URBANISM

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Géraldine Pflieger, Luca Pattaroni, Christophe Jemelin and Vincent Kaufmann, Editors

Preface by Manuel Castells

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Preface

The Networked City

Manuel Castells

Networks, space, society

This chapter examines the move towards new economic and cultural forms of organization, which are predicated on spatial transformations and linked to far-reaching technological advances made over the last 20 years. I will first address this issue from a comparative and global perspective, as these types of transformation can be both local and global in scale. Observing the cultural specificities of the given situation, culture, society and space will allow us to identify and examine the foundations which underpin such cultural and institutional variations. The relationship between certain invariants of technological and socio-spatial transformations and the cultural and geographical specificity of each city or region lies at the heart of urban issues today.

Over the last 20 years we have witnessed a far-reaching transformation of cities, due in part to technological advances. This development cannot be fully understood without first considering the technological revolution in terms of information and communication. Furthermore, cities and spatial forms remain an integral part of society; in fact, they *are* society. Thus we cannot consider space without considering society, and vice versa. The analysis of the transformation of the city must be placed within a global context, as we cannot restrict ourselves to the physical boundaries of a society, which is organized around different types of networks: a system of networked communication technologies. In turn, networks by their very nature are organized around interactions and exchanges which transgress national and institutional boundaries. They constitute an infrastructure of global and interdependent societies, which is marked by integration and exclusion alike. Networks organize the constant interaction of the articulated which varies according to how the network is programmed while at the same time they exclude anything that is not integrated into the programme.

We should keep in mind that the entire world is interdependent, yet most of its space and inhabitants are excluded from this network. For example, communication, production, political and underground economy networks stretch to the ends of the earth, quite literally. Yet, most of the world's population remains locked out. This network dynamic is at the root of the disparities in a geography of development that is shaped by inclusion and exclusion. It is thus fundamental to our understanding of how spatial forms evolve.

Focusing on existing international research, I shall first examine the spatial dynamics of a networked society before drawing a number of conclusions for urban planning, urban land use practices, design and architecture in order to identify the repercussions that this analysis will have on practice.

A new urban form: the metropolitan region

What directly and indirectly links digital information and communication technology with spatial forms and processes? Before we answer this question, bear in mind that the predictions of futurologists over the last 20 years have not come to pass. The death of the city has been announced a thousand times, for example. The reasoning behind this declaration was that modern communication technologies and the Internet would render the city redundant, as individuals could remain connected regardless of where they lived, whether at the top of a mountain in Switzerland or in the middle of a prairie in North America. People would only have to travel because they wanted to, thereby reducing traffic problems. As recently as five years ago, respected researchers continued to espouse this theory, even though the last 20 years have seen the strongest wave of urbanization in the history of mankind. Today, more than half of the world's population lives in urban areas; according to demographic forecasts, this will rise to two-thirds by 2025 and to three-quarters by 2050. These scenarios paint a picture of an entirely urbanized world in possession of only a few areas that are either completely disconnected or are subject to the influence of large metropolitan regions.

This trend also sheds light on the issue of over-population. By dint of its density, Belgium can be considered as over-populated. According to this logic, Central Africa can be considered as under-populated due to its low population density. Siberia, a region which is one and a half times larger than the United States, is also largely de-populated, a trend which shows no signs of abating. In 1990, it had a population of 32 million; in 2006 this figure had fallen dramatically to less than 26 million. The United States has sizeable metropolitan concentrations in California and on the East Coast, yet most of the country is not densely populated. The simultaneous concentration-dispersal trend is fundamental. Far from being present at the deathbed of the city, we are in fact witnessing a wide-reaching transformation of cities and space.

Between 1980 and 1990 Peter Hall and I, as directors of the Institute of Urban and Regional Development at Berkeley, produced a series of empirical studies on the link between ICT and spatial organization in the United States and worldwide. The findings of our work can be summed up simply in one sentence: we are witnessing neither a movement of pure urban concentration nor one of pure decentralisation, but rather two movements which operate in parallel. This two-pronged movement reflects the ability of technology

to connect and disconnect—on the one hand concentrating functions and activities and on the other decentralizing them. Of most importance is the distinction between activities and functions that will be subject to concentration and those that will become decentralized, not to mention how these are interlinked within the space.

Generally, a process of extensive demographic and economic concentration can be observed in large metropolitan regions; these constitute a new urban form, an urban form of the information era. Metropolitan regions can often comprise several interlinked metropolitan areas. However, within these regions, there is a considerable shift towards the decentralization of functions that operate both within and beyond the centre-periphery dynamic, albeit according to a polycentric structure. Metropolitan regions are organized around a series of hubs, connected by rapid transport, by telecommunications, by the Internet and by mobile communication. In relation to Europe, the work of Peter Hall and Kathy Pain, *The Polycentric Metropolis* (2006), offers the first systematic analysis of large European metropolitan regions. This research clearly shows the differences in the composition of metropolitan regions and the internal articulation of different centers and areas of activity which are no longer constrained by their functional specificity. It is now impossible to distinguish between an urban centre and an industrial zone, or between natural and agricultural spaces. Conversely, these different functions tend to merge and link up to new centralities, the evolution of which is primarily contingent on property strategies. This type of organization is not planned but fashioned and re-appropriated by markets as a function of opportunities. Flexible planning within a metropolitan area, which itself is connected to other metropolitan areas to form a metropolitan region, depends on the ability of transport and telecommunication technologies to connect stakeholders, such as companies operating within a space of prodigious proportions. Thus, in Europe, we observe the formation of macro-regions: Paris-Lille-Brussels; Rhur-Westphalia in Germany; Northern Italy; Lyon-Grenoble-Turin; the Dutch Randstaadt; Catalonia on both sides of the French-Spanish border, etc. According to projections, a high-speed train connection (Eurostar) between Paris and London should further strengthen the links between these two cities. Interestingly, this has yet to materialize, even though it takes as long to travel from Paris to London with this service as it does from Brussels to the French capital., Institutional and cultural factors come into play here; these have a greater structuring effect in mainland Europe than in the UK. According to British observers, this is why the continent of Europe finds it impossible to emerge from isolation.

Metropolitan regions are cropping up all over the world, creating mega-regions which are home to highly diverse populations and activities. The largest urban region in the world today extends from Hong Kong to Canton across the Pearl River delta, covering Shenzen and Xiamen, right across to Macau and Zuhai. This region, with close to 60 million inhabitants, already functions as an economic unit and is spatially articulated. Within the region itself, the functioning of an urban zone can only be understood in relation to the functioning of its neighbour. Similar phenomena can also be observed elsewhere in Asia (Tokyo-Yokohama-Nagoya and larger Chinese cities, such as Greater Shanghai, with approximately 30 million inhabitants each) as well as in Latin and South America—Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires and Mexico, for example. Of course the United States is also subject to this phenomenon—Los Angeles is at the very heart of a mega-region which extends from Santa Barbara across the US-Mexican border to Tijuana, counting close to 20 mil-

lion inhabitants. Other mega-regions in the US include San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose-Sacramento, New York-New Jersey, Chicago, as well as Atlanta. In Russia, Siberia may be emptying, but Moscow continues to grow, with the metropolitan region now home to 14 million inhabitants and integrating important outlying sectors such as Zelenograd, the Russian Silicon Valley, which lies 30 km outside Moscow.

These large metropolitan regions are organized around a global urban system which itself is part of a global network. Most economic, technological, cultural, political and communication exchanges occur between these regions. This means that the spatial architecture of our planet comprises metropolitan mega-regions that absorb populations, activities, capital, and knowledge, and that are interlinked thanks to telecommunications and rapid transport networks. The growth of medium-sized cities often results in the decentralization of regionally dominant functions. Rural areas as such are starting to die out. It would appear that capitalists are responsible for realizing Stalin's dream of achieving socialism through the elimination of peasants. In modern Europe, for example, it is more profitable to be employed by the European Commission as an environmental guardian than to continue to cultivate the soil at protected and untenable prices. In this way, metropolitan mega-worlds are linked up to worldwide networks, thereby shaping the global city. In her book, *The Global City* (1991), Saskia Sassen never described London, New York and Tokyo as global cities, thus relegating all others to "less global". What she in fact said was that certain cities have a greater number of global functions. Take New York, for example. It is not entirely a global city. The New York district of Queens with its proximity to Kennedy airport is completely local; it has its own local neighbourhood life and has very little to do with the global functions of New York.

We should make a distinction here between the aforementioned phenomenon and the hypothetical framework put forward by John Friedman, which places *world cities* at the top of a hierarchical ranking. This hypothesis merely applies the older French idea proposed by Pierre George of urban hierarchy albeit on a global scale. Here we can speak of urban functions being structured by hierarchies, dependencies and domination, rather than structured by networks. Yet, the concept of a global city refers to the interaction of a range of urban and metropolitan functions. All large cities throughout the world are global cities. For example, part of Abidjan is global due to its connection to the global economy, its integration in the global communication network and its participation in global scientific exchanges. Every urban region is to some extent global, even though parts of it may be local and others even disconnected. The share of these different functions within each city defines the dominant relations which they maintain within their sphere of influence. Cities that are connected to the global network operate as an intermediary between localized functions within their hinterland and global networks, around which the entire global economy and societies are organized. Within the city, certain zones are linked to global functions, whether they are financial, political or cultural. These functions are not always financial, as is the case for New York, Frankfurt and London. In most instances, the links are technological, institutional or religious in nature. Consequently, different global networks of functions can be observed, which in turn organize various network hubs in each city. The more a region resembles a series of different network hubs, the greater the possibilities for interconnecting these networks within a space and the more likely it becomes that this region will be a driving force in the global system. If we

take the underground economy, for instance, which accounts for about 5% of the gross world product due to money laundering through the world's financial markets, its inter-metropolitan exchange system will be similar to those of cities such as Miami, which are more important than Paris in this specific network.

At this point, I would like to move away from the idea that networks are simply financial, technological or cultural networks. Networks can involve any type of global activity within different hubs in each city. These hubs structure global networks at the spatial level in a variety of ways.

In each city, private investors and public authorities can choose and adjust their investments, those which allow them to compete in global networks and those which are linked to improving the quality of life of their inhabitants. Available public and private funds are plowed into airports, international hotels, industrial services, or alternatively into housing young people and protecting the environment. These objectives, however, can also clash, for example, the expansion of airports or high speed train links versus environmental protection.

In general, with the exception of residential zones controlled by the property market, trade-offs are made in favour of investments that enable greater competitiveness within global networks and the accumulation and circulation of wealth. Cities must above all be capable of responding to global competition, thereby winning market share before redistributing this wealth. This tension between participation in the global networks of accumulation and participation in local redistribution is the main bone of contention that urban planners, urban developers and architects face.

The development of wireless and mobile communication has accentuated the concentration-decentralzsation phenomenon. In terms of concentration, the ability to access mobile communication networks is unequally distributed across the planet, both in terms of access and quality. At the same time, mobile communication enables an extraordinary distribution of activities. Currently, there are three billion mobile phone subscribers, which means (by applying a multiplying factor) that close to two-thirds of the world's population can communicate thanks to mobile telephony. Even in places without electricity, in Africa for example, aerials are constructed with bits of metal, and bicycle salesmen travel from village to village in order to recharge telephone batteries. Currently, mobile communication has high value because it enables access to the network, including the global network, of communication.

The ability to spread communications coupled with the development of urban sensors and the distribution of telecommunications technology is transforming urban services and making it possible to create a hybrid space at the interface between technology and urban forms. Bill Mitchell from MIT has set up a new laboratory, the MIT Design Lab, and has demonstrated in his recent work how cultural relations have been transformed by new distribution networks. For example, cities can now be subjected to a series of experiments which involve introducing sensors and programmes in different buildings throughout the city to create interfaces with mobile telephones. These enable users to communicate verbally, to exchange information and images and to establish dialogue with the built environment. Individuals are therefore able to interact with the city, actions which form the cornerstone of a signifying space in the communications network that differs from a space of abstract flows.

Three distinct metropolitan regions

The generic model of metropolitan regions differs considerably depending on the cultural and institutional characteristics of each place. We shall compare three models—Los Angeles, Mexico and Catalonia—which are completely different at both institutional and spatial level.

The primary distinguishing feature of Los Angeles is that it has ceased to be Los Angeles. Residents of the Los Angeles region do not actually live in Los Angeles; the city of Los Angeles has three and a half million inhabitants, while the Greater Los Angeles area has some 20 million. This region around Los Angeles is known in the media as "The South Land", stretching from Santa Barbara to the north of Los Angeles right down to Tijuana across the Mexican border and to San Diego. This region is characterized by the high level of decentralization of its economic activities and by the presence of high technology, as well as the aeronautics and media industry. It is also home to a semi-formal economy consisting of light manufacturing, furniture, textiles, etc. which is maintained by massive immigration and by a multi-ethnic and multicultural population, as well as extreme social and ethnic segregation. The most powerful new form of social segregation in most of the world does not involve sidelining the poor, but rather the conscious decision of the rich and affluent to remove themselves from the rest of the population. Some time ago Douglas Massey showed that the increase in the urban and spatial segregation index, i.e., social differentiation of the space across the world, is most prevalent among the wealthiest, who, thanks to market mechanisms, attempt to dissociate themselves from the rest of the urban space and construct rich ghettos, i.e., selective and protected spaces. There is also a considerable gap between the functional metropolitan space and government institutions. Los Angeles is characterized by the absence of political control, with growing differences between the institutional ability to manage the region and the morphological reality of the region. It has begun to expand into the desert between Los Angeles and Las Vegas, generating serious environmental problems and creating difficulties in terms of access to drinking water.

The Mexico City model is fairly similar to that of Los Angeles, which can be found throughout the world. The region of Mexico City is of course no longer limited to a single city in Mexico but regroups an important agglomeration with vague and complex institutional boundaries that separate the state of Mexico, districts and municipalities. Mexico is above all characterized by an informal construction process that took place between1960 and 1980. While Mexico City's approach to urban planning is not entirely informal—, the origins of its urban expansion are. This growth has been based on land being occupied, with the situation later regularized, a system dominated by political cronyism. In terms of how it functions, the urban form of the greater Mexico City region is totally incoherent and remains controlled by private interests and informal networks of influence that bring their weight to bear on the local government. This phenomenon has been active even in the last 10 years. The influence of the informal sector has affected the distribution of, and access to, urban services, and has structured socio-spatial inequalities. Segregation, which has long existed in Mexico, has become a process of fragmentation to such an

extent that urban theorists on Mexico refer to it as a "disconnected city", marked by the absence of communication except that which is indispensable for individuals, to organize their day-to-day lives. The historic city center has fallen into decline, with the exception of a few symbolic programs implemented by the government and private foundations: the bedrock of the traditional centrality of Mexico City has crumbled. At the same time, crime has risen to such an extent that it now pervades state institutions at all levels, from judges to the police and right up to the government itself.

We can look at Catalonia for analytical reasons: the spread of a new metropolitan world in a historic European city. Barcelona appears to be the polar opposite of the previous two examples. Nevertheless, in my opinion Barcelona shares certain similarities with Los Angeles, a statement which Catalonia often finds disconcerting. While the greater Barcelona region has 1.5 million inhabitants, Catalonia has 7.4 million. The functional unit is in fact Catalonia, including what the Catalans call Northern Catalonia, which is simply the eastern French Pyrenees. This region is completely integrated at the functional level in terms of transport, communications and activities. While most people work in Barcelona and surrounding towns, they do not live in the city itself. In 2008, this region will be linked to the TGV network linking Madrid-Saragossa-Barcelona and the French border, placing all urban hubs of Catalonia less than 30 minutes from the centre of Barcelona. The region also has a highly-developed communications network: the rate of penetration of mobile phones is 103% and more than half of Catalan households have an Internet connection. The region is increasingly integrated by rapid transport and by an extensive motorway network, making Catalonia a polycentric region with exchanges in all directions that function as a system.

Works by Catalan geographers dating from as early as the beginning of the 20th century spoke of Catalonia as a city, and of integrating the entire region in an urban network. This has now become reality. Of course, the historic center remains but the famous Ramblas of Barcelona is now a theme park and no longer constitute a city centre. Few people from Barcelona go to the Ramblas. It is primarily a tourist attraction for the French, Dutch, German, Japanese and Chinese. The same can also be said of the historic centers of most major European cities, which have become what the international literature calls a *visitor-city*. The visitor-city is not a real city, a city of residents with public spaces shared and used by these residents, but a city constructed for tourism by municipalities according to the Disney World model.

There are observable and sizeable differences between the Catalonian model and Los Angeles/Mexico. The most important is the place the city gives to the public space. In Catalonia, the public space represents an essential component of the city's cultural and social interlinking. Furthermore, the dense transport networks in Barcelona mean that car use in the city itself is not necessary and that car use generally across Catalonia is reduced. Third, there is a very active urban life and a strong sense of urbanity driven by the European high-density model. This high urban density allows services to be organized, bolsters interaction between individuals and promotes urban life. Therefore, a diffuse metropolitan space and the ability to preserve or construct a public space of social interaction constitute the difference between a functional metropolis and the rebirth of an urban culture adapted to the 21st century.

Three challenges and three priorities for urban planning and architecture

Based on these examples, I would like to highlight three fundamental problems currently being discussed in all large metropolitan regions, and which imply three lines of action in the field of urban planning and design.

The first challenge concerns, first and foremost, the establishment of a multimodal communication system that enables the integration of public transport, walking, cycling and the car. This integration at multimodal level should take account not only of transport but also of communication. We must better understand how mobile telephony can organize transport: how electronic communication systems can be arranged differently thanks to its ability to distribute information among users. This enables mobile phone users to manage their journeys and their daily lives and thus to manage the flow of communication in the framework of revitalized urban planning.

The second challenge concerns the preservation of the public space so that it becomes the hub of social life in a city. The first problem to overcome is the limitations of privatizing the public space. The public space increasingly means a space of shopping malls and retail units. In my opinion, these do not constitute public spaces because they can be locked, they are also private and they must adhere to regulations and meet commercial objectives. The second difficulty is the spread of public spaces beyond the city center to the urban region as a whole. Since urban regions develop according to a polycentric structure, the organization of public spaces should also be polycentric.

The third stake is institutional. Institutional coordination should be organized at the metropolitan level. Local institutions have not been scaled up to keep pace with the development of metropolitan regions, however. Many attempts have been made, such as metropolitan governments. Yet these are not viable solutions because they are a centralized structure within a decentralized city. Inter-municipal agreements have also been tried but they are mostly structured around center-periphery dependencies. Districts to organize urban services were created but often encountered difficulties in terms of the institutional boundaries of networks and the connection between different networks at the metropolitan level.

These challenges lead me to put forward three major lines of action which urban planning should pursue.

The first is planning mobility and connectivity. There must be a move away from policies that focus on instruments, i.e., on means of transport, towards policies which center on the system for the production of flows and exchanges in the metropolitan region. Given that the use of land determines these flows, the focus should be on the use of land, i.e., on the distribution of large-scale activities. Reflection is also required on how to take advantage of complementarities between telecommunications and transport, rather than seeing them as competing. One of the primary challenges faced by urban mobility planning is the ability to plan the use of land in such a way as to generate decentralized transport flows: transport flows that are not concentrated in time or space.

A second problem considered as pressing in most large metropolitan regions is environmental management. In many urban regions, people are living on the brink of an ecological disaster in terms of water distribution and water treatment, and the risk

of epidemics and pollution. For example, Los Angeles has a serious problem of respiratory epidemics; the rate of respiratory illness in children in Los Angeles is three times higher than the United States average and is as high as that of Mexico City. The speculative urbanization of forests in the greater Los Angeles area is the main cause of frequent and devastating fires.

Finally, cities should take into account the new frontier of urban design and address the question of the place of architecture in the city. One of the difficulties associated with large metropolitan regions is that they afford a sense to the city but without offering a cultural and symbolic marking of the space. Cities, including those in Europe, therefore progressively become spaces without history. The large residential spaces and spaces of activities found in European metropolitan regions lack any physical, cultural or historical marking. For their residents, there is no symbolic space which separates their habitat from the rest of the world; in many instances the city ceases to fulfill such a buffer role. In recent years, major cities have built important architectural and symbolic monuments, using architecture as a badge of distinction. The trend began with the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao and the Millennium Park in Chicago, both designed by Frank Gehry. However, this type of symbolic and architectural marking tended to be realized in central spaces with the aim of negating the idea that the city was in the throes of decadence and to show that the given city had once again returned to the forefront of the global scene, symbolized by this new iconic architecture.

Nevertheless, these projects do not address the fact that the sense of the space of habitat and daily life has been lost. Against this backdrop, Barcelona, for example, showed an innovative spirit at the end of the 1980s by exploiting the arrival of the Olympic Games to renovate and transform the city as well as the greater Barcelona area. The idea was to open public spaces in a decentralized fashion within the metropolitan area by means of urban architecture projects, sculptures and small-scale monuments. Ultimately, it was concerned with decentralizing monumentality at the regional level. Whatever the affective relation with this architecture, sense is given to these spaces. The ability to mark the space through various systems of symbolic reference points has become a fundamental preoccupation of spatial planning. Any attempt to mark the space in an innovative way, any attempt to articulate the needs of the population living in the metropolitan region has one prerequisite, however: the political will to innovate and to serve this general interest. We are currently witnessing a rupture between citizens and governments, which imposes the rebuilding of alliances between professionals and urban social movements to bring about social change that will lead to an urban planning policy based on intense cultural innovation.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Urban Forms, Experience and Power

Géraldine Pflieger
Luca Pattaroni
Christophe Jemelin
Vincent Kaufmann

Introduction[1]

The Social Fabric of the Networked City aims to reconsider sociological perspectives on urban phenomena by proposing a dynamic exploration of the links between infrastructural and technological aspects of the urban order, power relations and everyday life experiences. This perspective circumvents the immaterial aura of post-modern urban analysis and the material determinism that characterizes the structural approach to the city.

Without going further into the artificial distinctions between technology and society, nature and culture, or science and politics, we propose to re-evaluate the role that objects play in the transformation of the city. What impact do forms and tools have on our perception of changes in the city? Which objects change space and cities? What is the impact of the formal dimensions of the urban space on guiding and/or shaping social and spatial experience?

Indeed, the urban phenomenon has been changing profoundly over the past decades, and numerous publications describe the deep changes affecting architecture, urbanism, geography, sociology, the economy and political science.

Among the many elements that make up a—or the—city, three are of overriding interest for us. Why? Because relations between them have changed, and these changes are the source of the current transformation of the city. They are: functional centrality—a city radiating upon a hinterland of which it is the functional center; the morphology of the built environment—a city is characterized by the density of the built environment and its form; and finally, the lifestyles—the inhabitants are vectors of specific cultures.

[1] This chapter is partially based on work supported by the Swiss National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) North–South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change.

Although it has always been important to deny the existence of unilateral and mechanical links between material reality and a body of social functions (Voyé and Remy 1992), it is also essential to recognize that these links constitute the *sine qua non* condition for the existence of the urban phenomenon as such. Not more than a few decades ago, centralities, morphologies and lifestyles fit into each other like Russian nesting dolls. Lifestyles were ordered by morphologies, the city concentrated central functions in hierarchical manner, the borders of municipalities corresponded to functional borders. In other words, daily life was embedded within territories with multiple but clear-cut and stable borders, and cities radiated upon a hinterland according to modalities that were abundantly modelled by geographers (Bairoch, 1985).

Independently of the spread of the urban lifestyle, the morphology of cities is changing due to urban sprawl. This aspect has been analyzed by numerous studies, reaching from analyses of urban sprawl (e.g. peri-urbanization) or localization strategies (e.g. the problem of edge cities, these new central entities of entry into cities), passing through forms and processes of segregation (Gated Communities, conditions of networks access, etc.). Basically, these studies illustrate a change of scale in the production of the city. From the metrics of the pedestrian and then the tram, the city now constructs itself around automobile metrics. Potentials of speed offered by the latter have been put to massive use by households wanting to live further away from the city; these households are attracted both by the dream of suburbia and by very affordable real estate. This situation, linked to a considerable development of major urban road infrastructures (bypasses, urban thruways) gradually modified metrics systems. In parallel to the growing numbers of automobiles, companies modified their siting strategies by moving to the peripheries of cities, amplifying the sprawl phenomenon.

From a spatial perspective, urban forms, infrastructure networks and the localization of urban equipment lie at the heart of a constantly changing historical process. In order to understand these phenomena, we shall study the process of urban development by addressing two sources of major transformations with strong material, social, and political ramifications: infrastructure and communication networks; architecture and the built environment. This should encourage us to take an in-depth look at both urban and mobility capacities:

- The built environment and the infrastructures are not only a context. Residential aspirations are inseparable from the city's material attributes in terms of aesthetics, atmospheres, possibilities of ownership enabled by the built environment, the mobility potential generated by the transport system.
- It is indeed the players' capacity for mobility or motility that changes the city (Kaufmann, 2002). With the multiplication of the possibilities to move, the city could have disappeared; in fact this scenario was projected by an extensive scientific literature in the 1970s and 1980s. This phenomenon did not occur because city stakeholders ascribe essential qualities to the city which they find nowhere else. We are not witnessing the end of cities because the superposition of the three dimensions presented above has come to an end. Cities remain places in which these three dimensions subsist (living space, morphology and centrality), but combined differently. The city is a dense space that leaves room for alterity (otherness) and many persons seek it out for this very reason. It is the place that

> enables us to travel without moving, that opens up career opportunities, that lets us change our lives thanks to its anonymity (Montulet, 1998).

Studies on the recomposition of urban centralities evoke the phenomenon of metropolization, which in many ways is an urban consequence of globalization. Certain cities progressively acquire world centrality, extending beyond the reputation of the countries they are located in. Such metropolitan centers concentrate job and added value generation, creativity in the arts and innovation in general. This is not an essentially material process, although it does have morphological implications (such as the development of the financial districts). Metropolization as a phenomenon may be viewed as the final stage of the process of concentration of power in central locations that has gone on for centuries, a process of which the rural exodus used to be an important manifestation (Le Galès, 2003).

Computations of global network connectivity (Gugler, 2004) involving the number of corporate headquarters, stock exchange funding, or direct international flights, make it possible to establish a ranking of these metropolitan cities. Some of them play a minor role in the global economy, but a major one in regional flows; Cairo, for example, which in 1992 came before Los Angeles, Bangkok or Singapore in terms of flight connections (Keeling 2005). Over and above such rankings, which are more or less instrumentalized politically, the major impact of metropolization on urban forms is a strong normalization of space, via the reproduction of internationally valorized architectural archetypes, the recovery of city centers, or the increasing awareness of historic built environment as heritage (patrimonialization) (Deboulet *et al.*, 2007). This does not imply less complexity however—in fact, in view of an increasingly insecure job market and socio-political reconfiguration processes, quite the opposite is true.

Indeed, the urban era does not mean that spatial and social differences have (or will) disappear: these tend to grow more global, but recompose and become more marked. In the competition between metropolitan centers, quality of life and urban atmospheres become an essential ingredient, projecting a differentiated form of attractiveness; the growth or social inequalities and the resulting poverty contribute to the increased fragmentation of urban spaces, both South and North.

Urban renovation projects have an impact not only on the internationalized forms in city centers, but also on informal urbanization. Players with low economic clout find themselves shut off from urban production processes. In Beyrouth, for example, informal land occupiers who migrated from rural regions produced numerous buildings and housing over the years, before the new legal and financial provisions that are now enforced for housing production, even in poor neighborhoods, caught up with them (Fawaz, 2007). These phenomena are not being compensated by more globalized inhabitants' opinion forums; in India, for example, squatters' associations have reached a national scale and are in touch with inhabitants' representative movements in Korea, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. In spite of this they generate but feeble protest against population displacement operations that take place when major projects are under way (Du Plessis, 2005).

Thus, beyond the observation of a segregated, fragmented, *créolised* urban phenomenon, these developments invite urban sociology to reconsider its objects, its analytic categories and its methods in order to comprehend the underlying principles of the new "urban revolution". We will thus recall, via a reflection on forms, the four analytical axes

proposed in the preface: (1) the articulation between the local and the global, between places and flows, the willingness to interface between the city and different scales all the way up to the international manifesting itself in the construction of major infrastructures, (2) the evolution of lifestyles in connection with the networked society, and the challenges it poses in terms of spatial, residential and social mobility, (3) the reshuffling of social processes and the internationalization of urban policies, the effects of which can be seen in the deterioration of "close" or local solidarity, (4) and finally, the querying of planning and decision-making modalities, and of the role of participation and concertation.

The originality of this book is that it involves the first-ever examination of the architectural and urbanistic ramifications of the emergence of the networked city and mobility. By focusing on issues of accessibility, mobility and planning, the present publication places the problem of communication and mobility—which besides networks and physical infrastructures represent the intrinsic properties of the networked city and its social fabric—at the center of urban studies.

Deciphering the new urban revolution

This first chapter opens with three postulates for a renewal of urban sociology. It goes on to present a "small sociology of the paving stone", which illustrates our undertaking in greater detail. It ends with a presentation of the book's various chapters, which give concrete body to our project.

Recovering urban form as an analytic dimension

When Maurice Hallwachs in 1920 presented his analysis of past plans to enlarge and develop Paris, he stressed—with a certain irony—that even before the 19th century attempts to plan Paris worked only if they validated already existing developments *a posteriori,* developments that had been implemented piecemeal in the capital's suburbs (*faubourgs*). In short, the plan and the norm are never as effective as when they attempt to control nothing, when they norm, planify, and formalize nothing, thereby also demonstrating our incapacity to foresee the city *a priori*. Since the 17th century, Hallwachs tells us, "…the tracing of thoroughfares, and the changes in the superficial structure of Paris are due not to concerted *designs* of one or several individuals moved by a particular act of will, but to trends and collective needs that builders, architects, prefects, municipal councillors, and heads of state obeyed without any clear awareness of these social forces, and sometimes even under the illusion that they were inspired by their own concepts". Thus, since their very invention, plans and norms apparently never really functioned, never reached their objectives, in that they simply confirmed pre-existing construction and planning and development practices, spawned by urban population and growth dynamics. Thus, the plans to develop Paris were vast undertakings to regulate the peripheral districts, the *faubourgs*, including them in and enclosing them by the city, as slums and shantytowns are now regulated and restructured via their access to urban services or the expansion of the perimeter of the official plan. This is described as *urbanisme de rattrapage*, recovery urbanism. This view of the city at first leads us to believe that regardless of norms, laws and regulations, the city creates itself without them.

It is true that utopians attempted to highlight the importance of form for their urban ideal. Thus at the end of the 19th century, Ebenezer Howard wished to combat the rural exodus and urban overpopulation by proposing the establishment of new cities, "…a group of slumless, smokeless cities", built in the form of circular garden-cities, maintaining strict separation between city and country. Viewing as magnetic the reasons which cause populations to opt for cities (quality of social ties, jobs, anonymity) or the country (clean air, solidarity), he proposes a third magnet combining the supposed assets of both forms: "Town and country must be married and out of this joyous union will spring a new hope, a new life, a new civilization" (quoted in Pinder, 2005 p. 36). To sum things up, his approach is based on the belief in "re-ordering the city as a means of re-ordering society" (ibid. p. 40). Yet this utopia to a large extent remained at the planning stage, and failed to impose new forms.

So, where do the forms of cities come from? Between the large avenues of Saint-Petersburg and the Bouygues house in a Paris suburb, between the New York skyline and new cities, between fortified village houses (*bastides*) and the New Urbanism, cities—or fragments of cities—have been designed by institutions, engineers or head architects, codes, procedures, standards and schools. And even though norms may not be perfectly implemented, their influence is never null and void. Thus, let us recall one of Hallwachs's conclusions on the plans to extend Paris: "Building is taking place in spite of regulations. But would building not have been more extensive and rapid if there had been no regulations at all?" Thus, in a second movement, after the city that constructs itself, we have a city that presents itself as the result of thousands of ingredients, norms, laws, architects and politicians.

Yet it is precisely the genesis of this form that we wish to understand, between "city without norms" and city "resulting from", in this complex adjustment between codes from above, and practices and needs from below. But how do these adjustments take place? What factors determine that one is nearer from one of the two extremes: the formatted city and the self-generated city?

Urban dynamics reveal themselves in the aptitude of players to be mobile

Compact urbanization, a historic heritage, dense, delimited, and marked by the congruence of spatial contiguity and social proximity, is gradually transformed, particularly when inhabitants and other concerned players become mobile. This process is accompanied by the development of new relations to space and time, based on the reticular (network-related) mode of opening to opportunities. Thus, the capacity to be mobile is a constituting principle of the urban phenomenon. This is by no means a new observation: did urban growth not at all times develop on the basis of migratory flows? Did not the network of trams and subways not remodel the city just over one hundred years ago? Has the city not always been the place where ideas circulate and confront each other? In the 1930s, the scientists of the Chicago School evoked "man gifted with locomotion" as the subject of urban sociology. If the mobility of the players is at the heart of the dynamics of the urban phenomenon, and constitutes a powerful analyzer of its substance, this is fundamentally because co-presence remains the keystone of sociability and social insertion, in spite of the considerable impetus of long distance communication technologies.

Valorized at economic level as a vector of growth, mobility is required by companies from their executives; it moreover assumes new forms linking telecommunications, transport, and residential aspirations, upsetting the temporalities of daily life. Mobility destabilizes institutional architecture, enforces the reform of decision-making structures down to their very bases, and in the end queries the governability of urban territories. Mobility is the source of the growing fragmentation of urban spaces; people's different capacities for mobility project social inequalities of a new order. To put things clearly, mobility, a dimension until recently largely overlooked by urban sociology, is becoming a research priority, since it poses the question of the social tie. When some may escape while others are bound to a given territory, how is one to recover the rule (of the game) enabling the restoration of social and spatial justice?

If cities still exist, it is because the city fosters mobility in the classical sociological sense of the word, i.e., a change of status, and that this mobility is sought after by many players as a desirable commodity. This implies that the changes which the urban phenomenon is currently undergoing pose the question of the definition of the city: it is not enough to say that the urban is everywhere. In the same manner, analyzing "urban problems", as done by the extensive current literature: sociological (with a focus on insecurity, for example), geographic (on the urban sprawl) or political (on territorial governance), tells us nothing about the substance of the city. These studies all too often take as their starting point the principle that a problem is urban because it is localized in the city. These considerations take us some distance from a negative view of the relations between the city and transport, where the road system is seen as destroyer of the city. In fact, first transport and then telecommunications systems contributed largely to the reshuffling of relations between lifestyles, urban morphologies and functional centrality by modifying the field of possibilities. These possibilities have been used to multiply alternative lifestyle projects, a multiplication founded in particular on the materiality of space: site coverage, heights, architecture, human density, atmospheres. In a word, the urban phenomenon (Lévy, 1999).

Dealing with the relations between city and mobility requires us to leave behind the debate on the structuring impacts of infrastructures and to take an interest in the types of flow created by, or expected as a result of, these infrastructures and above all in the scale of their impacts.

To illustrate the link between infrastructure and urban form on the one hand, and between the inscription in space of a given decision and public action on the other hand, we think it pertinent to refer to Sylvia Ostrowetsky (2005). Can one determine good form to determine the good city? "The term new city may in many respects be considered an oxymoron; the city may appear as a physical and social articulation which stays perennial in its elementary forms in all—or almost all—great civilizations. How then can it be not new (*neuve*) but novel (*nouvelle*) without disavowing itself? The Middle Ages are full of new towns, and America is beset by new English towns. In fact they are not so much new; rather they attempt to perpetuate the ideal of the old for the benefit of a new world which wills itself to be better". In conclusion she adds: "For the new cities, where one understood the specificity of urban forms of sociability and felt the obligation to maintain them, the challenge was to play upon a contradiction in terms. They were disappearing in the morass of the conurbation; but one wanted to reinstate them by integrating them in

the very movement that had destroyed them previously. While they were disintegrating, and while the countryside gradually succumbed to endless encroachment, one wished to restore them via the phenomenon of newness". The observation is ambiguous: networked infrastructures have called forth peri-urbanization, and planners attempt to combat this phenomenon by other types of infrastructure.

Analyzing the city presupposes the integration of a pragmatist continuum: powers, urban forms, experiences

For an in-depth study of the reshuffling of relations between urban forms, centralities and lifestyles, and in order to integrate players' aptitudes for mobility in the analysis, we propose to approach the urban phenomenon from the position of the pragmatist continuum: powers, urban forms, experiences.

To understand the dynamics of these complicated skeins and the ways to untangle them, one has to start out with an analysis of the very physical matter of cities, i.e., the body of elements which contribute to give the city form and make it possible to guide and co-ordinate the activities that take place on its territory. The form of cities is always more than just an aesthetic element, it allows for an ordering of human and non-human elements enabling them to co-exist.

How then is it possible to compose a city here and now, when a part of the objects and humans which constitute it responds above all to obligations, rhythms and attachments that are born elsewhere? The tensions which traverse the contemporary city are largely due to the tangle of scales, which is also a tangle of objects and normative orders. In consequence, one must ask oneself how distant elements of a network make their presence, i.e., their demands in the here and now of the city, felt. At the same time, one must also inquire how, in spite of the introduction of networks that orient the city towards the outside, one can still ensure territorial coherence, and a world of proximity (neighborhood world) that is essential to our quality of life.

Coming to terms with the "here" and "there" means making the effort to endow the experience of the city with variable qualities: by turn, it must be the place of speed, of efficacy and connectivity, of safety, of prosperity and comfort, the place of excitement and exploration, as also the place of conviviality, encounters and hospitality. All these qualities hark back to many objects, to material and normative mechanisms—in short to the forms of the city.

The forming of the city opens possible pathways to the composition of variable objects, rhythms, scales. Thus, to understand the manner in which the networked city seeks to resolve the tensions that run through it, one must be attentive to the manner in which it composes the most diverse entities and aspirations to make room for the coexistence of different activities, experiences and temporalities.

Such an analysis, the outline and certain parts of which will be provided by the articles in the book, presupposes a serious approach to the question of the city's materiality and, more generally speaking, of its forms, which offer it its realism—the unfolding in time and space of its qualities and its resistance to change. It is indeed true that forms resist. The instruments that shape them display their own logic and temporalities, along the lines of technical standards, legal norms or urban development plans.

Of course the forms of a city do not determine the activities that take place within it, and the aim here is not to reproduce a kind of structural determinism. Nevertheless, it would be just as great an error to consider forms as nothing but a "social construct" and their impact as only the result of their interpretation. We are interested in the median way. This is based on the idea of affordance as developed by Gibson (Gibson, 1979). Affordance harks back to the manner in which the elements in our environment support the pursuit of a given activity, and its success.

Thus, to imagine how forms may contribute to the ordering of activities taking place in the city, one must take a look at how they allow for essential regulatory operations: judgement and action.

- *Forms and judgement*: Urban entities first allow for our aesthetic and political judgements (beauty/ugliness, heritage value, monumentality, efficacy, sales value, etc.). These judgements link our sensible experience to larger political considerations (Breviglieri & Trom, 2003). The dynamics of these judgements is particularly essential to an understanding of the functioning of social conflicts around urban developments (Lamont & Thévenot, 2000). As a matter of fact, critical mobilization in the city always involves requalifying urban objects, denouncing bad forms, and promoting alternative ones (Pattaroni, 2007). More fundamentally, behind this link between form and judgement we find the whole question of the experience of forms, their meaning and the manner in which our environment nourishes our identity.
- *Forms and action*: Our relation to forms is by no means only perceptual and cognitive: forms are not only open to our judgements, but also to our actions. The body of elements which shape cities in practice (sidewalks, urban furniture, buildings, thresholds, doors, road and traffic signs, etc.) are the concrete support of our daily actions (Latour & Hermant, 1998). Whether the aim is to move efficiently, to have a friendly neighbourhood, or to live in a large home—all these things require a certain number of arrangements, which in fact often contradict each other. The contemporary urbanistic and architectural challenge is to find the forms that will go along with the multiplication of activities, the acceleration of their rhythms and their simultaneity. The network unfolds via specific activities which are all anchored in material places and mechanisms. Imagining the articulation between flows and places means imagining experiences of the world that are endowed with different qualities and the material mechanisms that are their equipment.

Once they have been stabilized by various mechanisms (technical and legal norms, political referents, justifying orders, architectural solutions, etc.), the coercive powers of form increase. As a matter of fact, they generate order both by orienting judgements towards good or bad forms of behavior and by facilitating their practical realization. Due to this, form requires certain competencies of its residents,[2] and thus produces exclusion.

[2] There is a whole tradition of analysing city-dwellers competencies which partly goes back to the work of Goffman (Goffman, 1959; Lofland, 1973). It has been updated in recent years in France, with a "pragmatist" twist (Pattaroni, 2007). For an analysis of mobility capabilities ("motility"), see Kaufmann, 2002.

The normative powers of the city reside not only in the political discourse on the "good city" but also in the technical mechanisms which prolong these normative horizons in time and space.

Considering the implementation of forms and their mechanisms of qualification and coercion, one observes the gradual appearance of the link between form and power. The study of the conception and production of form leads us into the very core of the stirring political debate on the future of cities. The quality of our cities revolves around the transformation of forms, implying all the entities involved in these operations (theories, norms, players, objects, etc.): their fragmentation, the effects of segregation, the articulation of the near and remote, the peaceful coexistence (or lack of such) of rhythms and persons with their differences, and so on.

The power of forms, and their political horizon, largely depends on the weight of material and normative investments required to stabilize them (Thévenot, 1984), often making change costly in terms of time and money. Consequently, they require preliminary steps to modify political, legal and administrative frameworks, and follow-up technical and material modifications. These changes also require either collective mobilisation able to voice a critique of forms and propose alternative ones, or strong political will fed by, for example, a change of referents (valorization of participation, change of planning concepts).

One would be tempted to add, at an even more preliminary stage, the transformation of lifestyles which often appears to drive the transformation of urban forms (sprawl due to mobility, etc.). But we also know that tracing causal links here is a delicate undertaking. Growing mobility is the result of a technical evolution (extension and acceleration of means of transport) but also of a deeper modification of capitalist modes of production around the figure of the network (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). Mobility thus becomes a possibility, and a valorized figure.

Thus, in order to understand what is at stake in the concomitant modifications of normative horizons, forms of the city and lifestyles, we must follow, step by step, how form is imagined, produced and linked to forms of life. Throughout this book we will track the appearance of links between lifestyles and changes in the forms of the city; we will make a detour through the history of the ideas that shape our conceptions of how to form the city; we will follow the political battles that revolve around the configuration of places in the city, themselves structured around diverse experiences and demands. Every time, we will have to see in detail how the city is manufactured, identify the involved entities (human and non-human), and together imagine normative horizons and technical solutions.

We now have a better outline of the ideal movement of our investigation (of which this limited series of articles is just the beginning). This should take us from the daily experience of the networked city—where lifestyles establish and stabilize themselves, where the tensions between flows and places are tested sensibly—to the political query of its adequate ordering, which determines the qualities of a city where one seeks to come to terms with, and compromise between, demands of connectivity and the wish for decent and attractive housing.

The manufacture of the town should thus link up the city's day-to-day existence and its planning, the nearest and the most remote. The question of form is focal here, since it is form that on the one hand feeds into and guides judgements and actions, and on the other hand enables their coordination, and thus their ordering on a larger scale or scales.

Few current theories on or scientific investigations of urbanism lay claim to understanding the urban phenomenon in its entirety, or in its globality, along the lines of the urban systems and models that Manuel Castells and his team analyzed during the 1970s. Theses and research projects are fragmentary and often highly focused in order to increase their scientific rigour and level of pertinence.

We have chosen, therefore, to deal with the problems that interest us, not by the vain quest for studies that embrace the entire continuum: powers, forms, experiences. We have instead opted for a collective investigation that includes several perspectives, points to be highlighted and diverse approaches, each localized at the interface of at least two or three objects.

A minor sociology of the paving stone

To evoke the movement that will take us from one chapter to the next, let us simply take the paving stone and the sidewalk. For several years now, in France and elsewhere in Europe, local governments have launched vast projects to "beautify" public spaces by repaving streets and making them more ornamental. Still, these paving stones are also there to frame and propose specific uses. As of now, one must anticipate everything when paving a public space, says the daily *Libération*[3]. The ground must neither freeze nor surfaces be damaged by road salting products. Reconciling other uses is a complex undertaking: anti-chewing gum coating should not transform pavements into ice rinks; anti-skid granulation makes the surface turn black. Denis Baupin, deputy to the mayor of Paris, evoked "…the incredible sums that have to be spent on struts, posts, on 30 cm steps for sidewalks, on combatting rudeness and aggression among drivers". Consequently, the quality of these places changes, access to the paved streets and their equipments is unequal. Long gone are the days when Haussmann decreed there should be sidewalks for all Paris thoroughfares, from the avenue de l'Opéra to the eastern *faubourgs* (suburbs). Pascal Cribier, landscape designer, stresses: "Granite, stainless steel, light diodes are for the city center; it is quite impossible to maintain this standard at the periphery". Granite is for the square in front of the church, the alleys around the castle, or the streets surrounding the cathedral; then we turn to the dealer in reconstituted stone for the new neighbourhoods and small peripheral centers. Thus, form presupposes an unequal distribution of access, of types of public space and of city types. Form is at the heart of the distribution and composition of essential uses for the design of the city's qualities. The book's first chapters will focus on the reciprocal relation between uses, mobilities and urban forms.

For reasons of comfort as well as aesthetics, local politicians seek to equip city centers with visible paving stones: mosaics in the shape of a peacock's tails, the Roman opus style, the quincunx. The paving stone is intended to entertain passers-by, awaken their sensibilities, give them a certain image of their city that the product descriptions in the catalogues include: "…a whiff of yesteryear, the stamp of the past, a tribute to traditional craftsmanship, beauty akin to that of old pavements". Perceived as kitsch or vintage—depending on individual taste and appreciation—the form, whether deliberate or not, studied or not,

3 "Ils refont le trottoir", *Libération*, Thursday, 1 December 2005, pp. 38-39.

is experienced via individual sensibility. The sense of form is present in this experience, via judgements that are aesthetic, political and/or moral. The changes in architectural and urbanistic theories and practices, and their impact on social change in cities, will be examined in chapters 3, 4 and 5.

Who manufactures the public space, a given pavement, a given form? With the new pavings one changes the function of sidewalks. Landscape designer Pascal Cribier detests this form of ostentation: "The public space is not meant to demonstrate the quality of the carpet, but to bring people from one point to the other. When Haussmann invented the sidewalk, he did not want to make the city more aesthetic. He wished to resolve a problem of public hygiene". He used three elements: the convex road surface, the gutter, the sewer. Local communities now want to reinforce their local identity by using the paving stone. But between reconstituted and natural stone, industrialists have divided the city among themselves: the further one moves from the city center, the lesser the quality of products: 70 euros per m^2 of natural stone in the center, 35 euros per m^2 of reconstituted stone outside the historic hub. Major projects, on the other hand, such as tramlines, are almost completely executed with Chinese paving stones: 25 euros per m^2, including transport. The production of forms thus depends on a complex adjustment of expressed, revealed or invented needs, functions that must be taken in charge, and public interventions conducted by players keen to shape the city. Between economic considerations, political needs and projects, the evolution of planning lies at the heart of a system of constraints and bears witness to an era experiencing profound modifications of local public action principles. These will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7.

Finally, underneath the paving stones we may still find the paths leading us to the space of urban policies where the question of territory that should be planned and developed democratically is being dealt with on a larger scale. Creating new infrastructure often necessitates transactions with inhabitants and local residents: inconvenience generated by the work is exchanged for a transformed public space once the work is finished. A granite mason told us that the figures for the des Maréchaux tram in Paris made one's head spin: "…90 km of curbs, 7 hectares of flagstones—I had never seen such a surface". And since paving is now a major focus of infrastructural projects, it is becoming very complex. Coordinating various players is required for each public space: roadworks, shops and businesses, lighting, moving, safety, water, gas, even telephone mains (it is much more difficult to tear up a paved thoroughfare). Paving and tramlines outline new territories of stakes and negotiations; they are becoming the lubricant in the cogs of participatory democracy. Their function changes, highlighting the complex position of infrastructures in the urban landscape, between the NIMBY (not in my backyard) syndrome, functional aesthetic or economic considerations, requisite transactions, the redefinition of intervention parameters, and competencies. The relation between functions, forms and democracy will be the focus of the last two chapters.

Outline of the book

The preamble by Manuel Castells gave us an overview of the changes to the networked city, its organization, its functions between the space of flows and the space of places. Manuel Castells has shown that cities have to deal with possible tensions between urban

management of the space of places and residents' demands, and the competitiveness of the principal hubs in the space of flows within the new global economic market. Castells thus identified the architectural and urbanistic implications of the necessary articulation of places and flows. Castells also provides an introduction to the topics dealt with in the remaining chapters. He underlines the three principal problems faced by metropolitan areas: the need to develop multimodal communication and the systematization of urban space; the need to preserve the public space as a site of urbanity and exchange; and the importance of institutional coordination at the metropolitan level.

Branching out from the movements presented above, the book will first propose contributions by sociologists who address the main social changes generated by the rise of the networked society. They will address behavioral modifications relative to social and spatial mobility. Echoing these social changes, we will then take an interest in the transformations of urban planning and architecture in a context that telescopes the space of places and the space of flows on a metropolitan scale. However, this analysis of architectural and urbanistic changes will require a historic detour through the traditions of modern urbanism. Finally, we will close the loop by going back to social practices and examining the territorial inscription of new planning modalities, with a view to the demands of democracy or of popular protest movements against new infrastructural projects. Using examples of the planning of a tram line or an airport, we will discuss the concrete political implications of the tensions between spaces and flows.

The first chapters of the book deal with new issues and social practices which question contemporary urbanism, in particular social and spatial mobility. These issues lie at the very heart of the tensions between places and flows and imply new constraints as well as new opportunities for public action. The three first chapters specifically look at new social and spatial mobility behaviors at the place-flow interface through an examination of the social and spatial effects of the mobility imperative. Sven Kesselring identifies new mobility patterns, strategies and configurations of mobility and immobility. The author raises the question as to whether the reported subject-oriented strategies for coping with the modern "mobility imperative" offer a new perspective on structural changes to the modern concept of mobility. The theory of reflexive modernization is used to examine this question and to improve our understanding of the relevance of the empirical findings. The paper focuses on mobility research and makes a distinction between "transit spaces" and "connectivity spaces" as relevant issues for research on new spatial, social and virtual mobility configurations.

Then the theoretical and empirical exploration undertaken by Max Bergman and Katharina Manderscheid aims to investigate the relation between spatial/social inequalities and mobilities. To this end, taking the spatial turn described by social theory as their starting point, the authors outline two paradigms of geographic spatiality. First, they define the modern paradigm as an isotropic and uniform space, where differences are understood as temporal variations between advanced centers and the backward periphery. Then. with the emergence of various socio-economic phenomena grouped under the label of globalization and post-modernity, the authors show that spatial structure has undergone a change of paradigm. Transportation and communication technologies make it possible to bridge territorial distances and even to make them irrelevant, since communication no longer requires a territorial co-presence. Far from making space disappear, these new

means of bridging distance both physically and virtually have driven a process by which access to technologies and the ability to use them have begun to replace the inequality produced by the imperative of being physically in the material center.

Finally, observing the impact on the gentrification process of the quality of urban planning and development and types of accessibility in various neighborhoods, the chapter by Vincent Kaufmann, Marie-Paule Thomas, Luca Pattaroni and Jérôme Chenal shows that adequate metro service and urban development measures to curb traffic have an ambiguous effect on the gentrification of the central Paris neighborhoods. Gentrificators perceive these morphological characteristics as a sign that one may now live a pleasant life in these areas. But they are also a trap: they mask the harshness of social and neighborhood relations in certain strongly segregated neighborhoods.

Faced with new issues raised by the networked city, in particular the space of flows, mobility and accessibility, as well as the need to rethink contemporary urbanism, the following chapters of the book propose a comparative approach to the historic changes in architectural and urbanistic practice. It examines "modern" urbanism which has guided the planning and development of the vast majority of cities in the western world for over a century. This section also echoes the initial work by Castells on the industrial city and the production of the urban system. The understanding of the modern planning ideal, through the examples of Hausmann and the new cities of the 1960s, aims to offer a distanced and reflexive look at the social fabric of cities and our inherited urbanistic and cultural heritage. Jean-Louis Genard focuses on Castells' critiques of architecture and the space of flows: "whose forms are so point neutral, pure, diaphanous, claiming to express nothing at all. And, in proclaiming nothing, they confront the lived experience with the solitude of the space of flows". Genard adopts a reflexive approach in order to understand the contemporary architecture to which Castells refers. He places this architecture at the heart of developments in architectural practice, since the modernism movement, through an in-depth examination of the positions and paradigms which underpin successive trends. On a broader level, this treatment of architecture through the prism of historical sociology invites reflection on the production of the networked city at the turn of this century. Pursuing this reflection on historic changes to urban planning, Agnès Sander studies the transformations of the city against the backdrop of regulations, standards and practices which bypass the concerns of resident home owners. Based on the analysis of an urban intervention carried out in Paris by Hausmann, Agnès Sander shows that certain thoroughfares, such as the *rue des Pyrénées* in Paris, remain unfinished more than a century after they were opened; or rather they are "in a state of perpetual construction". As the city and its regulations evolve over time, these routes are subject to continual construction and adaptation. The study of this Parisian thoroughfare illustrates how an urban element, a product of planning, becomes part and parcel of the territory. Sander details resistance to such planning projects and the limitations of the planners themselves. She also illustrates how this resistance is essential to the production of the city and to the integration of built elements in the territory. Finally, she shows how the thoroughfare, an urban object, is progressively absorbed over a long period time to finally become an inextricable part of the city.

