that draws on the vocabulary and techniques of the hospitality and tourism industries in refashioning clinical space to attempt a global "non-space" (Augé 1995) inviting medical tourism. Melodramatic bodies – those for whom the operation's cost stands as its impediment, necessitating dramatic sacrifice and risking everything – have

been removed from the scene: thus the second figure of cliché, the seamless and pleasurable mobility of people like us.

Second, the foreign has been repatriated. One no longer needs Switzerland: indeed, the requisite Swiss idyll of the popular Hindi film of the 1980s and 1990s has been given over to the diminished, less metropolitan scale of the regional-language cinemas. Tamil film crews now prowl Lucerne improvisationally creating landscapes of affect (Pandian 2011). Back at home, the non-place of the five-star hospital marks a new experience of the city: stratified, with zones (like the quiet and rationalized waiting room) of the affectively global.

Third, the repatriated clinic may distribute its gender in new ways. In *Chandni*, the male hero can go around the world to come back healed, calling into place the immobile values of the heroine. But here men have to move only as far as the non-place of the five-star waiting-room, positioned comfortably between life and death, to gain access to memory and recall the emergent story of a new and self-authorizing generation. The scene of care, in other words, is of the three male friends for each other: the Oedipal figure of the older divorcée Tara is removed to a space of sovereign dispensation that no longer matters. Sid's peculiar love for an older woman had marked this new generation as radically self-formed, but in the end she can stand neither for the older order of intergenerational family sacrifice at stake in *Waqt* (where Vijay perjures himself to afford his mother's operation) nor for the new transnational circuit of cosmopolitan youth. Sid will meet a woman his own age, and the film ends with their exchanging looks of recognition and desire.

One may not be surprised that the values linking gender to place have not shifted all that much. Unlike Chandni, Tara cannot go back to her first love, in this case an abusive husband, and she cannot be redeemed. The demand for female immobility is sustained. In this repatriated foreign clinic, the story is not necessarily that of the leader's body and its masculinized mobility. The body operated on is that of a woman. The transplant operation fails to happen: but it is as if no one is there to receive the doctor's familiar gift of death.

From Alma-Ata to Drugs for All

If Switzerland disappears, or is relegated to the regional, so does the utopian clinic enshrined in the Alma-Ata conference and post-Janata era rhetoric of "Health for All by the Year 2000." As the millennium approached, a new assemblage of NGO (non-government organization)-mediated medical

humanitarianism and clinical social science had replaced "Health for All" with "Drugs for All" as the urgent call of clinical utopia. The long-term, low-cost, and clinically effective provision of life-sustaining treatment for HIV-AIDS and variously drug-resistant tuberculosis took center stage both in international health circles and their attendant anthropologies (Farmer 1999), through the focus on Directly Observed Therapy, or DOT.

Globally, effective long-term supplies of antiretroviral and antitubercular medication were highly uncertain: the movement of pills limited by their expense and consolidating regimes of global pharmaceutical patent protection, by the erosion of regional distribution networks in poorer countries with earlier structural adjustment programs cutting subsidies to local pharmaceutical companies (Peterson forthcoming), and by the ontological insecurity of eroding popular and state commitment to the guarantees of progress and development (Ferguson 2006; Guyer 2007) and to the easy promises of the drug, running against the historical grain (Fassin 2007).

Like the Alma-Ata effort to universalize the rural primary clinic through a generic understanding of local health resources and challenges, the turn to DOT provided a powerful tool for effective adherence to immensely challenging drug regimens by scaling up local conditions to large-scale generic models, allowing for the circulation of "implementation" technologies increasingly drawn from managerial science as opposed to professional public health. DOT as a strategy for drug delivery presumed a degree of mobility in the demands of life and labor on the economic and social margin. But like the Alma-Ata effort before it, the pharmaceutical utopia of new health activism depended on relatively immobilized patient bodies able to be observed taking their treatments.

Such presumption of immobilization for the rationalized administration of humanitarian and state assistance and entitlements was an ever-poorer fit for a largely mobile and increasingly urban nation. Both urban and rural political power in India, however, depended on the distribution of welfare to fixed "populations" of identified persons. The need for immobile beneficiaries was not only a feature of the political exigency of supporting populations that would stick around to vote and of the bureaucratic exigency of basing entitlements on fixed residency; additionally, Indian politics depended upon capital flows generated by diverting welfare monies to politicians, flows legitimated by creating phantom populations tied to specific territories, a classic form of the modern "scam." Critics of corruption noted that the rolls of state welfare programs were inflated by the presence of massive numbers of "duplicate" identities generated by the powerful. Identity duplication was also a tactic

for the socially marginal. The more welfare entitlements from ration cards to health care access were tied to immobilized identities fixed in one's ancestral "native place," the more improvisational survival by urban migrants depended on creating new and alternative paper identities.

Over the first decade of the 2000s, the government of India began to develop a national program for a new form of "universal" identification, utilizing multiple biometric data points to ensure no new duplication. This Universal ID (or "Aadhaar") card imagined a political subject (termed the "Resident") who, once certified by possession of an Aadhaar document, could be entirely mobile. If Universal ID began as a security measure to control dangerous mobility across regions and borders through biometrics, it quickly shifted to a project promoted by the Finance Ministry for the liberalization and mobilization of labor. The dual promise of biometrics, for the supporters of the Aadhaar program, lay in the rationalization of welfare: through both the "de-duplication" and the deterritorialization of the nation as database. The implications for a global health apparatus organized around the provision of long-term pharmaceutical treatment to populations-in-place, Drugs for All, are not yet clear.