At the interface between retrospective argument and perspective on contemporary urban practices, Adriana Rabinovitch will explain her views on the major urbanistic trends of the post-war period. Situating contemporary urbanism in a moving trajectory

in which the certitudes of modern ideals were followed by their conflict-ridden querying, both practical and theoretical, the author insists upon the legacy of previous movements and the marks left by sometimes violent breaks with modern urbanism. Current urbanistic practices seem to belong to no particular school, but seriously address the heritage of the past imprinted upon the territory, and past mistakes.

With Vincent Guigueno's chapter, we understand that new cities and infrastructures which sprang up in the 1960s provide a matrix with which decision-makers and intellectuals have an ambiguous relationship. On the one hand, political and urbanistic discourse, devoid of any particular consideration of chronology, lays the blame squarely on these cities and infrastructures for the contemporary ills which afflict the urban space: for infrastructures which produce "non-places" and for the recent crises in the French suburbs (*banlieues*). Past public action is accused of having been riddled with faults such as arrogant technocracy and democratic deficit. In short, it is regarded as an anti-model of good territorial governance. On the other hand, the many different testimonies show that this period in urban history is characterized by the emergence of the often nostalgic "era of testimony". Vincent Guigueno examines the conditions which underpin the production of these new cities, as well as the successes and mistakes of this planning policy since the early 1960s. His article avoids any outright criticism of functionalism by positioning this practice within its historical context and by studying the articulation of places, flows and habitat during this era.

The two last chapters of the book examine the contemporary problem of the articulation of flows and places. It first analyses this issue at the local level, where tensions between the issues of accessibility and residents' demands increase exponentially. Then, moving to the local versus global scale, the authors look at the management of central places of flow, such as airports, which find themselves at the center of conflicts between functions, between territories and between sociopolitical actors. These two chapters examine the production of infrastructures, the management of flows and the link between infrastructures and the forms which the built environment takes. As in other countries, the problem of urbanization in Switzerland is first and foremost a problem of rising mobility and the growing need for space. The integration of urban development and transport policies is crucial to curbing the spread of urbanization and to upholding the standards set for combatting pollution. On the one hand, there are housing developments concentrated around areas that are well-served by public transport, combined with a restrictive parking policy to check the growth of automobile traffic. On the other, there is an urban planning policy that aims to promote "the compact city" and which requires a formative public transport network to absorb the concentration of the flows naturally caused by this type of urban arrangement.

The contribution of Fritz Sager is situated within this discourse and focuses on the question of how far attempts to achieve elements of the compact city generate diverse interests, ultimately resulting in games of influence-seeking and power play. Airports undoubtedly yield wealth for surroundings spaces. However, airports are also the subject of growing disputes and opposition. Guillaume Faburel's chapter examine this issue through an analysis of examples of conflicts in America and Europe. Having observed that the knock-on effect of aircraft noise is the construction of remarkable geographies, which in turn are increasingly the focus of local disputes, the author shows that local territories

constitute a new spatial point of reference in debates, in addition to the more conventional ones such as the international or metropolitan scale of air traffic and ensuing regional economic effects. Through the values and legitimacies they carry, through coalitions of elected officials and local communities which structure public action, these territories are able to hinder the operators' or owners' projects more effectively. In some cases, they even manage to redefine the political intentions of airport projects and management. The reintegration of airports in their territories with the aim of guaranteeing the acceptability of their operations begs the question of a form of airport governance which would integrate local stakeholders in the decision-making processes.

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Chapter 2

Skating over Thin Ice

Sven Kesselring

Pioneers of the mobile risk society

'In skating over thin ice,
our safety is our speed.'
(Ralph Waldo Emerson, cited from Bauman 2005, 1)

In social theory mobility is a general dimension of modernization that is often still neglected. More than this: mobility is a general principle of modernity comparable to rationality, individuality, equality and globality. Modern society is in the middle of a process of transforming itself into a "mobile risk society" (Kesselring, 2008). In ever wider spaces and under the conditions of sometimes large-scale mobility practices that are embedded into everyday professional life experiences, people need to lead risky lives of ongoing insecurity and instability (Beck, 1992, Beck, 1999, Sennett, 1998). In the global age, societies' mobility performances constantly increase, i.e., the amount of effective spatial mobility is permanently growing (Urry, 2007). This propels the risk society to a new level of global interaction and networking and transforms the nation state to a global and mobile risk society.

In this paper the theoretical assumptions and conclusions in relation to risk society theory play a minor role. Instead, it concentrates on some empirical observations and their interpretation. It focuses the impacts of the transformations of the capitalist global time-space constellation on the "body scale". The paper presents selective strategies of people whose daily professional lives are shaped by constant change, the need for individualized risk management and—last but surely not least—different mobilities. We call these people "mobility pioneers" (Bonß, Kesselring, Weiß, 2004) because they possess a highly educated and skilled mobility competence (motility) to "master and practice the art of liquid life" (Bauman, 2005: 4).

In contrast to the findings of many other studies on mobility, work and uncertainty, the people here are characterized by a surprisingly positive approach to their high mobility performance. In a certain way mobility pioneers successfully manage the uncertainties, insecurities and existential threats of the mobile risk society. They have the mobility potential, the social skills and the cultural as well as financial capital to cope with a mobile life that demands their readiness and capacity to react actively to fundamental changes in life circumstances.

In line with Beck (1992), Castells (1996), Urry (2007), Sennett (1998), Bauman (2000), and Boltanski, Chiapello (2005), the current global situation can be considered as an inevitable structural change within the social constitution of modern societies. The globalization and "glocalization" of spaces and societies, the re-territorialization of cities and regions, etc., lead to new constellations of mobility and immobility, stability and change, motility and flexibility. The mobile risk society is a network society at its core (Urry 2003a). It rests on powerful socio-material networks. And one of the results of the transformation of the Max Weberian modern world of stability and linearity into a non-directional and disorganized modernity is a new meta-structure of power. Beck puts it as the "meta play of power" (Beck, 2006), which shapes the new transnational world (dis)order. Individuals, groups, institutions and whole nation states are involved in this "play" and they cannot escape from it because it is a networked meta-structure that entangles the whole world (Jessop, 2006). Theorists illustratively describe this powerful and violent transformation on the macro level of social inquiry. But this global restructuring occurs not only in the global space of flows. It also has major impact on the daily life of people all over the world. It influences the life courses of people and their everyday arrangements between work, leisure, family, civil society and so forth (Blossfeld, 2005). The globally networked society manifests itself within territorial settings. People, goods, information and wastes travelling through the "space of flows" (Castells, 1996) start and remain in territorial contexts and environments (Graham, Marvin, 2001, Brenner, 2004).

Processes of network building and globalization transform conditions of the social. In a world of disembedding, permanent change and the omnipresence of social, ecological and terrorist risks, questions of identity, social identification and belonging arise to an extent never seen before. People search for identity. But the limits of the "power of identity" (Castells, 1997) and the fragility of social integration are obvious. Questions of social cohesion come up wherever mobility is taken for granted as an element in peoples' lives. Mobility—and this means the capacity of people to navigate their lives within social, material and virtual (cyber) networks—is a prevailing imperative in their private and professional lives (see Kesselring, 2006a). People need to be mobile, they need to be able to manage complex patterns of spatial and socio-cultural mobilities. And the ability to be mobile becomes a kind of economic fetish. Performing as the "mobile man" becomes a distinguishing factor between winners and losers (Bauman, 2005: 3). To behave as a mobile person can be a successful strategy for individuals in their professional lives to demonstrate their "grandeur", their importance (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2005).

Living in the mobile risk society raises this question of magnitude. It brings us to the question of whether there is some resistance to the "corrosion of character" as Sennett (1998) puts it. From the empirical data collected among mobility pioneers we learn something about the permanent struggle of individuals to steer an autonomous life course in

an attempt to avoid becoming "drifters" (Sennett, 1998). Drifting is the opposite of being mobile because drifting is a passive and impassive way of adapting to changing conditions and environments. Flexible people are able to "go with the flow"! But a mobile human being influences the direction of his or her movements, since mobility is an active strategy while flexibility (and adaptation) is a passive one. Individuals struggle to influence their living conditions and the itineraries of their lives.

Socio-material networks

The socio-material networks around us are the resources for this kind of "mobility politics", (Kesselring, 2003) where people actively choose the trajectories of their lives. If people navigate their lives, if they actively take decisions between different paths or itineraries, they use a number of social and material (and/or technological) networks to realize their plans and projects. They need access to these networks and the competence to appropriate and use them. The fitting term for this complex setting of socially structured opportunities, skills and competence is "motility" (Canzler *et al.*, 2008). Motility "refers to the system of mobility potential" (Kaufmann, 2002: 1). This system consists of many different social and material networks. They are the resources for acting and they build the base from where "an actor appropriates the field of possible action in the area of mobility, and uses it to develop individual projects" (Kaufmann, 2002: 1).

The competence of an actor to move and especially to move intentionally is the individual side of motility. The structural side of motility within societies is restored to the global level, but through local infrastructures: the roads, the communication networks, the airline networks and last but not least the multiplex social networks that people maintain within places and across spaces. All these socio-material networks construct historically and culturally specific opportunity spaces. They structurally restore and define society's potentials to move, to change its shape and to deploy itself in a certain way. Mobility potentials are socially as well as politically constructed and they define the range where people and whole societies can be in motion—movable and maneuverable.

The question of socio-material networks *en passant* points to the deep-running and inevitable structural change within modern societies. The theory of the mobile risk society puts center-stage the creeping transformation of the institutional and the scientific fundament of modern societies. It is the merit of the risk society approach to problematize the ongoing modernization of modernity (Beck *et al.*, 2003).

The cosmopolitanization of globalized societies is also a new time-space constellation. It is a socio-material and socio-spatial constellation (Beck, 2000; Habermas, 1998) based on the worldwide extension of communication and transportation networks and the expansion of politico-economic networks. The new world order of a globally active and powerful capitalism developed equally strong and powerful spatial fixes and "immutable mobiles" that have stabilized the opportunity space on a global scale (Jessop, 2006).

This structural change occurs, at minimum, on three different scales: At first on the global or macro scale; secondly on the meso scale, where companies become more and more developed in the form of (socio-material) networks; and thirdly, and this is the con-

tent of the main chapter that refers to mobility strategies, on the micro scale or on the body scale, where people use networks as resources for their social positioning. This is the empirical subject of this paper.

The macro change: world city network and beyond

We are living more and more in social, technological, infrastructural and virtual networks (Castells, 1996; Wellman, Haythornthwaite, 2002; Graham, Marvin, 2001; Urry, 2003b, Hollstein *et al.*, 2006). Networks define the spaces and places where we live and where we work. They connect important places and people in the world, they create connectivities and communicativeness. They decide who is accessible and who not, and they define as well who has access and who is excluded from it. From science and technology studies, urban sociology and so forth we learn that technologies and materials are not "dead". Quite the opposite: they are actors and active. They are in motion, vivid and social (Latour 1991; Latour, 1993). Technology is social: it is a social process, not a finite product![1] Virtual spaces are not technological or even antiseptic spaces. They are dynamic, and they are spaces of social encounter and interaction between people living and working in very different places, contexts and cultures (Vogl, 2007; Castells 2001; Rheingold, 2000).

Manuel Castells emphasizes the relevance of communicative networks for the transformation of modern societies. The new capitalist economy rests upon the shoulders of powerful and effective ICT networks. The table below shows the strong concentration of access and power to the Internet within the triad of North America, Western Europe and Japan. Most of all Internet domains can be located within the so-called global cities (Sassen, 1991). Whole continents like Africa and huge countries such as China are supposed to be empty spaces within the Internet galaxy. There is a strong "digital divide" between connected and disconnected spaces and places.



Fig. 2.1 Total number % CONE and country-code domains by city, January 1999 (source: http://www.zooknic.com. See also: Castells 2005, p. 228).

[1] See also Law, Hassard (1999), Law (2002), MacKenzie, Wajcman (1999), Rammert (1993), Weingart (1989), Potthast (2007), Peters (2006).

Clearly, the Internet galaxy is an important "space of action" (Handlungsraum) within global economies (Boes *et al.*, 2002). But equally important for the network economy are material structures, transport and especially air transport networks. More than 90% of all transnationally traded goods are transported by vessels (Gerstenberger, Welke, 2002; Rodrigue *et al.*, 2005). But, nevertheless, the pace and speed of "fast capitalism" depends intrinsically on aeoromobilities and the organization of air transport networks (Cwerner, Kesselring, Urry, forthcoming). In 1995 Keeling was already stating that the world city network depends for the most part on the global airline network and can be graphically represented by it. Airports or the "aviopolis" (Fuller, Harley, 2005) are the hubs of the growing "fast capitalism". The time and the mobility regime of this hypercapitalism relates to the time regime of the airline network. A mapping of these relations and connections reveals the topology of the network economy with its major hubs and economic hot spots. The current empirical research on the network economy is able to draw a picture of the airline-based world city network that correlates, with a striking resemblance, to the Internet-based city network (see Fig. 2.2).



Fig. 2.2 Air travel-based city network (source: Derudder & Witlox, 2005, p. 2384).

The world city network is configured around a restricted number of airports and economic centers. As we know, key cities are (re)produced by what flows through them rather than what is fixed within them (Derudder *et al.*, 2005).

The meso change: understanding the new mobility regime

This meta structure of global networks helps to understand the meso change within economy and society. David Harvey used the legendary formula of the "time-space compression" (Harvey, 1989) that shapes the postfordist capitalist regime. Today, people talk about "fast capitalism" but in fact it is a networked capitalism, based on the motilities of modern societies. For example: every year, 1.6 billion people travel by aircraft, 3 million people

pass through airports day by day, and 300,000 people travel through the US airspace annually. Major European airports doubled their capacities within the last 12 years (see Kesselring, 2007b: 828 ff; see Urry, 2007: 2 ff.).

Even these few figures show that the global space of flows is highly developed and accessible. The global airline industry and airports in particular are growing markets (Button, Stough, 2000, Jarach, 2005). Architectural and logistical concepts like the "aerotroplis", (Kasarda, 2005) the "airport city" (Conway, 1993) or the "Global TransPark' (Kasarda, 1998) signify the restructuring of global mobility potentials. The opportunity spaces are global and the inner logic of mobility politics within companies and institutions is shaped by these opportunities and new possibilities for relations and connections.

I do not argue for a causal relation or a direct correlation between the meta restructuring of spaces and mobilities and the meso scale of society. But I consider this relation as a "*Wechselwirkung*" (Georg Simmel), as a strained relationship between the meta and the meso change within societies. What we can observe is, for example, a new structuring process inside companies. Companies transform themselves into networks of global nodes and relations. They deploy new global mobility regimes, where the readiness to travel and to move from one place to another becomes a taken-for-granted demand. It completely loses its exotic nature (Doyle, Nathan, 2001). Bauman calls this a shift from heavy to light capitalism and into a "liquid modernity". Boltanski and Chiapello (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2005) ascertain a new "mobility regime" (*cité*) that is configured around the key concepts of risk, mobility, project and network. This mobility regime is rising up. It gains absolute power (like an "empire") and will change the social relations within companies and the social conditions of private life. Spatial mobilities and the competence of people to manage their mobilities are not individual achievements and subject to gratification. If everyone is on the move, sedentarism and stabilty need to be legitimized. Not vice versa. This is the reason why Boltanski and Chiapello state: "The apologia of change, risk and mobility replaces the former idea of security" (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2003: 133).[2]

In fact, daily working and living experiences are more and more shaped by mobilities. People use ICT networks for their virtual travelling and their interaction with kin, friends and professional partners anywhere on the planet. Key account managers working for multinational companies cruise the globe for new markets. Commissioners from engineering companies travel from city to city to start new machines or plants. Programmers, web designers, journalists and others are involved in globally structured projects and teams. Many tasks can be organized through virtual mobilities. But in many cases people have to meet physically, to chat, laugh, argue and quarrel face-to-face, to make decisions together, grounded in common trust and supported by social proximity (Urry, 2002). Jobs where people travel between 150 and 180 days a year are still rare and exceptional. But these people are the mobility pioneers who are tracing the mobilities of the 21st century.

Below, I give an introduction to the empirical work and findings of the mobility pioneers project which was conducted between 1999 and 2006 at the reflexive modernization research centre in Munich. At the center of our interest was the "body scale" of globalization and territorial restructuring. The daily lives, the working experiences and practices

2 Translation from German by the author.

of individuals are the interface where the structural changes within the mobile risk society meet. The blurring and the porosity of internal and external boundaries (*Entgrenzung*), the eroding relevance of the nation state and the cosmopolitanization of daily lives reach the body as well. People must struggle with and juggle these changing standards and constraints.

In search of mobility pioneers

The mobility pioneers project made an attempt to identify new patterns in the social construction of mobility. We wanted to know how people reflect on their own mobility performance and how they describe their strategies to manage high mobility demands from companies and customers. We were interested in the mobility discourse on the "body scale". We asked how people talk about and articulate their mobility concepts and ideas. Do they consider mobility basically as a load and burden? Or do they emphasize the chances and the new opportunities offered by travelling and the Internet's new connectivities?

Preliminary considerations led to the assumption that new patterns would most likely be found in branches of business that are considered to be trendsetters. We wanted to discover the subject-bound social mobility constructions that prevail in sectors from which we can expect substantial impulses for society. Based on this assumption, we rapidly settled on the IT and media branches as subjects for our research. Both of them are considered to be commercial segments in which the knowledge society's tendency towards the development of post-industrial conditions of work and production are most advanced. The media in particular is an industry with a current trend towards freelance production (Vogl, 2007). It is thus a pioneer in promoting the new trend towards greater autonomy for workers even in branches where some years ago it was still standard to agree on firmly established employer-employee relationships. Freelance journalists, graphic designers, sound technicians and production assistants have thus become pioneers for other segments of the economy in which the idea of an "entrepreneur of the own working force" (Voß, Pongratz, 1998) is closely associated with the ideal type of the "mobile man".

The interview phase was marked by the effects of a grave economic crisis in the media branch. As a result, advertising suffered a sharp decline. The effects of that crisis could be felt in almost all branches of the German media industry. Most of those interviewed were affected by this crisis, and many respondents were strongly affected by the great structural and financial insecurity that prevailed during the interview period. About 130 case studies could be made. I concentrate below mostly on typical cases which represent specific strategies of dealing with high mobility demands.

One of the primary aims of the project was to investigate how mobile people orient themselves under conditions of uncertainty, insecurity, the ongoing shrinkage of time and space and the globalization of Western societies. The term mobility strategy refers to the *inner logic of mobility practice*. The "socio-material network analysis" (Kesselring, 2006b) analytically reconstructs this inner logic on the basis of empirical data from extensive in-depth interviews. Interpretive methods like computer-based analysis and data-based group discussions enable the researcher to condense mobility strategies into ideal types of mobility concepts and practices. In the following I use the term *mobility management* to

describe these concepts and practices because it emphasizes the goal-oriented nature of activity and the less than perfectcharacter of solutions. I am aware of the fact that mobility practice is structured by contextual situations, economic and social conditions and power relations in general. But I underline the individual share in mobility because I want to illuminate the "body scale" of mobility practice and the actors' ability to influence their movement through time and space. Mobility is often conceived of as a form of freedom, but in fact mobility results from the dichotomies of autonomy and heteronomy, production and adaptation.

Mobility is not a clear-cut and homogeneous phenomenon. It is a general principle of modernity and as such it has a set of discourses, institutions and practices which bring it into materiality and social reality. Social mobility is not an isolated dimension, nor is it spatial or geographical mobility. It makes greater sense to talk about "mobilities" (Urry, 2007) or, as I propose, about different social, geographical and virtual constellations of mobility.

The work presented here contextualizes individuals in complex social, economic, geographical and technological networks. The individual subject remains the actor and is the reference point for my observations and understanding. This is the reason why mobility is defined as an actor's competence to realize specific projects and plans while "on the move". At the same time this definition of mobility demands critical reflection on the autonomy of modern subjects and their capacity to use physical movement as a tool for creativity and self-fulfilment. My interpretation of the involvement of subjects in powerful networks is a kind of decentering of the subject. The concept of autonomous mobility politics for the way people influence the directions of their social as well as spatial movements is insufficient to understand the relation between subjects and the mobility imperative in modern society. The term mobility management seems to be much more appropriate for the juggling and struggling with mobility constraints, as the empirical data shows. To establish mobility strategies, subjects need to be related to external structures and forces such as working context, powerful actors, the restrictions and dynamics of technological systems and so on. But, surprisingly, mobility pioneers try to decouple themselves from the compulsion of spatial movement by logging in to technological systems and networks.

Centered mobility management

The centered mobility management type is the most representative within the sample. It is symbolized by a hub-and-spoke structure as can be seen in the picture below. This is a highly gendered strategy to cope with mobility demands in professional contexts. In most of the cases we found men practising this strategy. Mobile women (in this sample) seem to develop different and more networking strategies to react to the mobility imperative of modern working life.[3] Centered mobility management is a strategy based on the existence of a clearly defined center of life which functions as a point of departure for different sorts of movements. The graphical representation here summarizes data sampled from social

[3] See also the findings in Vogl (2007).

and geographical network maps collected among the people interviewed. In the middle (which is not to be understood geographically but socially) there is a stability core, a social gravitation center that in most cases is built around a flat or a house, a very small but effective social network and a place of high cultural and social identification. This strategy gives answer to the question Agnes Heller raises as the paradigmatic one for late modern individuals: "Where are we at home?" (Heller, 1995).

Especially in the cases of IT specialists, this strategy seems to be very effective and stable. We suppose this has to do with the clearcut tasks and duties within, for example, a multinational IT company. Among the freelance journalists sampled this strategy was often described as risky and problematic in times of economic crisis. In the case of freelance journalists this strategy of grounding identity shows powerful elements if people can work in "their" city with "their" people and "their" issues. In Vogl's work on freelancers in the media branch this mobility type is called "the navigator", because their socio-spatial constellation is analogous to their use of ICT technologies. They use the Internet only as a resource for information, data and reports. The idea of networking is irrelevant for their social construction of mobility, place and identity.



Fig. 2.3 The hub-and-spoke-structure of centered mobility management.

In the following I present a case study for this first mobility type from the journalists sample. This is one of the most important and revealing cases and served as the basis for the ideal type of centered mobility management.

The case of Achim R.

The case of freelance journalist Achim R. exemplifies the specific centered mobility management type. Achim R. is 35, married, and has three children. His wife comes from a non-European country. He is a trained social scientist, member of a journalists' cooperative, and he is self-employed. He lives with his family in his own house in his small hometown.

His office is an hour away in a larger city that is one of the centres of the German media industry. He is a commuter and maintains many strong and weak ties to his hometown and people living there. Most of his extended family lives there. He participates in local political activities and is personally as well as professionally interested in local history.

His career as a journalist has developed over the last 15 years. Currently, he is a valued contributor to important German newspapers, magazines and radio stations. From time to time he also produces for television. He is an active member of various professional and private networks. He was the co-founder of an international federation of journalists. He is active as a volunteer adviser to a large German trade union. And he has intense international contacts all over the world.

Achim uses public transport for his daily commuting to his office and for many of his professional appointments and meetings, totalling approximately 15,000 km per year. He drives approximately 8,000 km per year in his own car (including family trips) and flies approximately 8,000 km per year (including travel to his wife's family). His preferred mode of travel is public transport. Most of his travel is not long-distance but local and regional. This refers to one of his characteristic competences: the ability to manage complex activity chains by public transport. He is familiar with timetables and able to exploit waiting and travel time as creative phases of professional activity. Often he finishes the first draft for an article on the way home from a meeting, press conference or interview. Even when he must travel longer distances, he tries to be home at night.

Thus all of Achim's movements circulate around a stable centre of life: his family, house, friends and local belonging. His social networks are dense, interactive, and multiplex. They are dynamic and actively structured. Many are local and regional networks, but none are simply given or traditional. After leaving home for his university studies, he returned to his hometown and resumed his contacts and forms of social integration. The strong compulsions of proximity in his work, requiring him to be on the spot, do not hinder his concentration on his home place and on local social networks. His relation to virtual networks is professional and selective. He uses the Internet as an additional information source but avoids chat rooms and does not engage in extensive e-mail communication. He combines worldwide professional networking with local integration as a rooted citizen.

In the case of Achim we observe a strong, socially deeply-rooted potential for shaping and controlling mobilities. Achim possesses a mobility potential which enables him, on the one hand, to cope with the mobility imperative inherent in his profession. On the other hand, he has the potential to manage complex situations and demands arising from family and private obligations.

This case shows the specific concept of centered mobility, representing a certain constellation of mobility and immobility.Centered mobility management requires a high level of competence, discipline, organization and maintenance. The centered structure is a mobility resource. Immobility in the sense of social stability and reliability, local belonging and embeddedness is the essential element in motility. It enables individuals to control the many demands on them and activities and to navigate social and geographical spaces. Data generated from cases such as Achim R. reinforce the modern notion of mobility as a vehicle to realize individual projects and plans. Achim R. sees himself as the "navigator" of his own movement and as the controller and producer of his life conditions.

De-centered mobility management

The second ideal type is called de-centered mobility management. In its socio-spatial structure it is reminiscent of the tunnel-effects of hub-and-spoke infrastructures (see Graham, Marvin, 2001: 201). People practising this mobility pattern commute constantly between different places and socio-cultural contexts of nearly equal importance. An example from the literature is the "NY-LONdoners" who are at home in London, New York and sometimes also in other places, too (see Doyle, Nathan, 2001: 17). They frequently use direct flights between the two global cities. In some cases there is also a hierarchy between the different places and a tendency to network building can be observed. The hierarchy means, for example, a relatively stark distinction between places for play and places for work. But in most of the cases there is a blurring or even merging of boundaries. And the core of stability that in the first type is represented by nearby family, friends, place and social belonging, emerges as virtual. The individual website or the durable e-mail address, the constant mobile phone number, etc., become a stable and stabilizing element within a life of high mobility performance. People are rushing around between different places of identity and places of professional engagement. And in between, they use the time of an airplane delay or while sitting in a traffic jam to cultivate their social networks, friendships and professional contacts. Their mobility performance is characterized by a kind of social tunnel effect or even "life in a corridor" as (Lassen, 2006) puts it. They live and travel in transit spaces where they don't develop any contact with the environments and cultures they pass through. Their preferred mode of transport is the airplane with its "architecture of nudity", and "emptiness of transition" (Castells, 1996: 450, 451). The airline network provides the fundament for their strategy to cope with mobility constraints and demands. They deploy a very specific mobility management to position themselves in time and space. And they accept the new spatial mobility regime; they construct a form of social stability which breaks with the traditional ideas of socio-spatial embeddedness and identity.



Fig. 2.4 The hub-and-spoke/tunnel-structure of de-centered mobility management.

Representatives of the de-centered mobility management strategy ideal typically have an individualized concept of mobility. It is "their" mobility, "their" constellation of mobile and immobile elements, places of identity and places of transit, etc. But this "their" is different from the centered one, because it is completely individualized. Solidarity and social relations are to be understood as "their" achievement, their decision, etc. In this sense the de-centered mobility pioneers understand themselves as individuals and not as members of a social group or a collective. If there are social relations and intimacy they perceive this as their own individual choice.

The case of Wolfgang S.

The case of Wolfgang S. illustrates a much more relativistic understanding of mobility practice and shows much more disembedding, contingency and openness. It is a de-centered pattern of mobility management. In cases like this, individuals put themselves and their mobility performance much more into perspective.

Wolfgang S. was a successful editor and department manager in the business-news section of a major radio and TV station before becoming a freelance journalist. His theme was "How to become a successful entrepreneur". He was responsible for a popular TV magazine for young business people. He was an Internet specialist with a nationwide reputation. His father's death brought about a rupture in his life and his professional self-concept. Unmarried and with no children, he quit his job and began looking for alternatives, ultimately settling into a new life as freelancer and trainer in Internet research and data management. He established residence on one of the Balearic Islands but retained his small flat in Germany as a "base camp". Today it is his starting point for expeditions into his new life as a self-employed person.

Wolfgang spends his time moving between the Balearic Islands, Germany, Italy and, more and more, the United States and Russia. From his base in a middle-sized German city, he manages his seminars and carries out journalistic investigations. An Italian enclave is his favourite location for recreation and Buddhist exercises. In recent years he has become acquainted with places and people all over the world. Wolfgang's experience represents a multiplex socio-material network of places, people, ideas and cultures.

He is characteristic of what we call "hypermobile" (Bonß *et al.*, 2004), in other words a person who is socially and physically in constant motion and in the process of transformation. He is a frequent flyer and does not possess a car. He maintains a widespread social network. His professional activities are mostly connected with private visits and contacts. Boundaries between the professional and the private have largely vanished. He is subject to many compulsions of proximity which he wants to control. He continually changes priorities for the contacts he wants to maintain and those in which he has lost interest. His life as a single person is extremely dynamic. Unlike Achim R., he has no clear center or direction in mobility practice. But Wolfgang nevertheless sees himself as the navigator of his life, too. This is an often-observed paradoxical self-description among mobility pioneers. The less people are able to control their mobilities, the more they see themselves as navigators.Wolfgang is not, however, a 'drifter' (Sennett) who simply goes with the flow. He wants to steer his life's course and to influence the conditions of his life and work.

His experience of life makes sense to him, and he formulates many aims and goals. For example, he has a clear definition of success: to be on the top means to make enough money in two weeks to finance a pleasant life for the next two months. This is completely at odds with the advice he had earlier given to young entrepreneurs, which was to minimize economic risks and to avoid professional failure. Although socialized in the Protestant ethic of discipline and success orientation, he wants to establish for himself a new concept of life quality and personal growth.

Wolfgang is a networker. He competently manages a huge number of social contacts. He is socially well-embedded on a high complexity level. He lives on his Balearic Island in a residential community without a partner and maintains many contacts with locals. He is well-integrated in a worldwide network of communication with his extended family in Germany, old and new friends, colleagues and like-minded people. He says of himself:

I'm going to virtualize my life, step by step. E-mail has become my favorite mode of communication. I only use the phone when I really have to. I can be reached by e-mail and via my homepage wherever I am. I do not write letters or postcards. It happens more and more in my working life that I don't see my customers. They know my work, they know my price, and so they do not need any physical contact. I'm astonished myself, but people have a lot of faith in the medium [of the] Internet.

This case illustrates the main elements of de-centered mobility management. He lives the network, and he gives life to it. Switching between national territories and continents, he has given up his former goal to marry and to start a family. Love, sex and friendship follow the idea of networking. He has contacts with women, but he distinguishes between different purposes: talk, intensity, sex, love, social, psychological and technical support, etc.

De-centered mobility management is an ambivalent concept of mobility and practice. On the one hand, it implies considerable personal freedom and self-determination connected with movement, travel and transnational commuting. But at the same time people like Wolfgang are under great pressure to be on the spot and to secure the income needed for their particular pattern of life.

De-centered mobility management often takes place at a high level of income, comfort and competence. But hidden behind his casual talk on the "logistics of mobile lives" (taken from the interview with Wolfgang S.) there is a *must*, not a desire. The individual decision to leave the security of a stable job and to choose the freedom of self-employment produces unintended consequences. To live a life beyond local fixations and to develop an individual culture and practice of "uprooting and re-grounding" (Ahmed *et al.*, 2003) demands competence, discipline, concentration and mental strength. The personal challenge is how to integrate all these different networks.

Motility in this case comes from its plurality, in other words from the social and technological competence needed to manage complex networks with numerous opportunities and risks. Wolfgang S. actually wants to reduce physical movement. But physical travel is nevertheless the instrument he must use to realize an independent life without the restrictions of a 9-to-5 job. He talks about himself as a *cyber creature*. If he had the chance, he would choose *virtual mobility* as his preferred mode of travel. Virtual networks are part of his motility and enable him to spend much of his time on the Balearic Islands. These networks function as resources for his worldwide presence without being physically present. Technologies such as the Internet, e-mail and mobile telephones enable him to

be away and accessible at the same time. What he aims for is a maximum of connectivity and a minimum of co-presence. He temporarily decouples himself from the "compulsion of proximity" (Boden, Molotch, 1994). On his island and on the move, he is accessible to those who want to contact him directly.

The prerequisite for this complex juggling of different places, social belongings, identities, and social, material, and virtual networks is a set of competencies and skills. The decisive factors seem to be his technological know-how as an Internet pioneer and his ability to keep in touch with friends, colleagues and clients. The point of convergence for these two factors is his ability to maintain contacts and achieve social integration via the Internet. Different levels of professional, private and cultural activities come together in different identities, which he manifests on different homepages. He produces himself as a private person interested in people, nature and ecology, beauty in general, music, food, cultural events, etc. But beyond this quasi-hedonistic performance, he presents himself as a successful, effective and reliable professional. The integration—and the decisive instrument for his de-centered mobility management—is a public time schedule on his homepages where friends and clients can see where he is and where he will be at any given moment. Clients can see when he is booked and when he is available, and friends can likewise keep abreast of his availability. He is embedded in a far-reaching network of contacts and places and functions as a node around which others must arrange themselves for their own purposes.

In summary, the inner logic of de-centered mobility management is non-directional in the sense that there is neither a clear center of life nor a clearly defined aim for social and spatial activities. In other words: mobility practice does not involve the modern idea of movement with origin, direction and destination. There is evidence in this and other cases that social and physical mobility patterns must be seen as parallel expressions of the individual logic of social orientation. In other words, there seems to be a strong connection between social and geographic mobility practice, and it makes sense to interpret the one as an expression of the other.

Reticular mobility management

Reticular mobility management pushes the ambivalent tendencies from the de-centered type to a radical point and phenomenology. Between geographic and virtual mobility people deploy strategies of "non-directionality" (Kesselring, 2007a). They are highly motile but they do not use their mobility potentials to travel to clearly defined career or life course destinations. But nevertheless: they do not drift, they are mobile! People show an enormous level of motility, but their movements in physical space are not even worth mentioning in the most avant-garde form of reticular mobility management. Within the first and the second type people use their competence and their energy to arrive at attractive places for carrier or in physical space. The reticular strategy reveals a social orientation which Sennett (1998) and Bauman (2005) call the non-directional way of being mobile. It definitely breaks with the modern mobility imperative that movement through physical space is the one best way to be mobile and to effect intended changes within one's own life. The reticular mobility pioneers have plans and orientations, have values and norms but they know there is no direct way to the top, no linear path to success, wealth or durable

health and sanity. In other words, their identities and their self-concepts are nomadic; their socio-spatial imageries from a modern life are "rhizomatic" (Deleuze, Guattari, 1987) or even "liquid" (Bauman, 2005): not clearly structured, transparent and pre-structured. The reticular type is the ideal type of the "mobile risk society". The "reticulars"

do not own factories, lands, or occupy administrative positions. Their wealth comes from a portable asset: their knowledge of the laws of the labyrinth.' They 'love to create, play and be on the move.' They live in a society 'of volatile values, carefree about the future, egoistic and hedonistic.' They 'take novelty as good tidings, precariousness as value, instability as imperative, hybridity as richness.' In varying degrees, they master and practise the art of 'liquid life': acceptance of disorientation, immunity to vertigo and adaptation to a state of dizziness, tolerance for an absence of itinerary and direction, and for an indefinite duration of travel (Bauman 2005: 4).

The findings of the mobility pioneers project confirm empirically Bauman's theoretical assertion. The identity of the "reticulars", and their self-concept in particular, is characterized by an "acceptance of disorientation" and the "tolerance for an absence of itinerary and direction". This is the reflexive paradigm of non-directional mobility. Gerlinde Vogl's work on virtual mobility (Vogl, 2007) shows that the "reticulars" are regularly provided with an amazing potential for networking. The Internet is their resource for a very specific social positioning within social spaces and markets. Self-employed people in the media branch, in particular, use the Internet for the creation of multiplex networks of social support, friendship and for the construction of a new form of fluid solidarity. As Wellman and Gulia put it, "net surfers don't ride alone" (Wellman, Gulia, 1999). But this is not a taken-for-granted fact. This is the product of a very complex setting of social capitals, access to technology, professional skills and the social competences of actors. People who do not possess this mobility potential are in fact in danger of anomy and social disintegration.[4]

But at the same time our results qualify Bauman's following statement as overemphasizing the reality of mobile people. Bauman says:

The greatest chances of winning belong to the people who circulate close to the top of the global power pyramid, to whom space matters little and distance is not a bother: people at home in many places but in no one place in particular. They are light, sprightly and as volatile as the increasingly global extraterritorial trade and finances that assisted at their birth and sustain their nomadic existence (Bauman, 2005: 3).



Fig. 2.5 "Like a spider in a web"—the network structure of reticular mobility management.

4 See the case study of Julian Sandt in Kesselring (2003).

On the basis of our research on mobility pioneers we must say that the people who circle closely to the top without being well integrated into the hierarchy of a company or any other institution or organization are in a socially risky situation. If they do not have the competence for "virtual mobility" or virtual networking they drift and it is too much for them to manage the complexity of a mobile life.

The following case study shows a person who is brilliant virtual networking. But she also demonstrates how it is possible to live and to succeed in a global media market as a kind of "cyber creature", as a person who does not travel. She demonstrates the reticular mobility management strategy perfectly, where she acts "like a spider in a web".[5] Her personalized virtual and social networks give her an amazing social stability and identity. She can separate her professional life in cyberspace, as an expert, from her social life in physical space.

The case of Johanna R.

Johanna R., a well-known freelance journalist in Germany, exemplifies reticular mobility management. She is a highly competent specialist in Internet and data security and freedom of information rights. She is married, with a five-year-old daughter, and she lives near a middle-sized German city. Her income exceeds € 5,000 per month, a top rate for freelance journalists. She reports on secrecy services and German and European data security law. In one sense she seems to be immobile: she is a non-mover and does not travel. Caring for her daughter is solely her responsibility; her husband does not participate. This is the most important restriction in her life and determines the boundaries of her professional activities. In fact she has just five hours a day to allocate to her extremely busy professional life. This is a serious challenge, as participation in professional life is very high in her value system. She attaches great importance to being an active political citizen and journalist. Consequently she must solve a recurring mobility problem: In situations where physical movement is the absolute prerequisite for public presence, importance and impact, she must fail. She must develop other forms of mobility that function as a substitute and as a vehicle to enable her to realize her own projects and plans.

I asked Johanna about important "places" in her life. Her answer was quite surprising. Her distinct preferences were her e-mail program, her computer and telephone, her desk and her house. She did not mention her place of residence nor her hometown. She mentioned only two cities where she had lived for a few years and Turkey, the country of origin of her husband. On the same level as the two cities she mentioned three homepages, calling them "important locations". When she starts work in the morning, the first thing she does is to visit these homepages for new information and to check her e-mail. Her efforts as a journalist and political citizen standing up for freedom of information and in defense of the private sphere are documented on these web sites. She knows no better

5 This citation is taken from another interview conducted by Gerlinde Vogl during the mobility pioneers project which is documented in Vogl (2007). It characterizes the social concept of imperfect social stability that we could observe in many of the case studies of mobility pioneers.

platforms for public and expert discourse on data security and freedom of information. And she, as an expert and a public voice, is located in the middle of the discourse. These web sites are an important resource for her motility, supporting the realization of her plans and projects. Her Internet connectedness is one of the main reasons she is one of the best-paid freelancers in Germany, continually in demand for new articles and books.

For Johanna R., there is no better place to be, beyond this virtual forum. From time to time she travels to a conference or a lecture. But she minimizes her travel to about 10 trips a year. Before becoming a mother, she enjoyed travelling. Today, physical travel is not important to her. Nevertheless, she is a very motile person, with considerable mobility potential, and maintains a multiplex social network of professional and private contacts, some of whom she has never met in person.

Johanna R. has created her own individual *scape* based on a specific constellation of technological, social and virtual components. She has shaped her own configuration of scape elements and thus her own optional space or mobility potential.[6] In her private life, direct interaction and the facilitators of direct interaction (bike, car, public transport, etc.) are relevant. But in her professional life, virtual interaction and the technologies of virtuality are much more important than any conventional mode of transport. She plays an important role in professional networks with specific restrictions, options, risks and chances, with many nodes and relations. She arranges them to interface with social networks which are localized and virtualized.

Johanna works in a niche and is a mobility pioneer in that we cannot generalize her experience over a population. Her journalistic activity permits an extreme form of immobile mobility. In her work she moves through cyberspace without needing contact with the physical world. The world comes to her, channelled through her computer. On the Internet and in e-mail, she uses PGP—Pretty Good Privacy—a computer program to encode and decode information and prevent misuse by others. This guarantees confidentiality in her communication with informants. Thus, confidentiality technology also fosters new dimensions of interaction and opens up new mediated spaces of connectivity and proximity. This reduces the compulsion of proximity for her and is one of the main reasons why she is so effective in her field. In a certain sense she drifted into her chosen area of journalistic activity. But she is not a drifter at all. The connection between her spatial and her social mobility is very weak. Her social networks also rely on virtual mobility practice. She has an individualized concept of social success and satisfaction. She has found a very specific solution to the problem of harmonizing her social role as a mother and homemaker with her demanding career. She is not interested in upward social mobility. The case of Johanna R. manifests a non-directional concept of mobility where contingency is high and there is no clearly defined destination and end of professional and personal success.

It is difficult to say whether Johanna's mobility management concept, based on virtuality, is successful and stable. There are few criteria for comparison with others, as her positioning in virtual space is individual and very specific. She has a very good income, she participates in public life without being co-present, and she defines her situation as satisfactory. Her concept of reticular virtual mobility management is a clever solution to

6 For the term optional space in relation to mobility research, see Canzler, Knie (1998).

the problem of unintended immobility. But unlike the non-directional pattern of social mobility which Sennett (1998) describes, she configures and reconfigures her individual scapes as required by her life situation.[7] It is difficult to predict whether this is a lasting solution or just an intermezzo between more spatial mobility patterns.

Towards a cosmopolitan sociology of mobility

These three mobility strategies shed light on social positioning in the mobile risk society. The winners of the "meta play of power" will not necessarily be those who hand themselves over to the rules of a fast and global capitalism (Ulrich Beck). Maybe those who best understand the opportunities of the network society will be successful? In a world that is becoming more and more structured by neoliberal thinking and concepts and where the stable arrangements of the industrial society and the Keynesian welfare state erode and vanish and the liquid structures of the mobile risk society become prevailing, the reticular mobility strategy opens new insights into the social positioning of people under the conditions of risk, insecurity and uncertainty. If mobility is the competence of actors to navigate their own paths and to realize individual plans and projects, socio-material networks are resources and the relatively stable and relatively reliable grounding for their movements through the web of life. Non-directionality, the loss of clearly defined super-individual goals and orientations urge people to behave and to decide as if they were really individual. But this raises the question:

Is it actually possible to act and to decide as an autonomous subject within the global web of the networked society, which Castells paints as a kind of superior and omnipresent matrix around all of us?' (Vogl, 2007: 24).

Is it really possible to steer an individual course of life within the mobile risk society? As researchers we have to give an answer to the methodological question if the stories that mobility pioneers tell us are really track records. Or do we need to doubt and to question what people describe as their realities?

My interpretation of the reticular strategy is that it reveals a very specific subpolitical solution and a remarkable social positioning. This is pioneering mobility at its best. It breaks with the dominance of physical movement. It uses the power and the connectivity of the network society to escape from its totality. In this sense the mobility pioneers have an optimistic message and they contradict Bauman's culturally pessimistic reading of liquid modernity.

The three cases are paradigmatic as each of them represents a specific way of moving in a globalized world. They show patterns of social positioning. Each of them is an ideal type and an essential mobility pattern found in the empirical data. The centered mobility management type reveals a very modern concept of mobility. There is a strong "will to order" (Parsons, 1972). It is shaped by the idea of an autonomous subject as the maker of

[7] Sennett (1998) describes late-modern social mobilities as retrogressive and non-directional. He posits drifting as a passive adaptive mobility pattern in which individuals 'go with the flow' and end up where external factors force them to be.

its own mobility. Mobility pioneers of this type understand themselves as the navigators of their own spatial activities, their own life course and career. They dictate their own movements and activate their motility in their own best interests. The centered type views her-/himself as an actor in private and economic life who manages situations in order to exploit economic and social opportunities and to avoid risks. The pursuit of career and individual satisfaction and the maintenance of social networks are basically grounded in spatial mobility. This mobility type deploys a high level of motility, using spatial networks such as transport and communication systems to establish a strongly focused social and professional network around a core of stability. Among the IT professionals in our sample, a pattern of reproductive immobility (family and household) underlying spatial mobility practice is more common than among journalists (see Bonß, Kesselring, Weiß, 2004: 263). For most of the IT people interviewed, centered mobility management seems to be the characteristic strategy. Among journalists in the sample, the range of possible forms of mobility management is broader and more complex.

The decentered mobility management type shows that the strong relation between social and geographical mobility as seen in the centered type is not immutable. New technologies provide people with the (mobility) potential to substitute other modes of presence and absence, proximity and distance. Being away while remaining accessible is the crux of this second mobility type. It is a technology-driven approach which involves the decoupling of spatial and social mobility. Wittel (2001) describes this as "network sociality" but talks about an additional sphere of connectivity and social positioning. In the decentered case we see that spatiality, sociality and virtuality are entangled. Decentered mobility pioneers maintain their social networks by using the Internet, e-mail and intelligent communication as instruments of social mobility. The social positioning of these mobility pioneers rests on complex, efficient (infra)structural as well as subjective motility.

In the third type spatial mobility does not emerge as an essential element of mobility practice. All activities in geographical space remain local. The social network is extremely small but intense. By contrast, the virtual network and virtual professional activities are multiplex and globally linked. In particular, the professional social network transcends spatial activities. Face-to-face interaction is nearly superfluous and sometimes even explicitly not desired. Mobility pioneers such as Johanna R. maintain lasting and stable contacts with colleagues, informants and friends without co-presence. Interestingly, the complex codices of behavior in virtual space allow the social construction of trust and reliability.[8] Mobility pioneers who practice virtual mobility management avoid the modern compulsion of proximity and mobility.

The most interesting question arising from these empirical observations is whether these mobility patterns show more than only particular aspects of the complex relationship between mobility and society. More precisely, is there something in the data that suggests a possible structural change in mobility? Or are we witnessing the banality of technology-driven differentiation in the emerging network society?

[8] In another case study of the so called Jonet (www.jonet.org), a virtual network of journalists for the exchange of information, jobs, knowledge and support, we investigated the functionality of these codices. Membership in this network allows participants to overcome spatial restrictions. Mail circulating through the mailing list can often solve problems of journalistic life and mobilize formerly unknown local support.

At this stage it is impossible to say whether the existence of these spatial and non-spatial mobility patterns provides evidence for a strong hypothesis such as the theory of reflexive modernization, which posits a transformation from first to second modernity (Beck *et al.*, 2003). The empirical data show that there are new ways to be mobile and to realize social belonging without being bound to place or to local community, thus weakening the modern pressure to travel and to be physically present. This is an indicator that a general principle of modernity, mobility with its paradigmatic connection between spatial and social movement, is in flux. It is impossible to say how far this new mobility pattern is spreading throughout the population. But we see evidence that a decoupling of spatial and social mobility is possible and empirically verifiable.

This finding is quite important for a cosmopolitan theory of modern societies (Beck, 2000; Vertovec *et al.*, 2002). Social scientific cosmopolitanism implies a mobility bias and the development of new ways of social interaction beyond time and space. Reticular mobility management shows that individuals are already finding ways to connect without meeting.

The decentered mobility management type buttresses the theoretical presumption that under the conditions of the mobile risk society radically new configurations of mobility and immobility, presence and absence are possible. Mobility pioneers deploy their own "socioscapes" (Appadurai, 2001) while using the technoscapes of the global network society for re-structuring and re-embedding. Unlike conventional place-bound strategies of embeddedness and local belonging, these strategies are risky business. These scapes are connected to the individual and his or her motility. They collapse if the individual collapses. In this sense they are highly individualized mobility patterns in highly standardized infrastructural and technological environments.

As a suggestion for further research and the conceptualization of these different mobility modes, I propose the distinction between mobilities in "transit spaces" and those in "connectivity spaces". Transit spaces are spaces of high and hard structuration and heteronomy. As Thrift puts it, they are "movement spaces" (Thrift, 2004). Transit spaces are characterized by directionality and linearity; places, meetings and interactions are just transitory situations of goal attainment. Centered mobility pioneers experience the world as a transit space, as an environment that has to be controlled to manage the problems between periphery and center. It can be seen metaphorically as an airport with travellers passing through. Some try to reduce check-in time to a minimum and reach their destinations as quickly as possible. Although physically present, they are already gone in mind, and they experience only the transitory situation.

In contrast, other people live in "connectivity spaces", or spaces of interaction, optionality and contact. At the "airport" they stroll around and stay for a while. They connect with others and are able to change perspective. Travelling time is a time of experience and not dead time between starting point and destination. In transit spaces we do not experience places, environments and surroundings. People moving through connectivity spaces live in intense relation to others, are less structured and more open to contingency. They want and need to experience what surrounds them. They use connectivity spaces as platforms for their creativity and power. Living decentered lives, they need to be able to reconfigure themselves in complex social, material and technological environments and networks.

Living in transit spaces and living in connectivity spaces are different modes of being in the world. They are internally and externally differently structured. This suggests a direction for further investigation and mobility research. The distinction between the two spatial orientations is important for the analysis of cosmopolitan mobilities, places and cities.

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Chapter 3

Spatial Patterns and Social Inequality in Switzerland—Modern or Post-modern?[1]

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Space and mobilities as dimensions of social inequality

In this chapter, we outline some results from an empirical examination of the relations between social inequality, space, and mobility patterns in Switzerland against the background of current debates in the field. With the recent 'spatial turn' in the social sciences, space and spatial processes have become central to social theory. The past space was treated for the most part as something natural or non-social. Recent approaches, however, focus on the relations between society and space. These approaches derive from different theoretical origins, and differ in other major ways,[2] but nevertheless share a common assumption that the conceptualization of space is formed by its social, political, cultural and economic conditions. This reflects what Lefèbvre called "representations of space", that is the space of scientists, planners, urbanists etc., which, due to the signifying power of these groups, is the dominant space in any society or mode of production (Lefèbvre, 1991: 38f.). Such an assumption is based on the notion that every social formation produces or constructs its specific "social spatialisation" (Shields, 1991: 31), which encompasses the logic of the spatial and its expression and elaboration in language and more concrete actions, constructions, and institutional arrangements (ibid).

1 This article and the research it is based on was partly funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and its National Research Program (NRP 51) on social exclusion.

2 One difference concerns the fundamental consideration of whether space is pre-social or not. Incomplete summaries of the debate can be found in Collinge (2005), Manderscheid (2008), and Massey (2005).

Our study is rooted in recent theoretical debates concerning the relation between social inequality, space, and mobility. We therefore distinguish, in the first section of the paper, between modern and post-modern paradigms of space and their relations to inequality. With regard to these spatial strands, the focus lies on *representations of space* in social theory, by which is meant "what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived" (Lefèbvre, 1991: 38). Therefore, the link to empirical evidence, taken as an indicator of spatial practice (the second part of Lefèbvre's spatial trialectic; Lefèbvre, 1991: 38; cf. Unwin, 2000), remains obscure.

The second section of this paper is dedicated to the empirical analysis of two substantive areas, both of which are implicated in the debate about the relations between inequality and space. The goal here is to examine the extent to which different research results fit into either meta-theoretical paradigm and to what extent these theoretical paradigms are helpful when interpreting empirical findings. As mentioned, the challenge lies in the discrepancy between the highly abstract theoretical debates and the often rather trivial empirical evidence available. Obviously we cannot solve this problem but what we present here is one possible way to bridge the gap.

In the final section, we draw conclusions about the relations between inequality, space, and mobility, for Switzerland in particular, and propose future theoretical and empirical directions in this field.

Modernity: container space and domination of time over space

In social theory, there is no agreement as to what characterises modern conceptions of spatiality. For the most part, the critical attributes of "modern" are defined explicitly in temporal, not in spatial, terms (King, 1997: 109). Nevertheless, in the following, we identify a few central implications for spatiality, especially with regard to socio-geographic space.

Most qualities of modern space are defined in opposition to, or contrast with, either antecedent pre-modern spatialities, or subsequent post-modern or global spatialities. One of the early sociologists dealing explicitly with the society-space relation was Pitrim A. Sorokin, widely known for his studies on social mobility. Sorokin describes the space of modernity as distinct from the qualitative spatialities of pre-modern peoples:

As in most ancient cosmologies, the space concept of primitive peoples is not the isotropic and uniform space of Newtonian mechanics, but always nonisotropic and qualitative, consisting of regions with different qualities that are inseparable from the regions, and these qualities are often derived from the character of their culture and society. Farther on, subdividions of space (…) are again stamped by the sociocultural conditions of the respective society. (Sorokin,1943: 143)

As a means of orientation, these socially and locally bounded geographical spatialities were predominant until the lengthening of what Norbert Elias (1997) called "interdependency relations", that is, the expansion of sociocultural interaction between growing social formations, promoted the progressive replacement of local systems by larger and more universal systems of space representations and reference points: "[T]he emergence of uniform, isotropic space of the classical mechanics itself, with its system of reference, was conditioned by the sociocultural process of growth of cosmopolitan and international

society and culture" (Sorokin, 1963: 147). Correspondingly, Zygmunt Bauman identifies the start of modernity as the period "when space and time are separated from living practice and become ready to be theorized as distinct and mutually independent categories of strategy and practice" (Bauman 2000: 8).[3]

In this view, the concept of space as three dimensional and isotropic is understood as the *present* representation of space in contrast to *former* representations, or, as Shields phrases it, "the world is given as *presence* and as *what is present*" (Shields, 1992: 182; emphases in the original). Doreen Massey criticizes this understanding of different *places* as different stages in a single temporal development (Massey, 2005: 68) because it *temporalizes* coexisting differences, thus obscuring spatial multiplicity. This view is found, for example, in some strands of development theory. Here, Western Europe is thought to be *advanced* while Africa is just *behind*, not different (ibid: 62ff.; cf. Durkheim, 1893; Tönnies, 1991 [1935]). Furthermore, the here presented typology of modern and post-modern spatiality also carries this temporality, implying that the latter is a further development of the former.[4] In a similar way the socio-economic differences between the city and the countryside turn into a temporal development continuum. One pole of this temporal continuum is demarcated by highly developed, modern centres, the other pole by the still underdeveloped and traditional periphery. Rob Shields points at this interrelation of modern spatialisation and time when he describes the fusion of spatial and temporal presence:

The textured, geographical space of Westerners' 'common sense' is grounded both in pure space and in a temporalising logic of points, places, and lines. It is by this logic that what is spatially remote can so neatly be conceived of as an absence in the same manner as the past or the future: non-presences, non-nows. In this sense, spatialisation is paradoxically also temporalisation. (Shields 1992: 190)

The homogenous and isotropic quality of modern space is not only an aspect of its conceptualisation or representation, these characteristics are also products of modern social, economical, technological, and political forces or spatial practices. For example, the economic coverage of space and the corresponding levelling out of spatial differences concerning the distribution of commodities has been described by Marx in terms of the annihilation of space by time:

Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus, the creation of the physical conditions of exchange—of the means of communication and transport—the annihilation of space by time—becomes an extraordinary necessity for it. […] Thus, while capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. to exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from one place to another. The more developed the capital, therefore, the more extensive the market over which it circulates, which forms the spatial orbit of its circulation, the more does it strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of the market and for greater annihilation of space by time. (Marx [1861]: 524; 539f.)

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3 Bauman names this era "heavy modernity"—in contrast to the post-modern era of "fluid modernity"; see below.

4 To escape this problem, we could argue that the typology is not to be understood as temporal and that the co-existence of the two paradigms forms present reality more than ever. Still, the problem persists in the very notion of linking time—modernity, post-modernity—with spatialities.

Also in this sense, modernity can be understood as an "era of territorial conquest" (Bauman, 2000: 114).[5] Apart from wars and colonialization, further means of conquering space were measuring and mapping it (on maps see Massey, 2005: 106f.; on the impossibility of representing space see Lechte, 1995), as well as the development of transportation and communication technologies. Although this latter point, the technological conquest of space, has been referred to by Marx and others since then as the "annihilation of space by time", Massey has highlighted the peculiarity of this formulation, because "what is actually being *reduced* here is *time*, and what is being *expanded* (in the sense of the formation of social relations/interactions, including those of transport and communication) is *space* (as distance)" (Massey, 2005: 90f; emphases not in the original).[6] Nevertheless, the technological and economic "opening" of geographical space did contribute to its homogenization and isotropy.

With regard to social, especially educational and professional opportunities, this ideal of modern spatiality was obviously never fully realized in modern national states and economies. Rather, the spatial place of origin defined an ascribed status affecting individual chances of occupational (and therefore economic and, connected with this, social) achievement. Since the ascription of social status through social and spatial origin stands in opposition to the modern ideology of meritocracy as the distributive mechanism of social positions, it is only consistent that modern policy aimed at overcoming these ascribed non-meritocratic inequalities. The development of modern social welfare and educational systems derives at least in part from the gap between the ideal and reality of the independence of social origin and achieved status, and in many cases modern spatial politics, such as urban and regional planning, also contain a component directed against status ascribed by spatial origin. The latter is found for example in German policy where the stated aim of spatial planning is to "create homologous living conditions" (Abschnitt 1 §1 Abs. 6 ROG; Artikel 72 Abs. 2 GG). Similarly, in Switzerland, structural and agricultural policy are to follow the guideline of "decentral settlement" (Artikel 103; Artikel 104 Abs. 1c; BV).[7]

Territorial conquest, mapping, the fencing in of territories and the routinising of time (Bauman 2000: 114f.) go hand in hand with a concept of cultures and societies as place-bound (ibid; Massey 2005: 68f.). As such, the modern world is divided into separate places of different societies; the nation state "as a container, representing a unified spatio-temporality" (Sassen 2001: 260) appears as a typically modern form of spatialisation, ideologically containing a cultural homogenous society and a national economy (c.t. Berking 2002; Nassehi 1995). This social place-boundness implies what Shields describes as one of the modern spatial paradigms, differentiation:

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5 In the conquest of space, time was also tamed in order to fortify the conquered space. Time was tamed, colonized and domesticated to produce uniform and inflexible time, the kind of time Bauman describes as "cut in slices of similar thickness fit to be arranged in monotonous and unalterable sequences" (Bauman 2000: 115).

6 Bauman also notes that "accelerated movement meant larger space, and accelerating the moves was the sole means of enlarging the space. In this chase, spatial expansion was the name of the game and space was the stake; space was value, time was the tool." (Bauman 2000: 113)

7 On the basis of the shown parallel logic with the welfare state, it is not very surprising that this guideline of spatial equalisation seems to have lost its consensual position and, under recent pressure, is again a subject of public debate.

[Z]ones are separated in order to establish the identity of one space but achieve the identification of several at the same time. This 'juxtastructure' is a mosaic pattern of difference (...). Zones remain in a permanent relationship of justaposition, almost as each other's 'alter egos'. This spatialisation of social difference provides a key to understanding the social construction of meaning in the landscape as spaces 'for this' and other spaces 'for that'. The foreigner or stranger is not only an outsider but also a category mistake, a foreign substance that 'pollutes' the ordered differentiation of zones. (Shields 1992: 185)[8]

Having considered some key elements of modern spatiality the question of their connection to the modern social world, modern social practice and thus empirical evidence arises. Many of the mentioned spatial characteristics of modernity were not identified until new characteristics were observed and thought to be significant with the rise of the next era, be it called light, fluid, reflexive, or post-modernity. For others, like the appearance of the nation state and isotropic representation of space, history provides plenty of evidence. A third source of empirical evidence can be identified in studies of geographical inequalities, but the number of systematic studies is small. As noted by many authors, the spatial dimension has largely been neglected in social theory and research; distinctive socio-spatial setting is invoked only occasionally as an ad hoc explanatory device (Lobao 1996: 80). One of the few exceptions is the study of Peter M. Blau and Otis D. Duncan which found, in the United States in the 1960s, a quantitative hierarchical distribution of economic chances, moving between a low level of opportunity in the countryside to a comparatively higher level in the large cities (Blau, 1967: 244ff.). This clear continuum between the poles is interpreted in the light of modernity as a temporal differentiation between "most developed" and "behind", the latter being characterised by lower levels of education and economic chances. Blau and Duncan found that this geographically unequal distribution leads to a socially selective migration: "men predisposed to occupational success" (ibid: 257) tend to move to larger communities in order to improve their economic chances—a "social mechanism for adjusting the geographical distribution of manpower to the geographical distribution of occupational opportunities" (ibid: 243) but one which reproduces that geographical inequality.

The results of Blau and Duncan's study therefore support the notion that modern spatiality appears to follow the ideal of isotropy, but that, in "reality", it is characterized by temporal distances between the large economically developed centres and the small rural villages. The spatial pattern they describe is understood as one empirical example of the modern spatial pattern outlined above.

Spaces of globalization and post-modernity: flows and time-space compression

This is not the place to discuss if the present time is best defined by the term post-modernity, reflexivity or fluid modernity, late capitalism, flexible accumulation, post-indus-

[8] Against this background, functionalism in architecture and town planning appears once more as paradigmatic for modernity, applying the idea of zoning to social practice of every day life.

trialism, global age etc. In the context discussed here, the term post-modernity refers principally to the phase following classical modernity. Typical descriptions of this era consist in the diagnosis of growing uncertainty and contingency (e.g. Shields 1992: 192), less order than disorder (Hassan n.d.), a cultural condition where constant change has become the status quo and the notion of progress obsolete (Lyotard 2006), and the compression of the world (Robertson 1997: 40). Intimately connected with the proclamation of a new era is the appearance and spread of new technologies, especially the new information and communication technologies that allow immediate communication without territorial co-presence, but also the increase, dispersal, and easier accessibility of transportation technologies. Although many observers of the present social changes attribute these to the new technologies, Shields pleads for a non-determinist relation: "Rather than a determinism, however, it is more correct to speak of a correlation between the manner in which these technologies function and 'postmodern' revisions of common-sense categories and modernist universals" (Shields 1992: 193; concerning technology and culture, see also Thrift 1994). The potential inherent in these technologies led many analysts to the general assumption that "people can live where they want without loss of friendships or kin solidarity, and capitalism can progress beyond fixed production lines and trading centres into a contemporaneous, multilocational, non-stop world market" (Borden & Molotch 1994: 257). For example Zygmunt Bauman, who calls this post-modern phase "light modernity" or "fluid modernity", sees this era as being marked by a long technological effort to accelerate the speed of movement, that is, the nihilation of space by time, reaching its natural limits (Bauman 2000: 10). According this argument, starting from the technological possibility of bridging geographical distance, the conclusion is drawn that spatial distance and therefore space in general, no longer matters in people's practice:

If all parts of space can be reached in the same time-span (that is in 'no-time'), no part of space is privileged, none has 'special value'. If all parts of space can be reached at any moment, there is no reason to reach any of them at any particular moment and no reason to worry about securing the right of access to any. (Bauman 2000: 118)

Instead of an end to space, a less enthusiastic view proclaims a re-structuring of it as 'network-space',[9] thereby recognizing the path-dependency (Sheppard 2002: 308) of distance-bridging technologies that link only chosen places. Most prominently, Manuel Castells describes networks and streams forming a new type of spatiality. Networks are not centrally controllable, which implies a shift away from the spatial hierarchy between centre and periphery. Paradigmatic for network-space is the internet, developed in the Cold War to establish an indestructible communication system (Castells 2001: 6f.). For Castells, the new form of spatiality also originates in technological developments. The dominant social, economic, and political functions are organized in networks belonging to the space of flows (ibid: 431ff.; 535). By flows, Castells refers to the repetitive sequences of interchange between physically unconnected positions taken by social actors within the economic, political, and symbolic structures of society (ibid: 467). The material base of these flows consists of technological means of communication and transportation. Although these technological means appear to make spatial positioning irrelevant, Castells

9 A critical review and extension of the network-metaphor is found in Urry (2003: 8ff.; 51ff.).

emphasises the importance of the nodes within the network of flows. Therefore the space of flows is not placeless. In addition, the space of flows is not the only spatiality. Beyond the spatial logic of flows, there exist various spaces of places, characterized as scattered, fragmented and unconnected. These places contain their own temporality, ranging from the dominance of nature's rhythms to the strict tyranny of clock-time (ibid). Appadurai's (Appadurai, 1990) concept of different scapes can be understood analogously as describing the different spatialities of different social spheres. According to this perspective, the post-modern or global age does not make space meaningless but merely alters the spatial logic; different spatialities coexist and overlap and are constantly emerging (Urry, 2003).

Although this view pays credit to horizontal spatial relationships, Eric Sheppard (Sheppard, 2002) criticizes the point that the emphasis is, like the proclamation of the end of space, still very much on possibilities, neglecting the relational inequalities within networked spaces. In order to capture the shifting, asymmetric and path-dependent ways in which the futures of places depend on their interdependencies with other places, he proposes the idea of *positionality* and the metaphor of the wormhole (from physics) to represent the highly non-Euclidean spatiality of the global economy (Sheppard, 2002: 308). And, as Shields mentions, the spatial restructuring is linked directly with social changes, or, more precisely, the social change is inseparable from the spatial one. Compared to modern spatiality, Shields notes a change in the meaning of social and (territorial-) spatial distance and proximity:

The world is no longer given as a simple presence and as what is present, but as an incongruous synthesis of new social proximities which may not coincide with spatial proximity, leading modernist high culture back towards the relativism of everyday life. The resulting ambiguity is not just philosophical or a question of language games, but is the everyday, 'popular' experience of post-modernity. This is the difference that space makes. (Shields, 1992: 196)

Spatial and social inequalities or mobility as a key competence?

Sheppard's considerations of positionality refers to inequalities between geographic places, but it also leads to the more general point of *spatial and social inequalities* and their interconnections. Surprisingly, there are hardly any systematic analyses of the interrelation between spatial and social positionalities and mobilities, although their relation seems obvious even beyond the linguistic level. Indeed, all social overthrough and social change in history has contained a spatial component. The process of industrialisation, for instance, is inseparably connected to the dramatic process of population movement, the urban centres, and the accompanying change of social structures from a rural and 'ständische' society, to an industrial, urban, and meritocratic society that is commonly referred to as 'urbanization' (Franz, 1984: 16). Likewise and more recently, the fall of the Berlin Wall and Reunification of Germany as well as the integration of the post-socialist countries into the European Union was and still is accompanied by massive migration from East to West. Blau and Duncan describe *residential mobility* as a "social mechanism for adjusting the geographical distribution of manpower [sic] to the geographical distribution of occupational opportunities" (Blau and Duncan, 1967: 243). Furthermore, processes

of modernization[10] do not only very often enhance residential mobility and migration but are also accompanied by a compression and acceleration of traffic connected with a rise of mobility options and a qualitative increase in their significance. For example, Fordism and the later post-world war II modernization in Western Europe and North America is inextricably connected to the rise and social diffusion of the car and its infrastructure which dramatically re-shaped the socio-cultural and geographical landscape, allowing, among other things larger distances between work and home, and connecting formerly more remote places with urban centres.

According to the post-modern argument of the end of space, presented by Bauman amongst others, social inequality distribution should be independent of geographic space, or, more specifically, the resource allocation in present societies should not relate to place. But even Bauman admits that social inequality still matters, or rather, that it is re-dimensioned along the crucial competence of *mobility*: "[s]peed of movement had today become a major, perhaps the most paramount, factor of social stratification and the hierarchy of domination" (Bauman, 2000: 151). In contradiction of his earlier argument, that space no longer matters, he also states:

People who move and act faster, who come nearest to the momentariness of movement, are now the people who rule. And it is the people who cannot move as quickly, and more conspicuously yet the category of people who cannot at will leave their place at all, who are ruled. Domination consists in one's own capacity to escape, to disengage, to 'be elsewhere', and the right to decide the speed with which all that is done—while simultaneously stripping the people on the dominated side of their ability to arrest or constrain their moves or slow them down. (ibid: 120)

Alternatively, in Castells' terms (2001), there is a global elite moving within the flows, dominating the majority who live place-bound. Apart from the question of the different kinds of mobilities (cf. Kaufmann, 2002),[11] the instantaneousness of post-modern spatiality seems to be socially restricted and socially restricting in the sense that mobility appears to have become an important factor for social success and social exclusion in the global era. Consequently, the social sciences undergo at present a 'mobility turn'[12] "spreading into and transforming the social sciences, not only placing new issues on the table, but also transcending disciplinary boundaries and putting into question the fundamental 'territorial' and 'sedentary' precepts of twentieth-century social science" (Hannam, *et al.*, 2006: 1f.).

The growth of connexity has led many authors to confuse the potential for mobility and mobility itself (Kaufmann, 2002: 61). Crucial points concerning this new dimension of social inequality seem to be what Sheppard (2002) called positionality within

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10 The term "modernization" is misleading since it implies a connection only to modernity. What is meant here, in accordance with e.g. Ulrich Beck (1986) and Zygmunt Bauman (2000) as well as Norbert Elias (1995) and John Urry (2003), are continuing processes of technological, social, political, and economic development. This does not, however, infer any singular notion of development, though we need to recognise that these processes bring with them certain path dependencies and homogenising pressure.

11 For their relation to fixities, cf. John Urry's (2003) concept of mobility/mooring, a dialectical relationships between mobilities and relative immobilities; see also Adey (2006); Hannam *et al.*, (2006).

12 An overview of the discussion is found in Hannam *et al.*, (2006).

the networks in their social and spatial meaning, and, connectedly, access to (personal and material) resources as a means of distance-bridging (e.g. Boden & Molotch 1994: 275; Kaufmann 2002: 61ff.). The concept of *motility* seems useful in illuminating the link between mobility and social inequality, as motility can be used to explain different social and spatial trajectories in relation to one's spatial and social position. By the term motility, Kaufmann, Bergman and Joye (2004) refer to the potential or actual capacity to displace people, goods and information. Motility incorporates structural and cultural dimensions of movement and action and, as the capacity for spatio-social mobility, motility may be realized differently across varying socio-cultural and spatial contexts. This concept seeks to provide a theoretical framework to examine and explain spatially differentiated transfer potentials between, for example, cultural capital, and social positions (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2004: 750)

In the following we will try to combine the theoretical debates on modern and post-modern spatialities, and their implications for mobility and motility with empirical findings from Switzerland. Concerning the latter, there is the problem of operationalisation to solve, since *capacities* are not measurable directly for empirical studies.[13] Realized mobilities—in the following the focus lies on their social form such as professional career, marriage, etc., and their spatial forms including daily commuting, leaving one's place of origin, residential mobility etc.—can be, among other options, interpreted as indicators for motility in its "materialized" form, measurable movements are just one expression of the subjacent competence to move.

Spatial patterns and mobilities in Switzerland—empirical findings

In the following, we examine the relations between different geographic-spatial and social indicators of motility in Switzerland and their links with other dimensions of social inequality, against the background of the modern and post-modern spatial paradigms elaborated above. We will examine the spatial and mobility patterns of different forms of household and connect them with spatial location, education, and social position. Concerning the spatial patterns, we face the common problem of operationalizing theoretical approaches for empirical analysis, being limited to readily available indicators, but never being able to get "the whole picture" of the social world. Furthermore, following the logic of some recent spatial approaches and deconstructivist feminist theory (e.g. Massey 2005; Rose 1993; Urry 2003) we do not understand the social world as a unidimensional, proceeding chain of events but rather as a multiplicity, including different trajectories and possible links, of which some might never be connected or explored. Correspondingly, the theoretical basis outlined above contains many more potentialities than are "used" for our empirical analysis, emphasizing the paper's explorative and open rather than completing or locking character. Before moving on with the analysis, we will describe the frame of the study in more detail.

[13] As is the case with many other dimensions of theoretical conceptualizations, e.g. Bourdieu's different forms of capital are also only *indicated* by selected factors.

The results here presented are taken from an ongoing study and are therefore limited in scope. To our knowledge, there are hardly any large-scale studies of spatial and mobility-patterns which seek to grasp broad societal tendencies. A second delimitation is to be made regarding the data we used: at least for Switzerland, it is very difficult to find data sets, which include more than rudimentary indicators for both social and spatial positionality and mobilities. The data set we used is the MosaiCH data, which allows for later extensions of the analysis onto other European countries. The Swiss Household Panel or the Swiss Census would serve to a limited extent as well to investigate the relations between social and spatial position and mobility. However, neither have data that are sufficiently detailed to study the relationship between social and geographic position, mobility and origin. Concerning these multidimensional requirements, MosaiCH seemed the most suitable data set for our undertaking. Still, the decision for a secondary data analysis means of course the restrictions imposed by the available variables.

The name of the data set, MosaiCH, stands for Measurement and Observation of Social Attitudes in Switzerland. It is the follow-up survey of the "Eurobarometer Schweiz" survey of 1999. In the year 2000, several questions taken from the International Survey Programme (ISSP) were added to the questionnaire. Until 2003, the survey was conducted annually, after which it was changed to bi-annually. MosaiCH contains a recurring section on socio-political aspects, a thematically changing section, two ISSP modules, and an extensive socio-demographical element (Sidos 2006). We used the MosaiCH data set collected in 2005, which also contains the 2004 ISSP module about work, a module on citizenship, and a part on social networks. Overall the data set contains 1078 cases from all regions of Switzerland and it is a regional stratified random sample of the adult (older than 17 years) residential population.

Concerning the spatial dimension, we used and calculate the following variables:

- Community typology: The data set contains the community where the person lived at the age of 14 (referred to in the following as 'community of origin') and the present residential community. The typology used in the data set is the Swiss 22 type community typology (cf. Joye *et al.*, 1988). Based on the 22 types, we used the merged typology developed by Bühlmann, Barbey, Kaufmann, Levy and Widmer (2005) that produces only 6 types: (1) grands centre metropolitains (great metropolitan centres, GCM); (2) moyens et petits centre metropolitains (medium and small metropolitan centres, MPM); (3) moyens et petits centre régionaux (medium and small regional centres, MPR); (4) communes suburbaines (suburban communes, SUB); (5) communes périurbaines (periurban communes, PUB); (6) communes péripheriques (peripheral communes, PEP).
- Residential mobility: The dichotomous variable residential mobility (yes/no) was created on the bases of the BfS-numbers of the residential community and the community of origin, included in the data set.[14]
- Commuting: This dichotomous variable existed in the data set as "community where one works is the same/other than the community where one lives" (yes/no).

[14] This variable includes a certain inaccuracy since individuals, who left their place of origin but returned, will appear as "residentially immobile".

Unfortunately no further specifications can be made how far the way to work is. Depending on the spatial position, it is possible that people marked as commuters have a shorter distance to bridge than not-commuters.

Concerning the social position we could use or had to create the following variables:

- Highest level of education completed: The data set contains information on the level of education completed by the interviewee and his or her father. The 16 possible answers were summarized into 3 levels of education: low, middle, and high.
- CAMSIS: In order to judge ones social position we used the Cambridge Social Interaction and Stratification Scale called CAMSIS. According to the CAMSIS approach (cf. Bergman & Joye 2002; Bergman *et al.*, 2002; Bottero 2005: 160ff.), individuals are embedded in socially moderated networks of relationships. Within these networks of relationships they engage in social, political, economic and cultural interactions that are qualitatively and quantitatively different from interactions with persons who are more distant from these networks. For instance, acquaintances, friends and marriage partners tend to be chosen much more frequently from within a given social network than from without. The CAMSIS approach proposes that differential associations between individuals across social, cultural, economic, and political spheres can be seen as a way of defining proximity within these social spaces. Like most stratification measures, CAMSIS takes occupational groups as indicators of social stratification. Present CAMSIS versions use marriage as the basic relationship variable and, by quantifying the probabilistic relationship between actors according to their occupations, one obtains information about the social distance or proximity between these occupations. As a result, CAMSIS conceives stratification as a single continuous scale.

In order to focus our study on the employed portion of the population we limited our analysis to 25 to 65 year olds.

The following two sections will explore, first, the links between spatial position and mobility of different forms of households, and, second, dimensions of social inequality in relation to space and mobility. While the outline of the modern and post-modern spatial paradigms were quite generalized, both these sections of empirical findings will be introduced by more specific summaries of theoretical and empirical works and their implications for modern or post-modern patterns.

Spatial positionality and mobility of different forms of households

Starting from the basis of the theoretical debates summarised above, our research is based on the assumptions of social structuring and structuredness of space, that is, the notion that space is a product of social power relations, and spatial relations themselves structure relations and actions. This also means that physical space is produced or formed by social, political, economic and cultural relations, manifest for example in the modern binary opposition of urban versus rural and the associated notions of the good life (cf. Gorton

1998), the different opportunity structures, etc. Space pre-structures (not determines) social action since it reduces contingency in a specific way.

In the modern spatial paradigm with its temporal continuum of urban and rural, together with the aspect of zoning (see above), it might therefore be expected that different living arrangements are distributed unequally across geographic space. From its very beginnings, the modern city was described as a place in which direct social control was declining and, consequently, individualization and accompanying modern forms of social integration were on the rise (e.g. Bahrdt, 1998 [1961]; Park, 1974; Simmel, 1984 [1903]; Wirth, 1938). The industrializing city, as the centre of processes of modernization, is understood as the place where the impacts of these developments on social organisation became first observable. For example, in 1930, Louis Wirth described the result of urban living conditions for the traditional family:

Thus, for instance, the low and declining urban-reproduction rates suggest that the city is not conducive to the traditional type of family life, including the rearing of children and the maintenance of the home as the locus of a whole round of vital activities. (…) In cities mothers are more likely to be employed, lodgers are more frequently part of the household, marriage tends to be postponed, and the proportion of single and unattached people is greater. Families are smaller and more frequently without children than in the country. The family as a unit of social life is emancipated from the larger kinship group characteristic of the country, and the individual members pursue their own diverging interests in their vocational, educational, religious, recreational, and political life. (Wirth 1938: 21)

The plurality of living arrangements, also observed early on by Simmel (1903) and others as typical of modern societies and flourishing particularly alongside the welfare system of the late 20th century (Beck 1986), appears most evolved in the major cities due to the interdependent factors of high social density, highly differentiated opportunity structure, loosened primary social relationships such as families, and a high degree of anonymity (cf. Simmel 1984; Wirth 1938). In most western European countries the postwar period saw large processes of counter-urbanization. Although the bourgeois social class began to move to the outskirts of the cities earlier, suburban and rural life and the connected image of a more natural, healthy family environment became obtainable for large parts of the middle classes through the growth of private transport and accompanying policies (cf. Frank 2003: 275ff.; Gans 1976; Gorton 1998: 158; Wilson 1991). Almost as a backlash, in the last couple of decades many European inner-cities have seen processes of gentrification, re-urbanization mainly pushed by pre-familial and family-alternative middleclass households [yuppies (young urban professionals), dinks (double income no kids)], mainly between the ages of 20 and 45.[15] One of the most recent observable trends is the return of the so called woopies (well off older people) into the city, once their children have left the home and the suburban environment ill-suits their specific demands and abilities of social and cultural participation.

Recapitulating, a modern spatial pattern of living arrangements should reflect the temporal difference between the city and the rural with the latter being more backward and traditional, especially with regard to family structure. The city, in contrast, should

[15] On the lifestyle specific attraction of urban life cf. Manderscheid (2004).



Fig. 3.1 The theoretical pattern of urban zones and of family types. Burgess & Locke (1953: 100f.).

show a higher diversity and a lower proportion of family households. In the case of families and their need to coordinate different spatial trajectories every day, different spatial postionalities probably correspond to different gender arrangements, shown empirically for Switzerland by Bühlmann *et al.*, (2005). An early model of the distribution of households along with their gender specificity was presented by Burgess and Locke in the 1950s, developed analogously to the functional zoning of the city (Fig. 3.1):

In contrast to the sketched modern zoned spatiality of living arrangements, a post-modern pattern should, in accordance with the paradigms outlined above, be characterized by a higher independence of spatial settings. Especially with the advances and spread of communications technology, many analysts identify a process of decoupling of the place of living and the place of work. Although the potential of teleworking was largely overestimated (cf. Castells 2002 [1996]: 329ff.) the potential of the internet and its service options suggests that urban dwellers are able to move further from the metropolitan core (Gorton 1998: 158). This suggests that a post-modern spatial pattern should be characterized by a less defined continuum between the urban and the rural but a higher spatial diversity of different forms of households and gender arrangements across all types of communities.

Analysing the empirical distribution of different types of households in Switzerland,[16] we found that there seems to be a significant but moderate effect (Cramer's $V = 0.115$; $p < 0.05$) of community type on the form of household as shown in Figure 3.2, while in the metropolitan centres (GCM) single households are the largest group of households, in regional centres, the sub- and periurban and the peripheral communities (MPR, SUB, PUB, PEP) it is the classical family household that dominates. Since the differences

[16] As described, our spatial differentiation is narrower than the one Burgess & Locke (1953) applied for their zoning typology.



Fig. 3.2 Households over community types (Cramer's V= 0.115; $p < 0.05$).

between the composition of the households are rather small and do not follow a linear grading down from central to peripheral places, at this point it is not possible to decide whether this finding indicates a modern or a post-modern spatial pattern. For this purpose it would be crucial to know if the composition has changed over time and in which direction. Unfortunately, there is no comparable data set available for Switzerland from former decades.[17]

Secondly, while the analysis above concentrated only on the form of the households, their "content", that is, their inner structure, may vary significantly. As the typology of Burgess and Locke (1953) suggests, and the study of Bühlmann *et al.*, (2005) shows, there is a significant interrelation between the distribution of work between the genders and the spatial dimension. They found that the big metropolitan centres are the places of more egalitarian family models while the periurban and peripheral communities are dominated by families with more traditional gender roles (2005: 339f.). Here, the traditional male breadwinner model is taken as indicating more traditional gender roles.

In our data set we could find similar differences for family households with children (Figure 3.3; Cramer's V= 0.17; $p < 0.01$) but not for couples living without children. This finding could be caused by the already mentioned need to coordinate different trajectories

17 The earlier Eurobarometer does not contain the community typology.



Fig. 3.3 Main breadwinner in family households (n = 304; Cramer's V= 0.17; p < 0.01). MMA: main metropolitan areas; SMA: small metropolitan areas; SARC: secondary agglomerations and regional centers; RA: rural areas.

within families where especially young children require the aid of a parent.[18] In main and small metropolitan areas, these recurring daily plural family trajectories seem to be easier to manage, thereby opening options for new or less traditional family models, e.g. a more egalitarian work distribution between men and women.

Another place-bound factor contributing to this finding could be the more diverse metropolitan job-market. Underlining the latter, a multinominal logit model, presented in Table 3.1, suggests that the gender roles relate primarily to the presence of children. Including this variable into the analysis, the spatial dimension matters statistically less and is no longer significant. This suggests that the gender roles within families depend mainly on children, and households with children appear, as shown above, unequally distributed over space. There seems to be a stronger space-dependency of households with children concerning post-traditional gender roles than there is for couples without children. Nevertheless, even in rural areas, roughly 15% of families do not match the traditional image, indicating a certain degree of post-modern plurality across all spatial dimensions. Still, the dominant model across all community types is the traditional family with the male as the main wage earner.

[18] This still does not explain why it is mainly the woman doing the childcare and family work. That is the product of an underlying patriarchal social structure and its embedded naturalization (cf. Bourdieu 1997).

Table 3.1 Multinominal logistic regression: Female, equal or male main earner (dependent variable) depending whether there are children living in the household and the community type of residential position.

			95% CI for exp b		
	B	SE	Lower	exp b	Upper
Female main earner					
Low education	0.46	.21	–.31	.09	.50
High education	–0.47	.21	–.50	–.10	.31
Children	–3.36**	.26	–1.37	–.86	–.36
GCM	2.12*	.42	.07	.90	1.73
MPM	0.10	.46	–.86	.05	.95
MPR	0.32	.56	–.91	.18	1.27
SUB	1.22	.33	–.24	.40	1.05
PER	–1.06	.54	–1.61	–.56	.48
Constant	–5.01**	.28	–1.98	–1.42	–.87
Both earn the same					
Low education	–1.07	.21	–.65	–.23	.19
High education	1.28	.21	–.14	.27	.67
Children	–4.62**	.26	–1.74	–1.22	–.70
GCM	–0.77	.55	–1.49	–.42	.65
MPM	1.04	.39	–.35	.40	1.16
MPR	–0.54	.60	–1.49	–.32	.84
SUB	0.04	.33	–.63	.01	.65
PER	–0.72	.45	–1.22	–.33	.56
Constant	–4.30**	.26	–1.65	–1.14	–.62

(main earner = male is the base outcome). B = raw coefficient; exp b = factor change in odds for unit increase in X; Pseudo $R^2 = 0.05$; LR $chi^2(16) = 46.87$; $p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$

In summary, we could find some moderate and significant differences of household forms and their gender specificity in relation to different types of communities. Metropolitan spatial positionalities seem to include certain advantages, judged by their greater plurality of living arrangements. Still, to a smaller extent, all Swiss communities seem to contain a certain degree of plurality that can be also interpreted as indicating a post-modern place-independence. Further, our findings show that the implications of spatial positions relate also to the social situation as demonstrated by the form of household one is living in. This latter finding supports the theoretical idea of the mutual constitution of the social and the spatial (cf. Manderscheid, 2008) and the recognition of a multiplicity of spaces (cf. Massey, 2005). So far we could say that the spatial pattern for families with children appears rather modern and zoned, while the childless living arrangements show no significant place-specificity, hence, their spatial pattern is rather post-modern.

Social inequality in relation to space and mobility

In this section we examine further dimensions of social inequality, their relationship with spatial dimensions and their capacity to be mobile. Following Pierre Bourdieu and many other researchers of social inequality, we do not understand social stratification solely in

financial terms, but as a multidimensional subject, structured first of all by the dimensions of economic, cultural and social capital (Bourdieu 1983). Due to limitations imposed by our data set, we focus on the dimension of cultural capital indicated by the educational level achieved and the social position measured in CAMSIS units, indicating professional status and therefore, indirectly, economic capital.

As mentioned above,[19] a modern spatial pattern of inequality with its asynchronousness implies less qualified and diverse educational and professional opportunities outside the metropolitan centres and therefore a socio-spatial two-pole-continuum of inequality with rural areas at one end and the centres at the other. This pattern was empirically supported by the study of Blau and Duncan (1967). Furthermore, the labour force survey (LFS) of the European Union, which focused on education as an indicator of cultural capital, suggests a rather modern pattern with a decline of the level of education from city to rural area. According to this view, residential mobility is analysed as a constant reproduction of the spatial dis-balance. The latter mobility form constitutes a rather singular and irreversible social experience, implying a change of socio-spatial and cultural context (Kaufmann, 2002: 24). A post-modern spatial pattern on the other hand should overcome these spatial differences either by the fulfilment of the modern ideal of spatial coverage (see above) or through widespread, diverse, and reversible mobility strategies which cancel the impact of spatial distance, that is, daily mobility, travel or deployment of communication technologies (Kaufmann, 2002: 25). This means that empirically no significant differences between rural and metropolitan communities should show up concerning education, professional achievement etc.

Since *school-education* is usually acquired at the place of origin, we analysed first the distribution of educational achievements in relation to the community type of origin, that is, in MosaiCH, the community where one lived at the age of 14. On the basis of our data set, we could not find significant differences concerning educational achievements across the different community types (Cramer's $V = 0.098$; $p > 0.05$), which is to be taken as a first indicator of a high degree of spatial coverage concerning educational chances. Education depends, as many studies (PISA; Bourdieu 1983; 1984) have shown, mainly on the *social background* of the individual. Looking at educational levels, our data set also shows a fairly strong correlation between the educational level of the father[20] and the interviewee ($r_s = 0.353$; $p < 0.01$). Interestingly this correlation differs across the different community types with gender (Table 3.2).

There appears to be an interaction between the three forms of ascribed social status: gender, spatial and social origin. While in the great metropolitan centres, educational achievement appears to be statistically independent of social background for women, for both men and women, it seems strongest in middle and smaller metropolitan areas and in the bourgeois suburbia.

19 Another linguistic spatiality implying a temporality.

20 Unfortunately the educational level of the mother is not contained in the data set.

Table 3.2 Influence of social origin in relation to spatial origin for men and women—correlation between the ecucational level of the father and the interviewee across different community types.

Community typology (Lasur-Pavie) age 14	all	men	women
Great metropolitan centres (GCM)	.285*	.432**	.060
	n=77	n=39	n=38
Medium and small metropolitan centres (MPM)	.405**	.425*	.438*
	n=66	n=34	n=32
Medium and small regional centres (MPR)	.136	.087	.277 (p=.201)
	n=47	n=24	n=23
Suburban communities (SUB)	.352**	.338**	.392**
	n=156	n=85	n=71
Periurban communities (PUB)	.067	.302 (p=.082)	-.241 (p=.258)
	n=58	n=34	n=24
Peripheral communities (PEB)	.275**	.346**	.205 (p=.063)
	n=164	n=81	n=83

** $p < 0.01$
* $p < 0.05$

Secondly, we looked correspondingly at the correlation of the social position achieved by the father and the respondent across community types (Table 3.3) and found that, measured in CAMSIS units, social background strongly influences the social position of women across most community types,[21] but not significantly the social position of men.

Table 3.3 Influence of social origin in relation to spatial origin for men and women—correlation between the CAMSIS of the father and CAMSIS of the interviewee across different community types.

Community typology (Lasur-Pavie) age 14	all	men	women
Great metropolitan centres (GCM)	.244	.098	.484**
	(p=.060)	n=31	n=29
	n=60		
Medium and small metropolitan centres (MPM)	.399**	.137	.704**
	n=50	n=28	n=22
Medium and small regional centres (MPR)	.020	.215	–.173
	n=37	n=22	n=15
Suburban communities (SUB)	.253**	.028	.489**
	n=131	n=76	n=55
Periurban communities (PUB)	.230	.308	.116
	n=46	n=29	n=17
Peripheral communities (PEB)	.210*	.113	.330*
	n=131	n=71	n=60

** $p < 0.01$
* $p < 0.05$

[21] The finding, that there is no correlation at MPR and PUB level, despite the small number of observations, could be interpreted as indicating a very open job market or some other socio-economic dynamic.

It seems logically consistent with the two reported results that the findings show a strong correlation between the CAMSIS-value of the father and the community of origin[22] in accordance with the expected modern spatial pattern. Therefore it seems that, regarding the space-dependency of educational achievement in Switzerland, at certain community-types, the previous generation experienced a movement towards spatial irrelevance and an overcoming of the impact of social origin. With regard to the achieved social position measured in CAMSIS-units, for men social and spatial origin seems to have no major impact, while for women social background still matters significantly.

According to multidimensional stratification and exclusion approaches, education is only one element of analysis: crucial is its conversion into **social positionality** measured in terms of professional achievement. The literature concerning the various phenomena beyond meritocratic criteria for women, lower class decendants and ethnical minorities, e.g. glass ceilings, ethnic sub-stratification etc. is too extensive to be discussed here (for a theoretical approach cf. Bourdieu 1984) but it underlines the importance of this point. Using the CAMSIS scale as an indicator of achieved social position we compared separate linear regression models for men and women (Table 3.4) in order to get an idea of the different influencing factors. Employing this method, we found that, statistically, for men, spatial origin does not seem to have a significant impact on eventual social position, which is based mainly on (high) education. On the basis of this data, it appears that for men, the meritocratic ideal works, meaning that socio-economic achievement should only depend on one's merits.[23] For women, spatial origin is similarly unimportant, but social background is still an unmeritocratic, determining factor.

Table 3.4 Linear Regression Model: Impacts of social and spatial origin on social position.

	of women[1]			of man[2]		
CAMSIS interviewee	Coef.	Std. Err.	Beta	Coef.	Std. Err.	Beta
CAMSIS_father	.23	.055	.26**	.031	.06	.03
Dummy low education	–10.82	2.85	–.22**	5.00	4.25	.07
Dummy high education	12.34	1.98	.38**	11.56	1.80	.39**
Dummy GCM	3.81	2.62	.09	1.67	2.96	.04
Dummy MPM	3.68	2.84	.08	4.61	3.08	.10
Dummy MPR	5.05	3.29	.09	–2.95	3.32	–.06
Dummy SUB	.33	2.15	.01	–3.15	2.24	–.10
Dummy PEB	-1.79	3.15	–.04	4.09	2.99	.09
Constant	40.87	2.83		45.63	3.06	

[1] $R^2 = 0.390$; $p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$
[2] $R^2 = 0.185$; $p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

22 Education of father and community: Cramer's V = 0.20; $p < 0.01$; CAMSIS of father and community of origin: the mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level: $F(5, 556)=3.7$.

23 Since the achieved educational level also for men depends on one's social background, this statistical model does not support the thesis of real meritocracy. For men in contrast to women, the father's social position does not impact directly the achieved social position, which is determined by education.

Although spatial origin does not seem to matter in contemporary Switzerland in terms of predefining educational and social achievement, the actual spatial position might still impact the conversion of accumulated cultural capital (e.g. via education) into social positions (measured in CAMSIS). When looking at whether there is a different tendency to leave the place of origin depending on its type, we found that overall almost two thirds of the interviewed residents no longer live in their community of origin. Differentiated by gender, we found that women are significantly more likely to leave their home community (women: 72%; men: 59%; $r = 0.13$; $p < 0.001$). While for men those most likely to stay in their community of origin are from the periurban communities (PUB 65%), for women it is the median and small metropolitan centres (MPR 50%), but these mentioned differences are trends and not significant. Concerning residential mobility, the only significantly relevant distinction we could find was that between people who were married (including divorced as a form of post-marriage) or single ($r = 0.12$; $p < .001$; $n = 782$), so obviously a certain amount of residential migration is associated with marriage.

In contrast to the theoretical assumptions of motility as a new dimension of social inequality, we could only find moderate empirical evidence for a dependency of cultural capital or social position with regard to residential migration from one community to another.[24] For men there appears to be a small but significant correlation between residential migration and the social position of origin measured in CAMSIS-units of the father ($r = 0.11$; $p < 0.05$; $n = 358$), while for women there is a correlation between their own education (compared with both other levels) and the leaving of their home community ($r = 0.10$; $p < 0.05$; $n = 405$).

As already found for the communities of origin, for the residential communities indicating spatial positionality the data does not imply any significant differences concerning education or social positionality, either for men or women. But a closer look suggests that spatial positionality is not irrelevant. Rather, there seems to be greater access to means of mobility in order to overcome potential disadvantages of the residential community. This argument is supported by the strong interdependence of daily mobility in terms of commuting to work with the residential community (Table 3.5).

Table 3.5 Commuting to work over residential community.

	GCM	MPM	MPR	SUB	PUB	PEP	Total
Working in residential community	56 80%	71 63%	33 60%	59 25%	25 29%	56 32%	300 41%
Commuting to work	14 20%	41 37%	22 40%	179 75%	62 71%	117 68%	435 59%
Total	70 100%	112 100%	55 100%	238 100%	87 100%	173 100%	735 100%

$Chi^2 = 112.17$; $df = 5$; Cramer's $V = 0.39$; $p < 0.001$

[24] Not measured is community-internal residential movement.

In summary, our investigation of social inequality in relation to space and mobility shows a rather fragmented picture. The achieved educational level appears to be independent of the spatial position, suggesting a high degree of spatial coverage concerning educational chances and therefore an overcoming of the modern continuum from urban to rural. But educational level and social position was found to be highly dependent on social background, that is, the social position of the father. Furthermore, this dependency varies with gender across the spatial dimension, indicating a place-dependent impact of gender.

Furthermore, professional chances are not equally distributed across geographic space Switzerland but they still appear accessible via a high coverage of transportation. The high correlation of residential community and commuting underlines the meaning and extent of reversible mobility strategies, which seem interestingly not to relate to dimensions of social inequality. These findings support the theoretical claim for a multiplicity of relational spaces, showing how context-sensitive the implications of different spatial settings are. That means further that the characterization of Switzerland as possessing a modern or post-modern spatial pattern depends on the positionality and the dimension.

The Swiss pattern of mobilities and space

The theoretical and empirical exploration presented here aimed at investigating some relations between spatial and social inequalities and mobilities. For this purpose, referring to the spatial turn in social theory, we outlined two paradigms concerning geographical spatiality: the modern paradigm as the ideal of isotropic and uniform space, where differences were understood as temporal differences between the advanced centres and the backward periphery. The city with its diverse opportunity structure therefore represented the best professional opportunities, an assumption supported by the broad empirical study by Blau and Duncan in the 1960s in the United States.

With the emergence of various socio-economic phenomena summed up under the label of globalization and post-modernity, the geographic spatial structure underwent several fundamental changes. Transportation and communication technologies lead to a new ability to bridge territorial distances and even to make them irrelevant, since communication no longer required territorial co-presence. Far from making space disappear, these new means of physically and virtually bridging distance drove a process by which access to technologies and the ability to use them have begun to replace the inequality produced by the imperative of being physically in the material centre. Consequently, many authors talk about motility as a new stratifying dimension.

Based on large-scale survey data, we investigated some of the links between spatial inequality and other social differentiations and hierarchies. Summing up our empirical findings, we can state that we found mixed results in terms of the strength of links between inequality, space, and mobility. Some results, like the unequal distribution of different household types, the gender specific work distribution, and the social position of the fathers' generation imply a rather modern spatial pattern with education and social position being best in the centres and worse towards the periphery. Other findings show an impact of the spatial dimension that does not fit into this modern spatial paradigm.

For example the differential link between social origin and gender or spatial location suggests a more complex view of spatiality. This supports the post-modern strand, which argues in favour of a new conceptualisation of space as a multiplicity. This understanding of space helps to capture for example the gendering of certain spatialities. But concerning the present population within the age of professional activity, geography hardly seems to impact opportunities. We could not find significant differences in terms of education or social positionality when correlated with community of origin or community of residence. Switzerland does not seem to have a geographically equal distribution of professional opportunities but it seems to provide the means of access to the relevant localities. The only area in our data where we found pronounced differences along spatial positions was in relation to commuting. Unfortunately, the data set contains insufficient information, for example about whether commuters use private or public transport. Given the extensive coverage of public transport in Switzerland, it seems likely that there might exist significant differences to other European countries. Together with the relevant social infrastructure, extended public transport might, for example, help women with children to bridge spatial distance and improve their chances of converting their cultural capital into economic capital.

The question we posed at the beginning, whether the Swiss spatial pattern is modern or post-modern, can—hardly surprising—not be answered in any simple way. The first problem with such an endeavour is that the outlined spatial paradigms are, what Lefèbvre called, representations of space, while the empirical evidence is taken as indicator for spatial practice. Although we also refer to results of other empirical investigations we cannot identify to what extent the presented modern and post-modern spatial concepts grasp or grasped the socio-spatial reality of the time. The connection, interrelation, or congruence of the two aspects is not analysed in more detail by either Lefèbvre or ourselves. But this is a fundamental problem of social theory and empirical research. The second main problem concerns the data set which includes, typical for available large scale data sets, only a limited set of variables on social and spatial position, social and spatial origin, as well as social and spatial mobilities. Further, an aspatial statistical analysis which has to rely on rather generalized typologies like the used typology of community types has to be complemented by spatial analysis in order to capture local specificities and interactions between social and spatial variables. Our analysis is therefore the necessary first step to further investigations into the interrelations of space, mobilities, and social inequalities. Our empirical results show evidence for both, a modern and a post-modern socio-spatial pattern. Since we assume that the modern spatial paradigm was never completely realized and also that the post-modern spatial paradigms will never define social and spatial reality completely, we therefore have to report on tendencies pointing in one or the other direction, this supportions the claim about a multiplicity of spaces in relation to social and spatial positionalities.

In order to judge the Swiss degree of spatial inequality more adequately, more empirical analysis is necessary. To move beyond the pure description of the social in relation to the spatial, the impacts of, for example, an uneven distribution of opportunities across space or the need to commute or migrate on other aspects of social reality, for example social networks, should be explored. In this context, Putnam (1995) suggests a decline of social capital caused by the increase of time spent travelling, whereas amongst others, Larsen, Axhausen and Urry (2006) observe the spatial extension of social networks.

Another important effect of spatial mobilities may be found in living arrangements and whether people succeed in integrating children into their mobile worlds. Further, we are planning an extension of this analysis using data from Britain, a larger country with different degrees of spatial decentrality, different patterns of social inequality, and where the distribution of different community types and the coverage of the public transport system differs. By comparing these different states and systems, we will investigate whether the link between motility and spatial or social dimensions might appear stronger in other settings with a lower accessibility of means to bridge spatial distances. This will allow for further insights into the linking of spatial policy and social inequalities.

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Chapter 4

Public Space Management and Public Transport Quality—Vectors of Gentrification: Six Parisian Case Studies

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Introduction

The aim of the present chapter is to highlight the circumstances under which public transport and urban public space management can be either vectors of gentrification or serve to consolidate the social diversity of a neighborhood.

Several recent studies indicate that the elements surrounding the development of gentrification vary according to location (Butler and Lees, 2006; Lee, 2003). However, instead of referring to morphological diversity, the studies tend to stress the importance of the social qualities of the immediate environment. Consequently, if we are to develop the main differential, we must first highlight the material qualities of the built environment. Tim Butler (2007), using London as a reference, cites the internal differences within the middle class in terms of their residential strategies and spatial expressions in the choice of various gentrified neighborhoods. Other researchers have made similar observations, such as the Brussels case study by Criekingen and Decroly (2003) or the Authier case study (1998) of the rehabilitated historical center of Lyons. The latter particularly illustrates that each population group, or those that have chosen to reside in these areas, is distinguished by its unique desires vis-à-vis its neighborhood and leaves its own specific mark on the area. In this context, the excellence of public transport and the quality of urban amenities are usually seen as factors that are likely to reinforce gentrification. However, should one generalize this statement? Under what conditions will reduced car traffic influence residential trajectories? Under what conditions do such improvements generate a rise in property value?

The focus of our analysis is the Île-de-France (Greater Paris region). Several major trends reflect the gentrification of Paris: falling population numbers since 1950 (in the period between the 1954 and 1999 censuses, the city of Paris lost a quarter of its perma-

nent resident population—725,000 inhabitants (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot, 2001); an increase in secondary residences during the same period; and rising property prices.

We selected six neighborhoods in municipalities (*arrondissements*) either outside the city of Paris (La Goutte d'Or, Les Amandiers-Ménilmontant, La Réunion) or in the inner suburbs of the city (Saint Denis center, Bagnolet, Montreuil). While the price of property in all six neighborhoods is on the rise, there are manifest differences in terms of their urban form, land use and public transport services. Based on a mixed methods approach to empirical research, the present chapter is divided into five sections and a conclusion:

1. a critical look at the notion of social gentrification;
2. a presentation of the methodology;
3. a presentation of the sociodemographic trajectories of the six neighborhoods in question;
4. the identification of three types of gentrification observed in the six neighborhoods; and finally
5. an analysis of the influence which urban land use and the quality of public transport have on the development of three forms of gentrification.

A critical look at the notion of social gentrification

Alongside the continuous drift towards suburbanization, the middle-class population is also relocating (Hannigan, 1995; Bidou-Zachariasen, 2003; Préteceille, 2007), principally within certain central, yet traditionally working-class urban neighborhoods. While documented as far back as the 1960s, this phenomenon gathered momentum in the 1990s. Gentrification refers to situations that simultaneously revitalize a residential environment and change the resident population that aspires to a city center lifestyle. Since Ruth Glass coined the term (Glass, 1963), the interpretations of "gentrification" have largely expanded to include both social and economic changes, due to the growing power of global cities (Hammet, 1984; Butler, 2006) and the integral dynamic of improving city centers. According to Saskia Sassen, the gentrifiers are those who supply the new global economy and contribute to metropolization (Sassen, 1996).[1] This refers to a fraction of the upper-middle class residing in the urban centers of global cities, essentially because of their desire to experience first-hand such an innovative environment as well as to reap the benefits of living near downtown areas. By occupying these central neighborhoods, gentrifiers contribute to rising property prices. In a broader sense, Tim Butler considers the term gentrification, used in the debate on global cities, as a metaphor that conveys the transformations of the urban phenomenon. He therefore proposes adherence to a more restricted definition (Butler, in: Bidou-Zachariasen, 2003: 14); this is in line with our position.

Consequently, we consider the term "gentrification" as a social transformation of central urban neighborhoods, run-down urban constructions, and the valorization of its property and land. We also believe that gentrification is a potential ingredient within a

[1] For a more in-depth discussion of this hypothesis, see Butler and Lees, 2006.

vast process of replacing one population by another of higher social status. Gentrification is understood in a global sense rather than according to the restricted definition used by Préteceille (2007) or Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot (2000), who use the term exclusively as a social extension of zones of high social status.

Methodology

To study the impact of the quality of public transport and of urban management on gentrification, we defined a sector in each of the selected neighborhoods in terms of public transport access and based on an aggregation of INSEE's Iris sectors (Table 4.1):

- The neighborhood of La Goutte d'Or is very well served by public transport, with two subway lines and close proximity to the multimodal traffic hub at the Gare du Nord train station, which has grown in importance since the 1980s thanks to the successive opening of the A, D and E lines of the RER (regional suburban train).
- The Amandiers—Ménilmontant neighborhood is well served by two subway lines.
- In Réunion, public transport access is poor in comparison to other parts of Paris: there is no direct subway line going to or through it.
- Besides the tram, Saint Denis center has excellent public transport services which have been improved further by the extension of both the subway and the RER.
- Bagnolet is served by the Gallieni subway station, which provides convenient access to the sector.
- Montreuil is served by one subway line, and the extension of another line is planned, already whetting the appetite of potential investors.