The Traffic, or the Last Cliché

As new assemblages of state and corporate power and rational expertise attempt to fashion order and govern life amid variously mobile populations, a double to the mobile nation has emerged, in effect its duplicate. The flip side to mobility becomes the order of "trafficking": of women and children for sex, of the poor for debt peonage and slavery, of willing migrants subjected to inhuman conditions, and of marginal bodies valued for their organs. If neoliberal reason celebrates mobility as the free play of self-authorized reason, trafficking discourse reduces mobility to conspiracy theory. Each shores up the other as the exception necessary to its vision. The dystopian organ-trafficking film is the inversion of the consumer utopia of *Dil Chahta Hai*, the violent mobility of the trafficked organ the inversion of the frictionless mobility of the five-star hospital.

Coercive labor, surgical malfeasance, and organized sexual exploitation and violence unquestionably exist. But for most global "anti-trafficking" organizations operating in India, many with roots in European or North American moral conviction, the sole operant distinction is often between trafficked persons and those not yet able to admit to the fact. The effects of such a self-

secured humanitarian commitment on the marginal sex workers presump-
tively being saved can be devastating (Ramberg 2009).

In early twenty-first-century Hindi film, these varied registers of traf-
ficking may collapse into a generalized figure of a criminal "nexus." One of
the main plotlines of the 2008 film *Ghajini* concerns a young woman who
uncovers a criminal ring kidnapping schoolgirls into both kidney operations
and prostitution. In *Dil Chahta Hai*, a liver transplant is but a matter of the time
it takes to find an organ, none of the three young men are ever considered as
potential donors for Tara, and the presumption is of a tissue bank conveniently
out there for the supplementation of five-star life. In *Ghajini*, the violent life
of the tissue bank is revealed as a figure of perverse and "trafficked" mobility
without any attention to the actual conditions by which human tissues move
across differential axes of wealth, status, and power.[4] Cliché piles upon cliché
on both sides of the binarism constituting these dreams of mobility: the ambi-
ent and the terrifying. The main character Sanjay, played by the actor Aamir
Khan, who was one of the leads in *Dil Chahta Hai*, developed amnesia from
being beaten by an iron rod by the traffickers, a rod used to kill his beloved,
the young woman who had uncovered the trafficking. In a sense Sanjay is the
quintessentially mobile subject, with no memories to hold on to and locate
him, something like the three men in the surgical waiting-room who appear to
forget the dying Tara. The bloody iron rod achieves in its way a similar affect
as the five-star hospital.

Coda

If the foreign operation has been repatriated, under the doubled sign of five-
star clinical internationalism in Indian metros and rumors of trafficked tissues
in its slums, the national operation seems to get exported. In the summer of
2011, the President of the Congress party and effective leader of the currently
ruling coalition government, Sonia Gandhi, traveled "abroad" for an "undis-
closed medical condition." If Sonia Gandhi's own Indian legitimacy as the
Italian-born wife of the former and assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
had long been held against her by Congress's rivals, she had over the past half-
decade solidified her authority. But neither her once questionable nor lately
affirmed identities as an Indian were a major theme of political reporting dur-
ing her mysterious sojourn. The once contested foreign operation of Sanjeeva

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4   For some discussion of these conditions, see Cohen (1999; 2004; 2011).

Reddy did not haunt the departure of the Congress leader in either the Hindi or English press. Details began to emerge in the press that Gandhi had been advised by her doctors in Delhi to go to New York City for an operation. The main focus of reportage was primarily on filling in the details: the foreign trip was not represented as a failure of ethical governance on Gandhi's part or of commitment to public health by organized medicine or the state. Indian five-star medicine was not assailed.

The operation occurred: notification came that it was a successful procedure to treat cervical cancer. Her doctor was a Non-Resident Indian (NRI). NRI blogs began to pick up the story: one blogger cited a story appearing across multiple websites about the doctor, noting that he had "an international reputation as a pioneer and authority in the cancer field […] referred to as 'a recognized leader in his specialty' by the *New England Journal of Medicine*. He was born in Vallur, a small village in Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh" (roopa 2011). This doctor had apparently earlier operated on President Sanjeeva Reddy: earlier disputes over the ethics of the leader's foreign operation disappeared into the persona of the NRI doctor. Reporting focused on the Indianness of the operation, celebrating the arc of a global surgeon who had moved from a small Indian village to become a leader of cancer treatment in Manhattan, exemplifying the mobility of his compatriots. The apparent confusion of the United States embassy in New Delhi as to Gandhi's whereabouts, immediately after her departure for New York, further troubled any sense of Sonia's operation as a "foreign" turn: Indians ran US medical care, or so it seemed, and could travel freely and flexibly while the US government struggled to stay caught up. Cancer, if one had the urgent operation that one's doctors demanded, was no longer the death sentence it had been for Anand. The Hindi press widely reported on Gandhi's postoperative condition as unremarkable: "*ab svasth hai*" (Now she is healthy).

Secondary and tertiary allopathic care, including medication, competent diagnosis, and most surgeries, may yet remain out of reach for most of Gandhi's fellow residents of the capital district, amid conttroversies over working-class mobility and extensive slum-demolition. The angry ruminations of Bhaskar in *Anand*, with which I opened this essay, still make claims upon any accounting of the distributed politics of life and death. Such passion and fury may yet lead a public and their experts, through the serious dreamwork of what I have here called a health utopia, toward ambitious commitments to redistribution.

Such utopias have, in the most serious sense, the dream's power and limitation. From Health for All to Drugs for All, health utopias have tended

to figure their subject populations as immobilized recipients of care. Might a different configuration of clinical mobility be possible? At present, the mobile imagination seems to have only clichés to offer, between the immobilized population and the terror of trafficking.

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