Table 4.1 Accessibility of the neighborhoods by public transport.

Goutte d'Or	Amandiers-Ménilmontant	La Réunion	St. Denis	Bagnolet	Montreuil
Multimodal hub	Subway line linkup	Tangential metro service	Multimodal hub	Subway terminal	Subway terminal

These sectors were subject to two types of examination:

- A socio-historical monographic study of the six sectors for the 1980-2005 period, based on urban planning documents, scientific literature and interviews with stakeholders from the public sector and associations.
- A survey of practices-representations-aspirations, conducted in the spring of 2003 with 500 representative residents from all six sectors, selected according to gender, age, and socioprofessional category. The questionnaire aimed to reconstruct the residential strategies adopted by households. In this perspective, the place of residence may be viewed as the result of residential trade-offs, which cover several aspects, such as the housing market, a sensitive relationship with the urban phenomenon, social segregation in the city, and residential aspirations.

The advantage of the "mixed methods" approach (Bergman, 2007) is that it enables us to quantify gentrification, as well as analyze this phenomenon in terms of the individual

history and morphology of each neighborhood. By combining a quantitative survey with a socio-historical monographic study, we overcome the problems of interpretation that are often encountered in quantitative analyses of the social division of space (Rhein, 1994), thanks to the specific knowledge of these environments and their dynamics gleaned from the monographs. These two examinations were supplemented by interviews with the actors involved in the gentrification process.

The research was funded jointly by the City of Paris, the Direction Régionale des Transports de l'Île-de-France (Greater Paris regional transport authority) and the RATP (Paris public transport system).

The socio-economic trajectories of the six neighborhoods since the 1980s

We shall discuss the results of the empirical investigations in two stages. In the first, we shall present the trajectories of the six neighborhoods, by successively examining five components:

1. the built environment and public space management;
2. the demographic dynamics of the neighborhoods;
3. the image of the neighborhood in the eyes of its residents;
4. the attachment of residents to their neighborhood;
5. and the transport behaviour of residents.

These five components highlight the six specific trajectories of the neighborhoods studied below in "Six socioeconomic trajectories". In a second stage, we shall identify the form which gentrification takes in the specific trajectory of each of the six sectors, before returning to the issue of the impact of public transport and public space management upon these trajectories.

The built environment and public space management

La Goutte d'Or. The name of this neighborhood, *the golden drop,* refers to a local wine produced there until the 19th century. La Goutte d'Or is characterized by a strong presence of low-income households of mixed ethnic origins, with a large proportion of Black Africans. The neighborhood is poor and rundown, with drug trafficking operating alongside bona fide wholesalers. Although property prices are rising, the outward signs of gentrification are not especially visible in this part of town. The neighborhood was laid out in cross-shaped blocks, lending it a very particular aspect. The planning is homogeneous, mixing Haussmann-style architecture with houses from the "*faubourg*" period (outer districts of Paris, incorporated into the city at a much later date). Apartments are small, there are many furnished hotels with permanent residents, and most of the property is privately owned. Over the past 20 years the neighborhood has been subject to several rehabilitation programmes, with buildings torn down and public spaces requalified.

Fig. 4.1 Goutte d'Or neighborhood in 2005 (credit: Nicolas Louvet).

Amandiers-Ménilmontant. Highly gentrified, Amandiers-Ménilmontant is a very lively neighborhood characterized by the presence of artists' workshops, as well as many cafés and entertainment venues. The annual artists' "open doors" week draws about 20,000 people each year. Property prices have risen sharply during the past decade; as a result, artistic activity has gone into decline (artists are aging, local associations are running out of steam). The neighborhood is divided into clearly defined sectors: small-scale buildings in a traditional street layout, some of which are still unsanitary; large-scale developments similar to the Grands Ensembles (e.g., the ZAC[2] in the rue des Amandiers) or subsidized HLM housing of 4-5 storeys, with the ground floor integrated into the surrounding urban fabric. The neighborhood was the scene of considerable conflict in the 1980s, with protests aimed at hindering or interrupting its demolition. As a result, a part of the traditional habitat was left untouched and is now highly prized. The neighborhood's many courtyards and abandoned workshops encouraged the arrival of artists.

2 ZAC: *zone d'aménagement concertée*: concerted development zone, a public initiative urban development instrument allowing for the redevelopment of a given sector by PPP.

Fig. 4.2 Ménilmontant-Amandiers neighborhood in 2005 (credit: Marie-Paule Thomas).

La Réunion is a neighborhood undergoing deep-rooted changes, owing to the arrival of a new population moving into housing built as part of the ZAC Réunion development program. The neighborhood nonetheless consists mainly of old houses, of which a considerable number are decrepit and run-down. Twelve percent of residential housing has no bathtub or shower.[3] There is a strong concentration of small furnished hotels, and most housing is not of the HLM (subsidized) variety. In the 1990s, local associations vigorously protested against the ZAC Réunion project; they demanded and finally obtained agreement that the project would go through a consultation process and that it be integrated into the surrounding urban fabric. Since the early 2000s, projects aiming to reduce traffic and rehabilitate the streets are regularly implemented alongside construction projects. From a working-class—even poor—neighborhood, La Réunion is becoming a sought-after residential area.

3 RSGP 1999. Without conveniencies, i.e., without a bathroom or shower

Fig. 4.3 La Réunion neighborhood in 2005 (credit: Marie-Paule Thomas).

Saint Denis is well known for its Basilica, but also for the fact that it is home to a large foreign population. Many businesses are located in the town center. The buildings are either traditional Parisian "*faubourg*" or modern HLM subsidized housing, the result of large-scale renovation work undertaken at the end of the 1980s. The center was also completely redeveloped before the introduction of the tram in 1992. Although property prices are rising, as everywhere else in the Île-de-France, no significant gentrification process is observable here. Problems linked to cleanliness, urban neighborhood management and the increase of petty crime discourage the middle classes, who show a marked tendency to relocate. Although completely renovated, the center of Saint Denis has yet to undergo gentrification.

Fig. 4.4 Saint Denis in 2005 (credit: Marie-Paule Thomas).

Bagnolet has been going through significant changes linked to the arrival of a new population as of early 2000, apparent for example in the number of new restaurants in this part of town. Building-wise, Bagnolet has a small town center that looks much like a village, numerous townhouses, old apartment blocks and large developments with many HLM buildings (in the Malassis neighborhood they account for 88% of total property in the area). Some of these properties are still very rundown and the population remains diverse. Property prices have risen sharply over recent years. Cultural activities are booming, to the extent that certain residents liken Bagnolet to a "mini-Montreuil".

Fig. 4.5 Bagnolet in 2005 (credit: Marie-Paule Thomas).

Montreuil has a rich industrial past, still visible today in its many small factories and industrial sites. Over the past decade the municipality has become home to a very dynamic artistic community which laid the cornerstone for a notable process of gentrification at the beginning of the 21st century. The presence of abandoned industrial premises contributed strongly to the number of artists who moved to Montreuil. Architecturally speaking, the center of the town is a business area, whereas Bas-Montreuil (lower Montreuil, closer to Paris) is made up mainly of *faubourg*-type houses, townhouses, and small subsidized developments, of which there are many throughout the municipality. Several urban management programs have been undertaken since the 1980s. Here too, property prices have risen significantly over the past decade. Montreuil is changing, and its new residents are very active members of various local associations.

Fig. 4.6 Montreuil in 2005 (credit: Marie-Paule Thomas).

Demographic dynamics of the six neighborhoods

Our analysis of the sociodemographic dynamics of the various neighborhoods is based on the inhabitants' residential pathways.[4] Depending on the neighborhood, the socioprofessional profiles of residents are somewhat varied: in Goutte d'Or, Amandiers-Ménilmontant and Montreuil a large percentage of new arrivals are either executives (*cadres*) or self-employed. In La Réunion and in St. Denis, newcomers are more socially diverse, whereas the resident population of Bagnolet is rather stationary, making for a smaller proportion of newcomers. In contrast, both Goutte d'Or and Montreuil have a high proportion of newcomers.

We shall observe sizable differences if we look at the people who consider that they will still be living in their neighborhood in five years' time. In Goutte d'Or, La Réunion and Montreuil, executive residents have a strong tendency towards residential mobility; in Amandiers-Ménilmontant the self-employed are more tempted to move. In Saint Denis the trend towards residential mobility is strong across all categories, unlike in Bagnolet, where the population is largely geographically stable.

[4] The questionnaire makes it possible to reconstruct a part of the residential trajectories, particularly by means of three questions: place of residence 10 years ago (and five years ago), the number of years spent in the neighborhood and a self-evaluation of the probability that they will stay in the neighborhood for the next five years. The last question may be supplemented with information on the reasons for leaving within five years.

Table 4.2 Population which thinks it will continue to live in the neighborhood in five years sorted by socioprofessional categories.

	Goutte d'Or	Amandiers-Ménilmontant	Réunion	St. Denis	Bagnolet	Montreuil
Artisans, self-employed	65%	57%	75%	57%	86%	77%
Executives	42%	69%	60%	53%	82%	61%
Middle management	73%	61%	65%	48%	61%	69%
Employees	65%	73%	57%	48%	63%	58%
Workers	65%	90%	75%	55%	75%	72%
Retired	83%	91%	82%	77%	93%	83%
Students	48%	58%	49%	48%	59%	50%
Overall	63%	73%	64%	54%	72%	66%
(N)	(468)	(483)	(469)	(455)	(473)	(481)

The reasons for moving cited by respondents vary substantially[5]: in Goutte d'Or and Saint Denis, segregation and its problems seem to encourage people to move; noise is a problem in Amandiers-Ménilmontant, unlike in La Réunion, where the neighborhood is described as somewhat lifeless. In Bagnolet and Montreuil the main reason cited is the move to a family home.

Table 4.3 Reasons for probable move (among the population which thinks it will have left the neighborhood within 5 years).

	Goutte d'Or	Amandiers-Ménilmontant	Réunion	St. Denis	Bagnolet	Montreuil
Economic reasons	19%	28%	29%	22%	13%	26%
Reasons having to do with social composition	42%	26%	20%	36%	19%	17%
Sensitive relationship to neighborhood	23%	28%	29%	21%	24%	23%
Aspirations to other forms of habitat	16%	18%	22%	21%	44%	34%
(N)	(501)	(499)	(500)	(401)	(498)	(500)

The same analysis, sorted by household composition, enabled us to finetune our observations. It shows that social segregation in the neighborhood is a more frequent problem for couples with one or several children than for other population groups, although here too we can observe differences across neighborhoods. In Goutte d'Or and Saint Denis this trend is especially strong; it is observable in Amandiers-Ménilmontant and La Réunion, but is less significant in Bagnolet and Montreuil.

[5] A multiple choice question was devised to deal with this aspect. It touches upon economic reasons for moving (my income will have increased, the housing market, I wish to live in a larger apartment, there aren't any, I wish to live in a larger apartment, they are too expensive), reasons linked to the neighborhood's social composition (the quality of schools, the neighborhood isn't safe), critical sensitive relationship to the neighborhood (the quality of life is getting worse, there are too many nuisances) and residential aspirations (I would like to buy property somewhere else, I wish to have a family home).

The image of the neighborhood in the eyes of its residents

To broach the subject of the image of the neighborhood, we asked those interviewed to describe their neighborhood by means of adjectives.[6] Based on the adjectives they used, we were able to identify three distinct situations in the investigated sectors:

1. The first case concerns the Goutte d'Or and St. Denis neighborhoods, of which the residents have a negative image; the adjective used most often is "dirty" (17%); moreover, both neighborhoods are characterized by the use of the term "dangerous" (more in St. Denis than in Goutte d'Or).
2. The second group includes Bagnolet and Montreuil: unlike in Goutte d'Or, the image of the neighborhood is positive. The adjective that is most frequently used is "quiet" (22% and 17% respectively) followed by "pleasant" (8% and 9%).
3. La Réunion and Amandiers-Ménilmontant residents have a more varied image of their neighborhood. The term "quiet" is always cited first or second; however it is followed by "dirty" in the case of la Réunion and "lively" for Amandiers-Ménilmontant.

Table 4.4 Connotation of set of adjectives cited, sorted by sector.

	Goutte d'Or	Amandiers-Ménilmontant	Réunion	St. Denis	Bagnolet	Montreuil
Positive	38.6	58.5	53.1	51.6	66.4	66.8
Neutral	10.3	14.8	16.2	7.7	7.1	8.8
Negative	51.1	26.7	30.7	40.7	26.5	24.4
(N)	(420)	(435)	(442)	(408)	(458)	(463)

While no particular differences in terms of the adjectives cited were observed across socioprofessional categories, the number of years spent in the neighborhood produced considerable variations. For all answers, positive adjectives were less frequent among those who had lived in the neighborhood for over three years: 59% for those who live in the neighborhood for less than three years, against 53% for the others. Thus, the image projected by residents according to their seniority of residence is quite different, with the newcomers insisting most vigorously on the liveliness and popular or "folksy" character of their neighborhood. However, this is not a general trend: it is not observed in the sectors of St. Denis and Goutte d'Or, for example.

[6] We did this by asking an open question of all our respondents: "Can you qualify the neighborhood you live in by three adjectives that seem the most pertinent to you?". The advantage of such a question is that, compared to bipolar scales, it allows for an exhaustive image of how residents qualify their neighborhood. In terms of processing this information, the adjectives cited with a similar meaning (dirty, dirt, very dirty, too dirty, etc.) were grouped together; moreover, the positive or negative connotation of each of the three sets of adjectives cited by each respondent was coded and is the object of a specific variable.

Attachment of residents to their neighborhood

Relations between residents and their neighborhood may differ widely, revolving around different aspects ranging from emotional ties through to neighborhood-based social relationships and up to a functional attitude. We chose three indicators to deal with this question: an emotional link with the neighborhood, the presence of friends and/or family members, and grocery-shopping in the neighborhood. Based on these three indicators, we arrived at four neighborhood classifications:

The neighborhood as dormitory: People with few emotional links to their neighborhood or none at all, who know several people there but do not see them on a daily basis. In such a case, car access is essential for this group.

The neighburhood as "village": People with a strong attachment to and integration in their neighborhoods, who live there on a day-to-day basis. Urban management for pedestrians is of great importance to this group.

The neighborhood as emotional focus: People who have strong emotional ties with their neighborhood, but without a high degree of social integration.

The neighborhood as a functional space: People with weak ties to the neighborhood and a low level of integration, who make frequent use of its shops and commercial facilities.

The classification of neighborhood attachment, sorted by sector, shows that it varies widely. Amandiers-Ménilmontant, La Réunion and Bagnolet are characterized by close links with the neighborhood as a living space. In Goutte d'Or and St. Denis we find a purely functional use of the neighborhood. More surprisingly the same goes for La Réunion, probably owing to the fact that this neighborhood is currently undergoing significant change and many of its residents are new to the area. More generally speaking, it appears that the newcomers (people who moved to the neighborhood during the last five years prior to the survey) have different practices depending on their neighborhood. In Montreuil, Amandiers-Ménilmontant and Bagnolet many residents see their neighborhood as a village. Yet a large share of newcomers to La Réunion have emotional ties to the neighborhood. New residents in Goutte d'Or and Saint Denis have more varied relations with their neighborhood. Clearly, the newcomers to these neighborhoods do not expect the same things from their new habitat as existing residents do.

Table 4.5 Type of neighborhood attachment sorted by sector.

Type	Goutte d'Or	Amandiers-Ménilmontant	Réunion	St. Denis	Bagnolet	Montreuil
Dormitory	17%	15%	13%	20%	21%	24%
Neighborhood as village	49%	57%	53%	43%	50%	47%
Neighborhood as emotional reference	11%	9%	13%	11%	14%	12%
Functional relationship	23%	19%	21%	26%	15%	17%
(N)	(501)	(499)	(500)	(401)	(498)	(500)

A look at the reasons for moving among those who think it likely that they will no longer live in the neighborhood in five years' time according to the type of neighborhood attachment shows that economic reasons rank highly among those who consider their

neighborhood as a "village or an emotional reference". Among respondents with a "functional" relationship with their neighborhood, reasons linked to social segregation ranked much higher than for the other types.

Transport behavior of residents

The modal behavior of residents, measured by frequency of use of modes of transport, highlights the fact that in all the neighborhoods the use of public transport predominates, while car use is relatively marginal. At most one may observe slightly more frequent car use in the suburban neighborhoods and slightly more frequent public transport use in those neighborhoods within the city limits.

However, sorted by indicators of social status, modal behaviors relative to frequent car or public transport use vary more widely:

- Concerning life trajectories, we note that respondents living with a partner and a child/children generally make more frequent use of their car, but this distinction is less pronounced in poorer neighborhoods (Goutte d'Or and Saint Denis), where there are fewer families with cars and thus the use of this mode of transport is lower.
- As for socioprofessional categories, we can observe highly differentiated modal use by neighborhood. Although in Goutte d'Or and Amandiers-Ménilmontant there are few differences observable as to frequency[7] of use of different transport modes, the same cannot be said of other sectors: St. Denis is characterized by highly varied use among social categories, undoubtedly due to its excellent public transport services; however, executive residents almost never use public transport in their everyday lives; La Réunion follows more or less the same trend, but in a context in which the public transport service is poor. Bagnolet and Montreuil, which do not have particularly well-developed public transport services, show little contrast between social categories, for transport use.
- Newcomers in Amandiers-Ménilmontant, Montreuil and Bagnolet are heavy users of public transport, while in La Réunion and St. Denis they tend to use the car. It is interesting to note that these differences in modal preference are not entirely linked to the quality of the transport services on offer. As for the attachment of residents to their neighborhoods, we observe contrasting practices which are indicative of different expectations.

7 Besides la Réunion in terms of car use, which is more widespread among executive residents, and in the Goutte d'Or in terms of public transport, also used more frequently by executives.

Table 4.6 Daily (or almost daily) use of the car for specific categories of population

	Goutte d'Or	Amandiers-Ménilmontant	Réunion	St- Denis	Bagnolet	Montreuil
Person living alone	7%	8%	7%	20%	18%	10%
Person living with partner with child (children)	12%	16%	26%	22%	31%	31%
Managers	9%	14%	21%	46%	36%	34%
Workers	11%	16%	16%	19%	33%	27%

Six socioeconomic trajectories

The five ingredients presented above structure themselves to form neighborhood trajectories that we could summarize in the following fashion, neighborhood by neighborhood:

Goutte d'Or

The Goutte d'Or neighborhood is characterized by the recent arrival of relatively affluent residents. Yet it is not a neighborhood in which new residents intend to stay in the medium term: a very large proportion of them want to move somewhere else. The survey we conducted shows that this willingness to leave should be interpreted in two ways. The distance that separates the affluent newcomers from the neighborhood's traditional population causes friction in daily life and poses insurmountable schooling problems for parents. These observations suggest that the speculative logic is counteracted by difficulties for executive residents linked to life in this neighborhood owing to the large presence of an economically disadvantaged population.

Montreuil

At first glance it would seem that the trends observed in Montreuil are akin to those found in Goutte d'Or: the arrival of culturally favored population groups. Yet the comparison ends there: cultural activity boosted by the existence of abandoned warehouses taken over by artists created a highly attractive neighborhood atmosphere. Thus, reasons cited for leaving Montreuil are completely different from those given by Goutte d'Or residents. People leave in order to buy a family home or an apartment that is more in line with their aspirations or because the neighborhood has become too expensive for them, but not because they are put off by the presence of socially disadvantaged groups.

Amandiers-Ménilmontant

Amandiers-Ménilmontant is characterized by the large-scale arrival of affluent young households. They come in search of an atmosphere that is generated by a very specific blend of factors: artistic life, lively local activity and the image of the *quartier populaire* (the traditional Parisian working class neighborhood). They are very attached to Amandiers-Ménilmontant, which they view and use as a village, and where most of them intend to stay. We clearly have a different situation here than in Goutte d'Or: people buy property in

Amandiers-Ménilmontant to settle down permanently. Those who leave the neighborhood are artisans, chased out by the property boom. In fact, the social diversity of the neighborhood is due almost exclusively to the presence of subsidized low-rent housing (HLM).

La Réunion

La Réunion is characterized by the arrival of numerous new households, which is hardly surprising in view of the volume of renovations and the construction work being carried out in the neighborhood. These new population groups are socially quite mixed and their attachment to the neighborhood is usually strong. This development goes hand in hand with a change of image for the neighborhood, which is considered more "friendly" by the newcomers. However, certain groups no longer feel fully at ease there; this is particularly true of the most disadvantaged groups, who leave the neighborhood or (in a large proportion) think they will have to do so within the next five years for economic reasons or because the neighborhood fabric is changing.

Bagnolet

Bagnolet is a neighborhood with low residential mobility and, strictly speaking, no exposure to social gentrification. The main reason for leaving the neighborhood is the desire for a family home. However, newcomers appreciate Bagnolet's friendly atmosphere. Located outside the old city limits *(portes de Paris)*, this neighborhood has yet to encounter the dynamics of gentrification, but the results of our survey indicate that the seeds of this process have already been sown. For such a static neighborhood population, the percentage of residents who think they will have to move within five years is high.

Saint Denis

Unlike Bagnolet, St. Denis is characterized by very high population renewal but without concomitant gentrification in the new population. Although the neighborhood apparently is becoming safer, the image of St. Denis is far from positive, due mainly to nuisances. The most socially advantaged population has a marked tendency to want to leave, owing to the presence of more disadvantaged population groups and to the general atmosphere in the neighborhood, which is perceived as bad. As in Goutte D'or, if not more so, St. Denis has yet to embark upon a gentrification process: the original working-class population still dominates the neighborhood, making it less attractive for the upper middle class, the upper class, and even middle-class families, for reasons linked to the reputation of the local schools and community relations.

Three types of gentrification

Through their similarities and differences, the six socioeconomic trajectories we have identified expose three different forms of gentrification, each considered from the point of view of the interface between the reasons that guide the actors concerned and the social and physical qualities of the residential sectors.

"Bohemian gentrification" due to the arrival of artists, which is followed by a gentrification process owing to the quest for a certain atmosphere or for proximity to alternative lifestyles. We noted this first type in Amandiers-Ménilmontant and Montreuil, as well as in Bagnolet albeit at an embryonic stage. The actors are usually characterized by their convictions and by their lifestyle which focuses on social networks within the community.

"Bourgeois gentrification" is the result of private investment in property. This second case evokes more classical forms of gentrification. This process is founded on the residential strategies of middle-class families searching for both a property and a functional lifestyle in which the car plays an important role. La Réunion offers, among other things, the qualities this population is looking for. However, this population may also be a major contributor to the acceleration of the gentrification process in the other neighborhoods under investigation.

"Thwarted gentrification" in which the overwhelming presence of disadvantaged population groups either partially or completely defeats attempts by bohemian gentrifiers to settle in the neighborhood, as well as the residential strategies of gentrifiers in search of a more conventional lifestyle. We observed this phenomenon in Goutte d'Or and Saint Denis.

Qualitative interviews with the actors involved in the gentrification process allowed us to identify the different forms which this process takes in each of the six neighborhoods.

One should note here that the two principal forms of gentrification do not unfold at the same temporal level. In its initial stages, bohemian gentrification may concern rundown neighborhoods. In fact, this may even be considered an important pre-condition for the entire process. It is partly because the actors involved have an effective social network and certain convictions, but not much economic clout.[8] The property they are looking for should thus present certain specific characteristics, i.e., it should be cheap and have certain architectural features. More generally speaking, the lifestyle they aspire to implies the valorization of elements, which they help bring about, such as public transport over car use, or the presence of a cultural infrastructure.

The bourgeois gentrifiers on the other hand require a relatively stable environment. Thus, their residential strategies ignore overly depressed neighborhoods, and they insist upon a preliminary process of requalification of the urban environment (and of the real estate). This process may be launched by the bohemian gentrifiers or—as noted by Neil Smith—by institutional gentrifiers (private or public) who aim to programme a gentrification phenomenon by changing the qualities of the urban environment.

However, at this stage we must insist upon the cultural difference which opposes a section of the bourgeois gentrifiers and the bohemian gentrifiers. As a matter of fact, the lifestyles to which the more classical gentrifiers aspire do not necessarily encourage them to valorize the same elements. On the contrary, if we stay in the realm of modes of transport, convenient car access may be more important for them than convenient public transport links. Likewise cultural facilities (cultural venues or fashionable cafes) may play

[8] If we apply the categories of Bourdieu, one might say that they have more cultural than economic capital. The important thing here, however, is not "cultural capital" itself, but the type of aspirations and lifestyle which derives from their definition of a "good life".

an almost non-negligible role. Their roots in the neighborhood are thus very different from that of bohemian gentrifiers.

To be more precise, a similar cultural distinction exists in this second generation of gentrifiers, who are not overly adventurous or willing to make sacrifices. On the one hand, we have a group of people who are attracted by the qualities of a stabilized bohemian environment (lofts, cultural activity, and night life). Others are attracted by the existence of more conventional property available in an environment which they above all want to be "pacified", i.e., not subject to great stress or tension, and in which diversity boils down to a form of indifferent coexistence.

These two types converge towards a gentrification phenomenon in the broadest sense, to the extent that their arrival contributes to higher property prices and changes in the neighborhood's demographic structure.

Nonetheless, we have seen that these processes may be counteracted by certain features of the physical or social environment. To reach a better understanding of the dynamics of these obstacles to gentrification, it is important to consider the cultural dimensions of gentrification. These cultural variations should not be viewed solely as values embodied by gentrifiers, but—more fundamentally—as registers of constitutive action for various lifestyles, the pursuit of which requires certain contextual qualities.[9]

The existence of these practical demands embodied by the gentrifiers enables us to observe the variable effects of urban policy measures and—in more general terms—the variation of gentrification trajectories linked to these measures.

The ambivalence of public transport and public space management for the three forms of gentrification

The three forms of gentrification we have observed by identifying socioeconomic trajectories in the six neighborhoods under investigation are built in part on transport networks and urban management measures. However, as shown above in "The socio-economic trajectories of the six neighborhoods since the 1980s", these elements are actually part and parcel of other dimensions. To make our analysis more systematic and return to the questions our article wishes to answer, we shall now attempt to highlight the specific role and the importance of transport and public space management for the three forms of gentrification.

First, let us note that the three types of trajectories we have highlighted indicate that there are no systematic links between the quality of public transport, the types of urban management and social gentrification processes. In Saint Denis, the investigated sector was completely rehabilitated in the 1990s, notably with the introduction of a large pedestrian area. Saint Denis has had a tram service since 1992, which does not change the fact

[9] The artistic activities of the bohemian gentrifiers call for large and modular premises. Likewise, their willingness to adopt soft mobility solutions implies the existence of neighborhood amenities. This aspect is important since it suggests that cohabitation between more affluent and working class groups of the population differs according to the form of gentrification.

that this is one of the least gentrified sectors of those studied. Likewise, Goutte d'Or has excellent public transport facilities, with subway link-ups and proximity to the multimodal traffic hub at the Gare du Nord; but, as we stated above, gentrification is not making much headway in this sector. On the other hand, La Réunion, though badly served by the subway, is involved in a large-scale bourgeois gentrification process as the result of property investments.

Reading between the lines of these observations, it appears that an added sense is given to these three types of gentrification when considered in relation to the ease of accessibility by car to the neighborhood. In fact, the relationship between modes of transport and gentrification seems rather ambivalent: everything depends on the neighborhood's trajectory.

Bourgeois gentrification seems to be fuelled by easy car access. In La Réunion, which is the most easily accessible by car, daily car use is high, with 54% private parking spots for motorized households. In fact, this situation is constantly improving, owing to the construction of new housing which systematically includes private access and basement parking.

Bohemian gentrification is structured around the subway. Bohemian gentrifiers usually do not own a car, and are proud of this choice. Thus, over and above the presence of abandoned warehouses, workshops, etc., the subway is a major reason why artists opt to move to a given Parisian neighborhood, a move which subsequently attracts households with considerable cultural capital.

Concerning public space management, whether in terms of traffic reduction or public parks and green areas, our monographs have shown two major trends:

- In neighborhoods with high bohemian or bourgeois gentrification, improvements in the public space and the introduction of green areas go hand in hand with the gentrification process, due to demands from the new residents. The "improvements" in turn increase the neighborhood's attractiveness for upper socioprofessional categories, and by the same token raise property prices.
- In neighborhoods characterized by "thwarted gentrification" the public authorities proactively use similar measures to influence the neighborhood's social composition. Improvements, such as a small square or a pedestrian zone, will encourage households to move to the neighborhood, which they deem "pacified" and which seems to offer them a certain degree of wellbeing. This type of management is also considered a sign of probable gentrification, which may encourage property speculation. However, daily life is often more pronounced in these neighborhoods than in the new amenities. More precisely, the image of the neighborhood suggested by the latter does not stand up to the test of daily life marked by tensions arising from the exposure of the resident population to different rhythms of life and diverse lifestyles. Daily life thus rapidly appears intolerable to the newcomers, who cannot become acquainted with the neighborhood, and do not find the conditions they need to pursue their lifestyles. This eventually prompts them to leave.

These considerations show that the effects produced by objects, public transport, road networks and road parking, as well as road or street rehabilitation produce different effects depending on where they are implemented. These differences demonstrate that

gentrification is not a uniform phenomenon. On the contrary, we should consider it as a much more encompassing phenomenon, revolving around specific resources which cause the various actors involved in the process to react differently to the same object. As we have attempted to demonstrate, public transport is a point of interest for bohemian gentrification but much less so for bourgeois gentrification, which is fuelled mainly by convenient car access. Our results suggest that public investments are sometimes used as a decoy or as a way of masking a situation, as in Saint Denis and Goutte d'Or, where they serve to influence investment strategies or residential trajectories.

Conclusion

What conclusions may we draw from our investigations? If, based on these observations, we attempt to formulate an answer to our first question, we would have to highlight the following factors:

Socioeconomic trajectories are central to the gentrification process

The specific history of each neighborhood is key to the trajectories we identified, in particular four integral elements: the built environment, access to housing, the resident population and localization relative to the transport network.

- The presence of warehouses and workshops is central to the arrival of artists and the "bohemian" gentrification it generates.
- Social housing policies are important for safeguarding the social diversity of a neighborhood.
- The presence of poor and immigrant groups who are deeply rooted in the neighborhood is a decisive factor in terms of resistance to gentrification.

Any examination of improved public transport and public space management in these neighborhoods must also take these observations into consideration.

Micro-contextualisation of the effects of transport and public space management policy

At the end of our project, we observe that the impact of the same public transport management/improvement measure varies according to the specific trajectory of each of the six neighborhoods.

Modifying the appearance of a neighborhood makes it more welcoming for certain population groups and less so for others. In more concrete terms it increases the visibility of children, renders public spaces more sociable for pedestrians—which encourages them to walk more—and limits noise pollution caused by traffic. This process may speed up (and be generated by) a process of gentrification which is already under way, as is the case in Montreuil and Menilmontant.

Nonetheless, the resulting new connotation of the neighborhood is an *optical effect* which does not immediately modify the elements that go to make up the daily experience of these neighborhoods and the tensions to which they are subjected, as in St. Denis or

Goutte d'Or. These more fundamental elements, which concern the diversity of the population and the coexistence of various groups, as well as the morphology and the structural specificities of the built environment, give rise to path dependencies (Pflieger, *et al.*, 2007), and influence the effects of the measures taken. The result is that public space management efforts notwithstanding, certain neighborhoods do not enter into a gentrification process, because the daily experience of these improvements does not match expectations (e.g., unsafe public spaces).

Similar trends can be observed in relation to public transport improvements. In certain cases it serves to intensify bohemian gentrification, which is linked to the fact that convenient public transport is an important element in the residential strategies of individuals in search of an environment offered by bohemian neighbourhoods, in terms of housing, population, cultural activity and night life. Nevertheless, here again, improved public transport on its own does not counteract obstacles to gentrification, as these are linked to more structural parameters.

However, improved public transport services may also have unexpected consequences. In neighborhoods which have undergone bourgeois gentrification, but are still relatively mixed (e.g., La Réunion), middle-class families remain to a large extent car-dependent. A significant improvement in public transport could cause the neighborhood to change its trajectory. Better public transport could be an added and new attraction that would also have an effect on the property market. This in turn could accelerate the move towards gentrification, pushing the neighborhood towards more bohemian and elitist forms, and correspondingly reducing its social diversity.

This result indicates that in the interests of preserving a neighborhood's social diversity, public transport improvements are not desirable always and everywhere. Transport policies, and more generally speaking urban policies, should therefore consider the variety of forms which gentrification can take, since at a more fundamental level they touch upon the issue of the diversity of lifestyles that the city must accommodate. If, seen as the guarantee of a city's quality, social diversity is a political objective, attention must be paid to the conditions which make diversity possible in the first place. Thus, as we have attempted to suggest by crossing our analysis of the built environment and of land ownership, with sociodemographic statistics, as well as a survey of residential trajectories and modal practices, social diversity should be viewed not only as the socioeconomic diversity of a certain population group, but as a diversity of lifestyles and relations with the city. In the name of self-preservation, this calls for truly diverse urban facilities, housing, public policies and modes of transport. These pathways—which deserve to be studied in greater depth, particularly as concerns the individual trajectories of gentrifiers and their relations with the city—provide us with a valuable opportunity to shed light on political choices relative to public transport and their connections with the qualities of the city one wishes to promote.

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Chapter 5

Architecture and Reflexivity

Jean-Louis Genard

An evaluation of Castells' diagnosis concerning the architecture of the space of flows

In this chapter I will review the work of Manuel Castells from an architectural perspective. Architecture does not occupy an absolutely determining place in the theories he develops in his "trilogy" on network societies, but it is important enough to provide a significant background to his approach. Also, Castells' personal trajectory led him to take a lively interest in issues of urbanism, territorial planning and consequently architecture. Thus, the question of space and its changes is one of the central analyzers in his thought.

The passages in which Castells analyzes contemporary architecture are above all those in which he activates the opposition—now a classic one—between *the space of flows* and the *space of places*. For him, the architecture of the space of flows "lies beyond history and culture". He sees it as an architecture of nudity, "the forms of which are so neutral, pure, diaphanous, that they do not claim to state anything at all. And, by saying nothing, they confront lived experience with the solitude of spaces of flows. Its message is silence". (Castells, 2001:521). What Castells mainly targets in this appreciation of the architecture of the space of flows are certain architectural types linked to it, e.g., the architecture of airports, new train stations, shopping mall but also certain types of architecture produced by the current architectural star system, by Rem Koolhaas for example.

Before tracking Castells' arguments any further, we might well ask ourselves if the experience described by Castells really corresponds to the lived experience which, according to him, this architecture generates. We are aware of the success of shopping malls and the relational forms that develop there. The poetry inherent in airports has been sung often, opposing a vision of a relational desert to the evocation of relations that are improbable and uncertain, but that correspond to contexts in which relational wealth is less and

less linked to stability and lasting identities. Maybe at this level Castells continues to be attached to a retrospective reading of identity, and fails to appreciate the extent to which current forms of identity depend on potential "openings to possibilities". Contemporary identities have in fact become flexible, contradicting the usual image of identities based on continuity and coherence in time. In short, and without going into detail, one might ask oneself whether Castells' critical assessments of contemporary architecture—genitrix of relational deserts—are not simply based on a retrospective vision of identity.

This brief comment calls for a reflection querying the position from which Castells voices his critical and pessimistic diagnosis. By arguing against the characteristics he ascribes to the architecture of the space of flows, Castells adopts a normative background that he associates with the space of places. He thus invokes a retrospective urban environment of neighborhoods, of a physical closeness that expressed spatial and relational density. He writes, "A place is a space whose form, function and meaning make up a whole within the framework of physical contiguity." (Castells, 2001: 521).

Actually, this statement comes as no surprise; we frequently encounter similar points of view in the current literature. I shall quote a few of the most important.

In his work on *Supermodernism,* Hans Ibelings, when talking of the architecture of the space of flows, uses terms such as "neutrality", "indefinite", "implicit" (Ibelings, 2002: 62), "uprooted/rootlessness", "decontextualization" (Ibelings, *op.cit.*: 88). He refers to it as an "empty medium" (Ibelings, *op.cit.*: 89), linked to nothing but itself, one that "automatically calls for an immediate and sensory experience of space, of light", abandoning all symbolic logic and replacing it with an accumulation of signs (Ibelings, *op. cit.*: 129). Constant references to emptiness, to neutrality, to desymbolization are put forth to describe this architecture. However, although Ibelings defines this experience of space as naked, his appreciation of it is not negative.

Descending from Heidegger, the entire work of Alberto Perez-Gomez is based on the claim that since modernism, architecture has been characterized by the incapacity to symbolize. It came to be dominated by logical-mathematical thinking, i.e., by the rational principle and by what Heidegger calls "the metaphysics of subjectivity", that is to say thought in which the subject is the measure of all things and the resulting absence of any relation to an outside referent that is capable of endowing it with meaning. According to Perez-Gomez, only a few architects manage to avoid this disastrous assessment. One of them is Daniel Libeskind, reputed for the wealth of symbolic references in his projects, such as the Jewish Museum in Berlin. Another is John Hejduck, closely linked to phenomenological approaches. We could also mention the works of Marc Augé on non-places (*non-lieux*); his diagnoses are similar to the one proposed by Castells.

By choosing to cite briefly, alongside Castells, such authors as Ibelings (whose attitude towards contemporary architecture is quite positive), Perez-Gomez (whose Heideggerian background is unrelated to the references on which Castells bases his reflections) or Augé (whose basic references are anthropological, where Castells places the totality of his considerations within the framework of sociology of the industrial and post-industrial world), I simply want to illustrate the fact that the interpretation of contemporary architecture by authors who differ strongly theoretically may yet be very similar.

In my opinion, what these writers share is the normative appeal to a retrospective horizon that uses characteristics ascribed to the architecture of the past in order to for-

mulate a critique of present-day architecture, which they accuse of no longer generating or purveying meaning.

By holding on to this retrospective horizon these theories cut themselves off from an awareness of the spatial experience belonging to what Castells calls the space of flows, and of the architectural and urbanistic experiments the latter fosters and enables.

Please don't misinterpret my meaning. I in no way wish to adopt a contrary position and formulate an apology of what Castells criticizes. There are a host of reasons to question the space of flows, the experiences it gives rise to, the mechanisms of exclusion that accompany it and the architecture it generates. I simply feel that the retrospective horizon to which Castells refers is not sufficient to understand the processes he describes. I shall attempt to demonstrate this point by going out from a certain number of emerging architectural and urbanistic practices. By doing so I will be true to one of the facets of Castells' work: his desire to comprehend social developments on the basis of what is conveyed by emerging urban practices.

To develop this argument, I will attempt to understand, position and contextualize points of view that unfold against a nostalgic background that mobilizes retrospective referents. I will then ask what such contextualisation may teach us about the subject of this seminar, which combines the themes of participation, judgment and sensibility.

The time of architecture

To introduce this part of the argument let us place ourselves within a framework that can be firstly described as Weberian, i.e., viewing modernity as rationalization. Nonetheless, I will go out from an extended concept of rationality, distinguishing between different "figures" of reason, and without succumbing to the positivistic approaches proposed by Weberian sociology. This contrasts with Weber, whose sociological positions gauge the process of rationalization against the model of rationality as finality, that is to say calculating or determining[1] rationality—to use a Kantian term to which I will come back later. I shall notably base my considerations on Jurgen Habermas and Scott Lash, who in certain works seek to reflect upon the destiny of architecture in the light of changing attitudes to reason. I ask myself the following question: can one say something about the history of architecture and urbanism by inscribing it in a reconstruction of modernization as rationalization (Habermas, 1981, Lash, 1999). Far from representing an arbitrary incursion of philosophy into the field of architecture—must we be reminded of the fact—architecture itself also played upon this connection, presenting philosophy and sociology with the concept of "postmodernism".[2]

Let us be clear about it: the scheme proposed here should not be understood in the evolutionist mode, nor in the mode of a history of representations. The different phases that will be disclosed appear more as strata that superpose themselves upon each other, that interfere, complete or collide with each other, than as mere moments succeeding

1 I am using the active forme "determining" to translate the kantian word "bestimmend".

2 For a more detailed analysis of architectural trends linked to the rollback of modernist ideals, see Genard, 2000: 95-110.

upon each other. If this is the case, it is notably because they are not only "systems of representation" but rather what Laurent Thévenot and Luc Boltanski, and also the sociology of conventions, call "investments of forms" (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991), in the sense that these "imaginary forms" of architecture and urbanism are written into mechanisms that become stable and solidified:

- regulatory mechanisms such as spatial development plans, urbanistic regulations, patrimonial standards;
- organizational mechanisms such as associations in charge of regional development, or those in charge of heritage protection;
- mechanisms that format ways of "reading" the city or architecture, such as cartography which imposed itself as the dominant mode of representation of the city (against which today a geography of sensibility seeks to impose itself);
- or architectural plans which are increasingly being supplanted by virtual imagery, the drawing table being replaced by 3D software;
- political mechanisms such as concertative or participatory assemblies that are ever more present in contemporary urbanism and address new political forms posing the problem of representative democracy or the status of expertise in the name of participatory democracy or active "citizenship".

The development of this hypothesis will lead me to discuss various historic phases, each corresponding to a certain form of relation to rationality (determining or reflexive reason, critique of reason) to which I will ascribe a central position, but also to a global social configuration (Fordist, post-Fordist society) and to one, or several, figure(s) of architecture and urbanism. At this level, I will evoke specific modes of intervention upon the city, relevant conceptual instruments and references (the plan, cartography, the place, the process, participation). I will also refer to the relation to time (prospective, retrospective or centered on the immediate), to architects' privileged allies or adversaries (geographer, art historian, engineer, anthropologist, communicator, publicist, manager, user, etc.), to architectural types (the dense tenement block, the one-family house, the garden city, the major intervention, the minor intervention in the chinks in the urban fabric, the pastiche of the historic city or town) and ways to express a public statement, such as the manifesto, the professional association, the collective, the forum and the charta. Let us remember that this is not a linear history. It consists of strata which superpose upon each other, which interpenetrate but it also consists of more conflict-ridden phases followed by phases of institutionalization or re-institutionalization. As I see it, such contextualization will shed a light on the background to Castells' positions and the relations on the links between judgment, participation and sensibility, three terms that, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, are part of the same configuration, although they do not necessarily function in harmony with each other.

It goes without saying that the chosen approach aims to outline certain ideal types to which reality does not conform completely. This, on the one hand, because as I have just said the different phases act like strata that superpose, interact and contradict each other with the recent ones benefitting from strong dynamics but still weak in their capacity to generate mechanisms formatting reality; on the other hand, because the most innovative architecture cannot be reduced to this type of schematic approach. The projects of the most innovative architects often go beyond the limits of what can be "thematized".

On the basis of this model, I would like to pinpoint the following three phases in the relation to reason, corresponding to different figures of architecture:

(1) Until the 1960s-1970s, the Fordist model predominated, marked by determining rationalism, according to the term adopted by Lash from Kantian philosophy. It will realize itself in architectural modernism, its manifestos and its organizations (such as CIAM), but it is also during this period that the architectural field, adjusting to the Fordist development of capitalism, will evolve its "capitalist" forms (real estate development, standardization).

(2) The 1960s-1970s will give rise to a moment of the "critique of reason"; identified particularly with its functionalist version, it is accused of reductionism and of destroying the meaning of the city and of the urban phenomenon. Three major orientations will arise from this critique:

- The retrospective pathway of post-modernism which valorizes the return to ancient forms, supposed to ensure a rebirth of the urban space previously endangered by functionalism (linked to such names as Bofill, Graves and the Krier brothers).
- In parallel to the aesthetization of daily life which arose at this time, the hyper-individualist path of deconstructivism (P. Eisenman, F. Gehry, Z. Hadid, Coop Himmelblau).
- Neo-capitalism will impose itself during the same period, a managerial capitalism mixing the quest for profit and the integration of a certain number of values taken from the counterculture of the 1960s-1970s. At the same time capitalism assumes its post-Fordist shape and takes on an orientation focusing increasingly on cultural goods. This leads to the development of an architecture of the image, in line with new forms of competition between cities brought about by globalization (with a founding moment in Robert Venturi's and Denise Scott-Brown's, *Learning from Las Vegas*) (Venturi and Scott-Brown, 1979).

(3) The 1980s-1990s will see the gradual elaboration of a reflexive model that will unfold in parallel with the appearance of new urban movements. During this phase, participation, the citizen—but also new methods of apprehending the city—and new relationships with the city will be the focus. To my mind this model is the one that today most effectively queries architecture and urbanism and that will enable us to reflect in the same frame on the issues relative to judgment, participation and sensibility.

As already stated, these phases produced and produce their own mechanisms which superpose and interfere. The logic of zoning, planning and map-making linked to the first phase is still present everywhere. Particularly in Belgium, heritage protection mechanisms inherited from the second phase in its post-modern version have become inescapable elements of architectural work. Policies of attractiveness and tourism, the impact of which on cities is becoming increasingly visible, are linked to the transition towards post-Fordist or connexionist cities. Participatory mechanisms introduced during the second phase, which were often limited to consultation relate to a representative concept of democracy, a mainstay during the Fordist heyday; today they are questioned by demands linked predominantly to deliberative or participative visions of democracy, or to competition-based approaches targeting the extended European market or the architectural star system.

Such demanding themes might appear to lure us away from the question originally posed with Castells' work as the starting point. On the contrary, Castells' point of view on the architecture of the society of flows—which is debatable—can be understood only in the context of reconstructive contextualization.

Determining rationality as part of the modernist-Fordist period

The modernist path

I will launch this evocation with architectural modernism. In view of the metamorphoses of rationality, we know it to be linked to the heritage of the Age of Enlightenment: reason is perceived as a vector of social emancipation. But it also inherits the avant-garde conception of art and the social conflicts of the 19th century. Its temporality is prospective, often messianic: the architect wishes to contribute to the construction of a better, emancipated world. He is convinced that architecture can make a significant contribution to this objective. He sees his responsibility as an aesthetic one, of course, but also social and political. His horizon is primarily historic, to which he commits.

The model of rationality which underlies his thought is a "determining" model in the Kantian sense. Deeply convinced of the precepts he invokes and claims, he publishes charts and manifestos and, like Le Corbusier, seeks to establish principles and propose formulas ("what is functional must necessarily be beautiful") which are often peremptory and reveal this type of rationality. He proposes urban development plans and grand projects, and he aims to integrate the conquests of industrialization within the logic of his constructions. Standardization does not daunt him. In the sense of Kant's determining judgment, his intelligence is strongly decontextualized. It refers to a universal, e.g., when, with a view of the emancipation of the working class, he proposes plans for a minimal kitchen, or architectural solutions such as the "radiant city" which supposedly could be built everywhere. He does not hesitate in face of large-scale utopian projects and is not held back by plans to destroy what already exists. He does not fear the displeasure or incomprehension of contemporaries; the user will not be his judge but history itself, the history of progress and emancipation. Progress and emancipation that are also made manifest in world fairs. These offer the opportunity to showcase innovative architecture and introduce architects who enter the competitive fray unhampered by the material contingencies of projects that will have to be integrated into the existing urban fabric.

This intelligence is analytic and functional. It decomposes reality into the elements it intends to structure: living, working, moving and relaxing will orchestrate the functional differentiation of cities. Zoning triumphs. Geography, and cartography, even more so, become "objective allies" of the architect. Like the trend to realize major projects, large-scale urban planning ambitions do not back down when faced with the profound restructuring of cities, even involving demolition of the built environment or the displacement of populations.

Today, we are tempted to describe this intelligence as monological, demiurgic and elitist. Strongly anchored in his principles and convictions, convinced of marching at the forefront of an emancipatory historic movement, the architect had no reason to fear being misunderstood by his contemporaries.

Sociologically speaking, the context is that of the Fordist society and its industrial models, based on the efficiency of the solutions proposed and on organizational forms dominated by the standardization of procedures, to use the terms coined by Mintzberg (1982). In sociological terms, a Fordist society refers to a model that combines a Fordist production mode (i.e., Taylorism linked to the principle of relative participation in production gains for the workers), mainly industrial production (not services, financial or

otherwise), an economic imaginary order linked to social movements relying in essence on economic bases (workers' movements, trade unions), a statutory professional imaginary order with the liberal professions and limited contracts as its model, political regulation ensured by a welfare state that plans and redistributes, the scale of the nation-state, credit-fed consumption.

Like the welfare state as the political instrument regulating the Fordist society in its various areas of intervention, modernist architecture in its political dimension stands for the ideal of *access* to goods that required the recognition and promotion of human dignity, including the right to decent housing of good quality. Fordist societies as described by functionalist or systemic sociologists also experience the triumph of the process of social differentiation. The various social fields (medicine, justice, education) tend to divide and separate, each one claiming its autonomy, particularly those that position themselves as holders of competencies internal to the field. This generates the figures of the physician, the teacher and the architect. In view of this process of differentiation, professional responsibility is seen above all in deontological terms, and it is referred to professional associations when the profession is liberal. Professionally, we are here in a systemic logic, with a tendency to self-reference: like physicians in their own professional field, architects are the guarantors of architectural works. They also tend to demand autonomy for their profession and discipline.

The Fordist period will be far from homogeneous. We know that the model of the engaged architect which marked the early period will gradually be transformed into a functionalist version. If in the history of architecture modernism will be the significant movement, it is the functionalist version of modernism that will leave the most numerous traces on the urban landscape: the destruction of old neighborhoods, dense tenement blocks, cities pledged to mobility, particularly via the automobile, real estate development and so on.

Architecture and urbanism as economic projects

But the Fordist period has also seen a part of the architectural field abandon the liberal profession model, the model of the independent architect, and enter into the era of industrial architectural production, especially for housing and major infrastructures. This development has largely corresponded to modernist demands for housing for all, for standardization—which has also led to a gradual loss of the creative architectural quest. Concerning housing, Fordist societies experienced a rise in the standard of living, the exponential rise of the middle classes, hand in hand with changing lifestyles and family structures, and an increasingly credit-based consumer society, particularly mortgage-based. This period also marked the triumph of the major infrastructures, notably road infrastructures with their engineering projects (in line with the mobility imperative, the logic of zoning or the functionalization of spaces), but also tower blocks or business infrastructures that confirmed the growing importance of the engineer. Here the production of the built environment adopted the real estate development model, aiming for efficiency, profitability, rapidity. Gradually, the architect saw himself occupy a position that was increasingly dependent on building production structures, while his role in the field of housing construction diminished in favor of industrialized key-in-hand construction.

In this model, reason, more than simply determining or functional, becomes instrumental. It primarily serves the interests of professional effectiveness and economic success, using procedures necessary to win a public tender or a share in the market. This economic architectural world will continue to develop in line with the developments of capitalism and globalization, generating major international groups of architecture industries. Their relations with culturally recognized architecture will be ambivalent; only a few will constitute themselves around the main figures of the current architectural star system, e.g., currently Norman Foster (Sklair, 2005).

The crisis of reason

The 1960s-1970s marked the beginning of the crisis of the welfare state and of Fordist society. This period also saw the acceleration of globalization—economic and otherwise—which among other things created a gap between the political and economic scales. The harbingers of the era of neo-liberalism appeared, but also new social movements (feminism, environmentalism, regionalist movements, community-based, identity-based movements) which begin to question the hegemony of the workers' movements. This period also marks the rise of the ethics of authenticity and the aesthetization of daily life as formulated theoretically by Charles Taylor (1994) and Daniel Bell (1979) respectively, the decline of the narration of emancipation, but also the rise of the "société du spectacle" denounced by the Situationists, of the cultural industries and of the star system.

Philosophically speaking, the turning point of the 1960s corresponded to the critique of the imaginary order of reason which underpinned the initial modernist phase, a rationality called "technical" (Heidegger), or "instrumental" (Adorno). This critique will also pose as problematic all the categories it celebrated in its heyday: standardization, functionalism, specialization. Mention will be made of the takeover of the world by technical or mathematical thought (Heidegger), of a loss of common sense (Arendt), or of the break between the system and the experienced world, and of the colonization of the latter by the former (Habermas). The argument may take on a comprehensive aspect—targeting reason as such—or a specific one: denouncing a certain type of reason (Cartesian, instrumental) without rejecting reason globally.

With reference to urbanism and architecture, this period will give rise to a virulent critique of modernism, particularly of its functionalist version. According to C. Jencks (1984) this came to an end in Saint Louis, Missouri July 15, 1972, with the demolition of its functionalist residential towers blocks.

If one wanted to theoretically group together opposition movements to reason, one might voice the hypothesis that the concept of *meaning* was mobilized against the concept of reason. There were two pathways. The first called for a rediscovery of meaning which reason had contributed to curtail, drive back or conceal; this will be the "narration of loss and return". The second, very different, was based on the realization of the failure of the rationalization process. Instead of voicing hopes for a return, on the contrary it sang the praises of a society freed of an oppressive rationality and from now on open to the different, to plurality, to difference, and so on, and this became the narration of deconstruction. In most cases authors have sought to establish a hard and fast opposition between retro-

spective post-modernism and the architecture of deconstruction. While I am fully aware of the distance that separates them, I propose to highlight their similarities when gauged against the narration of rationalization.

The retrospective narration of loss, postmodernism and patrimonialism

Doubtless it is Heidegger's philosophy that most clearly explains this narration. Heidegger wrote about art and architecture, particularly on "inhabiting", texts that are clearly constructed with the theme of the Forgetting of Being in the background. We know that Heidegger ascribed a normative status to the pre-Socratic moment as the point of departure for this process of forgetting. Other authors did not go as far on the path of historic retrospection and stopped at Ancient Rome (H. Arendt), the Middle Ages, or the classical European town (Krier, Culot).

Nevertheless, and regardless of which past horizon serves as a valorized reference point, a critique of the present takes on the traits of a critique of reason, which may be mathematical, technical, instrumental and of course, when speaking of architecture, functionalist. In the case of architecture it willingly rehabilitates an ambition that evokes the metaphysical quest of the absolute, the quest for unity and totality; for example when Castells himself, in a statement quoted previously, evokes an architecture which combined "form, function and meaning".

In the field of architecture and of its history, the most brilliant defender of this narration of loss is without a doubt A. Perez-Gomez. Referring explicitly to Heidegger, he narrates the triumph of formalist and mathematical thought over an architecture that loses all of its capacity to symbolize. Having become a formal and abstract improvization of sorts (bricolage), it loses its capacity to convey meaning, to make sense. As in Heidegger on the history of art (which according to him lost its greatness with the emergence of aesthetic reflection in Plato and Aristotle, i.e., with the imposition of reason, the submission of art to the logos) (Heidegger, 1971:75-89), the history of architecture is one of decline, here linked to the triumph of mathematical thought. We could also quote Christian Norberg-Schulz who, in the footsteps of Heidegger and phenomenology, will defend the *genius loci*. This theme has more recently been taken up by Marc Augé in the context of a critique of not modern, but supra-modern societies. Where modernist thought wished to decontextualize, here the notions of "context" and "integration" will play a central role in qualifying architecture. The characteristics of a place will impose their logic upon architectural interventions.

This discourse revolving around the critique of reason may be coupled with more reconstructive attempts. The aim will be to recover the capacity to make sense on the basis of what will evidently be defined as the Other than reason. This Other could be tradition (with its authority), but also the vernacular, regionalism, the body, the affect, sensibility, the genius loci, the context of course and the historicist anchor.

Several architectural movements will follow this pathway. Criticism has grouped them together under the post-modernist heading. Its principal authors and theoreticians are R. Bofill, M. Graves, the bothers Krier, to name just some. In Belgium, this trend was incarnated in the theme of the reconstruction of the classical European town, a theme broadly represented throughout Europe but which took on a particularly strong form in Belgium, and in the accompanying patrimonialist ideology.

The concept of the town will thus often revolve around its reading based on places (*loci)*. In this context the notion of the "neighborhood *(quartier)*" as living space, often retrospectively reflected in terms of the village and of strong social ties, will become a major focus. Often also—and particularly among authors with historic links to the political left—strong reference will be made to the *inhabitant* and his rights (e.g., the works of Henri Lefèbvre). Here doubtless lie the premises of participatory urbanism.

The architect's ally is no longer the planner, cartographer or geographer, but rather the art historian. Methods of spatial analysis will adapt to this development, notably via the increased importance given to typo-morphology, which will begin to influence zoning-based approaches. Architects' and urbanists' offices will acquire the requisite competencies. In Belgium, while patrimonialist ideology began to infiltrate the political mechanisms framing architecture and urbanism, the importance of art historians grew considerably. This was the case of the Royal Commission of Monuments and Sites, the powers of which were extended when architectural and urbanism projects had to consult them for approval. The patrimonialist impregnation of political mechanisms relative to architectural and urbanistic practices was all the stronger as the rise of patrimonial ideology corresponded to the process of the "juridization" of society (Genard, 2000). Public interventionism could be justified as a response to the excesses of the preceding period, which had been possible notably due to the weakness of public control instruments over architectural and urban projects.

The models discussed above clearly define the stakes which guided architectural thought until quite recently. Their opposition, modernism/functionalism versus patrimonialism/culturalism is the core of Françoise Choay's renowned anthology, *L'urbanisme. Utopies et réalités* (1965), which starts from the opposition between progressivism and culturalism. In reality things are less simple than that, and I think it is necessary to explain certain other trends to do justice to the present situation.

The deconstructivist narration and the hyperindividualistic pathway

When referring to the philosophy of the 1970s-1980s, one readily perceives that the discourse of the critique of reason not only opens the gates to the retrospective narration we have just evoked. Another discourse appears, which will have considerable influence in the field of architecture and which will be grouped under the heading "deconstructivism". In a nutshell, the issue here will no longer be to mobilize a lost meaning against reason, but to denounce the hegemony of reason and make room for an irreducible multiplicity of meaning, or rather meanings, which are seen here as an affirmation, a personal expression of the self or a collective expression of the group. This discovery of the explosion of meaning may for some take on a predominantly nostalgic connotation, though without the hope of a return. This applies to such authors as Baudrillard or Virilio. Or, on the contrary, it may insist upon the emancipation resulting from the breaking forth of plurality, against the dominant position of a rationality considered repressive. This will be the theme of "end of the grand narrations", of the "differend" in J. F. Lyotard (1979), of the difference in J. Derrida (1972), and of the rhizome in G. Deleuze (1980). Not only were their arguments used in the critique of architecture and by architects themselves; several of these authors co-operated with deconstructivist architects, P. Eisenman in particular.

The effects of this tendency on the architectural landscape are interesting and entirely paradoxical: to the extent that they defend a radical critical perspective (all of Western history, as the history of rationalization, is accused of being repressive) while creating conditions for the rise of a hyperindividualistic architecture in profound agreement with a certain number of social processes, the importance for our understanding of recent developments in architecture should not be underestimated. In this article I will mention them only briefly, instead referring the reader to an article I co-authored with Jean-Didier Bergilez, *L'architecture à l'ère de l'esthétisation de la vie quotidienne* (Genard and Bergilez, 2002). Here we have first the process of aesthetization first described by D. Bell. As of the 1960s, this process started with the "democratization" of the focal values of the art world: authenticity, creativity, originality, spontaneity—values that previously were pertinent in the artistic sphere only. In parallel to this process, which sees the development of the ethics of authenticity and self-expression, a critique of the dominant cultural standards linked to the Fine Arts tradition (museums, etc.) and the concomitant valorization of spaces centered around socio-cultural activities, creative expression, cultural difference, etc., we also observe the meteoric rise of design. In architecture we see the development of an aestheticizing architecture, decorative and embellishing, which includes retrospective, post-modern options, notably with the Disneyization of the historic town centers, the triumph of the pastiche reaching the limits of extreme caricature in the American town Celebration which was built and is operated by Disney. This architecture also includes rather avant-garde options. Certain architects, such as M. Graves, switch easily from one register to the other. Deconstructivist architects such as Daniel Libeskind, Rem Koolhaas, Peter Eisenman, Bernard Tschumi, Franck Gehry and Zaha Hadid of course pursue the avant-garde option.

These architects, and many others besides, will let their hyperindividualist architecture profit by image-based strategies in a world in which economics and politics ascribe a central position to culture. On the one hand capitalism itself becomes cultural, both because cultural goods (copyrights, royalties) play a major role in a society that will gradually come to be known as the "knowledge society". Also because, as shown by Boltanski and Chiapello, management capitalism as it has developed since the 1970s was based on the absorption of a whole range of values (responsibility, autonomy, originality, creativity) that were core values of both the aesthetization of everyday life and of the cultural protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, politics, which often considered culture as a secondary concern, came to understand the importance of cultural identification or "attractiveness" in a globalized world in which competition occurs less between nation-states than between cities: competition to attract tourists, conferences, corporate headquarters, international organizations or media events. Bilbao provides an excellent illustration of this phenomenon.

In this world, a world increasingly remote from many aspects of the Fordist societies (end of the nation-state scale, shift of the economy from industrial to cultural goods, flexibilization of identities, increasingly insecure trajectories), hyperindividualist architecture, which is deeply grounded in media thinking and the production of an architectural *star system* found conditions favorable to its development. This changed the structures and strategies of architects' offices, which now revolve around marketing approaches, the extension of forms of intervention and the privileged role of communication, the production of images and the neutralization of criticism—notably via intellectual property con-

trol. It also changes the nature of architectural interventions, with architecture becoming an identity instrument for companies—Vitra and many others—or cities, notably Bilbao. These now focus more on certain types of architecture needed for this type of identification, infrastructures to host events, for example, than on architectural forms as such.

The advent of environmental thinking: a new type of ethics for architecture

Finally, when discussing this moment of crisis of modernist ideals, one cannot overlook the rise of new referents: nature and sustainable development. Like A. Touraine, Castells pays particular attention to environmental movements among the social movements that emerged during this period. In terms of the changes in the relation to reason which we observe here, environmental or ecological movements signal their presence by certain characteristics that deserve our attention. Environmentalist movements have two basic referents that distinguish them, on one side, from feminist or gay movements, marked by the legal framework of political liberalism they try to extend and, on the other side, from identity-based movements, the horizons of which are predominantly retrospective,. First, "nature": we know the extent to which it can provide alternatives to the rationalization processes imposed by the determining-modernist version with its cult of progress, its centration and its demiurgic humanism. Second, a more ethical than legal vision of the "rights" of future generations. These two horizons establish the framework for a new responsibility which, for many architects, will serve as the groundwork of a new activism focusing mainly on the concept of "sustainable development".

This new reference will deeply influence architectural practices: energy savings and the use of appropriate materials and technologies, alternative energy sources, passive buildings. This is all the more so as new practices will be rapidly integrated into public mechanisms and regulations. Architecture now seems to run the risk of being formatted in line with the technical solutions that impose themselves as pertinent. However, I will not go into this important point, since it does not play a decisive role in the theme I am focusing on here.

An attentive reader of Castells will have understood that his positions in favor of the architecture of places are linked to a logic that is underpinned by the rollback of modernist ideals and the advance of post-modernist arguments. Without going into the details of these arguments, we know that Castells was closely involved with French architectural and urban policies of the 1960s and 1970s. The period was marked by large-scale functionalist projects, particularly where housing policies were implemented on the city outskirts. We also know the extent to which public institutions dealing with urbanism in France were up until the 1980s marked by players with a resolutely left-wing profile, often from the communist Left. Today Castells not only recognizes the inadequacies of these positions: he also insists that France, owing to the interplay between its institutions and the political affiliation of the concerned players, gained awareness of its errors late–too late. In other words, Castells' biography places him squarely at the interface of the emancipatory ideals made manifest in modernism and the criticism they were subject to during the 1960s and 1970s. In this context many Left-wing theoreticians established the critical horizon against which they projected the destiny of future architecture and urbanism via a strongly structured retrospective narration. In the case of Castells this was the concept of "place".

Without going into greater detail concerning the positions adopted by Castells, I want to suggest the relevance of a theoretical horizon going beyond the various backdrops sketched until now. If the tension revealed previously revolved essentially around the critique of modernism, doubts concerning the strengths and hazards of reason, the necessity for urbanism and architecture to rely upon foundations capable of endowing them with meaning, it seems to me that the question has shifted today. Its backdrop is now, on the one hand, a capitalism that in a post-Fordist context has become cultural-managerial—Castells' works offer revealing readings of this—and on the other hand, the emergence of practices, objects and mechanisms in which new figures of reason appear. These are described today by the term "reflexivity".

The post-Fordist context

The increasingly managerial character of the architectural environment

In this new context the environment of architecture changes. Where functionalism had insisted upon the importance of geographers and other cartographers, where postmodernism had highlighted the role of the art historian, the shift of architecture towards post-Fordist approaches has changed the situation and made room for new players. In the hyper-individualistic logic we have mentioned, these of course are marketing and communication specialists. But, more generally speaking and in less ambitious projects, new profiles are developing which now revolve around architecture and contribute their managerial and organizational perspectives. Project managers, quality or quantity surveyors invade the architectural space, often leaving architects with the feeling that their autonomy has been curtailed.

However, in real terms it is the entire field of architectural practices that has been modified, not only private ones. Step-by-step public management is coming under the rule of governance, with its new models of public pilot policies which combine the imperatives of efficiency, evaluation and flexibility but which also implicate involved players and users in decision-making processes. Such is the case of the new urbanism in the United States, which admittedly combines the promotion of governance with the defence of architectural forms of postmodernist descent. It is also the case of proposals such as those voiced by the *Principles of new urbanism* by F. Ascher, where the demands of good governance are associated with an urbanism eclectic in its forms but willing to adapt to the individualistic developments of the post-Fordist societies. The aims of this urbanism are much deflated in comparison with the emancipatory modernist project. Thus, not only new actors linked to the managerial spirit carried by the private sector make their appearance: public policies also gradually integrate this "new spirit of capitalism" (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999).

These developments are unfolding while the old regulations of the profession inherited from Fordist principles of functional differentiation are going through a crisis that forces them to reconsider their ambitions, functions and status. The professional associations see their prerogatives undercut by the evolution of the profession itself. Deontological codes seeking to ban advertising, or to establish uniform remuneration, explode when confronted with the evolution of practices, the appearance of new forms of real estate development, globalization that takes place under the cover of the "extended market" and of the valorization of competition, or changes in an increasingly media-oriented public space.

The definition of the profession itself is also subject to a crisis in a world in which identities are becoming increasingly flexible. Not only does architecture extend its range of practices (the production of images, events, artistic performances are now all part and parcel of architecture), but architectural practices that partake of more traditional models increasingly require multiple cooperation strategies with players who are not architects: artists, sociologists, anthropologists, participation experts. New practices also impose themselves, such as the *marchés de définition* or architecture competitions which bear witness to new regulatory provisions for the profession.

These changes are relatively well known. What seems to me highly interesting, however, is the appearance of new practices at the heart of this new context or on the basis of traditional inherited forms, which reveal a new figure of rationality that cannot be reduced to the determining rationality which dominated the first phase discussed in this text. The final part of my contribution will therefore deal with this process and the concept of "reflexivity" that sheds some light on it. This will enable me to draft a certain number of outlines for a critical backdrop to what Castells has called the space of flows, a backdrop that refuses introspection and enables us to operate in what is revealed by present-day distinctions and that emerges from them. Finally, the concept of reflexivity will allow us to return to our three structural terms: judgment, participation, sensibility.

The considerations below do not claim to describe the practices that are dominant today. The situation of architecture and urbanism continues to be marked profoundly by the practices described earlier. Most of the significant architecture of the space of flows but also, we insist, of the space of places, is today largely dominated by processes that are grounded in real estate speculation. Architecture has become a massive cultural industry which, upon demand, produces the infrastructures for the space of flows, as well as the characteristic typologies of the space of places. The post-modern moment significantly marked the face of cities, aiming to reconstruct the European city, proposing typologies to (re) create social ties, foster cohesion and restore neighborhoods. Just as modernism thought that architectural forms could change the social fabric and emancipate the working class, so post-modernism thought it could recreate social density by means of architecture. In most cases it has succeeded in producing architectural pastiches which find their apogee in Disney architecture[3]. In short, at the architectural level it may be post-modern architecture, which claims to extol the places so dear to Castells, that has best adapted to the demands of one of the most flourishing industries of the space of flows: the tourist industry.

Thus instead of invoking a retrospective viewpoint, my argument attempts to capture the significance and scope of emerging approaches which, better than the retrospective perspective from which Castells evaluates the architecture of the space of flows, enable us to understand processes that restructure current architectural and urbanistic practices. I do not think that by reflecting on certain emerging practices I am betraying Castells' considerations. Rather, I consider that I think with him—i.e., the theoretician of emerging urban movements—rather than against him—i.e., the nostalgic of the architecture of the space of places.

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3 For a contextualisation of Disney architecture see the *Cahiers de la Cambre-Architecture*, "Enclaves ou la ville privatise", La lettre Volée, Brussels, 2002.

The reflexive path

Doubtless it was J. Habermas who called attention to the weaknesses of post-modernist theses in the architectural field. Since architecture had bequeathed the concept of post-modernism to philosophy, Habermas addressed a certain number of his texts to architects. In these he attempted to describe precisely the conditions of a rehabilitation of reason; he saw its future as intersubjective, dialogue-based and communicational. Habermas thus sought to found anew the rationalist project of the Age of Enlightenment, while accepting the consequences of the critique of reason. The aim for him was to uphold the ideal linking emancipation and reason, but question the hitherto dominant concept of rationality. Against strategies invoking the reference to tradition-based "meaning", Habermas demonstrates that meaning should not be seen as having been "deposited", that it is not a given we must recover, but is always the precarious result of a joint construction process. Rather than monological, reason must be conceived of as communicational, i.e., manifesting its claims to validity within the very heart of a debate. Politically speaking, Habermas' positions generate a demand for the rehabilitation of a public debating space and for participatory or deliberative democracy. As we also know, Habermas distinguishes between different uses of rationality, which realizes itself differently according to whether it operates within the register of a claim to objectivity, to normative validity or to authenticity. We must admit that whereas Habermas' political positions favoring participation are convincing, his reflections on aesthetic questions or the status of sensibility are much less satisfactory. In short, if we follow his train of thought, we run the risk of reducing what I would call the "reflexive turning point" to its purely participatory dimension. Such a point of view is inadequate if we wish to understand what, with reference to the theme of rationalization, happens at the level of architectural and urbanistic practices: beyond the rise of participatory demands and mechanisms.

In *Another modernity, a different rationality,* Scott Lash proposes to take seriously the Kantian opposition between determining and reflexive judgments and to endow this distinction with sociological scope in order to interpret the shift in the uses of reason that characterized the 20th century (Lash, 1999). According to him, after the modernist moment which supported a determining concept of rationality, and after the regressive post-modernist moment, what we have today is the development of a reflexive moment. The concept of reflexivity has many applications in sociology, where it attempts to characterizse contemporary societies, corresponding to the post-Fordist turning point. Although they may not be fully convincing, the works of Lash have the great advantage of refining the concept of reflexivity by linking it to its philosophical foundations.

Let us recall the Kantian distinction. For the author of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a determining judgment is one that goes from the general to the particular, the latter appearing as a "case" of the general. Scientific and mathematical demonstrations are its best illustration, as well as, in Kantian thought, causal reasoning. What we have said about the modernist-functionalist moment exemplifies it.

The reflexive judgment moves in the opposite direction. While also claiming universal validity, it moves from the particular to the general. For Kant its prototype is the judgment of taste, which results from the contingent encounter between an object, a landscape, or a work, and an idea of reason these "evoke". While claiming a move towards generality, the reflexive judgment is powerless to impose its generality in demonstrative fashion,

to a partner in debate, for example. This is the opposite of the determining judgment that imposes itself on the grounds of *a priori* principles which generate necessary conclusions. The reflexive judgment, while claiming to go beyond the particular, continues to be marked by uncertainty and precariousness. Moreover, whereas the determining judgment is linked to an imaginary order of cleansing of what is not "rational" (for example the Kantian terminology evoking "pure" reason, but also, and closer to us, the epistemological principle of axiologixal "neutralization"), the reflexive judgment is immersed in the affects, emotions, sensibility and, particularly when it comes to judgements of taste, in pleasure. In the vocabulary of contemporary linguistics, one might say that determining judgments obey only cognitive logic, whereas reflexive judgements are open to a more comprehensive communicational spectrum. This includes, beyond the cognitive dimension of the relation to things and facts, the strictly communicational dimension of the relation to the other, and the performing and expressive dimension of self-implication (Ferry, 2004).

If we follow Lash's reasoning, the current evolution of architectural and urbanistic practices is part of a shift towards rationality of the reflexive type. Several elements bear witness to this.

One is the fact that unlike decontextualised *a priori* principles, posed for example by functionalist urbanism and certain types of modernist architecture, the use of rationality now would take place in a context, in a given situation. Its space would be less that of a peremptory affirmation of principles than the disclosure of spaces of listening, confrontation and debate. Urbanism would thus become more procedural, while architecture would be less concerned with the imposition of certain specific forms than with the opening up to reflection on its uses. These discussion practices would assume the fragility of the reasons invoked. Partners thus enter upon a back-and-forth game; rationality is co-constructed in the discussion. The reflexive moment also confirms the end of the hard and fast distinction, characteristic of the Fordist differentiation, between specialists and users. While more and more experts pay attention to the social mechanisms, expertise itself and its claim to a univocal truth is being questioned. Expert knowledge is being queried; users, citizens claim their own expertise, which tends to be accepted. The user tends to become a partner of the urbanistic mechanisms, as in the descriptive urbanism of B. Secchi and others.

In addition, and in opposition to the characteristic instruments of a determining rationality and its preceding moments, there are the characteristic instruments of a reflexive rationality, open to contingencies, to the subtle aspects of space, the sensibility of places and the multiplicity of the uses of space. In opposition to cartography and zoning and to the quantitative analyses that characterize a determining rationality, or removed from the typo-morphology that is present everywhere in the post-modern moment, we see the appearance of new instruments such as the photo reportage, filmed sequences, sound impressions, peregrinations and the urban escapades loved by the Situationists. Semantics are enriched by new terms such as "landscape", which evidently refers to the issue of sensibility. Landscapes is now a term commonly used with reference to urban environments, going beyond their visual aspect, becoming olfactive, sonar. Architecture and urbanism take possession of the night, in part to make the city profitable around the clock, but mainly to restore the poetry of the night. Art, in the form of interventions and installations, achieves the status of a vector of knowledge.

User competencies are taken seriously, sometimes at the risk of "NIMBY" reactions. Interviews are completed by processes in which users express themselves via media that

are no longer purely linguistic, drawings for example. Other forms of intelligence find their place here, based on associations and on poetry which is index-based rather than symbolic, according to the distinction established by Peirce. The aim is to move from images and associations to seize the expectations of users and developers. In short, as shown by Peirce, and against what is suggested by the positions of Castells or the theories of Perez-Gomez, the logic of signification may not be reduced to the symbol, referring instead to architectural types, to morphological coherence, to functional transparency. Successful architecture may simply be evocative, suggestiveit may mark a space and encourage associations.

Of course the anthropological horizon is no longer that of a human being reduced to his functions, or to being anchored in a belonging or a tradition. Rather it consists of a *competent* subject, endowed with *capacities* that make him a partner of specialists of space, but also a *subject of experience*, for whom the relation to space offers the occasion for living experiences that involve both sociability and sensibility.

New instruments are being invented: future users are asked to draw, communication tools are designed (e.g., card games) which generate forms of exchange that are no longer based on purely cognitive data. Architects and urbanists willingly propose "scenarios", explicitly adopting practices that welcome plurality.

The anthropologist and the sociologist have an important role to play, supplanting the geographer, the art historian, or the urban marketing or communication specialist. In short, we see a plurality of instruments and great methodological inventiveness.

Actors involved in the conception of urban projects multiply and shift in comparison to the ones considered in older schemes. Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe proposed the concept of "hybrid forums" (Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, 2001).[4] This is really what is at stake today. The architectural or urbanistic project supplies the opportunity to give birth to, and to see the birth of, such forums, which radically surpass the divisions inherited from differentiated societies. Architecture and urbanism are viewed as cultural practices, as practices of joint education.

At the urban movement level, this shift allows us to observe some significant changes. Thus, the relation to forms goes through a deflationary process for the benefit of procedural demands: where the older postmodernist urban movements multiplied counter-projects which often sketched a neo-classical pastiche of the European city or town, the new movements call for procedures, notably competitions, without predetermining the architectural forms they should promote. Rather, their mode of intervention is carte blanche, far removed from the modernist manifesto or the counter-project of the patrimonialist period. Their organizational form is collective, and their actions are perfectly in line with the development of the new communication tools, the Internet, e-mails. Competitions are launched in the name of architectural quality (obviously a generic concept with no reference to a specific form) and with the aim to launch discussion platforms on urban projects. Participation itself, which in Belgium has been part of urbanistic practices since the 1970s, is at a crossroads. Whereas participation in democratic procedures took place via *a posteriori* control mechanisms following public investigations (with concertative

4 See also *Les cahiers de la Cambre,* "De la participation urbaine", La Lettre Volée, Brussels, 2005.

commissions as forums of expression), participation is now integrated from the outset. The final objective, utopic though it may be, is the cooperative conception of the project; Lucien Kroll was a precursor in this field. Public mechanisms seek to deal with this turning point; in France via the *marchés de définition* we have already mentioned.

Practices are now more carefully defined, claiming to take the opposite stand to the arrogance of functionalist urbanists. Like the urbanism of Yves Chalas, particularly in its performative and apophatic aspects, urbanism now develops its methods and practices within an uncertain framework perspective (Chalas, 2000). Its temporality is prospective, but it is no longer a modernist type of prospectivity in which reason and progress bear the promise of a world that will surely be a better one. The future is one of hazards and precautions, of sustainable development with its careful use of resources.

As at another level in the field of social policies, urbanism conceives of itself according to an accompanying logic (Cantelli and Genard, 2007). It aims to create conditions for partnership and introduce necessary support measures for the co-production of its projects, along the lines of the *ombudsplan* mediator recently proposed for the redevelopment of the European quarter in Brussels.

The categories proposed by Hannah Arendt—labour, the work, and action—may be of some use to measure the changes conveyed by these innovative practices. Where real estate development and key-in-hand constructions link architectural production to labor and manufacture, where architectural modernism but also the postmodernist and deconstructivist models continue to be tied to the model of "the work", the specificity of the new architectural and urban practices becomes clearer if we refer to the idea of action. The success of production here lies in the process and in the result, with the success of the result, of the work, contributing to the process. Moreover this success is no longer viewed in categories that are characteristic of the work, such as its monumental aspect, for example, but according to effect criteria. A realization is much more significant because of what it does than because of what it is.

Conclusion

I have attempted to reconstruct the perspective from which Castells condemns the architecture of the space of flows, and to position it. I have sought, using the concept of reflexivity, to outline the trends generated by novel architectural and urbanistic practices, and I now wish to formulate my conclusion.

An understanding of contemporary architectural projects cannot be simply gauged against a retrospective vision of architectural forms or social links. If the criterion of our judgment is the density of social relations that characterize the neighborhood, or the supposed clarity of architectural significance found in the space of places, we condemn ourselves to a negative perception of the architecture associated precisely with the opposite of this space. And we doubtless also condemn ourselves to missing out on what is responsible for its specificity.

The architecture of shopping malls, airports, intermodal infrastructures and spaces designed to host large-scale cultural, economic or sports events, definitely has to be viewed in a critical light, even if many of the most significant architectural projects belong pre-

cisely to this category. The question I aimed to address is the one of the normative point of view on which such a critique ought to be based. Innovative practices that crop up in present-day architecture and urbanism and which are elucidated by the concept of reflexivity, seem to me to draft a much more pertinent outline for the construction of a relevant critical discourse.

With reference to Castells' own reasoning, they have the merit, moreover, of being supported by the most cutting edge urban social movement practices and not by social movements that were primarily marked by identity-based approaches, insisting upon the specificity of places and the lasting character of spatial meanings.

To put it in a nutshell: I hope I have convinced the reader that one may reflect upon architecture with Castells, against Castells.

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Chapter 6

Building Development in the 19th Century: between Planning Procedures and Local Action[1]

Agnès Sander[2]

Introduction

The Paris cityscape, which is largely a product of the transformations effected under the Second Empire by the Prefect Haussmann and the city administration, is astonishing for its degree of uniformity. It has been the source of much envy and, at the time, a certain amount of opposition. Charles Garnier himself, who designed the Paris Opera House at around the same time, was an ardent critic of this municipal action, its monotonous regulations and unwelcoming *froideur*.[3] Thus, understanding the urban forms of Paris involves searching for an explanation of the uniformity of its architecture and its avenues.

However, on closer inspection, Haussmannien thoroughfares present all sorts of irregularities depending on which streets we examine.[4] So in order to understand how an urban landscape is formed, it is worthwhile examining these irregularities and deformities[5], which demonstrate that such forms are not merely the product of municipal decisions. It is these deformities that we have chosen to analyze in detail here by studying a highly atypical Haussmannien thoroughfare: Rue des Pyrénées in the 20th *arrondissement* of Paris.

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1 This article is a revised and updated version of the case study in French entitled "*La rue des Pyrénées: les limites de la planification*", published in the BRA-MELT research report (1992). *Regards sur l'haussmannisme,* pp. 67-72.

2 Translated from the French by Neil O'Brien

3 Quoted by Loyer, François (1987) p. 361.

4 See Darin, Mickaël (1981) and Darin, Mickaël (1989).

5 Borie, Alain, Micheloni, Pierre, Pinon, Pierre (1984, first edition 1978).

This street was laid out beginning in 1862 in the outlying districts to the east that had just been newly "annexed" by the City of Paris. We seek to analyze this Haussmannien thoroughfare, which is incomplete in terms of the size of the accompanying edifices, by trying to understand why it diverges from the archetypal Haussmannien street bordered by a carefully aligned series of buildings occupying all of the permitted space and offering a uniform façade to the passerby. In order to appreciate why this street is now composed of largely heterogeneous buildings in terms of both their form and siting, we examined each plot in turn and tried to isolate the reasons for their divergence from classical Haussmannien form. We believe that only a plot-by-plot analysis can provide a precise understanding of how the buildings along a street were formed. Only such an analysis can establish why Rue des Pyrénées looks like it does today. Why did the buildings along this street actually get built? In other words: why these and not others?

Carrying out a plot-by-plot analysis does not preclude establishing classifications of similar-type plots. An initial "morphological" analysis that highlights ideal, typical forms and those actually observed could serve to identify:

- the major types of deformity in relation to what we expect to see in a Haussmannien street;
- typical plots;
- those that appear to be unique, etc.[6]

Once the deformity has been identified, hypotheses are developed to try to explain it in relation to the specific actions of the plot owners. This article will study the production of these urban forms along Rue des Pyrénées by analyzing both the intentions and actions of planners and resistance to such planning by property owners, based on two different approaches: firstly, a network approach[7] (the street as one element within an *ensemble* of streets designed to facilitate the passage of goods and people), and secondly, plot substitution (where the plot is seen as the unit of property on which buildings are constructed).

This analysis is preceded by a two-part overview of the context. In the first section, following a summary description of Haussmannien city planning, we briefly sketch the reasons for the visual uniformity of the Paris cityscape. The second section presents the street itself which is subsequently analyzed along with the hypotheses and different methods required for the analysis. The article will present details of a few chosen examples and will not delve into the history of each plot that we were able to trace in the archives.

Overview

It is important to realize from the outset that the transformation of Paris and the laying out of new streets did not begin with the Second Empire (Napoleon III, 1852-1870).

6 It is the relationship between the plot, built area and empty spaces that needs to be analyzed and classified and not just the plot itself. However, we can only verify hypotheses (reasons for deformity) on a plot-by-plot basis. Archive sampling may be useful in such cases.

7 Castex J. Depaule J.C., Panerai P, (1977) pp. 18 and 23, employ the term "global level"; M. Darin (1981), p. 13, uses "major urban element".

Although private thoroughfares, frequently bordered by houses built by decree were already being developed in the 17th century, it was really under the First Empire (Napoleon 1st, 1804-1814) that the first series of complete thoroughfares were built in the form of residential allotments: the state acquired the land, divided it into plots and subsequently resold these for development. Private developments began to take off from the beginning of the 19th century.

As regards Paris as a whole, the Haussmannien building programs carried out under the auspices of Georges-Eugène Haussmann, prefect of the Seine from 1853 to 1870, used the recommendations made by previous observers to good effect. The problems inherent to the City of Paris had long been recognized: delays traveling between the two banks of the Seine; the extreme poverty existing on the Left Bank and the squalor of the city center; the rapid development of the Right Bank of the Seine mainly towards the west, where the business and commercial districts that sprang up exist to the present day; failure of road widening schemes to have any real impact.

Haussmannien street building programs sought to resolve these difficulties by impacting on the existing city: two major Parisian axes (going from north to south and from east to west) and the Boulevard Saint-Germain were laid out to link the two banks of the Seine both physically and symbolically; many other thoroughfares were built to link important points in the city and, while they undoubtedly facilitated troop movements, they also cleaned up, embellished and showed off property to good effect. Ring roads also improved access to the peripheral neighborhoods annexed to the city in 1860. The programs were carried out on a massive scale and took advantage of the newly available procedure of expropriation.

Following the Haussmann era and despite the upheavals of the war of 1870, the major street building programs continued through to the end of the 19th century under the Third Republic (1871/1875-1940). The network conceived of by Haussmann was not only carried out but extended and completed locally mainly thanks to the action of the Paris city administration which was characterized by a remarkable continuity through successive changes of government. The same pattern can be observed in the areas of water and sanitation, parks and gardens, etc.

The early 20th century, and particularly the first reconstruction period that followed the Great War marked a radical change in city building practices due to the campaign to combat insalubrity and the rise in modern architectural practices: until the late 19th century new streets were lined with plots and the limit of city planning intervention cut right through the street block; social housing blocks in the 1920s and 30s were characterized by the disappearance of the plot pattern and city planning intervention limits extended out to the middle of the street. The major housing schemes of the second reconstruction marked the end of the street block and the formal and functional disassociation of public thoroughfares and dwellings[8].

8 Le Corbusier, Jeannenet, Pierre (1931).

The reasons for uniformity

Before studying the irregularities of the Paris cityscape, it is well worth recalling how the apparent uniformity of this cityscape was produced, insofar as no regulations existed under the Second Empire concerning the design and composition of building façades.[9]

The first important point is that while Parisian planning regulations (through to the early 20th century) had a major impact on urban forms and landscapes, they were not conceived primarily for this purpose. These laws were generally driven by concerns over safety: the height of buildings in relation to street width and the construction materials used; making it mandatory to plaster wooden façades to reduce the risk of fires; banning corbelling and overhanging forms more than a few centimeters wide; or refusing to authorize balconies running from one building to another.

Behind the plastered façades (since the end of the 16th century) that lent *ancien régime* Paris such a uniform air, buildings were busily adding floors of widely differing forms unremarked by passersby. As François Loyer explains, urban density increased without any major changes to the appearance of Parisian buildings. The regulatory height of cornices (17.41 m, for streets over 9.75-m wide between 1784 and 1859; 20 m for streets over 20-m wide in the case of Haussmannien boulevards) also had a major esthetic impact. Indeed, although the regulations passed in 1884 and 1902 authorized considerable increases in the height of buildings, this was only by playing around with loft space so that the actual appearance of façades changed little. Depending on the period, architectural compositions that tinkered with the maximum authorized height used either vertical or horizontal lines. The typically Parisian manner of alternating jambs and piers of the same width tended to blur such differences of *modénature* and composition.

We should also note that regulations frequently tended to reflect trends more than they set them: the 1884 regulation concerning the height of loft timbers was based on models that architects had already been experimenting with at the end of the Haussmannien period, notably on Avenue de l'Opéra, where builders were able to add an extra three main stories in relation to the regulatory size of a building in 1784.

Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the clout of the restructured administration under Haussmann. The *architectes voyers* (street architects) were important players and, in the absence of written regulations, were able to use their advisory role to exercise strict control over façade design, as borne out by the example of Avenue de l'Opéra. We should note that they played a lesser role in outlying neighborhoods where it was considered inappropriate to place excessive constraints on architectural design in places where land was difficult to sell. The only plot along Rue des Pyrénées for which an order to build within the year is appended to the deed of sale is the first plot sold, on the corner with Rue de Belleville. Sluggish demand coupled with the influence of property developers in the area (one of whom was a Paris city councilor) subsequently meant that the municipality placed few constraints on either plots or buildings along this street.

9 "The reasons for uniformity" section draws on the following works: Boudon, *et al.*, (1977), Harouel Jean Louis (1982), Loyer François, op. cit.; Pinon Pierre (2002).

Thus a combination of

- planning laws (focusing on the safety of persons and property) had already regulated the production of Parisian buildings for several hundred years;
- building methods and materials subject to their own rules, but evolving under the impetus of increased industrialization;
- the training of building contractors and tradesmen at the same schools;
- the social profiles of tenants and owners impacting the characteristics of dwellings and each floor of the dwellings;
- and a city council that was able to conceive of and implement a grand scheme, mean that Haussmannien architecture is perceived as being a particularly homogeneous style.

A study of the irregularities masked by this apparent uniformity shows that the reality was somewhat more complex: municipal action, even at its strongest during the Haussmannien period, has only a limited impact on urban forms.

Analyzing atypical street forms: overview and hypotheses

Rue des Pyrénées was laid out beginning in 1862. It was one of the newly-added, essentially rural districts to the east that was annexed to form the new Paris. It still looks like an unfinished street and lacks that visual coherence that we associate with the typical Haussmannien street. The mechanisms that produced the buildings are readily identifiable: where two buildings of unequal height meet, it is easy to distinguish the old plot from the plot that resulted from the street-laying scheme. A defect in the building suddenly reveals an old street boundary. The traces are there for all to see, visible in the urban space (Fig. 6.1).

The principal assertion underpinning our work is that a city is never produced by planning alone from a sort of *tabula rasa*, nor is it a being that develops on its own terms via a gradual process of organic growth.[10] The city is a series of trade-offs between planning regulations and the factors that resist or circumvent such regulations.[11]

For certain authors[12] Haussmannien planning methods represent a major break with what had gone before. However, we consider that the mechanism whereby streets were laid out within the limits of the existing urban fabric harked back to an essentially traditional method.[13] The process essentially entailed laying out new streets, and the planner's role was to define this public space. Therefore, to have a global impact on the urban space, the planner must start working at plot level. We could consider that the role of planners should stop at setting the limit between the street and the individual

10 Poëte, Marcel (1937).

11 This hypothesis is advanced in particular by M. Darin (1981), p. 13.

12 Particularly Boudon *et al.*, op. cit., pp. 58 and 59. Obviously, we are strongly indebted to this monumental study which has highlighted the necessity of a plot-by-plot analysis for understanding cityscapes and how they are formed.

13 Concerning the continuity between Haussmann building programs and previous schemes, see Bowie, Karen (dir.) (2001).

Fig. 6.1 An atypical haussmannien city landscape: Rue des Pyrénées (credit: A. Sander).

plots, however the boundary of each plot depends on that of the street: each of these tiny private enclaves is used to define the public space and this explains why the actions of planners also extend to plots intended for private development. It is also because, when a new street is laid out, the profitability of the scheme as well as public hygiene and the embellishment of the public thoroughfare justify an incursion into privately-owned property. The drafting of planning and building regulations is the most obvious sign of this incursion. Negotiations may be necessary with the owner of each expropriated plot, and the boundary of each plot may have to be redrawn before it can be resold.

Regrouping makes it possible to exercise control over the type of building that goes up, and a series of specific constraints may be imposed on the new owner via building specifications. Buildings may be prevented from falling into a state of "insalubrity" by regrouping plots in an appropriate manner. In certain cases plots may be resold to finance public works, but what subsequently happens to the plots that are sold back into

private hands is largely beyond the planner's control. The real break in city planning methods occurred when the planner's scope extended from the street to encompass intervention in a given zone.[14] In other words, by acting simultaneously on both the public and the private space, we eliminated all resistance to planning, especially due to the physical situation of the plots themselves: thence the old plot pattern was scrapped completely in the planned renovation zones of the 1960s and 1970s.[15] Any subsequent urban renewal can be very fraught as the land/property in question is a single indivisible entity: it is difficult to modify the buildings without demolishing them completely; it is impossible to split a plot in two as the plots themselves have disappeared. Moreover, technical networks no longer correspond to streets (inexistent) as they did in Haussmannien street building schemes but run under buildings or open spaces, seriously limiting any potential transformation projects.[16]

This analysis covers the section of the Rue des Pyrénées that runs between Rue de Belleville and Rue des Prairies. It excludes the section of Rue de Puebla (now known as Avenue Secrétan) that grew out of the widening of Rue Drouin-Quintaine (an old private street that has since disappeared). Thus, our research is limited to the section of the street covered by the first expropriation jury of December 15, 1864 (Fig. 6.2). It includes Place Gambetta, a favored location for property speculators in late 19th century Paris.



Fig. 6.2 Land covered by expropriation (jury of December 15, 1864), (map source: APUR Atelier parisien d'urbanisme, AP Archives de Paris and AN Archives nationales).

14 Situated by M. Darin, *op cit.*, p. 11 and by Gaudin, Jean-Louis (1985), at the beginning of the 20th century: reform of the expropriation law of November 6, 1918 and reflections on the Cornudet Law (Gaudin); expropriation law of April 21, 1914 (Darin). See also Legendre d'Anfray, Pascale (1990). *La petite ceinture,* graduate degree dissertation from the Institut d'Urbanisme de Paris, which highlights the role of these "insalubrious" building blocks in the process of moving planning from the street into entire zones.

15 Lucan Jacques (1980), p. 69: due to Post-War regrouping and the land mobilization called for by the modernists, plot subdivision—the secular form of constituting or reconstituting cities—was not as big an issue as it might have been.

16 See Treuttel J.J. *et al.*, (1996).

Drawing up a 1/2000 scale map of the street makes it possible to analyze the "formal" transformations that impacted the plots. Examining the regrouped plots in terms of the regulatory possibilities available to the city council enables us to see where the forms of the plots actually produced were out of line with a "logical" subdivision, which we take to mean the boundaries that would have been drawn by planners free of any constraints. Other plots of interest were identified from an analysis of the contemporary street profile and visible discontinuities in buildings. The use of archives to analyze changes in these plots and in the buildings that adjoin them makes it possible to highlight the chains of small events that produced such forms.

Planners' choices and constraints

The production of a local network

No sooner had the districts located between the Fermiers Généraux tax wall and Thiers' fortified wall been annexed to Paris in 1860 than "the city council commissioned engineers from the suburban division of the city public works department to study the profiles of a number of large thoroughfares intended to connect the new districts comprising the 19th and 20th, as well as a part of the 12th *arrondissements,* both between themselves and to the older districts of the City".[17]

The building of such streets (ring roads and thoroughfares going right into the heart of the city) corresponded to immediate implementation of the very principles that explained why the *notables* had wanted to annex the outlying neighborhoods in the first place. They hoped that the sense of order introduced into Paris by Haussmannization could also be extended to the immediate suburbs. In any case, this was the gist of the report in favor of "annexation" presented to the Emperor by the Secretary of State for the Department of the Interior Delangle, on February 12, 1859: "Expanding districts have given little thought to combining their streets with those of adjoining neighborhoods. They are all focused on Paris and all their efforts have gone into removing previously existing barriers: little has been done to link adjoining districts. However, one district straddles another; some actually run into each other and their overlap results in a hotchpotch of impressive streets that go nowhere, horrible lanes and cul de sacs, relatively well laid out modern neighborhoods and groups of buildings thrown up pell-mell".[18] The same arguments were subsequently used with regard to street paving, sidewalks, sewers and water and gas distribution: i.e., that "supra-territorial management was needed to embellish cities and to make their networks work more effectively".

This willingness to open up the old outlying Parisian suburbs underpinned the construction of streets such as the Rue des Pyrénées. Their categorization within the "third network" clarifies the choices subsequently made by the City Council: type of street proposed, amount of investment, building deadlines, etc. Castex, Depaule and

17 Haussmann Georges Eugène, March 8, 1862, in Lazare Louis (1862). *Publications administratives,* Paris.
18 Préfecture de la Seine (1959/1960). *Documents administratifs.*

Panerai[19] have described the "third network" as a "rag-bag of operations that had not been included in the second category". We should note that this network included link roads and completed certain projects begun previously. It also comprised all road works carried out in the newly annexed neighborhoods. Unlike the first and second categories, which were partially funded by the central government, the third category was paid for solely by the City.

The survey of the eastern Paris network shows that Haussmann's concerns were primarily of a functional nature and this attitude, which differed significantly from the approach adopted for projects within the first category and nearer the city center, had an impact on street design and the manner in which the projects were conceived. The current layout of Rue des Pyrénées was influenced directly by this initial planning approach.

The Imperial Decree of July 28, 1862 contains details of the street building program and road works to be carried out in the newly annexed districts of eastern Paris. It focused primarily on the inner ring road now known in its various sections as Avenue S. Bolivar/ Rue des Pyrénées/Avenue du Général M. Bizot, although it comprised other streets which were also decreed to be in the public interest. This group of streets constituted a proper local network within these districts, connected to Paris in a very basic manner.

Intervention by the city council: modus operandi

When laying out new streets, expropriation was the basic tool available to the council, and the limits of this scheme were enshrined in legislation. The expropriation law of May 3, 1841, as well as its subsequent enabling decrees, formed the legal basis for Haussmannien building programs. In particular, it stipulated that "buildings of which it is necessary to acquire a portion in the public interest shall be purchased whole if owners so require by a formal declaration addressed to the magistrate in charge of the jury […] the same applies to each plot of land that is reduced by one quarter of its total area following subdivision, if the owner does not own an adjacent plot, and if the plot thus reduced is less than 10 Ares in size".[20]

As contemporary critics pointed out,[21] this law favored private interests over the public interest. Owners could opt to keep plots along a street and if the plots were too small or if their form rendered them unsuitable for construction, they could obtain an adjustment to the building line. If the owner decided to build on the plot in spite of its characteristics, an "*immeuble-placard*" (closet building) would result and would quickly fall into a state of insalubrity.

The decree of March 26, 1852, amended the law of May 3, 1841, and completed the law of April 13, 1850, dealing with slum clearance. It provided "the means of tackling insalubrity in dwellings rented out; however, it did not prevent the construction of unhygienic dwellings".[22] It was heavily criticized for attacking the principle of private property and was a major enabling factor in the Haussmannien street building program

19 Castex *et alii,* op. cit, p. 20.
20 Deville, Rez (1886) p. 139.
21 Lazare, Louis (1868), op. cit., tome 2, Lahure (1842) and Bidaux Georges (1907).
22 des Cilleuls, André (1877), p. 59.

in Paris. While it provided the city council with much wider powers of expropriation, A. des Cilleuls and Lahure[23] have shown that these powers were in fact rarely used as the council wanted to avoid having to purchase additional plots of land.

Moreover, the possibilities available under the decree of March 26, 1852, were restricted by the decree of December 27, 1858, which strengthened the role of the *Conseil d'Etat* (French Supreme Administrative Court) [24] and, as J. L. Gaudin[25] has shown, this court tended to favor the interests of property owners until at least the end of the 19th century. This decree imposed public inquiries with a right of appeal to the *Conseil d'Etat* and clarified the pre-emption rights of the owners of plots at the far end of expropriated blocks of land located between their plot and the public thoroughfare (surplus expropriated land). This was the legal context against which the Rue des Pyrénées was laid out.

An analysis of the original street plan gives an idea of how the council planned to use the possibilities offered by expropriation legislation. We have taken a map pre-dating 1862 and compared the land expropriated to build the Rue des Pyrénées while distinguishing between plots expropriated away from the covered area with those expropriated along the area covered by the future street (Fig 6.3). Apart from a few specific cases that require more detailed research, we note that the following types of plot were expropriated away from the street:

- plots deemed to be not buildable once the expropriated parts were taken off (size, form, situation in relation to the street);
- plots situated below or above the new street level for which leveling was required. This applied to the plots situated between Rue des Pyrénées and Rue des Cascades (Fig. 6.3), or those located around Passage des Soupirs and Rue Villiers de l'Isle Adam;
- plots set aside for future redevelopment. This was the case with plots expropriated to build Place Gambetta. Large-scale expropriation enabled the reconstitution of entire blocks of land.

In general, expropriation was limited to plots located along the area actually covered by the planned route of the street and this type of minimal expropriation limited the possibilities of building a traditional Haussmannien street, i.e., one lined by buildings of a uniform nature. Plots that lay along the new street remained in the hands of the same private owners as previously and it was impossible to force them to build. Similarly, the procedure "whereby owners acquired land situated in front of their existing holding" did not involve any obligation to build along the public thoroughfare.[26]

The council could merely hope that the creation of a new street would encourage property owners to build. Place du Guignier is a good example of this type of situation (and will be examined in more detail below). Place du Guignier had not really been

23 des Cilleuls, André (1910) and Lahure, op. cit.

24 The streets and thoroughfares of Paris are all part of the *"grande voirie"* (highroads) whereas those of other French cities belong to the "*petite voirie*" and fall under the jurisdiction of the *cour de cassation* (French Supreme Civil Court).

25 Gaudin Jean-Louis, op. cit., p. 29.

26 des Cilleuls André (1877), p. 139.

Fig. 6.3 View of buildings situated between Rue des Pyrénées and Rue des Cascades (credit: A. Sander).

planned for, within the scope of the expropriation process, and it was created from surplus expropriated land. Only part of a block of land located between Rue de l'Ermitage and Rue du Guignier was subject to a second partial expropriation order dated February 8, 1868[27]. This order also includes a scheme to widen the Rue de l'Est which was subsequently completed but does not appear on the 1903 land registry. This case can be compared with that of the Place Gambetta where the expropriation was on a much larger scale. Place Gambetta was already planned for in this first phase: plots were regrouped and entire new blocks were created.

After the expropriation phase and before the land was resold, the surplus expropriated land was redrawn into new plots that would be easily buildable: boundaries perpendicular to the street, façade of suitable dimensions (Fig. 6.4). The form of the urban space took precedence over the form of the plot and was limited by the direction of the streets and by the old plot boundaries. Private ownership was subordinated to public planning requirements.

Conclusion regarding the choice of planning strategy

Analyzing the options chosen by planners is not enough in accounting for the appearance of a street. There is no corollary between the expropriated area and the type of buildings lining a street. We could be forgiven for thinking that Haussmannien build-

27 Archives Nationales, cote F/la/2000/102.



Fig. 6.4 The redrawn plot pattern, A. Sander on map source: APUR Atelier parisien d'urbanisme and AP Archives de Paris.

ings should have been erected on plots expropriated in large numbers and then redrawn in order to facilitate construction. Following the same logic, houses composed of just a few stories would then be more likely to appear on old plots that simply lay along the route of the new street, but that had been neither redrawn nor resold. While a comparison of Place Gambetta and the other public squares along Rue des Pyrénées (Place du Guignier, Place des Rigoles and Place du Jourdain) would appear to give credence to this assumption, there are so many examples invalidating it that a number of caveats need to be introduced.

This highlights how important it is for a project to be "assisted". Building a town hall on Place Gambetta or opening a street that runs into the heart of the city (in this case, Avenue de la République) are examples of incentives to build and strategies adopted by the planners, but they still do not fully account for the future appearance of the street. On many plots that were redrawn when the street was first laid out we now have houses of only one or two stories, whereas plots that merely lay along its route boast buildings seven or eight stories high.

Other factors have therefore intervened to shape the street by modifying the options initially chosen by the planners or by taking these even further.

Resistance to planning

Modifications to the network

Within months of the incorporation of the district of Belleville into Paris, numerous street building proposals were submitted to the city council and some of these survived in one form or another to be included in the Imperial Decree of July 28, 1862. Already on March 20, 1860, E. Masson stressed "the necessity for a major thoroughfare through

the heart of the 19th and 20th *arrondissements* of Paris".[28] He wrote that this "major axis half-way up a hill [would make it possible] to regulate traffic in these new Eastern districts which, due to the lie of the land, still do not have streets that are perpendicular to the Seine". The most frequent criticism recurring in the pages of the *Revue Municipale* gazette throughout 1861 concerned the location of the Town Hall of the 20th *arrondissement* which had been housed in the old Belleville town hall since "annexation". Its peripheral location within the newly-created *arrondissement* was heavily criticized.[29] L. Lazare suggested putting the new town hall and a church on a square to be built at the intersection of the Rue du Retrait and the Rue des Partants (now known as the Rue Villiers de l'Isle Adam). The council eventually decided against this location and opted instead for a new town hall in the middle of the 20th arrondissement on the traffic circle laid out behind the Père Lachaise Cemetery (now known as Place Gambetta). A hospital was built behind the town hall, while a church was put up on the site of the old Notre Dame de la Croix chapel in lower Ménilmontant.

The Decree of July 28, 1862, was quite warmly welcomed, and criticism was leveled mainly at the project's execution rather than at the project itself. Most public ire was focused on the slow progress. By 1870, only the work set out in the Decree of July 28, 1862, had been completed, consisting of the Buttes Chaumont Park and surrounding streets, Rue de Puebla, Rue de Meaux and Rue de Bagnolet.

Although the plan drafted by Alphand[30] indicated 1870 as the completion date for the Rue des Pyrénées, the actual date was obviously much later. The expropriation and resale procedures were unpopular and the lack of investment was highlighted as a real problem. "The city council was not short of options for building avenues and boulevards in eastern Paris. In the 20th arrondissement, even though it only had to pay out between 20 and 25 francs per square meter, the council only expropriated the plots that were absolutely essential for building the new street."[31] We should stress that per-square-meter land prices around the center of Paris hovered around 200 francs at this time, whereas the cost of expropriating plots that bordered the Rue des Pyrénées generally varied between 16 and 20 francs per square meter. As we have seen, by limiting expropriation strictly to the land covered by the new street, the council forfeited any control over future building programs. Around the Rue des Pyrénées, this strategy also resulted in plots that were difficult to build on due to the gradient in relation to the proposed route of the new street which ran along a contour line. The Lazare brothers considered that the planners' role should have consisted not only in actually laying out the new street, but in facilitating building along the street as had been the case in the center of Paris. L. Lazare also lamented the lack of publicity in relation to the public auctions of land which prevented any competition between potential buyers. Thus, well-informed speculators were in a much stronger position to acquire the new plots at knock-down

28 Masson, E. (1860). *La revue municipale,* No. 332 of 20 March, 1860.

29 *La revue municipale,* articles of Bernage and of L. Lazare, No. 327 of 1 February, 1860; No. 343 of 19 July, 1860; No. 349 of 10 September, 1860; No. 336 of 1 March, 1861; No. 375 of 1 June, 1861; No. 396 of 1 January, 1862.

30 Alphand, dir. (1889).

31 Lazare, Louis (1970), p. 127.

prices which often only slightly exceeded the expropriation indemnities paid out by the council a few years earlier so that no profits were generated on the sales of the new plots. However, the importance of the Rue des Pyrénées was now incontestable. In 1873, when a commission composed of local *notables* was asked to study the route of a metropolitan railroad line linking Paris to its suburbs, they recommended that this should follow the same route as this street. None of the subsequent modifications to the network of surrounding streets (all of which were made post 1871, i.e., after the end of the Second Empire and the Haussmann era), disputed the strategic importance of Rue des Pyrénées and are proof of a remarkable continuity in Parisian municipal planning (Figs. 6.5 and 6.6). This bolstered the local importance of the street and new investment was pumped into enhancing public spaces. However, in certain cases such developments actually slowed down urban development in the street itself.

Take, for example, the project to develop the area around the town hall of the 20th arrondissement. This required larger-than-planned-for expropriation, so on August 14, 1874, the city council decided to approve the acquisition of a site located on Rue du Rat-



Fig. 6.5 Chronology of streets laid out between 1864 and 1871 relating to Rue des Pyrénées, A. Sander on map source: APUR Atelier parisien d'urbanisme and AP Archives de Paris.

Fig. 6.6 Chronology of streets laid out between 1871 and 1889 relating to Rue des Pyrénées, A. Sander on map source: APUR Atelier parisien d'urbanisme and AP Archives de Paris.

rait prolongée (now Rue du Cambodge). On December 4, 1876, an expropriation order for the purpose of widening Rue de la Chine and Rue de Robinson (no longer exists today) was submitted for public review. Neither of the two sites concerned were ever resold as, on January 30, 1877, the council decided to use this land to build a public garden. All of the plots composing the blocks between Rue de la Chine, Rue de la Dhuys (now Avenue Gambetta), Rue du Japon and Rue du Sorbier (now Rue Belgrand) were either expropriated or purchased subject to an amicable settlement. A new order was published on March 7, 1877, providing for the expropriation of the land required to extend Rue du Japon and to close Rue de la Cour des Noues (between Rue Sorbier [now Rue Belgrand] and Rue de la Chine) and Rue du Ratrait (section formerly situated between Rue Sorbier [Rue Belgrand] and Rue des Prairies). This was not implemented immediately as a new modification to the street widening program was submitted for public review on December 10, 1877. It was only then that the plots regrouped by the previous council in and around the new town hall and the Rue de Puebla were put up for sale.

Resistance to plot patterns

Once the plots along Rue de Puebla were put up for sale, the role of private buyers and sellers became crucial. A map of the redrawn plots bears out the important role played by one particular category of property buyers that may be termed "speculators".

Several, sometimes adjacent, plots were bought up by the same owners. The names of Bariquand, Cantagrel and Laubière crop up especially frequently: these three people owned a number of plots on Rue des Pyrénées, some individually and some jointly.[32] Historians are familiar with Bariquand, who was a bailiff by profession, and Laubière, a "property owner", and G. Jacquemet has written a long article about them.[33] Cantagrel, who was an architect and city councilor, only joined them later around the time of the speculative property transactions in the 20th *arrondissement*.

G. Jacquemet's paper provides details of the periods in which speculators were most active. A boom around 1880 undoubtedly fuelled the acquisition of the sites acquired along Rue des Pyrénées, most of which were put up for sale by the council between 1879 and 1881. However, an economic crisis in 1882 resulted in a wave of property sales and foreclosures and most of the sites acquired in 1880 still had not been built upon. The bulk of the property acquired by speculators was sold in 1889 and subsequent sales after 1890 did help to boost building activity; however the whole process helps to explain why development took so long, even after the land had been sold off by the city council.

Another reason was speculators' lack of enthusiasm for these relatively cheap neighborhoods. It was much more profitable to build in wealthier areas where the return on investment was more or less guaranteed. The new building requirements imposed on property developers by Haussmann and his successors (compulsory connection to the sewage system and the water and gas networks, etc.) meant that site costs were nothing compared to construction costs. The development of systems to rent out property with a subsequent promise to sell had a similar impact. Under such schemes, it took the tenant a number of years to pay for the property which meant that, as construction costs were the same in all neighborhoods, it was more advantageous to build on expensive land. As a result, this type of rental scheme was rare in the 20th *arrondissement* where "it must be remembered that, with regard to the value of the land newly-annexed to Paris, local influences were to hold sway over the central influence that resulted from the annexation for a long time to come".[34] For all of these reasons, the development of the Rue des Pyrénées was painfully slow: the street had been laid out but private investors were reluctant to build in this old outlying district of marginal interest.

The plots situated at present day numbers 317 to 341, and 290 to 294 Rue des Pyrénées provide a good example of the consequences of the acquisition of land by such speculators. These plots form the northeastern façade of Rue des Pyrénées along Place du Guignier (Fig. 6.7). Our main source here is the *Journal d'annonces Petites affiches* (jour-

32 Bariquand acquired 17 plots, including two jointly with Cantagrel and one with Laubière. Laubière and Cantagrel acquired four plots and seven plots, respectively, on their own.

33 Jacquemet Gérard.

34 Haussmann André (1863), p. 301.



Plot boundaries and built-on land in 1862.

Plot boundaries and built-on land in 1989.

Plot boundaries and built-on land in 1903.

Northeast façade of the Place du Guignier in 1989, with contemporary street numbering.

Fig. 6.7 Place du Guignier, northeast façade A Sander on map source: APUR Atelier parisien d'urbanisme, BHVP Bibliothèque historique de la Ville de Paris, AP Archives de Paris and AN Archives nationales.

nal of small legal announcements), consulted for the period in question at the Bibliothèque historique de la Ville de Paris (BHVP: Historical Library of the City of Paris).

As we have already seen, this square was built using surplus expropriated land. The plots situated at numbers 317 to 341 Rue des Pyrénées (plot numbers 13 to 19 in the plan of the redrawn plots, Fig. 6.4, plots numbered from left to right) were sold by the council between 1880 and 1886, at the same time as most of the plots expropriated under the order of December 15, 1864. Plots 13 to 16 were acquired by Cantagrel on his own, while plots 17 and 19 were purchased jointly by Bariquand and Cantagrel. In fact, Cantagrel had previously acquired land opposite these plots, on the other side of the street. In other circumstances, all such land acquired by a single buyer around a public square could have been used for a private housing development, regulated or otherwise. In actual fact, the land remained idle and the plot at 337 Rue des Pyrénées (number 13 in the plan) was split into two plots and auctioned off on March 10, 1896. We do not know if there were any takers but a little later, on April 27, 1897, it was once again put up for auction, this time together with all of the plots we have just described. This land still had not been

Fig. 6.8 Place du Guignier, North-East façade (credit: A. Sander).

built upon 17 years after it was first put up for sale by the city council! The only exception is the plot located at number 339 (number 12 in the plan of the redrawn plots) which has housed a seven-story building since 1896. This was one of the plots acquired by Cantagrel in 1880, and we do not know whether he sold it again or let it out in the intervening years. The plots located at numbers 337 and 341 were once again sold by auction on July 1, 1902.

These plots now contain very heterogeneous buildings despite having been redrawn by the council prior to resale (Fig. 6.8). The dwelling at number 317 has one story, while number 331 consists of a two-story building dating from 1909. This plot, owned by a certain Pinton, was resold on March 24, 1908, even though the owner had just connected it to the sewage system with a view to putting up a six-story building. It was the new owner, Bruelle (or Brucelle?), who built the aforementioned building that survives today. Number 333 is an eight-story structure built in 1907 by the same Pinton. Number 335 consists of just one story, while number 337 comprises eight stories and was put up in 1905 by Philippon, architect and owner of the site. As regards number 341, which currently houses a five-story building, it was sold by legal auction on July 11, 1914, while building work at the site was in progress.

An analysis of other plots that now house buildings of just one or two stories provides an understanding of the role of the owners of what were previously plots of rural land, and who, following the small-scale expropriation that accompanied the street-building program, suddenly owned property along a brand new street. As they could not raise the sums necessary to put up an appropriately-sized building, many chose to construct small structures containing a store on the ground floor and an apartment above. Such plots

house similar structures to those built on sites acquired by individuals of modest means once the speculators had gone bust, i.e., low-rise buildings reserved for the private use of their tradesmen or artisan owners or let out in small apartments. In one case where the plot was quite large, the owner simply developed it as a single site (Cité Leroy) containing small individual houses (which have survived and are now in huge demand) Thus we can see how the initial decision to limit expropriation to a strict minimum combined with the low value of the land to produce urban forms that were highly atypical in a newly laid out Haussmannien street.

It is also very important to understand the planning regulations in force during the initial phases of development as these had a significant impact on the buildings that eventually came to line the street. They explain why building development on the Rue des Pyrénées, which lagged behind the initial street building program, was blocked in certain cases by new regulations. Let us take just one example: the stripsof land that are almost perpendicular to the street and for which the Rue des Pyrénées provided an outlet. These plots were not immediately built upon and sometimes had some of their width trimmed in subsequent sales (e.g., numbers 318 and 316). If there is a construction project at the far end of a pre-existing plot, i.e., behind the street, this may limit the permitted height of buildings on the street itself. However, this is not enough to freeze the urban landscape. When the plots increase in value sufficiently, the acquisition of all of the plots in question can obviate the effects of this type of planning regulation and facilitate more profitable real estate development (the case of number 312).

Section conclusions

This third section has highlighted the manner in which development first had to be preceded by the constitution of a network of roads organized around Rue des Pyrénées (the case of Place Gambetta). While the creation of such a network initially held up the sale of plots, it was also an essential part of the process, as developing the land around Place Gambetta only became profitable once these new avenues had been laid out, thus linking it to the gateways to the new Paris (Porte de Bagnolet and Porte des Lilas) and to the center of town (via Place de la République).

We have also pointed up the important role played by speculators in the appearance of a street. Their actions have an impact on both the prime potential building sites and the rhythm of development. When the plots along Rue des Pyrénées were put up for sale in the 1880s, many were acquired by speculators who had no intention of building at that particular time. We have also shown how the low value of the land was an obstacle to development. The negative investment environment put the sites "on hold" for 20 odd years and it was not until the beginning of the 20th century that new investors were willing to erect buildings of appropriate quality on them.

The actions of local property owners who forfeited land that lay along the actual path of the new street to expropriation also need to be taken into account. Their strategies varied widely and resulted in contrasting urban forms depending on whether or not they tried to make the most of the opportunity offered by the creation of the Rue des Pyrénées. Some built a house for their own use while others found the means to construct an appropriately-sized building, thus benefiting from the new outlet available for

their site. Others sat on their plots and waited for them to increase in value so they could sell them at a profit. Some built a small housing development on their site as we saw in the case of Cité Leroy. Each of these options has been a victim of the vagaries of time: once the city expanded and required more densely constructed structures, the small houses were demolished and replaced by more economically profitable buildings; when the neighborhood became more middle-class, the small houses needed to be preserved.

We have also shown how neither the initial choices of planners nor the regulations subsequently applied are sufficient to push a city planning project through to completion. The pre-existing context and any subsequent changes, as well as the actions of private investors also play a crucial role. Nevertheless, the possibilities made available by planning or planning regulations should not be neglected: investors may choose whether to or not to make the most of these, thus the importance of assisting projects by providing other types of incentives.

Overall conclusion

At the time of Haussmann, new streets were laid out in order to transform the city in as short a time as possible, and not merely to service plots of land or link a pair of monuments. This is borne out by the obligation to build within a year that was frequently imposed on buyers of new plots that had been redrawn by the council.

However, certain streets, such as Rue des Pyrénées in Paris, still have not been completed nearly 150 years after they were laid out. By incomplete, we mean "in a state of perpetual construction": these streets continue to evolve and to change in line with changes in the city and its planning regulations. This research has shown the extent to which an urban object and product of planning is rooted firmly in the territory. It has highlighted the factors that underpin resistance to this planning and the limits to planners' roles. Finally, it has demonstrated how the new street, as an urban object, is gradually absorbed by the city over the long term[35], so that it becomes an indissociable part[36], but it still experiences difficulties in its development that are important to highlight.

In actual fact, we have highlighted the extent of the interaction between "top-down" planning actions and the "bottom-up" choices of the property owners in the production of the newly-laid out street. We are dealing with genuine co-production of a city which explains why the production process itself is so long and non-linear. Following in the tracks of the putative Haussmannien bulldozer, the tiny actions of the former, partially expropriated owners or the speculators that snapped up the newly created plots were of considerable importance. They combined with public action (which is itself framed by

35 Braudel Fernand (1969) and Fortier, Bruno (1984), p. 119: "This dimension of time is probably the only "place" where we can observe—far removed from showcase city planning projects—the "micro-city-planning know-how that has made it possible to deal with this reality and to blend these fragments together without merely aggregating them".

36 Fortier Bruno, *idem*, p. 112, shows how the traces of the urban phenomena, housing developments, newly laid out streets and grandiose projects actually exist only in the map of Paris that he is analyzing (*le Vasserot*): they have been subsumed into a much more dense and indiscernible structure."

expropriation regulations) to produce a huge variety of specific urban forms. Thus, if we want to understand these forms, it is crucial to analyze not merely the planning environment, and this goes for both a micro-plot-based analysis and a study of the route of the project as a whole. True, the route of the new street is in principle determined wholly by the planners but, as Halbwachs points out, "in spite of their authoritarian approach and a desire to leave their mark on the project, those tasked with laying out new streets have had to take the social requirements expressed within the city itself on board, and their action merely implements the procedures and details of the project without changing or counteracting the influence of collective forces.[37] Thus, we have shown how the layout of Rue des Pyrénées can be traced back to the projects presented by several local *notables*. We have also seen how, in certain cases, the routes of planned streets were modified prior to completion for financial reasons or local considerations.

The manner in which this combination of actions by one or other group actually produces the forms observed can only be fully appreciated when the decisions of each party are placed in their own specific spatial and temporal context in relation to the location in question. The public actions and choices of property owners in Paris' wealthy city center and in its peripheral districts were not the same. They also depended on economic circumstances: financial crises had the potential to "freeze" the development of plots of land, sometimes for years. When studying these plots in detail we observe that the first few years of a project are crucial in determining urban forms. Although the link established by Haussmannien city planning between building construction and plot patterns facilitated the substitution of buildings and the development of the cityscape in principle, in reality it became difficult to develop plots that were not built on in the first few years: construction of buildings at the far end of a pre-existing plot leading to planning restrictions on buildings giving onto the street itself; apertures for daylight that cannot be removed subsequently, etc.

The reticular dimension of operations is also very important in terms of how quickly they are completed: private investors only become interested in one-off, isolated operations once they make sense in relation to the city as a whole (e.g., if they have been linked via new thoroughfares), as we have seen with Place Gambetta, which attracted interest from investors only once it was linked to the city center (via Avenue de la République) and to the gateways of Paris (via Rue Belgrand and Avenue Gambetta). This last conclusion bears out the findings of research into contemporary public transport networks: developing the areas around city railway stations as proposed in a number of *SCOTS*[38] requires a skilful articulation of the spatial and temporal dimensions affected by the relationship between long-distance flows and local spaces.[39]

37 Halbwachs, Maurice (1977), p. 337.

38 *Schémas de COhérence Territoriale* (guidelines for coherent territorial development), which have replaced development blueprints under the Urban Solidarity and Renewal Law of December 13, 2000.

39 For a summary, see: Zembri Pierre (1997).

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Chapter 7

Innovation in "Urbanism" Thinking: Spectrum and Limit

Adriana Rabinovich

Introduction

Over the past 20 years changes in urban planning and its translation into new instruments for urban projects and management have been observed in numerous cities throughout the world. The approaches resulting from this transformation process are often labelled "innovative", "strategic planning" and "advocacy planning" feature prominently in Europe and Latin America, along with "communicative planning", the "urban project" approach and "problem-centred planning" or the Local Agenda 21 strategies that have been drawn up throughout the world since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, which is also known as the Earth Summit.

It could be assumed that the character of the innovation derives from a critical stance on previous, more traditional approaches to urban problems. However, over and above the dilemma of differentiating between traditional and new, which has played a constant role in the transformation in urban planning, since the late 20th century innovation appears to be adjusting to a need to link heterogeneous players, diverse scales and multiple dimensions. More broadly, while reworking ways in which to imagine the city and act accordingly, innovation sets us on a meandering path of ideas and off in shifting directions.

Although various writers have analyzed changes in urban planning in terms of paradigm shifts, Taylor (2005) warns of the risks of applying Kuhn's concept to urban planning. On the one hand, it is not possible to identify scientific changes in a field which has difficulty gaining recognition as scientific in the strict sense and, on the other hand, the notion of "paradigm shifts" lends credence to development in which "a whole way of perceiving and explaining some aspect of the world is overthrown and replaced by a new theoretical perspective". Furthermore, although relevant changes can be identified in urban planning theories, it is not possible to assert that new theories have definitively and unanimously replaced previous ones, but rather that the different approaches coexist in

time (Taylor, 2005: 69,157). In more practical terms, Portas (2004: 221) puts forward the view that, even though the planning crisis has been diagnosed for two or three decades, throughout this period, its formal or legal system based on the hegemony of structuring plans has not undergone major change in most European cities. These partial or global territorial plans have retained both their technical or conceptual characteristics and their implementation methods and processes. Peter Hall has a similar opinion but adopts an explanatory perspective, stating that ideas as "products of human intelligence derive from others, branch out, fuse, lie dormant or awakened in exceedingly complex ways, which seldom permit of any neat linear description". (Hall, 2005: 5). Indeed, this complex web of continuity and rupture is woven from accumulated experience and epistemological transformations and is relative to changing contexts behind the different ways of thinking and acting. Within this framework, when questions are asked about who does and/or should change cities, on what scales intervention should be made and how the capacities, tools and values of experts and non-experts are defined, the answers begin to display multiple nuances.

Despite these warnings, a distinction may be made between the knowledge and experimentation of the inter-war period, the experience gained in the aftermath of reconstruction after the Second World War, when what was initially urbanism became urban planning in the strict sense, and the profound crisis of the 1970s that opened up new directions. And while it appeared that during a historic moment of great crisis in planning the plan-project, technician-resident and global-local oppositions could prevail, as a result of increasing complexity these polarities gradually diminished towards the close of the 20th century.

In this contribution[1] we intend to examine the main perspectives associated with these issues, reviewing some of the topics that have arisen as problems in urban planning over the past decade. The point should be made that these reflections do not constitute a presentation of the state of the art, but represent instead operative reflections that have emerged within the framework of an ongoing international comparative research project[2], in which self-proclaimed "innovative and sustainable" urban interventions are analyzed in different countries. This international comparison has made it possible to identify major similarities and differences between the various interventions and their contexts and

1 Our sincere thanks go to Alicia Novick for her critical reading and advice on the development of this chapter. We would also like to note that we have adopted many of the arguments developed by her in Novick 2003, 2004 and 2007. Special thanks to Dshamila Toscani and David Neal for their help with the linguistic quality of the text.

2 The research project "Innovative decision-making processes in sustainable urban projects" is being conducted under the direction of Dr. Adriana Rabinovich (Laboratory of Urban Sociology, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne) and Professor Andrea Catenazzi (Universidad General Sarmiento, Buenos Aires) as part of the National Center of Competence in Research North-South (NCCR N-S), cofounded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation http://nccr-ns.epfl.ch/. Case studies are being carried out at local level under the direction of: Dr Alicia Novick (Universidad General Sarmiento in Argentina); Patricia Rodriguez Alomá and Dr Carlos García Pleyán (Master Plan of the Office of the Historian of Old Havana and Local Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Cuba); Yongtanit Pimonsatean (Regional Centre for Archaeology and Fine Arts, Southeast Asian Ministers of Education in Thailand).

posed many of the questions on which this paper is based. The two main questions that arise here concern the themes that emerged as problems in the programmes and projects analyzed and the ways in which the ideas regarding the city and urbanism were created and disseminated at the different latitudes.

Responding to these questions presented considerable difficulties. First, although speaking of global development in any field raises complex issues, broad international trends can be identified in urbanism. Referring to the capitalist world, for example, Ward (2002: 395) shows that there has been a common international discourse in urban planning but with significant variations in emphasis.[3] Therefore, the reconstruction and understanding of both the original concepts and the nature of the translations in different and particular contexts would appear to be a fundamental requirement.[4] The second difficulty, which is typical of any historical review, is that of periodicity. As we have said, the examination of the transformations in urbanism does not produce a precise linear chronology: each context reveals specific temporalities.

These dilemmas generate two clusters of issues. On the one hand, there is a need to revisit the theories, key authors and experiences to demonstrate what was at stake in the various historical scenarios. At the same time, it is important to understand how ways of thinking and acting in urbanism were "translated" in different geographical areas. As Pierre Bourdieu says, ideas travel without their context, which is why they can be read and interpreted in the light of the different realities in which they are received. On the other hand, the hazy temporalities of emergent, appearing and disappearing ideas, which are reformulated with explicit or subjacent logics that are not always easy to grasp, should be considered.

From this point of view, this text makes no claim to exhaustiveness and presents a rough interpretative panorama of the urban planning debate while also offering a tool for positioning our current research project in this area. It should be mentioned that we owe many of our interpretations to Taylor (2005), who succeeded in presenting a thought-provoking overview of the dilemmas in the field of urban planning theory.

To illustrate our concerns, we propose to differentiate between three problem-related moments in time: in the section on "urbanism as a modern project" we will review some of the dilemmas that were dealt with in the first decades of the 20th century and after the Second World War, when urban planning tried to establish itself as a field capable of interrelating technical, political and social dimensions. These principles were challenged in the climate of "loss of certitude" characteristic of the post-1960s period. In this context, we will refer to the changes related to the procedures of an urbanism conceived in terms of modern policy (formulation/implementation, technicians/politicians, state/market) and of the sphere of new actors, tools and themes.

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3 In some cases, although international trends have arisen in response to local concerns (generally those of Western countries), many or even the majority of them have been transplanted—not always successfully, to other countries in the North and in the South (Hall, 2005).

4 This is particularly important as our research project ultimately aims to formulate recommendations on how to extend and replicate innovative strategies developed in particular contexts.

Urbanism as a modern project

Urbanism and urban planning

The conditions of the emergence of a new field of knowledge and practices concerning the city have been amply treated by various authors. On the one hand, on the basis of words and their scope the term urbanism was examined (dependent on Cerdá's neologism) and taken up once again by French specialists, then recovered by the English-speaking world with its traditional connotation of urbanity. This notion was used for the first time in the 1930s, in the sense of "lifestyles" (Wirth, 1938). And while town planning, city planning and urban planning were the commonly used terms in English, it is not by chance that at the end of the 1980s, "new urbanism" was adopted, thanks to North American thinking, as a notion evolving towards a theoretical and political critique of the city and urban planning (Ward, 2002). This term was established by those suggesting a return to the norms and forms of urban art, of the "made in USA" civic art of the early 20th century, in the sense of the tradition of urban design or even urban landscape. Therefore, the new urbanism describes an architectural practice linked to the "communitarian" urban composition (Katz, 1994), through more livable towns and neighborhoods, but also through a search for quality in design which had been watered down by the abstraction of the tools of urban planning after the second world war.

Above and beyond recovering terminology and the recent attempts to rethink the form of the city, urbanism was a field of knowledge with practices based on various assumptions. Firstly, a concept of the Enlightenment—the relationship between space and society—had enabled the city to grow as an object of study and action during the 19th century.[5] Insofar as it was supposed that the city could be the object of scientific diagnosis and technical procedures by specialists, one also imagined the possibility of constructing the city as a field of operation restricted to those familiar with and able to act on such bases. The profile of the specialist, the urban planner—in the metaphoric sense of the "doctor of the agglomeration" or the "orchestra conductor"—was that of the person who provided rational assessments and advice to politicians and acted as an educator for society. The scale of intervention of these "plans" based on a diagnosis that took into account the "laws" governing growth, intervention "projects" that qualified space, "regulations" that ordered private activity and growth varied, even though the town council provided a significant step towards their implementation. The pro-urbanism movement in the interwar period initiated a series of outreach activities that helped legitimize a field with weak epistemological foundations.

How then was the modern city conceived, starting from this disciplinary project? Centrally, as pointed out by Bernado Secchi (1989), urbanism attempted to use new tools in order to deal with the problems stemming from the threefold metropolitan expansion of traditional cities growing outward (extra-muros growth), inward (densification that should

[5] Urban planning experts argue that as an intellectual and professional movement, 20th century city planning essentially represents a reaction to the problems of the 19th century city. Pioneers' concerns were based on the plight of the millions of poor people trapped in the Victorian slums (Hall, 2005; Taylor, 2005; Ward, 2002).

dovetail with integration) and towards the future (through the formulation of projects). Within this framework, the mission of the plan document was to balance the space and function of a city that had been profoundly altered by the Industrial Revolution. Based on the enormous trust bestowed on scientific positivism, the multiple dimensions of the modern plan were examined as an "urban file". "Urbanistic evolution" studies were seen as components of this diagnosis, whose aim was to identify the laws underlying the growth of cities, which were viewed as inputs for the formulation of renovation proposals.

As Novick explains in *City Planning and Urban History*, (2007)[6] based on various references, it is clear that the concept of urban planning, along with the field of knowledge and practices it attempted to limit, was not exempt from reinterpretation and ambiguity. The explanation of the word itself, present in a series of texts and pamphlets entitled "What is Urbanism?" and published in the 1920s and 1930s, was one of the strategies used to standardize the terminology, concepts, methods and tools, and it legitimized the new field of knowledge. Indeed, the arguments and iconography form part of outreach and communication strategies in response to the programmed objectives of a movement that hoped to achieve widespread consensus, concerning the methodologies of a discipline established on a weak conceptual basis and the vague concerns of the urban planner's brief.

Neither the natural sciences nor the social sciences that were being developed in the 1920s and 1930's were able to provide sufficiently solid epistemological references to link the dimensions of science, art and technique, present in the definition of urbanism, into a relationship. In a desire to define the urban planner's field of action, an attempt was made to ground diagnosis in an articulation of the advances in statistics, human geography and scientific methodology. However, it can be perceived that urbanism appeared not only as a solution to the social and spatial problems of the modern city but also as an outlook that redefined and created the problems to answer them, starting from the available solutions. In the first few decades of the century, alongside the implementation of a new written and graphic language, a new agenda (a problematic territory) was created that mediated between the "imbalances of the city" (new demographic, social, economic and technical considerations), the diagnoses that made it possible to identify them and the "formulation of answers" (tools and manners of management and intervention) (Novick, 2007).

To understand the urban planning movement it is important to note that in most urbanized nations, since the 1920s, and especially since the 1950s, planning has become a craft acquired through formal education in universities and polytechnics, and a substantial theoretical corpus has been built up over time. While a part of this theory strives to understand the practical techniques and methodologies that planners will always need, some planners seek to understand the very nature of the activity they practise (Hall, 2005; Taylor, 2005). While the former were described as theories *of* planning, the latter will be defined as theories *in* planning (Faludi, 1973).

With regard to this debate, one must consider that as a form of social action directed at shaping the physical environment, urban planning is impelled by certain moral, political and aesthetic values. This implies that the purposes or aims that drive urban planning entail studying the values that underpin urbanism, i.e., a normative theory of what con-

6 We are taking up her arguments as they give an account of the alternatives of the names, the concept and the construction of the field of urbanism.

stitutes the ideal urban environment that urban planning should try to achieve. Normative theories should therefore refer to both the kinds of environment that town planning is seeking to create—substantive theories—and to those theories that deal with how to approach urban planning as a practical activity, i.e. procedural ones. At the same time, one must also consider that procedural theories cannot be dissociated from more substance-based theories, as there are players representing values of what is considered urban behind urban practices. Hence, any decision-making process in urbanism, any choice of what is seen as the most appropriate alternative action, is above all a value-based consideration (Taylor, 2005). In addition to this affirmation, the history of urbanism reveals a growing gap between theory and practice in most countries around the world.

In some ways, and returning to Novick's analysis, it is possible to see the advances of urbanism as constellations where technical ideas interlink with professional methods of action and forms of state regulation and intervention. In turn, these influence technical, political and social agendas, as they are not categories but rather historically developed concepts that have been redefined over time and in relation to different realities. However, these crafts of urbanism have been based on the articulation of knowledge—much broader than theories as it also refers to systematized experience—and practices (Claude, 2006). The term was therefore initially put forward to refer to problems inherent to industrial cities, in an imaginary line stretching from tradition to modernity. After the 1960s, which marked the end of centralized planning, urban planning was rejected, as it was identified with a technocratic product that failed to factor in the processes of "urbanization".

Modernization, industrialization, urbanization

Historically, in the field of urbanism two great moments are recognized in the period following the second world war. The first is qualified by the equation between "modernization, industrialization-urbanization—", characterized by faith in the rationality of the plans. The second was defined when it was believed that, with the trend models, a scientific reference had been found for the discipline.

Some theorists examine different prevailing concepts of the nature of urban planning as a discipline, or, in other words, the different views on what kind of activity urban planning is or should be. A historical overview shows that for almost 20 years following the Second World War—a period described as the Golden Age—urban planning theory and practice in most western European countries was dominated by the view that urban planning was an exercise in the physical design of an entire town or at least part of it.[7] This approach was underpinned by physical determinism, i.e., the idea that the physical form of buildings and environment could affect or determine, social and economic life. Consequently, urban planning at the city or regional level was frequently described as physical planning as opposed to social and economic planning. It was therefore assumed

[7] In fact, the urbanism approach, strongly influenced by modernist utopias, was characterized until the late 1950s by attempts to build ideal new towns based on different models (such as Howard Garden Cities or the Radiant City of Le Corbusier, for example). Whereas the Radiant City represented the ideal modernistic town, the model for the city of the future, the Garden City reflected the wish to return to nature, hence a certain anti-urban aestheticism and resistance to modernizing change.

that the activity was carried out primarily by architects. Indeed, town planning was deemed an extension of architecture, on a larger scale of the physical design. Working on the basis of this assumption, urban designers' primary task was the production of master plans for urban forms, which had to be as detailed as possible in order to guide and control the future development of an ideal city.

In the early 1960s, this perspective was replaced by a vision of towns as systems of interrelated activities and places in a constant state of flux. On the one hand, systems theory originated in the highly technical fields of cybernetics, where the modelling of systemic relationships using statistical and mathematical techniques was seen as necessary to control systems, and also had a strong impact on other disciplines, such as geography. On the other hand, systems theory was inspired by ecological thinking describing natural phenomena as an "ecosystem" (Mc Loughlin, 1969). A paradigm shift can thus be clearly observed between the 1950s and 1960s.

While town planning was seen primarily as a craft and a technical practice until the 1950s, by the end of the 1960s most theorists considered that it should be seen as a science in its own right (Hall, 2005; Taylor, 2005). This approach led to the criticism that urban planners, focused on the design of ideal utopian settlements, lacked an adequate understanding of urban phenomena, particularly as far as social and economic dynamics were concerned. At the same time, urban systems theory was driven by wider technological and sociological factors, which were applied to analyze the interrelated urban phenomena.[8] Urban planning became a matter for not only engineers and geographers but also for social scientists and economists. In practice, systems planners were involved in two different kinds of activities: as social scientists observing and analyzing reality; and as designers acting on reality to bring about change and dealing with other professionals, politicians and the public in general.

However, both were trained to analyze and understand not only how cities functioned spatially but also how they were linked to their regions in economic and social terms, a factor which introduced the idea of regional planning. In this approach, cities remain subordinate to regions.[9] At the same time, it was felt that urban planners had to be capable of evaluating the probable effects of any development proposal. Therefore, master plans as an end-state of an ideal urban development were questioned. Urban systems theories, emphasizing activities, dynamics and change, needed the development of more flexible and evolving plans, envisaged as "trajectories" (McLoughlin, 1969) and enabling an ongoing process of monitoring, analysis and intervention in fluid situations. These plans were intended to be strategic economic, social and physical documents.

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8 As an example, the idea that a good city should be based on functional ordering principles (different functions organized and contained in specific geographical areas linked by motorway arteries), gave way to the recognition of the mixture of uses, an intricate and fine-grained diversity of uses in constant mutual support, both economically and socially as a precondition for a good city (Jacobs, 1961).

9 In 1915, the pioneer planner Geddes wrote of cities and their regions as functioning entities. However, apart from his writings on the need to do surveys prior to planning (precursors of the rational process view of planning), Geddes's ideas remained marginal throughout the first half of the 20th century, which continued to be dominated by architectural ideas (Taylor, 2005: 62).

Planning schemes were formulated using the assumption that the scientific methods and forecast models were able to provide reliable references for the political decisions that drove the operations on the territory. Their input consisted of the explanatory laws on urban development, the study of structural factors, functional relationships and the ways of organizing activities in space. Within this context, centralized state decisions concerning territory and the need for expert technicians who were capable of establishing diagnoses and taking action served to promote the establishment of national planning bodies.

Nevertheless, the concept of town planning as physical design has not been entirely discredited. Although it was marginalized for over 20 years, in practice the physical form and aesthetic remained significant at the level of local planning that has been applied in more immediate interventions, while at the more strategic and long-term level urban planning has been driven by a systems view.

As a synthesis, starting from the aspects we have presented so far, which are rooted in the 19th century, urbanism developed as a field of knowledge and set of practices that viewed the city as an object for study, intervention and control. This was under the responsibility of specialists capable of streamlining intervention as well as that of state oversight bodies that possessed the competencies to transform not only space but also society, through policies, plans and projects. After the 1960s, however, these statements came up against their limits. From different vantage points, the following limitations became clear: firstly, those of a field not considered strictly scientific and which claimed validity on the basis of a multitude of sometimes contradictory disciplines and arguments; secondly, those of technicians claiming to take on a neutral role in their actions; thirdly, those of a society whose knowledge about its habitat was not factored into decision-making processes, and finally, those of a state that had to reconcile its actions with the logic of the market. The critical climate of the 1960s developed in opposition to these limitations.

Loss of certainty

Towards the late 1960s, the changing trends that characterized the new cycle of the post-industrial city challenged the deeper basis of the planning ideas characteristic of the post-war boom years. Little by little new visions of solutions for the city developed, while its problems and views were changing. Both urbanism and the scientific view of the environment as a system, coupled with the application of a rational process view of planning[10], were part of the European "modernist" optimism of the 1960s regarding the use of science and reason (Rabinovich, 2002; Taylor, 2005; Hall, 2005). Nevertheless, based on a series of theoretical and empirical studies, strong criticism arose at the end of the decade against comprehensive planning and system planning, both of which ignored political reality.[11] An analysis of American cities revealed that comprehensive planning and systems plan-

[10] The rational process strove for an understanding of the planning process itself. The approach was to consider town planning as an ongoing process involving several stages. During the whole process it is possible to return to any stage to review the actions, the view of the problems or to consider new alternatives not previously defined, as the planning process never ends but involves a continuous action.

[11] Those studies were based either on philosophical right- or left-wing urban political scientists' works, linked to the process of democratization of public decisions and inhabitants' participation in the 1960s.

ning had done nothing to improve the condition of cities, especially the living conditions of poor inner-city communities. At the same time, planners in Europe[12] acknowledged that the ring of new towns built around London, for example, and also in the inner areas of many cities, had transformed the urban fabric.

The demographic decline, production transformations and the new issues in inner cities created a very different vision for the discipline. The Club of Rome acknowledged this new set of circumstances by publishing its report *The Limits of Growth* (1972). The limits of growth that were assumed to be a continuous process, the actions of the state that was gradually changing in size, and an urban system whose configuration was changing also revealed the impossibility of resolving issues using traditional tools. The new reality, together with the new perspectives for analysis that attempted to explain them, modified the objects and the objectives of the studies. Thus, the basis for centralized planning based on scientific methods and provisional development models was disputed from various points of view. As far as Marxism was concerned, planners, their proposals and state action were seen as the result of capitalism or as the emergence of unrelated utopian illusions disconnected from social and spatial reality (Hall, 2005). In the academic field, the focus switched from physical planning to the consideration of social and economic factors. Faced with the limited ability of state action to provide solutions, research was undertaken with the aim of analyzing the social players, the structural factors intervening in the modalities of urbanization, the social movements and the local power.

Hall caricatured this paradigm shift: "In 1955, the typical newly graduated planner was at the drawing-board, producing a diagram of desired land uses; in 1965, she or he was analyzing computer output of traffic patterns; in 1975, the same person was talking late into the night with community groups, in an attempt to organize against hostile forces in the world outside." (Hall, 2005: 366).

The Stockholm Conference of 1973 endorsed the environmental dimension while the Vancouver Conference of 1976 on "human settlements" introduced new terms, such as the all-inclusive concept of "habitat". In a semiotic reading presented in 1965, which questioned the holism of specialized solutions, Françoise Choay considered "urbanism as one of the Utopias of the industrial city". In the same vein, Jane Jacobs (1961) reinstated the value of the street and the urban community which had been destroyed by modernity, Henri Lefebvre claimed "the right to the city" in 1968 while anthropology stressed the perception of inhabitants as a kind of collective knowledge. For its part, in line with the initial questions posed by Team X, the field of architecture redefined itself on a new basis with the aim of recovering the leading role that urban planning had stolen from it. In the same context, but in a different way involving the juxtaposition of a mixed bag of French authors from the field of human geography and urban planning historians, in La Arquitectura de la Ciudad (1965), Aldo Rossi endorsed the traditional forms by linking them to urban memory and converting the morphology of cities into a project input. On the basis of these multiple references, heritage rehabilitation operations emerged and the constructed context of cities was transformed into data for the formulation of projects.

12 Particularly in countries like England, France, Belgium, Spain and Switzerland, among others.

In other words, the historical urbanism debate illustrates how urban planning theory has evolved over nearly half a century. Basically, wide-ranging and extensive criticism was directed at traditional planning, intervention modes and, in particular, the management of urban space. This criticism was based on different theoretical, epistemological, ideological and contextual arguments, and was primarily driven by the quest to integrate the social, economic and political realities of intervention contexts and to include more actors in decision-making processes (Healey, 1997; Bolay *et al.*, 2000). The principles that had previously served as a basis for urbanism were questioned from different perspectives.

The contributions from cultural studies, sociology and political science, the environmental sciences and architecture left their mark. Along with the consideration of social actors and their capacities, increasing emphasis was placed on the importance of participation in the planning process. Decentralization strategies found their place in a new political science that challenged centralized decision-making modes. On a broader scale, environmental issues and the status of natural resources became priority issues. These shifts reflect the transition from planning to management and the dilemmas that resulted from the problematic equation of the whole versus the parts and the global versus the local, which initially emerged as opposites but would later become connected.

Oppositions and interconnections

Urbanism became established as one of the dimensions of modern policy development in the inter-war period. In conjunction with the tools of intervention and control such as the plan, the new policies signposted the role of municipal authorities and the state as actors in the expansion of cities. In this context, urbanism appeared as one of the vectors behind the major shift in the relationship between public and private, state and society, technical rationalizations and political decision-making. In the post-war period, spatial planning provisions were mainly devoted to centralized spaces where technical competence assumed a substantive leading role. The planning offices that were attached to the central administration and the gradual adoption of trend models requiring specific methodologies and capacities both helped to establish the figure of the specialist. However, the notion of a process of rational planning, the appropriate role of the state and the controversial relations between political rationales and technical neutrality underwent structural revision.

Planning versus implementation: criticism of the method

Within this context, many of the theories that supported urbanism as a science and field of practical intervention were challenged.

First, there was a need to rethink the alternatives to the rational process view of planning that emerged during the 1960s and were analyzed by Taylor.[13] To begin with,

[13] The author feels that although some scholars describe systems and rational planning together (as both share the concept of the environment as an interrelated system of activities and places), these two theories are conceptually distinct (Taylor, 2005: 59-73).

the plans considered as rational decision-making processes appeared to highlight significant differences as compared with earlier plans.[14] Nonetheless, throughout the 1970s the debates also revealed their limits. On the one hand, given the extremely complex character of the issues to be resolved, together with the fact that decisions are generally taken on the basis of persuasive arguments driven by the values of diverse groups of actors, decisions in urbanism are rarely based on rational choices. As such, the numerous facets of these debates open up a series of key questions linked to decision-making processes, be they rational or not, i.e., who decides what constitutes an issue and, above all, how should issues that will actually be addressed be prioritized? The same logic applies to the quest for solutions: who decides on the appropriate solutions and based on which criteria?

In the light of these new dilemmas, it was generally considered that the emphasis placed on procedural theories had prompted urban planners to neglect to reflect on the real problems to be solved. Yet at the same time no one questioned the purpose of urbanism, avoiding references to the impact of interventions. The real nature of the theory and procedures was challenged, and it was deemed essential to conceive of urbanism as a practice and to base it on empirical research, including an analysis of how plans and policies were or were not implemented. From the standpoint of the implementation theorists, planners had to be concerned with the real world of action planners and policy-makers, who might themselves become more effective actors and implementers by gaining an understanding of the implementation process in itself: the theory of planning should be the theory of planning in practice. Accordingly, questions were raised, whether planning should be seen as a problem-solving exercise or whether its role was to satisfy objectives and the nature of the relationship between planning and implementation.[15] At the same time, attention was paid to plans and policymaking and to policy and plan evaluation. Also raised were questions about whether or not planning was an independent activity, whether it should be analyzed in relation to the socio-economic and political system within which it developed and in which many players operated outside the public sector, and how its foundations could be established.

Some of the answers emerged in implementation theories—action-centred theories—in the 1980s, with alternative perspectives on the relationship between policy and action. While some authors believed that they were two separate but interdependent phases, although not sequential as in a rational view of planning, others continued to stress the need to combine planning and action. Thus, policymaking would be seen as part of the action or implementation rather than something that precedes action. If development proposals depend upon the acceptance of proposals and the will to invest (generally by the private sector in capitalist societies), they cannot be considered in the final phase of planning, leading to a risk that they may never be implemented. The establishment of

14 Rational process as a continuous process represents a significant break with the traditional design-based view of urban planning and, in particular, the rejection of blueprint planning.

15 For more information on this aspect, please consult the research done by Faludi and Needham, as applied by Taylor (2005).

plans and policies as well as implementation alternatives should all be analyzed simultaneously (Friedmann, 1969).[16]

Implementation theories soon brought up a second issue, as theorists posited that effective implementation required interpersonal skills such as communication and negotiation. Planners had to learn how to cooperate with the market system and the developers of the private sector and how to negotiate with different players and groups. Towards the 1990s, this view of planning as a communication and negotiation process led to the development of "communicative action planning" (Sager, 1994; Healey, 1997).[17] Pragmatically speaking, working with different players and particularly with the market meant compromising public planning ideals to achieve something that would not otherwise be achieved. This pragmatism drew harsh criticism in the area of urbanism, which continues to this day. It was felt that taking care of the problems of action with the aim of ensuring its implementation could compromise the critical questioning as to which proposals should be implemented, how priorities are set and by whom, and finally who the beneficiaries are, as well as how to ensure that interventions do not exacerbate social inequality.

Technical neutrality versus political stance

In this context, some planning theorists warned that plans and planning decisions should be based on value judgements concerning the kind of environment it is desirable to create, arguing that urban protests reflected the fact that these judgments were political rather than technical or scientific. This approach broke with the assumption that planning was a matter for professional planners, be they architects, engineers, geographers or economists. In fact, criticism was based on the assumption that until this time, urban planners acted as technical experts who developed their own, supposedly apolitical values.

At this point, some urban experts felt that planners needed to inform the public of alternatives, compel consideration of underlying values and force public planning agencies to compete for support, i.e., to become advocacy planners (Davidoff, 1965).[18] Planners

16 A first step in rational planning was made by the development of disjointed incremental planning, which was put forward as a more realistic account of what the process of planning was like and could be in practice. Nevertheless, this approach did not specifically address the issue of implementation (see Lindblom, 1959, in Taylor, 2005).

17 In actual fact, urban planning theories have tended to focus on communication theory, based in particular on Jürgen Habermas (1984), whose dream was to make the planning process as democratic as possible by opening the communicative process of decision-making up to all interested parties. John Forester was one of the pioneers of communicative action planning, whose function is based on this theory (Taylor, 2005: 123). On the other hand, the need for urbanists to develop communication competencies does not belong exclusively to implementation theories but is also approached within the context of the debate on participation.

18 This trend was inspired by Marxist theories that were becoming accepted by intellectuals, gaining ground over positivist logic. Davidoff was one of the first to urge planners to practise bottom-up planning by becoming advocate planners. This would make the debate about the setting of goals and objectives explicit, which blueprints and systems planning bypassed through the assumption that this was the professional planners' job (Taylor, 2005; Hall, 2005). Shortly thereafter, urban architects like Alexander at Berkley, Habraken in Holland and Yona Friedman in France went on to introduce participative planning methods in universities, particularly at architecture and urbanism faculties.

were, therefore, responsible for opening up the decision-making processes to the general public (Goodman, 1972), including an ever greater variety of stakeholders: inhabitants, local NGOs, associations, etc., and at many different levels—local, regional, national and international. This constituted a major shift in the view of the planner's role from technical expert to that of a facilitator, drawing on other people's views and skills in the business of making planning judgments.

As an immediate reaction, planners themselves decided that top-down approaches, where technicians, experts and governments (national and/or local) defined priorities of intervention, had to be replaced by bottom-up approaches. These were often described as neighborhood action, grassroots and self-help, approaches that include urban dwellers in the determination of their needs, thus becoming participatory and people-centred (Hall, 2005; Rabinovich, 2002, 2007). Concerning public policies, the shift from top-down to bottom-up approaches constituted an inflection point in urban policy, a change in strategy, moving from what was labelled as "assistance" policies to "support" policies.



Fig. 7.1 Bottom-up approach for the revitalisation of the Tha Tian historic community in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1998 (credit: Y. Pimongsatean).

Recognizing urbanism as a political activity would open up the debate on such issues as citizen participation, acknowledgement of the "informal city" (Harday, Satterthwaite, 1987) and the relationship between the public and private sectors.

Public versus private

Another key topic of debate in urban planning that emerged in the context of this paradigm shift was the role of the state, which had hitherto been acknowledged as a planning agent, and in particular the types of relations between the public and private sectors. The debate varied considerably depending on the development of political economy theory,

both liberal and Marxist. While the former advocated cooperation with the market system in order to ensure greater effectiveness in implementing plans and policies, the latter defended a strong public sector in urban planning.

The most extreme liberal positions managed to discredit urbanism as a practice and all of its intervention tools, espousing the concept of capitalist societies where the market was given the role of setting the priorities of urban intervention and the state was relegated to an essentially normative and administrative role. In England, for example, during periods of economic recession and loss of public spending capacity, land value and ownership were driven by market interests and pressures, as the state had lost its role of promoting development.

Socialism, on the contrary, emphasized the need for the state to exercise public and social control over the means of production through land ownership and all urban investments. Planning would therefore be done by the state, based on the priorities defined by the public sector and protecting society as a whole and the underprivileged sectors in particular. Whereas in the beginning an opposition was established between state backers and market proponents, intermediate approaches based on social democratic systems later tended to combine the two positions, stressing the need to maintain private land ownership while boosting the state's regulatory capacity. In this sense, the role of public authorities became more regulatory than normative and administrative.

During the 1970s, the search for reality-based urbanism led to a study of urbanism's undesired or unplanned mechanisms[19] and the initiation of discussions on the true role of planning—and of the state in particular—in the evolution of cities and on the players in this evolution. On the one hand, Marxist theoreticians (Althusser, Castells, Harvey, Paris)[20] developed a social scientific theory of planning, arguing that in capitalist societies governments and the state usually take on the role of maintaining and managing the economic system (Miliband, 1969; Castells, 1973). However, the opposition between planning, as the sphere of public authorities, and the private interests of the market did not explain the negative effects of urbanism of the last 20 years. Rather, it could be said that urban planning helped support and reinforce the capitalist system, that is, it was an integral part of that system. On the other hand, urban management theories argue that in the liberal capitalist economies, market forces generally face very few restrictions and are therefore decisive factors in urban development and on its impact, whereas the development of the public sector is clearly limited by public finances.[21]

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19 High densification processes in inner cities, conurbanization and suburbanization processes (associated with models of containing cities via green area rings), as well as the inflationary impact on land and property prices were thus identified as characteristic urban planning results of the last 20 years. These territorial and economic effects were associated with social segregation, as they do not affect different social groups in the same way. It is interesting to note that the concept of the market did not previously include the actions of private individuals acting on their own in producing their own habitat, but rather referred to companies looking for profit in urban planning.

20 For Marxist theories see Hall, 2005, Taylor, 2005.

21 Lack of financial and human resources in public administration is characteristic of cities in the South, particularly at local levels. Another factor is the difficulty of undertaking coordinated strategic action, given the diversity of capital invested in urban operations (i.e., the investment of migrants' remittances in housing, services and infrastructures).

The 1980s marked the resurgence of classical liberalism in Western democracies, which was strengthened by the collapse of the socialist system that finally launched the debate on the need for a public urban planning system. "Notional land use zoning" was advocated as a basic planning system in order to support the market-driven development of land, while other stands defended the dismantling of urban and land-use planning, leaving the role of legal oversight to ensure the protection of private interests to the state (e.g. the development of residential areas). Towards the end of the decade, those planning theorists who did not necessarily adhere to this neoliberal point of view nonetheless accepted the need to adopt a positive attitude towards market-driven development. The debate, based on theories of "regime and regulation", took place at the local government level, within the decentralization processes framework.[22] This was characterized by spending cuts at the central state level and by a search for alternative forms of financing, including the provision of public services such as water, electricity, transport, housing and other goods, and efforts to convince the private sector to guarantee investments.[23] At the same time, critical comments were heard regarding the efficiency of national companies, due to the lack of competition in this sector, which prompted their need to work with the private sector in order to benefit from its competence and enhance their ability to compete.[24]

This evolution translated into a change of style in urban governance, moving, according to Harvey (1989), from a managerial approach in the 1960s to an entrepreneurial approach in the 1980s, the decade when different urban planning regimes emerged. These reflected not only a wide range of economic circumstances that have conditioned local government actions but also numerous different political positions vis-à-vis market processes.

Another fundamental element that influenced urban planning theories in the late 1980s was the change in capitalism itself, marked by the globalization process and characterized by the creation of transnational power based on economic and technological domination by transnational corporations.[25] The creation of this transnational economy, together with the process of outsourcing production to more competitive countries, had a major impact on of North and South countries alike, creating new regulatory modes that have profoundly affected urban plans and policies. Urban decision-makers and planners had to ensure that their cities could attract or at least retain investment business activity and cultural consumption. New investment priorities had a strong impact on the development of different city areas, with interventions such as waterfront renewal schemes, inner-

22 The coalitions and partnerships with other agents, including non-governmental actors, can be analyzed like regimes, which are defined as "the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions." (Stone, 1989). Stone distinguishes four kinds of regimes: maintenance regimes, development regimes, middle-class progressive regimes and regimes devoted to lower-class opportunity expansion.

23 For privatization of public services such as water see Catenazzi, Da Representaçao, 2004.

24 This discussion took place within the context of structural change in Western societies at times of great economic depression, marked by the retreat of the central state and by a need for local governments to play an active role in order to revive their own economies.

25 The search for an exponential increase in profits linked with a drastic decrease in costs characterizes the activity of the new transnational corporations.

city rehabilitation projects, shopping malls and international tax-free zones. Although each country tackled global pressures in a different way, it was extremely difficult for any nation, and even more so for an individual city, to withstand or moderate globalization processes (Ward, 2002). It is not my aim to go into a debate on governance or on globalization, which is a process that is felt not only in economy and finance but that also touches many elements of contemporary societies, including culture. What is interesting is to mention the contribution of the regime and regulatory theories, as well as the achievements of governance insofar as they shed light on the various scale of the relationship between the public and private spheres.

Fig. 7.2 London's waterfront renewal (credit : A. Rabinovich).

Thus, starting from initial counter-positions, step-by-step attempts have been made to inter-relate the two spheres. In fact, the modes of relationship between the public and private sectors have been a central focus for debate within the field of urbanism since the 1960s. In the background, however, the question as to who actually benefits from urban interventions persists.

New actors, tools and topics

Technicians versus social actors

We have seen that citizens' participation emerges from a critical analysis of industrial society and the inherent urbanism principles. Urban rehabilitation plans and projects and collective housing models developed by advocates of rationalism were subjected to critical analysis, as their standardized and strictly functional characteristics did not meet the peoples' needs and aspirations, especially those of the underprivileged social

classes.[26] Participation would enable a better harmonization of habitat with people's aspirations, habits and lifestyles while reducing habitat production costs by cutting out real-estate promoters, who are considered unnecessary intermediaries (Rabinovich, 2002). In addition, reuniting intellectual work with crafts and trades would make it possible to rejoin what industrialization had put asunder, to once again combine art with production.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, however, professionals have realized that involving people, particularly those of the underprivileged sectors, in institutionalized countries such as the European nations seemed a remote possibility. Some planners had opportunities to go to developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The reality of the countries of the South was a key source of inspiration for planners who, working hand in hand with local social movements, became European planning pioneers in defending self-building and self-help and in recognizing what was defined as "the illegal city" (Hardoy, Satterthwaite, 1987). For these pioneers, the planner's role should be to organize the self-builders' process (Turner, 1976).[27] Viewed as an alternative to the operations of urban renewal and centralized models, bottom-up initiatives in the North and in the South, such as self-organized communities, self-building, and even spontaneously organized slums, began to constitute a kind of urban counterculture, which little by little won the admiration of different intellectual groups who saw in these approaches a reflection of the population's expressions of its culture, creativity and its own organization (Davidoff, 1965).

The analysis of concrete experiences revealed that participation in urbanism did not always facilitate attainment of the desired results (Rabinovich, 2002, 2007).[28] Various authors have shown that while participation does result in greater resident satisfaction, this effect is not related to a difference in the quality of housing but rather to the satisfaction of being involved in the processes (Conan, 1988). Regarding habitat operations, for example, follow-up conducted some years later revealed unacceptable living conditions in terms of hygiene, health and security. In other cases, although often successful in improving the individual or neighborhood environment, many individual or collective actions were initiated and carried out without any coordination with local authorities and with little thought to the wellbeing of society as a whole.[29] Thus, the euphoria of two dec-

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26 As early as 1950, in England the Association of Architects invited Giancarlo de Carlo, an Italian architect who supported self-building by explaining that housing problems of poor people would not be solved by municipal housing but by the concrete will and action of the people themselves. Planning could help, but as the manifestation of community collaboration (Hall, 2005). Decades later, this approach would also be criticized, as it justified the state's withdrawal from seeking solutions to low-cost housing issues, especially in developing countries.

27 In fact, in English-speaking countries in particular, the tradition of integrating community intervention into the process to promote individuals and collectives dates back to the early 20th century. In countries with a more state-interventionist tradition, this would only emerge much later in urban policies and was the result of appeals by social movements. In the countries of the South, the issue of participation is contemporary with their initial forays into development policy, which go hand in hand with self-help policies concerning habitat.

28 Other ways to take into account social knowledge have developed, but there is no denying that participation has been one of the most hotly debated approaches throughout history.

29 For instance, in Latin America, where a relatively large proportion of the population has access to individual water facilities, it is nevertheless estimated that only about 10% of the collected sewage is treated and the quality of treatment is generally low.

ades of participation in urbanism (1960-1970) subsequently led to a certain disenchantment, at least among urbanism's professionals and researchers.

Since the 1990s, participation has once again become the buzzword in policies and development projects, reflecting a reappropriation by international, national and local institutions of issues which had hitherto been monopolized by social movements (Bacqué, 2005). This rebirth is linked to the distinctive leading role of sustainable development and the emergence of the concept of "governance", in the sense of the modes of coordination between the various players, who make up society, which enable public action (Le Galés, 1995).[30] This extension of public action to a wider group of players implies not only opening up the process to new players but also momentarily separating some previous major divisions, such as "experts and laymen" (Callon *et al.*, 2001), and recognizing the interests, needs, contributions and reciprocal potential of different groups. At the same time, changes in decision-making processes are expressed in new urban consensuses and conflicts that call into question the public values of the city and concern much more than just urban agglomerations or towns. In reality, they refer to an inter-territoriality which conditions all scales of public action and puts them into a network inside the local, national and international space. The way each level is connected with the other(s) varies according to the different development rationales involved. Consequently, the public's participation of the 1990s is no longer linked to bottom-up reasoning but rather to top-down, multi-player and multi-scale approaches, which also entail movements defined as bottom-up (Navez-Bouchnine, 2007).

Within this new framework, the debate between the expert knowledge of technicians and that of the social players remains valid. Using the analysis of concrete experiences as a basis, the social sciences make a distinction between a "ritual vacuum of participation" and the "real power" of residents to orient project-related processes and decisions (Arnstein, 1969; Lafaye, 2001; Healey, 2004).[31] Citizens generally express their disappointment, particularly about urbanism experiences in line with the plans, while technicians fall back on what they call their expertise and question the residents' ability to appreciate the general interest or urban order of the plans and projects involved.

Overall, more than 30 years of participative experiences, driven either by professionals and/or politicians or directly by grassroots social movements, enable evaluation of the potentials and limitations of participation by focusing on three main factors:

- the tools aimed at instrumentalizing participation;
- the aims, spaces and moments, or time, for effective participation, linked to the degrees of intensity and concrete ways to involve players, especially citizens;
- and the institutionalization of participation and how it spreads, from a perspective of empowerment and changes to procedures in hierarchical organizations.

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30 Governance issues can be approached in two ways: one more directly managerial and the other more theoretical and critical.

31 As early as the 1960s, Arnstein set up an 8-level participation scale, ranging from "manipulation" to "citizen control." She asserts that without redistribution of power, participation is a frustrating process, especially for the more underprivileged sectors of the population.

Plans versus projects

Critics of the grand plans of the era following the Second World War worked in terms of a concept of the "urban project", which was a key concept in the intense debate that developed in the ensuing decade. Contrary to the planning of the post-war years, the relationship between the urban building context, society and its history was examined from numerous angles. Advocating the urban project meant supporting a "project" rather than a "plan", as the latter was deemed insufficient to define space and urban form in general. However, criticism targeted not only the limits of urban planning but also modern architecture, which was deemed incapable of coming up with an urban architecture. Perhaps this questioning of urbanism and modern architecture did not give sufficient weight to the fact that its failure was not limited to the resulting material forms. The stigmatization of Le Corbusier and the large complexes in French working-class suburbs often glossed over the fact that the undesirable outcomes were also the product of the limits to growth viewed as ongoing. Nonetheless, the new concept gained ground.

Looking at the issue from this angle, we consider the arguments put forward by Alicia Novick (2003), which manage to explain recent developments with regard to these concepts and their reformulations.[32] As Novick explains, in fact, many authors found the roots of this new mode in the large restructuring and renovation interventions of the 19th and 20th centuries; indeed, large-scale restructuring projects certainly began very early in the history of the city. The urban project thus seemed to be linked to the concept of urbanism based on urban design. In this sense, the hypothesis to place the origin of the innovations in Italy seems to be correct. The seminal concept was that of the *progettazione*, which condenses the input of the plan and the architecture project into a single operation. The expression proposes a new tool and was a key element in the intense debate that emerged in the following decade, resulting in a real project culture that was interpreted in a different way in every country.

When seen from this perspective, the urban project appeared as a middle ground between an "architecture project" and an "urban plan" (Lacaze, 1993). Contrary to global visions, the urban project offered an alternative to the plan: faced with the impossibility of anticipation, it presented the alternatives of open programs and concrete actions. The urban area, when seen as a group of streets, squares and the fabric of the city, gradually shifted attention that was formerly devoted to habitat themes and social equipment.

The new concept dovetailed with the management changes of the agglomerations, where metropolitan and centralized entities were losing ground. In England, state reforms eliminated planning bodies, while decentralization was introduced in France. Mitterrand's monumental works in Paris were built within this framework, as were many experiments in Spain in the post-Franco era. In Madrid, the Immediate Action Program was proposed in 1985, with the aim of handling functional issues, the lack of equipment and the environmental requalification of the city. It was a case of an overall alteration to the urban territory via structural actions with multiple effects. Similar organizational objectives drove the actions of Oriol Bohigas in Barcelona, which had been preceded by the Estación Saints

[32] Her analysis references several authors, including, for example, Sainz Gutierrez (2007), Choay (1989), Porthoguesi (1969), Lacaze (1993).

and the Parque de la España Industrial projects a decade earlier, in addition to a myriad of rehabilitation interventions of historic centres and towns. At the same time it offered a platform for the preparation of the Olympic Games. Such an approach offered an alternative urbanism to the outdated model of the grand urban-regional plans, and to the abstraction of quantitative zoning that relegated the consideration of the real building of the city to huge unrealizable ideas. Giving shape to public spaces went hand in hand with the renewed leading role of architects, who were capable of transforming public space through a group of ideas that could really be applied. A body of reasoning that governs the re-evaluation of the aesthetic dimension of urbanism also served as a basis for defending its cultural value and, therefore, the need to develop synergies between the quality of the design and cultural factors.[33]

The scope of the urban project was redefined from different analytical perspectives. Thus, in France a substantial effort was made to systemize concepts (Devilliers, 1994). The urban project in both conceptual and operative terms was combined with sociological and urban management logics. In Spain, a major debate was held within the Madrid-Barcelona interventions on the issue of plan versus project. Contributions from researchers from the South were also key to these discussions. It is interesting to remark that in this overview of concepts and practices, Alicia Novick develops the similarities and differences between European and American experiences that go beyond the framework of these lines.[34]

Within this broad context, Francois Ascher (1993) refers to the threefold scope of the urban project: the political urban project (the intention of a city resulting from strategic reflection); the operative urban project (strategic intervention operations); and the urbanistic and architectural urban project (limited to urban design). This approach reveals borders between the "urban project" and "public policies" that are not sufficiently defined, a shortcoming that had already been pointed out by some specialists at the beginning of the 1990s (Mangin, Panerai, 1992).

Nevertheless, in the past few decades the scope of the projects has been redefined. In fact, project activity abandoned its problem-solving status in order to create projects as such. When seen from this angle, and linked with "second-generation" urban and architectural design methods, project activities resulting in approaches such as the "programming conception" method were based on the acknowledgement that urban issues are in fact "bad problems". (Prost 1992; Rabinovich, 2002). In other words, they cannot be precisely defined at the beginning of the process and, therefore, planning is an iterative process of conjectures and rejection, whereby the definition of the problem becomes clearer through a search for the solution.

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33 This debate was based on the different approaches to the concept of culture. Understood on the one hand as related to "art", it resulted in the creation and development of "cultural districts" in cities (museums, art galleries, concert halls, etc.). On the other hand, policies were developed in relation to a broader and more democratic vision of the concept of culture, including different kinds of expression that contribute to the life of the city, such as sports, public spaces, meeting and recreation areas. In the countries of the South, the demand for informal cities by some urban planners, in particular social science specialists, was linked with the revaluation of self-building as an expression of the culture of the less privileged sectors of the population.

34 See, for example, Toussaint and Zimmermann (1998), Solá Morales (1987), Mario Lungo (2004), Pérez escolano (1999) and Tsiommis, 1996, in Novick (2003, 2004).

However, in addition to their potential and multiple dimensions and their ability to contribute to constructing the problems, a broad consensus has formed since the late 1990s regarding these interventions. Their antinomy was no longer emphasized, but rather, the need to integrate them into a plan or a public program with a broader reach. Strategies veered towards analyzing negative effects while at the same time promoting effective tools to counteract them. On the one hand, the format of procedures able to include everyone's voice was examined, despite the fact that political will as a driver appeared to be a *sine qua non* for their implementation. On the other hand, the impact on land values due to improved regulatory tools was examined. From a localization rationale, efforts were made to group new locations for interventions that were not limited to prestige and visibility, thereby adumbrating the potential of the limits and the periphery of the location.

In other words, the urbanism of fragmented projects gradually stopped limiting the plan's scope. However, it was not a case of looking at plan and project as analogous concepts or of opposing them to or differentiating them from restructuring or embellishments. Rather, acquired experience consolidated them as a potential operational tool. The contest of ideas served to highlight the suggested innovative proposals and program definitions that could be included in an integral view of the city and its problems. Urban projects capable of facilitating coordinated management of the numerous players taking part in the production of the city and taking form based on alternative and open scenarios characterized by their flexibility, could constitute a vital dimension of plans and programs with greater scope.

Environment and inequality

Among other things, acknowledgement of urbanism as a political activity brought with it a repositioning of more substantive issues and problems that urban planning as a public policy should seek to address. Issues such as ever-increasing social inequality, the precarious living conditions of the underprivileged and the degradation of both the natural and the man-made environment were priorities that had to be addressed again in a consistent manner in the public agenda. A problem-centered defence of urbanism no doubt gained strength from the counterpositioning to neoliberal trends that emerged as a response to recession in different parts of the world, advocating a strong free market strategy as a vehicle for addressing urban issues. Accordingly, the topics viewed as problems on technical and political agendas were studied in a broad range of discussions.

On the one hand, some urban planners focused on theories specifically related to the issue of social inequality, building it up as a complex problem for which there is no obvious solution. The theme of the "habitat" of the popular (working-class) sector, for example, constructed from criticism of policies focusing on providing housing, shed light on the need to consider the relationship with more complex systems defining habitat not only as a group of material conditions of housing, infrastructure and services, but also as a safe metaphysical space. On another scale, there is the promotion of visions of "inclusive cities" (Westendorff, 2004), with conditions for "access" to multiple resources and to the labour markets, recognising the need to reinforce social and integration networks with practices of the so-called "informal" sectors (Hardoy, Satterwaite, 1987), taking into account their different conditions, not only in socio-economic terms but also in relation

to race and gender, for example. On the other hand, in the North, a wide range of topics has resulted in the so-called "post-materialist movements". Environmental themes and grassroots mobilization have also appeared in the countries of the South. Their importance forms part of concerns about quality of life. For example, the issue of "risks" associated with environmental topics and technological development has added more and more items to the agenda.

Since the 90s, the renewed priority given to the environment and its corollary "sustainable development" was undoubtedly a key factor in the debate on the problems of urban development. Concerns about ecological damage began to be addressed in the late 60s, in the context of a growing countercultural environmental radicalism that mapped out alternative paths to large-scale capitalism and government. During the 80s and the 90s, however, these ideas began to underpin more moderate opinions, leading to the development of the concept of sustainable development (Ward, 2002: 306). Within urbanism itself, the promotion of development models that favoured a balance between social, ecological and economic dimensions began to take shape, in association with the creation of ecological political parties. In this context, it is more than illustrative to review the role given to international agreements, as was the case at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, after which Member states adhered to the action plan presented under the name of Local Agenda 21 (LA21). Its principles are also partly "political compromises", a factor that explain the still somewhat vague character of the notion of sustainable development and the difficulties encountered in its practical application. The operational dimension of the sustainable development concept raises the question of the criteria and indicators for assessing or estimating degrees of sustainability (Wiesmann, 1998) as quantitative and qualitative measures of the economic, environmental and social dimensions in a particular context. Nevertheless, while this operational dimension is fundamental for some authors, others wonder whether the criteria and indicators used for evaluating sustainable development will not, once again, classify those always excluded (Querrien, Lassave, 2000). Moreover, 20th century planning theory shows to what extent sustainable development has been an implicit leitmotif, or an unknown concept (Campbell, Fainstein, 2003).[35]

Finally, together with the emergence of new territorialities, the inner areas and particularly the old historic centers affected by deterioration due to the recession of the last decades were the object of study and actions. The need to turn them into areas of development for the market through legislative measures and investments in infrastructure and services, and the re-evaluation of the heritage value of existing buildings, oscillated between policies which, linked to the mechanisms of economic and cultural globalization, promoted tourism as a source of revenue while striving to avoid gentrification. In different parts of the world, promotion of heritage values gradually became a relevant issue for urban planning, and discourses about heritage are evolving from building preservation to a broader approach encompassing socio-cultural values. Therefore, it is also important

[35] As, for example, in Geddes' Beautiful City, in the Garden City of Howard and Mumford, in the conservationist and bioregionalist approaches to comprehensive planning, and within the vision of the world as an ecological system developed by the urban systems planning of the inter-war period.

to consider the impact of specific rehabilitation policies at the international level, as for example the internationalized UNESCO-World Heritage Center policies.[36]

Fig. 7.3 Rehabilitation of the "Old Square" in Havana, Cuba, since 1979 (credit : A. Rabinovich).

Our research project is situated in this precise framework. It is not by chance that the identification process of self-proclaimed sustainable innovative interventions has led to the selection of projects that were undertaken in historic centers in various cities around the world, i.e., Buenos Aires, Havana, and Bangkok.[37] These were concrete interventions related to habitat, in the framework of plans and public policies that take different approaches to heritage values. Looking at similar projects at different latitudes serves to illustrate what remains and what changes over time, what is similar and what is different in each context. Viewed from this vantage point, the ultimate objective is to understand the alternatives in the fields of knowledge and practices of urbanism. Although the examples do not give an account of all the reasoning applied in the production of the city, they do make it possible to touch on some of them. Indeed, the cases chosen make it possible to analyze the connections between planning and implementation; illustrate the different types of relationships between public and private, technicians and residents, local and global; and show that the perception of sustainable development is strongly context-specific.

Its study is therefore paradigmatic in the framework of innovations in urbanism.

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36 Several meetings and charts proposed measures to tackle the degradation of historical centers. For example, the UN Convention in 1972, the Macchu Pichu Charter in 1977, the Heritage Symposium of 1983 in Mexico City and the Washington Charter of 1987.

37 The main objective is to explore the strengths and limitations of emerging innovative approaches to urban planning that aim at integrating the three relevant EES aspects of sustainable development (economic, environmental and social aspects). The analysis is based on a comparative approach, focused on the study of local urban projects: a) The "San Francisco Block" within the Program of Residential Consolidation of the Management Plan for the Historic Centre of Buenos Aires, Argentina; b) The Old Square in the framework of The Master Plan for the Rehabilitation of the Historic Centre of Havana, Cuba; c) The Revitalization of the Tha Tian Historic Community in the framework of the Conservation Master Plan for Bangkok, Thailand.

Concluding remarks

As a first step, it seems important to specify once again the scope of this contribution. It is an approach to the history of urbanism based on some topics for debate that have caused the discipline to develop as a field for thought and action for over a century. The background is that of innovation, in an attempt to define a broad problematic context that makes it possible to analyze—in an operative manner in our research—concrete experiences in different regions of the world. Accordingly, we asked several questions in the introduction, such as: Who does and/or should change cities? On what scale should intervention take place? How are the capacities, tools and values of experts and non-experts differentiated?

Throughout the paper, we have shown how the answers to these questions have changed during the century, although the nuances and overlappings are numerous. At the beginning, the emphasis was on the logics and the deceptive certainties of a militant movement that suggested transforming politics through science and technology, via the figure of the technician, the image of the plan and an arsenal of tools. The same movement also wanted to give a key role to the state and to technicians capable of transforming city and society. In the climate of the profound crisis of cities and interpretive points of view, the issues aligned themselves in terms of opposition.

In fact, in conjunction with questioning the method and the specialist's political neutrality, the knowledge of society counterbalanced the figure of the demigod technician; the role of the market offset the hegemony of the state; and the notion of the project opposed that of the plan. Notwithstanding, the need to create intermediate space, connecting space, slowly became very clear. Avoiding simplification means not only seeking adequate answers to complexity but also accepting its multiplicity and differentiated appropriateness for issues that can be analyzed from different angles and that can have different answers. Reflecting in terms of multi-player, multi-scale multi-dimensional processes, etc,. reveals decisions that are not very linear. In other words, diverse social, economic, political, spatial and environmental realities were progressively taken into account. Consequently, the move from a sole intervention model to relative pluralism in urban actions characterizes contemporary urban planning.

A second series of questions were raised in the introduction: What were the topics that came up as problems in the projects and programs analyzed? How were ideas concerning the city and urban planning conceived and disseminated at different latitudes? Perhaps the topics and issues broached are, in a broad sense, similar in Western countries, as a series of networks and communications between experts facilitate intense dissemination of ideas and experiences. However, in each context defined by different socio-economic political and cultural realities, theories and experiences were interpreted in very different ways. In this sense, more so than in terms of deformation, which assumes that there are truths and copies, it is necessary to review country-specific knowledge and experience in the light of the controversial journeys of ideas from one country or continent to another, which has always been a part of the field of urbanism. From this perspective, it is plain to see that the scope of innovation differs according to geographies. Although innovative solutions respond to objectives, procedures and implementation methods that are all bound by a common point of reference, one can single out the impact of local contexts

in the wide range of achievements observed on the ground. Moreover, we must consider that the answers provided by innovative approaches that were developed to tackle the complexity of urban problems will vary depending on the territorial scales at stake. We should therefore refrain from simply reproducing identical solutions at the local, regional, national and global level.

It is precisely on this problematic horizon that we in the end believe innovative decision processes should lie. However, even though the most recent suggestions extol the virtues of diversity and pluralism, which can be considered as a lesson for urban planning, we can run the risk of saying that there might still be some overarching universal ideals to which urban planning should aspire. The question is, once again, that of understanding who will define those ideals and which institutional contexts and political dynamics are able to ensure that the voices of less organized, under-represented actors will be heard.

In the framework of our research we will identify and analyze the way in which the objectives, values and interests of different groups of actors are concretely negotiated in the decision-making process of innovative urban projects. To conclude, however, we believe that from a disciplinary perspective it is important not to lose sight of the fact that in the 21st century, the dilemmas and solutions will not be found exclusively in the sphere of the knowledge and tools of urbanism.

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Chapter 8

Urban Planning in France in the 1960s: an Affair of State

Vincent Guigueno

Urban planning in France from 1960 to 1970 is a kind of matrix with which decision-makers and intellectuals entertain an ambiguous relationship. On the one hand, political and urbanistic views held it responsible to a caricatural degree for all the contemporary failings of French public space, ranging from the production of utilitarian infrastructure—the "non-places" coined by Augé (1995)—to recent social unrest in the suburbs. Every possible fault and defect was attributed to the period: technocratic arrogance, democratic imperfection; in a word, it was the anti-model of good territorial governance. But at the same time, the sometimes abhorrent face of contemporary urban planning in France led to a singular nostalgia (Fromonot, 2005). Recent publications, however, show that the time has come for eye-witness accounts, be they authored by decision-makers (Delouvrier, 2003; Fourquet, Murat, 2004) or researchers (Vadelorge, 2004).

The study of urban form and that of the actors and institutions of urban planning cannot be dissociated. Reading Michel Amiot's book and the testimony of the actors of the time whet the appetite for a study of the relationship between urban sociology and the state. It becomes very clear that the state, and the *Ministère de l'Equipement* (Ministry of Public Works) in particular, sponsored a sociology of which they were the principal target (Amiot, 1986). The real issue here is a history of the state, and recent research shows that it can no longer be viewed as a single monolithic entity (Baruch, Duclert, 2000). The program for the history of French new towns shows, for example, how a generation of professional urban planners was raised in design offices and town and country development agencies (Claude, 2005; Claude, Fredenucci, 2003). The connection between urban planning and regional development, two policies upheld by competing but mutually supportive agencies— *Délégation à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale* (DATAR) and the *Secrétariat Général des Villes Nouvelles* (respectively, agencies in charge of town and country development and of new townships)—is one of the dominant themes of the period. The present article is a contribution to contemporary urban history, still being written, but

constantly invoked whenever an issue of urban form arises, in particular the demolition of the HLM blocks (*Habitations à Loyer Modéré*, low rent public housing estates) in the name of the fight against so-called "criminogenic" urban planning in the 1960s.

Working on such recent history is indeed a risk-laden enterprise, of which a prime example is anachronism. Danièle Voldman demonstrated the slow emergence of the "Paris area" concept (Voldman, 1989), but today this is seen as an obvious definition of a research area to serve as the playground of the social sciences. The first task of a historical account should be to offer a critique of the geographic divisions and the categories which gave them their status, for example the "territory" concept which is so often put to use but only rarely questioned (Duclos, 2002). A second risk would be to reproduce in academic terms the administrative frontiers erected and maintained by the actors themselves. We will therefore demonstrate in the first section that all the actors shared a belief in the state doctrine of the time and in its town and country development and urban planning activities. Our thesis is that in the 60s there was a common vision of the relationships, albeit conflicting ones, between public space, towns and technology, and that there was a French-style modernism, which faded away in the 1970s but remains today as the "real of memory" described by Pierre Nora (1997), to town planning and development. The role of history is to break free of ideological conflicts of the period under study while providing context for actions and ideas, in order to study the formation of urban and country planning policies.

The sources of state-run town and country development and urban planning

The history of town and country development is often no more than a catalogue of sectoral policies (infrastructure, industry, recreation) through which the state exerts action over national territory. But the national territory represents much more than a physical foundation for public action: it exerts a categorical and structuring role on this action. This "collectively accepted and chosen geography", to quote Olivier Guichard, the first senior official in charge of DATAR is a potent ideology which seeks to practice in spatial terms the equality heralded in the French Republic's motto.

This is not a recent concern. Some authors (Desportes, Picon, 1997) see it as pertinent to the road network policy of pre-Revolutionary France. They point out that policy for building roads was detached from strategic and military considerations; rather, it was connected to the emerging liberal political philosophy. The circulation of goods and people and the restrictions which began in the same period (passports, for example) are typical of the notion of mobility in modern societies (Roche, 2003). Town and country development is a factor in the tension between encouraging circulation and a deliberate correction of the territorial and social imbalances it creates. The emergence of development sciences and techniques (mapmaking, public works) is marked in France by this very strong early relationship with the state.

After the second world war, the words *"aménagement du territoire"* (regional town and country planning) became a part of everyday vocabulary. Ministries and agencies claimed it as their own, i.e., the *Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme* (MRU) (Minis-

try for Reconstruction and Urban Planning), DATAR, etc. Most importantly, its scope of action extended well beyond infrastructure and networks and was soon to encompass industrial location, tourist infrastructures and the country's territorial political definitions, with the advent of the region. The founding work of this major trend involving all political classes and administrations is well known: *Paris et le désert français*, (Paris and the French desert) published by Jean-François Gravier in 1947. A youthful follower of Maurras, typical of the generation coming of age in the 1930s, Gravier worked in the *Secrétariat Général à la Jeunesse*, (agency for youth programmes) with Georges Lamirand and signed up with Maréchal Pétain's *Révolution Nationale*. He advocated the regeneration of France through its regions, supported by non-elected forces for action, including employers and trade unions (excluding Communists). It was in this context that he approached the *Ecole Nationale des Cadres de la Jeunesse* (national school for young leaders), known as the *Ecole d'Uriage* (Comte 1991), where the future elite were being taught the National Revolution, as well as Emmanuel Mounier's "Personalist Manifesto" and state-controlled economics. Paul Delouvrier, then a young trainee from the *Inspection des Finances* (Treasury auditors) and later in charge of urban planning for the greater Paris area, was quoted as saying that in Uriage, students did tax their heads to some degree, but mostly their feet since physical exercise and long rambles were part of the programme for the regeneration of the French elite.

Although the Vichy regime was clearly not the sole inspiration for town and country planning in the post-war period, to some extent, policies of that time certainly originated from this source. A significant number of actors in the French Resistance, inside or outside the country, subscribed to this diagnosis and some of the remedies prescribed by the schools of thought influencing the Uriage teachings. Town and country planning in post-war France was the work of a generation which had been deeply influenced by the "strange defeat" of June 1940, *"L'Etrange Défaite"* (Bloch, 1990; Dard, 2002).

Gravier's book provides several keys for identifying the focus of town and country planning and development in France. In the preface, Raoul Dautry, *Le Technocrate de la République* (Baudouï, 1992), a former railway engineer who became minister for reconstruction, wrote that town and country planning is "urban planning in the broadest and truest meaning of the expression". State urban planning grew out of the wartime period and flourished in the Reconstruction sites under the management of inspectors, urban planners and architects over the length and breadth of the land (Voldman 1997). Dautry's successor, Eugène Claudius-Petit, drafted the first nation-wide town and country planning programme *Plan National d'Aménagement du Territoire* (PNAT) (Pouvreau, 2004). Formerly in the *Résistance Franc-Tireur* movement, after a period of time in Algiers, Claudius was a close acquaintance of Le Corbusier who adopted Dautry's vision, i.e., that the development of the entire country was no more than an "extension of the mission" of urban planners. Urban order should therefore achieve a national dimension.

The second focus of town and country planning was based on a movement in the opposite direction: down from national to city level. This refers to the "spacialization" of industrial planning, born in the 1920s with a programme for national industrialization and strategic decentralization of the aeronautical industry to Toulouse. Under the Vichy regime, the *Délégation Générale à l'Equipement National* (DGEN) (Agency for national industrialization), launched an extensive study on industrial decentralization. This

work was published in 1949 (Dessus), but did not have any immediate influence on Jean Monnet's *Commissariat Général au Plan* (National Planning Agency). With the support of the American Marshall Plan, France launched into an industrial policy through which the state took control of sectors considered strategic, including transport and energy, and took the lead generally in the modernization of industry. Michel Margairaz described this as a conversion of the traditionally liberal-minded French elite to pragmatic Keynesianism (Margairaz, 1991). The central economic charts were the driving tool of this policy which rapidly made a deep impression on national territory, for example in the form of large hydroelectric installations.

The third and last focus, to which Jean-François Gravier was directly related, is the regional movement. Choosing the Editions du Portulan as publishers of his book *Paris et le désert français* was a statement. The post-war period was fertile in logic leading to the emergence of regions. A political current was born with the development of national patriotism in the 19th century, to which the cultural and political elite in the South or in Brittany, for example, were opposed. This political dimension of regions, which Vichy had used for its own purposes, warped by the Collaboration in Brittany, slowly emerged from the political and administrative institutions which were set up after World War II, to the accompaniment of regional action programmes and the regional economic expansion committees *(Commissions de Développement Economique Regional* (CODER)). More pragmatically, industrialists discovered the advantages of regions for the distribution of network enterprises (postal system, the production of electricity) and for organizing production along the lines of the "Clémentel regions" during the first world war.

In the 1960s, economic growth, the end of the decolonization process and demographic expectations—with population forecasts of 70 to 80 million people in France by year 2000, including 15 million in the Paris area—put territorial policy at the heart of the political agenda. Since expansion via its empire was no longer an option, France would have to choose intensification, according to the stimulating theory developed by Antoine Picon. The reshaping of national identity after the war was based on ambitious scientific and technical programmes, to which Gabrielle Hecht (Hecht 1997) gave the name of technopolitics in her work on France's nuclear, civil and military radiance.

In this context, DATAR was created in 1963, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. It was tasked with running interministerial committees for town and country planning, *Comités Interministériels à l'Aménagement du Territoire* (CIAT), with limited but highly incentive funding. DATAR became the instigator of government policy. It launched immediately into major projects such as tourist infrastructure development in the Languedoc region (Picon, Prelorenzo, 1999) and the industrial port complex development in Fos, with Parisian management (Paillard, 1981). Following in Gravier's footsteps, DATAR sought to find a better balance between France and Paris, placing more emphasis in favor of the provinces through the installation of infrastructure and industrial complexes. Its urban doctrine was based on a balance between eight major regional centers, in some cases groups of existing cities such as Nantes-Saint-Nazaire, Aix-Marseille, Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, Lyon Saint-Etienne and Metz-Nancy. The *Organismes d'Etudes des Aires Métropolitaines* (OREAM) (organizations for the study of metropolitan areas), headed by a *Groupe Central de Planification Urbaine* (GCPU) (central urban planning group), represented DATAR's secular arm for such operations. Their white papers and studies were

to have a lasting influence on regional urban planning, despite the early demise of the metropolis strategy, except in the Greater Paris area. Urban issues and practices in France in the 1960s were therefore very closely linked to regional planning.

M. Delouvrier's strange scheme

In DATAR's scope for action, one region is conspicuously missing: Paris and its suburbs, as they were usually referred to at the time. The Paris region was a child of the 1920s when the problem of poor housing around Paris arose (Fourcaut, 2000). The facts of the problem (300,000 people were concerned) but also the fantasies raised by them in the minds of the bourgeois population of the capital city, led to taking immediate emergency action—passing a law to finance and restore housing unfit for habitation—and then to the creation of a *Comité Supérieur d'Aménagement et d'Organisation de la Région Parisienne* (CSAOGRP) (higher committee for the development and general organization of the Greater Paris area). It is significant that the "regional question" was born of fear and serious social and urban problems.

At a time when London, Stockholm and Berlin through a 1920 merger law (876 square meters and 4 million inhabitants), were creating strong and extensive communities, the same kind of reform did not take place for Paris, which remained confined within the symbolic borders of its fortifications which were actually in the process of dismantlement at the time (Cohen, 1991). Le *Grand Paris*, grouping together the capital and the adjoining administrative districts, did not see the light of day. The name itself is still uncomfortably reminiscent of the *Gross Paris*, which was the name adopted by the Germans for the military command of the area during the occupation of Paris. For lack of any institutional definition, the region is defined as within a 35 km radius around Notre Dame Cathedral. In May 1934 a working group suggested a development program (called the Prost program) based on a limitation of Paris densification and a policy for motorway infrastructure comprising a ring road and five radial roads, including the *Autoroute de l'Ouest* (the motorway going west) as far as Rocquencourt. The technical department of the *Conseil Général de la Seine*, under the leadership of the mayor of Suresnes, Henri Sellier, conducted the study in a period of financial hard times. Five years of discussion were required before a decree adopting the plan was voted on June 22, 1939.

As was quite frequently the case, the war years maintained continuity. Although the CSAOGRP was abolished, the 1934 plan was confirmed: a committee and a development department were created by the Vichy government and were immediately transferred to the authority of the Ministry of Reconstruction when France was liberated. In 1955, Pierre Sudreau, Commissioner for Construction and Urban planning for the Paris region, asked the Paris Region development department, headed by Pierre Gibel, an engineer in the service of the City of Paris since 1943, to carry out a study for a *Plan d'Aménagement et d'Organisation Générale* (PADOG), (programme for development and organization). Broadly, the PADOG adopted the objectives set out by the Prost Plan, i.e,. demographic stabilization of the Paris region and decongestion of the area obtained by policies that promoted infrastructure for both road and air travel (Orly and later, Roissy-Charles de Gaulle airports). But by that time, the economic climate was very different. The impetus

provided by the Reconstruction allowed for the launch of several structural urban development projects, including the La Défense business district and the Montparnasse tower block (Picon, Lefebvre, 2003). The *Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations*, headed by François Bloch-Lainé from 1952 to 1967, was appointed as banker for these major urban construction projects (Margairaz, 2005).

Urban planning around Paris had existed therefore for some 30 years when Paul Delouvrier and the managers of the *District de la Région Parisienne* called into question the objectives and methods used by Gibel and his people. The *District* was created in 1959 and is a public institution that combines the administrative departments and townships in the region for tasks connected with development and infrastructure. It was headed by Delouvrier for a decade in the 1960s (1961-1969). After Uriage and the *Résistance*, Delouvrier, who was a French Treasury auditor (*Inspecteur des Finances*), participated in the Jean Monnet Plan, and later was the French Government's representative in Algeria. He was the incarnation of the paternalistic technocrat, authoritarian and cultivated, skilled in the use of classical rhetoric to convince others of the virtues of his ideas in favor of modernization.

The first break with the past that Delouvrier wished to put on record was the failure of the demographic Malthusianism presiding over previous programs. He put forward a figure of 14 million inhabitants in the Paris region by the year 2000, i.e., an increase of some 6 million, corresponding, however, to a reduction of the share of the region in the total urban population of France (24% instead of 30% in 1965). This shrewd statistical presentation of the facts enabled him to overcome the totally ineffective but well entrenched belief in the need to stabilize the region's population. Delouvrier, together with a significant portion of official decision-makers, dreamed of a modern metropolitan region, a region-cum-capital of France and Europe. Relations with DATAR were therefore dialectic, since DATAR and the District did not in any way share this vision of the role of Paris in the urban apparatus of France. Nevertheless, their development concepts were identical in that the plan was to encourage these metropolitan areas to emerge by combining infrastructures, industrial facilities and technical development.

This accepted version of urban growth was to be controlled by the famous *Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme* (SDAU) (Urban planning and development plan) for the Paris region. This outline was neither a mandatory plan (as the Prost plan and the PADOG had been) nor a development programme. It aimed to provide a template to fill both functions simultaneously: plan and develop. In many ways, the outline could be described as an "Unidentified Urban Object", which prided itself on being more efficient and flexible than classic planning tools. It became the model for future urban outlines contained in the 1967 Property law *(Loi d'Orientation Foncière).* The atmosphere of secrecy presiding over the drawing up of the *Schéma,* carefully orchestrated by Delouvrier and his assistants, emphasizes the anti-democratic nature of the process. Decisions were taken in direct liaison with the head of state and the document prepared by an institute for development and urban planning, composed of state-employed engineers and urban planners who tore to shreds any previous efforts. This included Gibel's PADOG, which was the target of especially scathing criticism. A study of the careers of the members of the institute shows that a new generation had arrived on the urban planning field, ranging from young engineers trained in road modelling in the United States to young militant

sociologists such as Manuel Castells whose doctoral thesis addresses the subject (Castells, 1979). Without erring on the side of the angels, the cultural and ideological diversity of the actors does seem quite astonishing today.

The SDAU, the legendary blueprint for Parisian urban planning, deserves closer inspection. It is not often read but is frequently quoted as a foil to good urban and country governance. It consists of a map on a scale of 1:100,000 and a book offering a vision for the Paris region. Before analyzing some of the more spectacular decisions—the new towns and a network of fast railways, the *Réseau Express Regional*—let us observe two original facts usually left under-emphasized in planning project histories, which are all too frequently "obsessed" by the projects themselves. The SDAU encourages a positive relationship with the whole region by dint of steering well clear of the traditional breakdown into Paris, the city, on the one hand, and its suburbs on the other. On the contrary, breaking the region down into seven administrative departments, one of them the city of Paris, reintroduces the division by fragmenting the Seine Department. Delouvrier realized that planning is not just a matter of drawing up plans and infrastructures, but also involves administrative and political lines of demarcation. These suffered a severe shakedown, not just because of the administrative reorganization of July 10th, 1964 that created the new administrative departments, but also by the invention of "intercommunality" in the new towns.

The Paris region SDAU is often presented as a monument to the most authoritarian form of technocracy. On closer inspection, the Delouvrier document takes on board phenomena which the state tries to contain for lack of being able to control them: firstly, an inclination for geographic mobility on the part of the French people who must be allowed to settle in the Paris region which is the largest employment catchment area in the country and secondly, mobility on a daily basis with a massive propensity for cars in the 1960s (Flonneau, 2005). In that decade, the growth of motorization was quite important, on a scale of 10% a year. It attained 46.5% (7.1 million vehicles) in 1965 and the scale of family car ownership was expected to be around 80% in 1985 (19.3 million vehicles). One might almost believe in a deliberate plot, with the state orchestrating the motorization of the French and migration of the qualified workforce towards the capital, to the detriment of the countryside where industrial sites were being relocated. Reading the still fragmentary analyses of the period, the impression gained is of an extensive transformation in which the French themselves, and not just the technocrats, were the main players. Delouvrier and his technocrats were not activating France and the Paris region; they were taking advantage of an exceptional period of growth to give a durable impulse to urban planning and transport in the region, while breaking away from the negative vision of Paris prevalent among the elite.

The *Schéma Directeur* in action: new towns and urban transport in the early 1970s

Edgar Faure, a member of the Radical Party, was much in evidence serving in successive government ministries during the 4th and 5th Republics. He admired the capacity of Turgot, a minister who served Louis XV, "to transform a thought process into a chain of events". Delouvrier adopted this maxim when he "translated" his planning document into

action. Obviously, it was never mechanically transferred into facts. The translation process, however, in terms of the sociology proposed by Akrich, Callon and Latour (2007), produced irreversible effects on the urban structure and the public transport system of the Paris region. The *Schéma* is not a scenario of urban history in the 1960s: it is a script adopted by actors, engineers, urban planners and sociologists to act out and write this story. In approaching a scientific history of the period, like Loïc Vadelorge in the framework of his program for a history and evaluation of new towns, historians are swamped by a large number of accounts and memoirs, contributing to the legend of a golden age for urban planning in France, teeming with achievements and ideas (Vadelorge, 2004).

The new towns are a case in point of the difficulty of writing a contemporary history of urban planning. The six towns, distributed in two axes on each side of Paris, were designed to host a significant portion of the region's population growth by creating what were referred to as "real" towns with several hundred thousand inhabitants. A powerful "street lamp effect" can be detected here: historians, following in the footsteps of other social sciences, rushing in where the authorities are directing their searchlights, now and in the past, by financing studies. It was demonstrated that, on the contrary, they represented a tremendous urban planning laboratory in the 1960s and 1970s, where the state's urban ideology and its inconsistencies are revealed.

Observers of every conviction were troubled by the experimental, or even utopian, nature of the new towns, in particular the first of them, Cergy Pontoise, which became famous following Eric Rohmer's film *L'Ami de mon amie* (1987) (*Boyfriends and Girlfriends*). Thierry Paquot refers to them as "rightwing utopias" (Paquot, 1977). The memoirs of Bernard Hirsch, the engineer in charge of their development, are an excellent introduction to the singularity of this urban experiment in the 1960s (Hirsch, 2000). Originally a public works engineer in the colonial service, Hirsch returned to metropolitan France to head a multidisciplinary team of engineers and urban planners with an unusually low average age, around 30 years old. Whereas the *Reconstruction* or development of the seaside resorts in the Languedoc were the work of high-ranking urban planners, the new towns were approached with what seemed to be a pluralist outlook. There was a mixture of participative democracy and traditional thinking. Bernard Hirsch refers to this on several occasions in his book, and gives an account, for example, of the trials and tribulations before a town could be "christened": Pontoise-Cergy, Cergy-Pontoise, Certoise or Ponty? A religious believer himself, Hirsch could not conceive of a town devoid of a church steeple. He was disappointed by the negative attitude of Roman Catholic Church authorities, who were thinking in terms of treating the new towns in "missionary" style, sending priests to gather their flock in the Trois Fontaines shopping center, designed by Claude Vasconi. The Sunday broadcast "Le Jour du Seigneur" devoted many a program to the subject. So that Cergy would not remain a lifeless spiritual desert, (Ellul, 1997), Hirsch actually visited brothels to find candidates for "his" city, since he believed, rightly, that crime and sex are an integral part of today's city life.

Reflection on what it means to "make" a town led the technocrats down the path of an urban sociology in the throes of a Marxist turning movement, set apart from the traditional framework of academic thinking. Within the newly formed *Ministère de l'Equipement*, (Ministry of Public Works) (1966), the urban research department massively supported this sociology. In Cergy, Bernard Hirsch called on Jean Lojkine,

a follower of his friend Alain Touraine. Hirsch wrote: "Before May 1968, sociologists did not have a reputation for being agents of destruction, as is the case today. On the contrary, they were very fashionable and a team of urban planners would not have felt it could hold its own without a full complement of sociologists." (Hirsch, 2000, 138). He was less enthusiastic when he read the works of his protégé Lojkine! A historical point of reference for the technocrats, the new towns played the same role for Marxist urban sociology: they were the epitome of capitalist urban projects to be fought against. In their efforts to relate the city and production, researchers sought to demonstrate that the city was being delivered into the hands of capitalism, with state complicity. In that perspective, "Urban policy is an active reflection of the relationship between the various classes and sub-classes. It condenses and sharpens the contradictions born of the segregationist nature of space occupied by the dominant classes." (Lojkine, 1976). The new towns were not the only ground for demonstrating this theory. The famous inquiry conducted by Manuel Castells and Francis Godard, *Monopolville* (1974) considers urban and industrial policies in Dunkirk, where the state invested in port infrastructure and steelworks along the coastline (Veltz, 1977).

The theory for the Paris region was robust. It sought to demonstrate that the new towns were part of a general strategy to organize the "deportation"—the word was actually used at the time—of the working classes to the suburbs. The de-industrialization of the region, where only the head offices of companies would remain behind, handing Paris over to the service industry and urban renovation plans (Coing, 1966) were seen as a concerted plan to deprive the working classes of their "right to the city", to quote the philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1968). Transport infrastructure policies, urban motorways, the regional railway network *(Réseau Express Régional)* were all part of the same strategy. The episode of the *Aérotrain* from Cergy to La Défense was symptomatic of the ideological interpretation of urban forms in the 1960s (Guigueno, 2008): what latent social projects are revealed by forms and networks? While discussion was still in progress regarding the feasibility or otherwise of the Aérotrain, there was a need to examine the ideological interpretation of a project for the creation of a high-speed link between the new town and the business district of La Défense. Sociologists focused their criticism on the hyper-polarization and segregation generated by this kind of project. The intention, they said, was to set up service industry bipolar structures, separating the corporate headquarters located in Paris or in La Défense from the office proletariat, banished to the suburbs.

The 1960s were therefore a laboratory distilling French modernity, of which today's networks and urban forms are now the components of a controversial landscape. The state was the main actor of this policy, conceived on a vast scale that integrated infrastructures and development programmes. In response to this technocracy which now appears less monolithic in the light of ongoing work, a critical line of thought developed and gave rise to a highly ideological urban sociology. Institutionalized in France, this critical appraisal was exported to the North American continent, where students in the urban sciences are inclined to read authors now forgotten in France (Henri Lefebvre) and to listen to the teachings of researchers trained in the 1960s. Manuel Castells does not underestimate the influence that the youthful years he spent in France had on his intellectual development. Soon after leaving Spain, he met Alain Touraine, who set him a thesis subject on the siting of industrial facilities in the Paris region.

Mutatis mutandis, California and the new technologies bear a likeness to France in the 1960s, which had dreams of being the land of high-tech (Pflieger, 2007). The internet has replaced the motorways in their structuring network role, global capital investment has taken over the role of organizing space that was once the purview of the state and sociologists are still attentive to the protests of anti-establishment groups. Contemporary concepts in urban studies, for instance reflections concerning mobility, could be usefully reimported when revisiting the history of the 1960s. Historical studies could also give some temporal depth to contemporary issues as well. The history of urban forms begins with an epistemology of the urban sciences although their operational nature does not facilitate much needed reflexiveness.

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Chapter 9

Planning, Power, and Policy Change in the Networked City: the Politics of a New Tramway in the City of Bern

Fritz Sager

The politics of articulating flows and spaces

In Switzerland, as in other countries, the problem of urbanization is first and foremost a problem of growing mobility and an increasing need for space. The integration of the policies for urban development and transportation is a crucial means to curbing the spread of urbanization and upholding standards set to counteract pollution (Kaufmann/Sager, 2006; Offner, 1993; Wiel, 2005). There are, on the one hand, housing developments that are concentrated in areas with comprehensive public transport services, which are combined with a restrictive parking policy that has been implemented to check the growth of automobile traffic (Banister *et al.*, 2000). On the other hand, there is an urban planning policy that aims to promote "the compact city" (Jenks *et al.*, 1996) and which requires a significant public transport network to absorb the concentration of flows naturally caused by this type of urban arrangement (Theys, 2002). This integration is ensured by coordinating the sectoral policies that govern urbanization with those that govern city transportation, i.e. the articulation of flows and places.

This chapter is set in the context of this discourse. It focuses on the issue of the extent to which attempts to build elements of the compact city trigger interests that diverge, resulting in games of influence-seeking and power (cf. Theys, 2003). This question must be divided into two sub-questions:

- Who are we actually dealing with, i.e., which players hold which positions and how do they advocate these?
- How is their power is determined by the political institutions of democracy and participation and what are the effects of these political opportunity structures?

These questions are discussed using the example of planning and decision-making for a new tramline to the western part of the city of Bern, (the Tram Bern West project). The project aims to resolve the severe transportation problems between this rather secluded part of Bern and the inner city, where many residents of West-Bern neighborhoods earn their living. In my view, this case is particularly suited to illustrating, in the context of political institutions, questions about the response of interested parties to planning solutions and the way in which people in different positions gain influence.

In the next section, I will present proposals to analyze the interaction between technical planning expertise, affected interests, and other interests in urban politics. More specifically, I will discuss the two approaches of new institutionalism and the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and I will develop corresponding hypotheses for the cases reviewed. In the following section, I will present the test case and describe in detail the process surrounding 12 years of highs and lows for the Tram Bern West project, from 1995 to 2007. I will then use this material to discuss the hypotheses put forward in the theory section. On this basis, I will draw conclusions regarding the tensions between issues of accessibility and affected residents' interests, and the corresponding questions of power distribution in urban planning.

Explaining urban politics

In the following section, I will present two theoretical approaches that I consider helpful when analyzing the interaction between affected interests and the State and its experts: the new institutionalism and the advocacy coalition framework.

New institutionalism and urban politics

New institutionalism connotes a general approach to the study of political institutions: a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional factors and political arrangement, performance and change. Institutionalism emphasizes the endogenous nature and social construction of political institutions. Institutions are not simply balanced contracts among self-seeking, calculating, individual players nor do they serve as arenas for contending social forces; they are collections of structures (with both formal rules and informal standard operating procedures) that have a partly-autonomous role in political life. The two main political institutions in Switzerland are direct democracy and federalism, both of which contribute to fairly extensive opportunities for political participation at the local level.

Political participation in Switzerland is not confined to voting. Direct democracy is a matter of active involvement, both at the cantonal and the national level, but particularly at the local level. The extent of direct democracy at the cantonal and local level varies considerably from one canton to another. Overall, there is an east/west divide with respect to the degree of direct democracy, this being greater in German-speaking cantons (including the city of Bern, the location of our case study), than in French-speaking cantons (in the west). However, the Swiss case also illustrates the "broken promises" (Papadopoulos, 2001) of direct democracy. Direct democracy reinforces corporatist schemes of decision-

making, since political parties and organized interests cooperate in order to minimize the risk of negative votes (Neidhart, 1970). Moreover, referenda tend to be used by groups who defend the status quo, and they thereby have a structurally conservative effect (Papadopoulos, 1994).

This is why other forms of citizen participation, such as neighborhood groups which, to some degree—dealing independently with problems at the micro-level and also seeking to influence formal decision-making processes—have developed in parallel to direct democratic opportunity structures (cf. Kübler *et al.*, 2005). A standard finding in Swiss political science indicates that differences with regard to both direct democracy and administrative culture coincide, more or less, with the language regions. Here, the (generally more participatory) political institutions in the German-speaking cantons provide incentives for a more intense associational life than do the French-speaking ones (Kriesi *et al.*, 1996; Kriesi/Baglioni, 2003). Accordingly, in addition to strong direct democratic institutions, there are various degrees of citizen participation in Swiss cities. In a comparison of six Swiss cities, Joye *et al.*, (1995) showed that the extent to which direct citizen participation is granted, i.e., the existence of opportunity structures, has a considerable effect on the state's capacity to act. The authors conclude that a strong degree of citizen participation at the local level helps improve living conditions with more focus on the domestic and neighborhood context, as well as with a specific focus on transportation issues, while a more representative democratic culture helps promote the city as a whole and emphasizes a less introspective approach.

With regard to the problem of professional policy experts being responsible for the actual planning of the transport infrastructure, and the affected population usually lacking relevant expertise, the question of technocracy must be addressed. In this respect, the nimby ("not in my backyard")-phenomenon (Fischer 1990) describes the behavior of citizens who are affected by a particular policy: they negate both the state's right to define public objectives and that of policy experts to define public problems (for a critical account of the nimby-concept cf. Trom, 1999).

From the institutionalist perspective, the question of technocracy is mainly a question of control. Due to the administration's expertise the information asymmetry problem (cf. Niskanen, 1971) has to be overcome. "Because agents may act on their own behalf, special control measures are necessary on the part of the principal" (Jones 1995: 76). The notion of citizen participation is based partially on the critique of representative democracy. "(R)eform politics weakens the representation of particular groups, especially if those groups are of lower status, have no citywide base of operation, or rank low in civic prestige. Citizen participation in making policy tends to occur through blue-ribbon committees, that is, committees composed mainly of upper-status business and professional purposes. (…) Because reform structures and practices are not attuned to the diversity of city life, minorities, especially those of lower status, have no easy avenues of political expression. (…) the lower class has need for direct political representation—for the personal link between constituent and representative" (Stone, Whelan, and Murin, 1986: 117). One way of controlling the bureaucracy or, generally, the power of policy experts such as planners has been seen in the strengthening of direct political influence in technical decision-making. Fischer (1990) for example, concludes that the integration of nimby-groups is best achieved by citizen participation in the experts' work ("participatory policy analysis").

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and policy change

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) developed the *Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)* to understand and explain policy change.[1] Unlike new institutionalism, which assumes limited rationality of the players involved, the ACF conceives the policy process as a competition between coalitions of rational players who advocate similar beliefs about policy problems and solutions. This competition takes place within policy subsystems, broadly defined as "those players from a variety of public and private organizations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue … and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain" (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 119). Unlike theories of rational choice, the ACF does not *a priori* assume that players are driven primarily by a search to maximize self-interest, but that the players' goals are complex and should be ascertained empirically (Sabatier 1998: 18). The ACF holds that players perceive the world and process information according to so called *belief systems* about how a given public problem is structured and should be dealt with. These belief systems are operationally defined according to three structural categories (see Sabatier 1993: 30; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 122-3): (1) a *deep core* of fundamental normative and ontological axioms that defines the vision of the individual, the society and the world, and that spans multiple policy subsystems, (2) a *policy core* of causal perceptions, as well as basic strategies and policy positions for achieving deep core beliefs in a given policy subsystem, and (3), a set of *secondary aspects* comprising a multitude of instrumental decisions and information necessary to implement the policy core. These structural categories of belief systems are assumed to show decreasing resistance to change, the deep core being most resistant, and the secondary aspects least resistant. The category of policy core beliefs is central to coalition dynamics: with regard to subsystem-specific policy issues, "policy core beliefs are the fundamental 'glue' of coalitions because they represent basic normative and empirical commitments within the domain of (the) specialization of policy elites" (Sabatier, 1998: 103). Although a player will not change normative aspects of his/her policy core beliefs easily, most policy core beliefs involve empirical elements that may change over time with the gradual accumulation of evidence.

Furthermore, the ACF argues that the policy subsystems are characterized by the presence of "advocacy coalitions" that form along lines of similarities and differences in policy core beliefs, and that this line-up of allies and opponents remains quite stable over time. In order to realize their policy core beliefs, these advocacy coalitions try to bring governmental programmes into line with the advocated policy cores. In doing so, they are assumed to be instrumentally rational, i.e., seeking and using venues through which they can exert influence in an efficient way. Based on these premises, the ACF presents policy change essentially as an alteration or the replacement of a hegemonic belief system within a policy subsystem.

[1] The presentation of the ACF is broadly based upon Kübler (2007: 220-222).

This can be the result of two processes. First, there is "policy-oriented learning", through which a hegemonic advocacy coalition tests and refines its belief system in order to realize it more efficiently: policy-oriented learning is more likely to concern only secondary aspects of a policy belief system, rather than policy core beliefs or, even less, deep core beliefs. Second, policy change can result when a previously hegemonic advocacy coalition is overturned by a new advocacy coalition that defends an alternative policy belief system. Thus, in terms of the difference from policy-oriented learning, this is a "non-cognitive" scenario of policy change, resulting from a distribution of power resources among subsystem players. According to the ACF, such a shift in power is unlikely to occur in the absence of external shocks, i.e., events that take place outside a given policy subsystem, but that nevertheless affect the resources and constraints of players and coalitions within the subsystem. One of the major hypotheses of the ACF is that, since policy-oriented learning is most likely to be confined to secondary aspects of a policy belief system, changes in the policy core aspects of a governmental programme are more often than not the result of a power shift following a disturbance in non-cognitive factors outside the subsystem (Sabatier, 1998: 105).

Four hypotheses

From these theoretical considerations, we can derive four hypotheses regarding our test case—planning and deciding a new public transport infrastructure in a city with extensive direct democratic and additional participatory opportunity structures.

- The first hypothesis is derived from a neo-institutionalist perspective, and states that the elaborate political opportunity structures for direct citizen participation lead to a broad integration of the interests of the affected population into the planning process.
- In a second hypothesis, however, we can, at the same time, expect that the elaborate set of instruments of direct democracy will provide opponents of the planning project with considerable veto power, irrespective of the degree to which their interests have been taken into account in the planning process, and depending only on their ability to mobilize the corresponding electorate.

From an ACF-perspective we can then derive two additional hypotheses regarding the planning of the tramline Bern West.

- As a third hypothesis, we can assume that a number of external shocks led to a policy learning process.
- As a fourth hypothesis, we can expect the result of the policy learning process to explain the outcome of voting on the introduction of the tramline, in that this is supposed to reflect the position of the winning coalition.

The chosen case, as the following section will illustrate, is an appropriate test for assessing the four hypotheses. First, it is located within elaborate political opportunity structures of both direct democracy and citizen participation and, second, it concerns a long-term process of urban policy change and thus allows for the detailed process analysis needed for the discussion of ACF hypotheses.

The Tram Bern West project: the twists and turns of a new urban transport infrastructure

The idea of building a tramway to the western part of Bern dates back to the beginning of the 20th century. It returned in several waves, in particular after the intensive urbanization of Bern's western neighborhoods in the 1950s. However, the idea of connecting the western part of Bern to the city center by tramway never succeeded for various reasons, mainly financial. The idea gained fresh momentum in the 1990s when another massive urban extension was planned in the west and several planning decisions opened a window of opportunity for the installation of the tramway. The historical background and the contents of the 1995 project are presented below, followed by a detailed analysis of the subsequent process until its final acceptance in 2007.

The historical background and the details of the 1995 project

The tram line between the city center and Bern's two western neighborhoods, Bethlehem und Bümpliz, first came up for discussion in 1914. The project was dismissed, however, because of the costs involved. Since the 1950s, Bern's western suburbs have been a main focus of urban development, accompanied by the need to develop the public transport system. This was achieved with a bus service; this was not, however, sufficient to meet demand. As a result, a new tram line project was born in the early 1970s. Again, the project was sidelined because of the high cost involved (CHF 80 million[2]). Instead of the tram line, a new, provisional bus line was established. This service continues to run today. The consequence of this episode for the tram project was that the planned route of the tracks was fixed by law. This meant that any new infrastructure along the planned tracks had to take into consideration the possible construction of the tram line.

In 1984, the project was put back on the city parliament's agenda. The motion was dropped, mainly because of the general stagnation of urban development in Bern. However, the idea came up again in 1991, and this time a study was commissioned on the possibilities for the development of urban transportation. The city parliament granted a budget for a feasibility study for the Tram Bern West project in 1995, on the basis of the study's results.

Figure 9.1 shows the route of the track of the new line, as planned in 1995. At that time, the planned tram line was 7.44 km in length. It connected to the existing tramway network at the border of the inner city, at the Brunnmatt. From here, one track led to the western part of the city. At the border of the western part, in Ausserholligen, the line split into two branches: the southern branch leading to Bümpliz and the northern branch leading to Bethlehem and the new urban area in Brünnen. In Brünnen, the new tram line connected with the railway line to Neuchâtel. This fit well with Bern's overall transport system, which emphasizes public transport, and it was closely coordinated with land-use planning (Kaufmann/Sager, 2006: 361).

2 CHF = Swiss Francs.

The track connecting the existing tramway with Ausserholligen, before the split, was the main issue at the center of the political debate. This was due, on the one hand, to the route of the track, and on the other hand to the high cost of the Ausserholligen viaduct underpass.



Fig. 9.1 The 1995 project. (Source: Grosser Rat des Kantons Bern (2004). Tram Bern West - Investitionsbeitrag, Kantonal Volksabsimmung 16. Mai 2004. Bern: Botschaft des Grossen Rates des Kantons Bern, p. 4.)

The cost of the project was CHF 152.8 million. Table 9.1 provides an overview of the distribution key for this total amount.

Table 9.1 Costs for the 1995 project.

	CHF million	Total
Infrastructure costs		**CHF 122.3 m**
Canton	47.5	
City (and suburban communes)	23.6	
Federal government	51.2	
Adjustments to the existing road infrastructure		**CHF 30.5 m**
City of Bern	18.5	
Energy Water Bern (independent service agency owned by the City of Bern)	12.0	
Overall total		**CHF 152.8 m**

The progress of the project, in four acts

After the city parliament granted the feasibility study budget for the 1995 project on March 3, 1995, there were some surprising twists and turns. The first was that, unlike the rest of the voting population, the people who stood to benefit from the new tram line—the population of the western part of Bern—voted against the project in the first popular vote. This incited the opponents of the new project to launch a financial referendum against it. It had previously been democratically approved by the deputies at the cantonal level (the middle rung of Switzerland's federal political system). Due to the strong urban-rural divide in the canton of Bern, the project was rejected in the cantonal vote.

Further reflections on how to improve the connection between the area west of the city and the inner city led to yet another attempt from 2005 to establish a tram line to the west. This project was then accepted in both the communal and the cantonal votes. The affected neighborhood population, however, again refused the project in the communal vote and accepted it with only a small majority of 17 votes in the cantonal vote of June 17, 2007.

We can identify five critical points in the process, which we can use to distinguish four different stages. These critical junctures are:

March 3, 1995	The city parliament accepts a grant for the study of a new tram line to Bern's western area
August 22, 2001	The federal government decides to increase funds for urgently needed investment of subsidized transport services in urban areas. An additional CHF 155 million is provided from 2002 to 2005, (2002: CHF 35 m, 2003-2005: CHF 40 m per year).
November 31, 2003	The citizens of Bern vote with a 63% majority in favor of the city's share of CHF 18.62 m for the Tram Bern West project. In the two western neighborhoods, Bümpliz and Bethlehem, however, the proposition is refused, with 55% voting against it (which did not affect the results for the city as a whole).
May 16, 2004	In the cantonal referendum, the canton's grant for Tram Bern West is refused by a very narrow majority: 50.4% no, 49.6% yes.
June 17, 2007	After voters in the city of Bern accepted the new Tram Bern West project by a 70.3% majority on November 26, 2006, the canton's voters followed with 69.9% voting yes on June 17, 2007. In the first vote, the proposition was again rejected by a majority of 53% in Bümpliz and Bethlehem, but accepted in the second vote with a difference of 17 individual ballot bills.

Accordingly, we can roughly differentiate four stages of the Tram Bern West project to date. I will refer to these four stages as:

1. *the planning phase* (March 3, 1995 to August 22, 2001);
2. *the euphoria phase* (August 23, 2001 to November 30, 2003);
3. *the fear phase* (December 1, 2003 to May 16, 2004);
4. *and the phase of parousia* (May 17, 2004 to June 17, 2007).

I will examine these stages in more depth now, and I will use this material to discuss the explanations presented for the process, as set forth in the theories described above.

The planning phase (March 3, 1995 to August 22, 2001)

During the first phase, the planning process was relatively unaffected by political considerations. The basic decision on the CHF 250,000 for the feasibility study had been taken and it was now the planners' turn. On the basis of the study's results, the city government, Bern's public transport service (Bernmobil), and the neighborhood commission for Bümpliz and Bethlehem (Quartierkommission Bümpliz-Bethlehem, QBB) met to discuss the project. In May 1997, the city government decided to change from a bus service to a tram system for the west. It also decided that the change should become effective within 10 years.

In August 1999, Bernmobil was commissioned to develop the plan itself. Various players participated at this stage: firstly, the bodies responsible for public transport in the Bern vicinity as well as in the canton and secondly, the QBB. The city government was required by a parliamentary decision to launch a public tendering process to integrate the new tram line into the existing transport system and its urban environment. An economic pre-assessment of the new line that was presented in December 1999 compared economic advantages to the current situation. In early 2000, the city parliament was informed about progress on the project. From May to August 2000, the population touched by the project was invited to participate, and neighborhood meetings were held at this stage. In August 2000, an exhibit displayed the tendered proposals. The three winners were selected in March 2001. This first planning phase ended with a decision at the federal level to grant an additional CHF 155 m for urgent public transport projects, from 2002 to 2005. This decision can be considered an external shock as defined by Sabatier and would as such be expected to launch a policy learning process, which I will analyze in the next section.

The first phase presented here shows that, following Sabatier's theories, we can identify only one advocacy coalition, which I have labelled AC1. AC1 was dedicated to promoting and developing public transport in Bern. If we are to describe it in his terms, the *deep core* embraces the notion that the wellbeing of the community is to be given precedence over the wellbeing of some individuals who are negatively affected by the pursuit of the general welfare. This deep core transforms into a policy core that prefers public transport to individual means of transport, and, hence, a public transportation system and infrastructure that meet the identified needs. These needs are best determined by trained experts, and the funds needed for the measures identified by these experts must be provided. In concrete terms of secondary aspects, this meant that the bus service for Bern's west had to be replaced with a tram line.

Due to the absence of other coalitions, AC1 was the only coalition at this stage. The QBB was part of this coalition, although it was a relatively weak member. To some extent, the singular position of AC1 was institutionally secured through the standard cantonal participation obligation in planning processes, as defined by federal law. There was, however, opposition to the project, although this did not take an organized or even coordinated form—hence the lack of any other coalition. The only real opponent was, at that time, a right-wing city member of parliament (MP), who voiced his opposition only in the city parliament. This changed during the subsequent period, with other oppositions appearing.

The phase of euphoria (August 23, 2001 to November 30, 2003)

The federal decision to provide more funds for projects like Tram Bern West led to an overwhelming optimism among its proponents about the chances of carrying out the project. However, the federal decision also led to growing publicity for the project and, in turn, to more concerns being expressed about it. It was during this phase that the opponents of the new tram line formed what can be called a second advocacy coalition, to use Sabatier's terms.

In November 2001, the political project delegation decided to grant another CHF 700,000 for the remaining planning efforts. In December, the canton submitted the project as one eligible for the new federal funds for public transport infrastructures. At the beginning of 2002, the city parliament granted CHF 230,000 for concomitant measures. At the same time, the city government was commissioned to develop an overall tram system plan for the region. In April 2002, the finalized project was officially presented to the public. In January 2003, the city government decided to stagger the concomitant measures in order to decrease the costs for the city from CHF 21 million to CHF 18 m. The overall tramline plan for the region was presented in March 2003.

Also in March 2003, Thomas Fuchs, the right-wing cantonal MP from the Swiss People's Party, who lived in the neighborhood affected by the project, set up a committee. The goal of the "No to the Millions-Tram Bern West" committee was to collect signatures for a (non-binding) petition, for the attention of the cantonal parliament. This marked the beginning of organized opposition to the project. In April and May 2003, proponents and opponents of the project met on several occasions at public participation events in affected neighborhoods. At this point other opposing groups with a stronger nimby-motivation formed. At the end of August 2003, the supervisory committee of the cantonal parliament unanimously approved the cantonal grant of CHF 47.5 million and recommended that the parliament approve it, which it did in September. Following this decision, the opponents announced that they would launch a financial referendum concerning the grant. The city parliament also approved the grant for the concomitant measures in September 2003. On 31 November 2003, Bern voters approved the city's grant for the tram with a clear majority of 63%, despite the fact that the two beneficiaries, Bümpliz and Bethlehem, rejected the proposition with 55%. This result is considered a second external shock since it legitimizeed both the proponents and opponents of the project: it was simultaneously a clear sign that the city's population wanted the new tram line and that the two neighborhoods that would benefit most from the project did not want it.

With regard to the coalitions in the second phase, AC1 remained consolidated and integrated, with some new players. We have already seen how the opposition formed. Two groups are of special interest, the aforementioned committee around Fuchs and a second group of opponents. These new groups formed at a point when most of the technical questions had already been decided, namely by the time the project was submitted to the federal government for the new funds. Originally, the two groups opposing the project did not have the same function. The first one, the Fuchs committee, was created primarily to collect signatures for the petition against the tram, while the second, the committee "No to Tram Bern West" aimed at calling a referendum. The groups fused shortly before the decision in favor of the cantonal grant and the launch of the cantonal referendum. I have

labelled the resulting coalition AC2. As to the belief system of AC2, all members belonged to the conservatives or to the right-wing liberal parties, so the deep core can be described as preferring the individual's liberty over the community's welfare, i.e., the aggregation of individual wellbeing is considered equal to general welfare. As a consequence, the state and public administration in particular are judged negatively in the first instance, as they are the sources of state intervention interfering with individual liberty, i.e., AC2 had an ideology of a limited state role. This translates into a policy core in which the public transport system does not necessarily impact on individual transport; even if it did, a new tram line limits the individual freedom of those affected by the inconvenience it causes, i.e., the nimby-groups. However, what was more important here was the cost involved. Since a new tram line costs a great deal, it was rejected. With regard to the secondary aspects, this attitude results in an overall dismissal of the new tram project and an alternative proposal for extensive use of trolley-buses for three reasons: first, they need less space on the road (not interfering with individual transport), second, they need no new infrastructure (less inconvenience for the affected population), and third, the rolling stock costs much less than new trams.

As for dominance, the AC1 remained dominant throughout the second phase. In the first stage, it accelerated the planning process following the federal provision of new funds over a limited time, and in a second stage, it prevailed at the political level in that all decisions in the second phase complied with AC1's belief system. However, this success story was about to come to an end in the third phase.

The phase of fear (December 1, 2003 to May 16, 2004)

The third phase is the shortest in the course of the Tram Bern West story. Directly after the communal vote in the city of Bern, the support committee was formed, integrating city and cantonal players. In January 2004, the federal government granted Bernmobil a railway concession for the construction and maintenance of two new branches in Bern's tramway network infrastructure. In January, the cantonal chancellery also declared that a potential vote on the project could take place as early as May 2004 in the event that the referendum took place. This was necessary because the federal funds could only be drawn upon if the actual construction work began in 2004. In February 2004, the opponents' committee "No to the Tram Bern West" submitted 11,713 validated signatures to the cantonal chancellery and the referendum against the cantonal credit was held.

Apart from the value-conservative and economically neoliberal Swiss People's Party and the right-wing nationalist Swiss Democrats, all political parties and vested interests supported the tram project, i.e., the corresponding grant. The crucial stage preceding the vote was initiated by the opponents' committee in April 2004. On May 16, 2004, cantonal voters rejected the cantonal grant for the Tram Bern West with 50.4% voting against it and 49.6% in favor, with an extremely narrow margin of 2,200 votes. Table 9.2 illustrates the outcome of the vote in the city of Bern and in the rest of the canton. Again, Bümpliz and Bethlehem together voted against the project; this time the rejection was even more pronounced, with 60% saying no. The vote is considered to be another external shock in that it completely changed the preconditions for the project since the decision that was taken was negative, again gaining in legitimacy as the beneficiaries voted against the new infrastructure.

Table 9.2 Results of the May 16, 2004 vote in percent.

	City of Bern	Rest of canton	Total canton
Yes	58.8	46.0	49.6
No	41.2	54.0	50.4
Turnout	52.6	42.2	45.3

If we look at the two advocacy coalitions, we find that even though it was clearly AC1 that dominated the whole process, it was AC2 that prevailed in the decision. This is due to the fact that the actual decision did not take place within the policy subsystem that Sabatier sees as the cradle of any policy change. However, a cantonal decision at the democratic level opened new rifts crucial for Tram Bern West. This institutionally-induced change in the game gave rise to new arguments and considerations. These new arguments concerned the question of the urban-rural-divide and more fundamental financial considerations on the left-right-axis, i.e., they were not linked to the original urban transport policy subsystem. The canton of Bern is a mainly rural canton, despite the fact that its economic wellbeing depends on three agglomerations in the canton, and the rural-urban divide played a major role in the result of the vote. People from the Bernese Oberland in the Alpine region could not see why they should support a tram line in the capital and why this should cost so much. Thus, the financial argument gained importance at the expense of substantial policy arguments regarding inner-city transportation problems. The shift in the decision-making arena thus worked in favor of the project opponents, while the proponents' arguments were of little use at this level. Only 24.5% of the canton's voting population lives in the city of Bern, while the rest (i.e., 75.5%), lives elsewhere in the canton. In the actual project vote, 28.5% of the voters were from the city, 71.5% were from outside the city. However, the very slim difference of only 2,200 individual votes still indicates that the local benefit of the project was also recognized at the cantonal level.

It is this narrow result that accounts for the process continuing and moving to another stage, even though the decision to terminate the project had been taken.

The parousia phase (May 17, 2004 until June 17, 2007)

In Christianity, Parousia (from the Greek *Parussía*—literally: presence) means the second coming of the messiah on judgment day. While the appropriateness of using this term to label a phase of a process is debatable, the resurrection of the Tram Bern West plans after their defeat in the cantonal vote does display characteristics of a 'second coming', resulting in the new reign of public transport.

Just a few days after the vote against the project credit, the project delegation decided not to stall the granting procedure for the project at the federal level. However, the controversial track route under the highway viaduct was suspended and a new analysis of this part was initiated. The delegation announced that once again it wanted to consider all options for the improvement of public transport in Bern West, but it also declared that its preference remained for the tram line solution. The opponents' committee immediately demanded that any further planning of a tram line be cancelled and that a bus solution be pursued instead.

In August 2004, the cantonal parliament commissioned the cantonal government to provide alternatives for the rejected project. In its answer, the cantonal government stressed the need for a connection in the west with the railway to Neuchatel, and as a

short-term solution it proposed the extension of one of the two bus services to the west. In November 2004, the project delegation presented its reassessment of the options with the result that the tram solution prevailed clearly over all other options, particularly any bus-based solution.

In March 2005, workshops were held with the neighborhood organizations (QBB) and an accompanying political commission, which also encompassed opponents of the project, was established. In August 2005, the project delegation presented the new project with a new track route. This went into detailed planning in the following months.

Exactly two years after the defeat of the 1995 project, the city government presented the definitive plans for the modified tram project, on 16 May 2006. The new project differed from the 1995 project on various counts: first, its overall costs were CHF 12 million lower, and second, the disputed track route under the highway was no longer planned. Instead, the track was to follow existing bus lines. Third, and as a consequence, the new track was shorter (6.8 km instead of 7.4 km); fourth, the tram had its specific track separated from car traffic on only 30% of its course, instead of 46%. Fig. 9.2 shows the new line. While, at CHF 141 m the overall project costs are lower than those of the 1995 project, which was CHF 153 m, the new route of the tracks increased the costs for the city from CHF 18.5 m to CHF 26 m, including necessary road renovation work. The city government awarded the new grant for the project of CHF 26 m on May 16, 2006.



Fig. 9.2 The route of the 2006 project. (Source: http://trambernwest.ch/images/stories/linienfuehrung.jpg (accessed 2/20/2008).)

In her presentation of the project, the city's planning director stressed the fact that the interests of those directly concerned by the project had been incorporated into the planning process of the project. The opponents, however, remained skeptical. The driving force behind the cantonal referendum, Fuchs, declared that the communal vote on the city's grant would show whether the affected neighborhoods supported the project. The vote on the grant took place on November 26, 2006 with 70.3% voting for the projecct. Bümpliz/Betlehem, however, displayed stable policy preferences and dismissed the grant once again, this time with 3,865 yes to 4,352 votes against.

In order to prevent another financial referendum, the cantonal parliament decided to voluntarily submit the cantonal share of CHF 33.4 m to a popular vote. In the campaign, proponents of the tram emphasized the importance of the new infrastructure for the whole canton, which relies greatly on the city's economic welfare. In spite of the fact that

Fuchs kept fighting the project, even his own party no longer agreed with him and recommended acceptance. On June 17, 2007, the cantonal voting population clearly accepted the proposition. The most surprising aspect of this vote was the acceptance of the cantonal grant in Bümpliz/Bethlehem with a margin of 17 votes.

In this last stage of the process, we can observe an actual policy change. After its crash landing, the original project was modified considerably, taking into account the various criticisms of its opponents. However, a tram is still a tram. In terms of Sabatier, therefore, we are dealing with a minor policy change and not a major policy change that implies a shift in the dominant policy core beliefs—far from it; not only is there no major policy change, no actual shift regarding the dominating coalition can be detected either. Even after its defeat in the cantonal referendum, AC1 clearly remained the dominant coalition. The opposing AC2 was not at any point able to install its members as dominant players with respect to the contents of the planning, nor could they establish their views as the guiding belief system for the definition of the policy.

What accounts for the politics of urban planning?

In the theory section, I presented four hypotheses for the analysis of planning and power in urban politics, two derived from the neo-institutionalist literature and two from the advocacy coalition framework. In this section, I will discuss these theory-driven expectations on the basis of our empirical test case, and evaluate their explanatory power for this case. Based on these findings, I conclude by discussing the question of power distribution in urban planning at a more general level.

Institutionalist explanations

A first set of two hypotheses was drawn from neo-institutionalism, claiming relationships between polity, viz. the organizational structure, and politics, viz. the distribution of power and the respective negotiation processes, and, consequently, policy as well, i.e., the contents of a given decision.

First hypothesis

In a *first hypothesis,* we expected that the elaborate political opportunity structures for direct citizen participation would lead to a broad integration of the interests of the affected population into the planning process.

This assumption is only partly supported, namely in the last phase of the process when the efforts to integrate the affected neighborhoods' interests in the project were frustrated after the defeat of the original project in the cantonal referendum. However, there was also institutionalised citizen participation in the first planning stage. The problem at this stage was that the actual interests had not yet formed and, thus, were not able to find appropriate representation in the planning procedure. The arguments against the project came not from the neighborhood but from the sphere of city politics where the politician leading opposition to the project attacked primarily its cost. It was after this initial opposition that

broader local opposition by citizens affected by the project formed. This happened mainly during the second stage (of euphoria), when formal political players clearly supported the project and the chances for it being carried out were more than intact—after the federal decision to provide new funds for urban public transport projects. At this stage, the clear dominance of AC1 seems to have led the key planners and decision-makers to ignore the growing opposition forming in the neighborhoods in the city's western areas. During the third phase (of fear), there was no room for integrating interests of those affected since this was a phase of political struggle over the finished project. Thus, overall, we can state that institutionalized participation does not *per se* lead to a broad integration of the interests of the affected population into the planning process. Instead, the extent to which affected interests are heard depends, on the one hand, on the extent to which these interests are articulated, and, on the other hand, on the political circumstances and resulting willingness of the decision-makers.

Second hypothesis

In the *second hypothesis*, we expected the elaborate set of instruments of direct democracy to provide opponents of the plan with considerable veto-power, irrespective of the degree to which their interests were taken into account in the planning project—depending solely on their ability to mobilize the electorate.

The second hypothesis applies mainly to the second and third phases of the Tram Bern West process. The main idea of the hypothesis is that there need not necessarily be a link between the contents of the policy and its development (in this case: consideration of affected interests in the planning process) and the outcome of a corresponding vote. The reasoning behind this expectation is that citizens act with bounded rationality, i.e., neither do all citizens have all necessary information nor are all citizens able to calculate the pros and cons of all this information in terms of their own wellbeing. Democratic decisions do not have to be rational at all, but are influenced by a plethora of factors at the macro and the micro levels (Lipset/Rokkan 1967; Lazarsfeld *et al.*, 1944). This assumption can be supported when looking at the second vote at the cantonal level. The behavior of the cantonal population can be explained by considerations completely separate from transport and urbanization issues. Here it was the rural-urban-divide and financial concerns that were most likely decisive in most of the votes against the project. As mentioned above, most people in the Bernese Oberland are note concerned about transport problems in Bern. However, the majority was nevertheless extremely slim, which implies that policy-driven, i.e,. specific considerations also played an important role for many voters. It was not until the second cantonal vote that the proponents of the tram line managed to convince the rest of the canton of the benefits to be gained from the local project. Thus, overall, our case confirms the second hypothesis.

Value-based explanations (ACF)

A second set of two hypotheses was drawn from the advocacy coalition framework, which postulates that policy change is mainly value-driven and depends on the dominant player coalition sharing the same belief system regarding the problem at hand.

Third hypothesis

In our *third hypothesis*, we assumed that a number of external shocks led to a policy learning process.

I have structured my case along three external shocks according to Sabatier: first, the federal decision to grant extra funds for urban public transport projects; second, the launching of the referendum after the communal vote; and, third, the negative decision in the first cantonal vote. What we have found, in short, contradicts the expectation stated. We did not find any shift in the coalition dominance, nor an actual policy change, leading to the adoption of a new belief system. After the first external shock, planning efforts were intensified and the dominant AC1 was consolidated. Following the second external shock, the political struggle intensified but no actual policy learning took place. It is only after the third external shock that we can observe some sort of policy change, even though it is clearly a minor change, not a major policy change since the tram line solution still prevailed even after the project was defeated in a popular vote.

How can we explain this resilience of the dominant AC1 and its belief system? If we take a closer look at our case we find that this dominance is due mainly to the strong institutional hedging of the key members of AC1. In contrast to AC2, we find government representatives as well as heads of public services and dominant economic interests. Through their formal role, these players are firmly anchored in the politico-administrative apparatus and hence play a major role in policymaking, even when their positions have been rejected in democratic votes. Thus, the imperturbable dominance of AC1 in the process can be attributed to institutional reasons rather than to their convincing belief system.

Overall, we have to dismiss the hypothesis, as its expectation was not supported in this case and the coalition dominance is due to institutional backing rather than to their prevailing in the competition of belief systems.

Fourth hypothesis

In the *fourth hypothesis*, we expected the result of the policy learning process to explain the outcome of the votes on the tram: it should reflect the position of the winning coalition.

As we have seen already in the discussion of neo-institutionalist explanations, the results of the votes only partially reflected the dominant belief system. In the first vote on the city grant, the project was approved by a clear majority of 63% of Bern's voters. With good reason, this can be interpreted as reflecting the dominant belief system of AC1. The project was planned in view of the city's development, particularly with respect to the major urbanization project in western Bern. The connection of this new urban center to the inner city was a logical and coherent consequence of this development, which was for the good of the whole city. The AC1 belief system mirrored this attitude in that it valued common welfare, which in this case corresponds with the city's economic and social well-being, higher than individual interest maximization. Thus, for the first vote, the hypothesis is supported.

However, this is not the case for the second vote at the cantonal level, where we have seen that arguments completely detached from the actual planning content were decisive. Accordingly, the outcome of the second vote did not reflect the dominant belief system. As illustrated above, this was due mainly to the institutionally-induced shift of the decision from the functional area in which the policy subsystem was valid, to the cantonal level,

which embraced a much larger geographic area that did not have anything to do with the problem that defined the policy subsystem. While the third vote essentially reproduced the situation in the first vote, there is support for the hypothesis in the fourth vote where cantonal voters clearly agreed with AC1's policy position. However, there is no value-based explanation about why it took so long for the dominant coalition to actually win. The prolonging of this process is due solely to the fact that opponents were able to take advantage of institutional opportunity structures.

The result of the fourth vote was that the proponents of the tram were successful in showing the great importance of the city of Bern's economic wellbeing for the whole canton's welfare, and how the new tram line would contribute to this wellbeing. In doing so, the local issue was transformed into a cantonal one. Based on this line of reasoning, we can derive the theory that the explanation presented here does, primarily, prevail when the problem geography of the policy subsystem and the borders of the formal decision area are roughly congruent.

In our case of the Tram Bern West, the neo-institutionalist approach displays more explanatory power than the value and player-based approach of the advocacy coalition framework. This latter approach also leads to valuable insights, but mainly in combination with institutionalist explanations.

The distribution of power in urban planning

The study of the Tram Bern West project has shown how great the influence of the institutional framework is and also the limitations to political negotiation within the policy subsystem. We have stated that opportunity structures alone do not automatically lead to participation, but that there also has to be a basic knowledge in order for the citizens who will be affected to be able to identify their interests. We then found that the dominant belief system does lead to corresponding decisions when there is a basic congruence between the problem geography defining the policy subsystem and the political decision area for the solution of the problem.

As to how affected interests respond to planning solutions by experts and how the different stakes gain influence from the political institutional context, we can conclude that the point in time at which the affected interests are integrated into the planning process is critical for the projects to be accepted. Fischer's idea of "participatory policy-making", therefore, makes sense. A precondition for participation is the organization of interests. However, the balance between the overall benefit for the city as a whole and the specific advantages and disadvantages for the affected interests has to be kept in view. The information asymmetry can also be seen from this angle: the experts' interests lie with the best technical solution, usually aiming to raise the general wellbeing; in contrast, the affected interests are somewhat limited in scope, as they only concern the immediately-affected space. These interests have to be provided with the necessary information in order to be able to identify their stance. Only under this condition is it possible for planners to take respective positions into account. A second and subsequent condition for a planning procedure which is sensitive to affected interests, but is yet professional and in the service of the common good, is the congruence of problem and decision areas. Policy learning in the respective subsystem only translates into corresponding decisions when these are taken within

the borders of this subsystem, i.e., by the population benefiting from or suffering under the decision. These findings are based on a case with extensive direct democratic opportunity structures. However, they are not limited to such institutional arrangements. When analyzing urban politics, instead of finding individual explanations only in institutions or values, it is vital that both types of factors are taken into account.

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Chapter 10

Towards a Regulation of the Space of Flows via Environmental Conflicts: Airports and Airport Areas as Laboratories of Urban Sustainability?

Guillaume Faburel

Introduction: on the general and growing difficulty of equipping metropolitan centers with airports

Over the past 30 years airports and their surrounding areas have become truly strategic sectors, offering unequalled leverage possibilities to public authorities, notably due to the large-scale urban equipment they acquire. Throughout the world the airport is seen as an urban gateway—and thus as a mobility interface—but also as a hub (centrality), i.e., a place of anchoring and integration. Via its impact on metropolitan production systems, it exerts an influence upon the equilibrium not only of its hinterland, but also of the city become metropolis.

Benefiting from these several functions, many airports developed harmoniously with traffic projections and metropolitan economic development fashioning their field of possibilities. The wealth generated for the territories was supposed to counterbalance already visible negative effects, such as spatial inequalities in the distribution of the economic manna produced by the airport, or the environmental noise caused by its multiple flows. We were caught up in the logic of supply, carried by the rhetoric of structuring effects and exogenous development, with its suite of technical determinism and mechanical metaphors, even though the potential of territories to host airports had soon been identified as an essential factor for the development of the relevant so-called structuring equipment (Offner, 1993).

However, a different trend has appeared in many countries over the past 30 years, a trend largely underestimated by the parties usually designated by the term "air transport

industry".[1] In spite of the abundant literature they produce (see, for example, the works of the Airport Council International, ACI, 1998), which are in turn based on writings on economics or economic geography as referents (e.g., De Neufville and Odoni, 2003), which presents airports as catalysts of wealth and purveyors of external economies, local protest movements have blossomed and consolidated around airports in many countries. In spite of the economic advantages extolled by the players of the "space of flows" (Castells, 1996), protest against the environmental impact of airplanes passing overhead has grown more stringent over the past 30 years.

The general extension of these forms of protest today constitutes one of the major constraints for development, and often for the very functioning of international air transport platforms. Operators have encountered growing difficulties when they attempted—and still sometimes attempt—to up their capacities in response to growing demand for air mobility and the rapid saturation of equipment in several European countries and the US as of the early 1990s. For example, a study by the Bureau d'Information et de Prévisions Economiques (BIPE), announced in 2001 that the 25 leading European airports would be saturated by 2015; some, such as Frankfurt Rhein-Main, had already reached saturation point at the time (with the resulting project of a new runway that marked events until 2005); others successfully increased their hosting capacities in exchange for significant environmental guarantees. In chronological order these were: Amsterdam Schiphol, Roissy CDG and London Heathrow.

After presenting a few of the many conflict cases, we will report on recent sensitive changes in the arguments and referents of protesters against the functioning of airports or the construction of new ones (second Section). Admittedly this masks a more deep-seated process, which is shared by all investigated conflicts: the entry of territories into the public arena (Faburel, 2005a). Doubtless this evolution, though it may be new in the world of air transport, is not surprising in view of the many analyses of earlier conflicts involving motorway or railway projects in France and abroad.

But when it comes to airports, there is one point that strikes us as more interesting: the entry of *places* and territories into modes of thinking and acting is common to different airport-related problem situations, regardless of the political culture, social ties and physical or symbolic particularities of the specific places concerned. We do not claim to formulate a law; even if we were to risk such a thing, it would be the law of the powerful territorial imprint on queries and arguments. Rather, by analyzing a few cases we will seek to gain an in-depth understanding of the birth of this generality and of its consequences.

The environment appears everywhere as the subject of a problem situation (conflict) focusing on a spatial object (the airport and its surroundings). In more precise terms, aircraft noise seems to play a double role in the rapid and shared explosion of airport-related cases. First, its social and spatial effects, long overshadowed by a technology-centered discourse (traffic projections, acoustic modelling) highlight the inadequacies of the vulgates fed by this discourse. Gradually, the question of impact becomes the subject of the debate. Thus, where the discontinuity between airports and local territories was long

[1] Aeronautics manufacturers, airline companies, airport management and regulation authorities (administrative supervision authorities, International Civil Administrations Organisation—ICAO, Eurocontrol…).

upheld in the name of the extraterritorial, or even non-territorial nature of airports, it now establishes social ties within the local territories, and a spatial link with other more conventional categories of scale present in the debate.

As proof of this trend, stakeholders' associations develop rapidly, led notably by coalitions headed by local elected representatives. These coalitions, guided by different values and endowed with different legitimacies, constitute the matrix of a territorial referent acting as an alternative framework structuring the debate. The strength of these values is that by refraction they block or redefine certain economic purposes that the space of flows conventionally ascribes to airports and their management. It is because of this very evolution that airports and their functioning are debated more and more hotly, sometimes becoming true objects of controversy (third and fourth Sections).

In the light of this basic tendency, we query an emerging issue: guaranteeing the social acceptability of the platforms. This increasingly important stake. i.e., the sustainable operation of airport activities, calls for a slow evolution of the archetypal relations that air transport players, and notably airport operators, entertain with space (reticulated with the *Hub and Spokes*, segmented by *Gateways*). This trend forces them to reconsider their relations with territories and *places*, and thus to revise their strategic position to space: in the post-Fordist world, strictly a resource of scale, essential for an activity with strong capital intensity. The fifth Section presents several derived concrete actions, registering various possible forms of cohabitation between airports and their host territories. Still and all, there are some black boxes that must be opened to disclose the historic weight of connections between the production of rationality and the practice of democracy (sixth and seventh Section).

The concluding in-depth considerations (eighth Section) suggest that although airports are territories with particular topographical forms and forms of organizations, they continue to assert themselves because they are unstable (conflicts), and thus the object of a growing number of negotiations (multiplication of governance initiatives), functioning as laboratories for planning and development decisions (stakes, principles, modes of action). However, do they represent not only hybrid territories within the space of flows, but new forms of regulating the world economy?

Airport conflicts: the structuring effect of environmental impacts on surrounding territories

Everywhere in the world, airports encounter growing obstacles to their attempts to expand capacity in response to the growing demand for air mobility and the saturation of equipment that has been announced by operators. Over and above the historic cases that fed the environmental chronicles (the long debate on the new London Heathrow terminal[2], a project for an additional runway at Boston Logan that has been pending since 1973), and that are often emblematic, all countries today face tense, if not blocked situations.

2 The decision was made in early 2002, after six years of debate.

In the US in 2002, over 50 airports, including world leaders in terms of passenger numbers (Chicago O'Hare, Los Angeles International Airport, for example) were caught up in legal maelstroms and open conflicts, or authorities foresaw such a possibility in the near future (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002). In Europe, the number of airports bedeviled by structured protest and tense relations grows constantly, with a number of historic cases here, as well: not only London Heathrow, but also Frankfurt Rhein-Main since the 1980s, Amsterdam Schiphol since the early1990s, and several French airports such as Roissy CDG in the mid-1990s.

Moreover, protest movements by the concerned populations are becoming more combative, both concerning the choice of new airport sites, or "simply" the modification of trajectories. We particularly have in mind the almost decade-long negotiations between the municipality of Denver (Colorado), backed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), on the construction of a new airport: Denver International Airport[3]; also the circumstances surrounding the debate about the third commercial airport in the Ile-de-France region (Démarche d'Utilité Concertée pour un Site Aéroportuaire International, DUCSAI), or the general reaction to the redistribution of traffic in the air space (e.g.: Brussels National).

This escalation in protests is due to a variety of reasons that we would be hard put to detail in a complete and precise way, since protest actions are strongly marked by their different political cultures, social ties and regional particularities. Nonetheless, the observations we have made in Europe, the US and Australia let us identify certain common traits. The environmental burdens which air traffic imposes upon the areas around airports, and the fears generated by traffic projections, first of all in terms of noise, are an important structuring component of protest. In this sense, environmental stakes have become elements that shape the future of airport capacities, i.e., future air mobility. However, from mere demands with a strong technical-environmental focus (quantified noise levels, rates of atmospheric pollutants), the debate has come to encompass a number of other problems. It is true that it has not totally abandoned queries relative to the representativity of acoustic (noise) modelling and indexes (Leroux, Amphoux, Bardyn, 2002). However, the debate now also includes the impact of these environmental burdens. And, although individual effects to this day spawn numerous demands (sleep disturbances owing to noise[4], the health impact of atmospheric pollution[5]and so on), the debate now generates queries linked to the more collective effects of burdens (Faburel, Rui, Déroubaix, Lévy, Gobert, 2007). Henceforth, such exchanges include more global considerations that put the overall future of territories lying close to airports into perspective. What is the reason for this phenomenon?

One of the reasons observed in several contexts is that aircraft noise may also have more subtle effects on the social and spatial dynamics of the surrounding territories due notably to the disturbances generated and the urban management tools to deal with them

3 Since 1990, the only international airport built in the United States, as a result of the tensions mentioned.

4 As an example, consider London Heathrow, taken to court by local communities and national associations for not complying with restrictions on night flights (decision of 2 October 2001, Hutton case, European Court of Human Rights, in Marguénaud, 2002).

5 See debate on Los Angeles International Airport.

(construction constraints, subsidies for soundproofing). To simplify our presentation we will construct a typology by adopting one that is considered binding in the air transport world with reference to jobs linked to airport activity: direct, indirect and induced impact (Faburel, Chatelain, Gobert, Lévy, Manola, Mikiki and Zegagh, 2006).

In the direct impact category, residential mobility, for example, may appear somewhat singular. It may, as in the case of Orly (second-largest French airport), affect population numbers. But it may also—and this appears to be more frequent—modify the structure of local societies, gradually giving rise to social marking of space: a concentration of lower income populations as against other sectors of the metropolitan area. This observation is reminiscent of the ones made by some American social psychologists concerning spaces close to hazardous equipment (with the concept of *Social Amplification of Risk*, see the work of P. Slovic), and the rapid spread of the principle of environmental justice in the referents for action (Executive Order 12898 on *Environmental Justice* of February 11, 1994).

In this register, the *Common Options For Airports Regions* (COFAR) project, which associates all the major airports of the European space, their metropolitan regions and other local communities of northwestern Europe, has shown, in a study conducted around Roissy CDG, the role of the depreciation of the living environment and of the loss of property value in the decline of certain areas:

- departure of populations with a higher social status
- and an influx of young couples from the subsidized rental pool of Seine-Saint-Denis (Martinez, 2001), acquiring their first piece of property.

Studies in environmental economics conducted over the past 30 years have constantly highlighted the statistically negative impact of aircraft noise on property values, affecting over 20 airports around the world (Schipper *et al.*, 1998; Navrud, 2002).

Still concerning direct impact, there are other phenomena, such as the one that here affects Orly: specific forms of sociability, limited in space because federated by a common experience of noise; and, more commonly, social representations conveying feelings of alterity and political abandonment. The latter effects of aircraft noise may even weld the community together, forging or recomposing if not an identity as such, at least a feeling of common belonging (Faburel, 2003a). The object of the conflict then is no longer the defense of a specific interest (otherwise (dis)qualified as egoist), but that of a general local interest (Lascoumes, 1994): defense of a territory that has become self-referential through symbolic identification. Airports surrounded by traditional or dense populations (e.g., London Heathrow), local territories in cultures which invoke the environment as a factor of wellbeing (Los Angeles International Airport, LAX, San Francisco International Airport, SFO, Frankfurt Rhein-Main) are particularly prone to such mechanisms.

Concerning the indirect impact of aircraft noise on territories, it may act as a block on the residential development of areas close to the airport. Here the preventive management of exposure to noise via regulatory planning instruments (Noise Compatibility Programs, Plan d'Exposition au Bruit, PEB[6]) is held responsible. The constraints imposed by them may have facilitated the introduction of heavy transport infrastructures required

[6] These instruments define acoustic zones, established by accounting for noise previews, in which building rights are more and more restrictive the nearer one comes to the airport.

for rapid access to the airport, as well as the functional allocation of spaces to economic and commercial uses. The surroundings of Chicago O'Hare are representative of this trend, and generally speaking, a number of American airports (Cidell, Adams, 2001). But these equipments have operated significant cuts in space, compartmentalizing certain municipalities around Roissy CDG, or even certain municipal territories within a municipality (Faburel and Barraqué, 2002).

Finally, with reference to induced impact, in several airport contexts the appearance of *protest* territories has been observed, one of their main resources being the defense of local identity and the preservation of living communities, partly shaped as a result of coping with noise problems, i.e., territorial wellbeing.

Even more fundamentally, these territorial effects of environmental burdens generated by air traffic and airport activities contribute to increasingly visible specific geographic formations, based on spatial and social differentiation. The outlines of these (structuring?) effects are often different from those delimited by regular environmental zoning. Thus, though long underestimated, the territorial effects of noise are increasingly present in the debate and may often structure the arguments of residents and local representatives, even raising hopes that they will be taken into account in settlements.

This is a result of the fact that another referent, notably a spatial one, often nourishes demands and alternative projects, frequently contributing to renewed awareness of problems relative to airports and their development. In this sense this referent, constituted along the lines of techno-centered referents of the air transport industry, significantly rejuvenates the local protest genre, and in general opens forums for debate by multiplying possibilities of contact.

The territory as the other spatial scale of reference

First, owing to its impact, in the reasoning of local territories, aircraft noise reinforces the position of the *place* as a further pertinent spatial scale, in addition to the traditional ones: the planetary scale made apparent by air mobility and the reflection on *Global cities* (Sassen, 1992; Graham, 1995; Janelle and Beuthe, 1997); the more continental, national, even regional one, implicit in reflections on urban frameworks and the planning of airport systems (De Neufville, 1995; De Neufville and Odoni, 2003; De Neufville, 2005).

This local territorial scale has already aroused some interest, globally focusing on geo-economic functionalities of spaces, establishing the dynamics of locations near airports within larger spaces (Cidell, Adams, 2001). Above all, aircraft noise impacts give rise to a different understanding of the territory, identifying other attributes, and in consequence perhaps other ways of conceiving of the juncture between airports and their surroundings. Here we no longer deal simply with a functional territory giving access to an economic resource represented by the platform, involving, for example, property expropriations or acquisitions required for its capitalization. Nor do we simply deal with the legal-political space relating to the competence of elected representatives and technicians, with questions of the coordination and hierarchy of powers. We are also dealing with the territory of residents' representations and practices, and thus the uses and living experiences of *places* and their implications for local dynamics.

To our mind, one of the ways in which these changes become manifest is the influence of these living territories on how inhabitants are inconvenienced by noise. For example, starting with a study conducted among populations living close to Orly airport, and backed by exploratory interviews and focus group meetings, we showed how the residential trajectories and aspirations of households, or the political feeling of being neglected by or excluded from decision-making processes, may influence feelings of inconvenience (*supra*). Broër recently recalled the importance of social representations of public actions, principally of airport-related interventions on the environment, on complaints or court actions relative to Amsterdam Schiphol and Zurich Kloten (Broër, 2007).

Finally, and perhaps above all, this interpretation of a living territory carries different values: identity, cohesion, justice or co-production and partnership unite local energies everywhere, and structure, or reinforce, protest against airport projects. These are linked through the proximity—sometimes an idealized one—of the legitimacies that the values convey. We have in mind for example the territorial legitimacy of local institutions, which expresses itself in the powers relating to urbanism choices conferred on them in France; in the US in the possibilities of legal recourse against non-compliance with environmental equity (*supra*). But there are also legitimacies that refer less to action abilities than to living experiences, such as residents' identity-based legitimacy (*supra*). More and more often, these invoked legitimacies are the basis of the attitudes and behavior of local players and populations living close to airports.

Since they are territorial, the causes and scope of these legitimacies are culturally and politically coded by the context of the debate. Thus, setting up a comprehensive inventory to give form to their invariants might comfort the ambition—an ambition we consider vain—of establishing an explanatory synthesis via the territory, elevated to the rank of a *belief system* by the mere importance of the organizations that carry it (Sabatier, 1988). We will cite only a few cases that illustrate the power of these legitimacies to mobilize local territories, propel them to the head of the debate, and even question the spatial references and the legitimacy of the air transport industry players. In fact, one of the testimonies to the forceful entry upon the scene of other legitimacies is the querying, or even repositioning as problematic, of more traditional concepts and scales linked to airport construction. We think that these refractions highlight the strength of this development, in terms of different values (towards a re-territorialization of airport structures?).

In the United States (Faburel, 2003b), territorial problems posed by environmental conflicts in particular generate socio-political alliances that aim to redefine certain planning principles and criteria that guide the siting of platforms. Owing to these difficulties, the choice of the site of Denver International Airport (40 kilometers from the city), together with the earlier case of Hartsfield Atlanta Airport, raised doubts about the planning options of American specialists (building the airport in the city to make it a key element of the urban structure, or even to make residential areas more dynamic) and oriented them towards more recent European models (the airport seen also as a source of negative impact, and thus to be removed from urban agglomerations).

These alliances, about which we will say more later, go so far as to attack the structuring of flows via hubs, by questioning the efficacy of regional transport systems. This is the case in California and in Massachusetts, where modal link air traffic solutions have been debated at regional level for some time, following the recovery of certain high velocity

rail link projects at state level (San Francisco–Los Angeles–San Diego link), or between neighboring states (Boston and New York).

The political significance derived from the territorial legitimacies of some players on the protest scene influences this development. For example, Boston, where the mayor's office has been battling the project of a new runway at Logan (14/32) for quite some time, makes use of its prerogatives and its multiple resources, activates the networks that have constituted themselves, and makes abundant use of experts' counter-opinions to call for an extension of the referent scale for the project (state or economic region). The mayor's office is in this way working towards the renewed questioning of the conventional issues at stake in the future of Logan airport. Let us specify that there is also a specific parameter linked to the local regulations in this problematic situation that has come up again: the legal action that was launched in 1973 by protesters, which 30 years later, owing to multiple developments, had still found no issue. Indeed, over and above the usual radicalization of positions generated by all conflicts being submitted to procedures, in this case environmental ones, this particular procedure brought certain advantages to those who opposed the project. It progressively highlighted the inadequacies of the project's statutory technical evaluation and certain scientific opinions it was supposed to be based upon (Jasanoff, 1995). Once this statutory basis and the resulting rhetoric had been shaken, the debate focused on the usefulness of a new runway in the context of the regional transport offer. Following the demand made in February 2002 by the FAA, mediation was attempted in 2003 by Massport (airport management), notably with the Mayor's office but without the expected results.

In the name of the very same territorial legitimacies and their power to contradict, and following a government decision of 2002, regional airport extension projects in Great Britain are and will be subject to consultation at national level, conducted simultaneously in every region. The objective was to coordinate the choice of airports to be extended to cope with strongly growing regional traffic. Initially (1998), these projects were to be pursued conventionally at national level, implementing local consultation processes under the control of airport authorities. But here, too, although the decision was essentially a national one, the regional scale was confirmed as the frame of reference.

Finally, it was also in the name of identity, proximity or partnership-related values that in the public debate on the third commercial airport near Paris (2001), alliances were made between elected representative of the municipalities meant to host the platform, local associations, national federations, and certain institutions. These alliances attempted to highlight the issue of the complementarity of the air transport offer at regional level, or that of the modal link at national territory level. There was a gradual questioning of the usefulness of a new platform as a corollary. The demand to shift certain productive functions of Roissy CDG to more remote platforms provides an interesting example (e.g., cargo and postal service carriers to Vatry, an airport 80 km from Paris and conceived with this in mind, but which has not seen much activity).

The territory as a multi-territorial coalition of airport areas

As these examples suggest, kinships enabled by these territorial legitimacies take on concrete shape in exchanges between players whose approaches were previously quite remote.

In the context of a number of airports we see the establishment of networks or even coalition groups, a development that reshuffles the system of players (Faburel, 2003b; Faburel, Rui, Déroubaix, Lévy, Gobert, 2007).

These coalitions first bring together local elected representatives, often with different political orientations; certainly the "power coalitions" model gave rise to the rapid emergence of such groups, originally in the US: this was the case in Boston for the fourth runway at Logan (*supra*). Here again, these alliances were forged via legal recourse. This gave protesters another advantage: a space in which various categories of players had to meet and exchange their points of view. Thus an alliance was formed that today links the city of Boston and the governments of other locations which are close to other airports in the State of Massachusetts, such as Bedford near Hanscom Field Airport.

This is also the case for Chicago O'Hare, with the re-allocation of trajectories as part of the redefinition of runways, a project of the city of Chicago, which owns the airport. Among those who opposed it, the project gave rise to an alternative proposal for another international airport lying outside the legal city limits. This proposal generated a coalition (Suburban O'Hare Commission, SOC), consisting of several municipalities (Bensenville, Wood Dale) and counties (e.g., DuPage), backed by the State of Illinois. Faced with this situation, the mayor of Chicago has over the past 10 years injected considerable funds into the soundproofing program around O'Hare. To this day it is the most important program of this type in the world, managed by an airport commission created especially to this end (*O'Hare Noise Compatibility Commissio, OHNCC*). Some of the local communities that wished to benefit from this manna to soundproof housing and public equipment (e.g., schools) left the coalition and joined the *OHNCC*. The resulting divisions, and the recent desertion of the State of Illinois, strongly shook the protest coalition, to the point that the extension project now includes the majority of elected representatives of the local protest coalition?

Los Angeles long remained at an earlier stage in the birth of its conflict prior to an agreement in 2005 between airport authorities and the local coalition. The planned extension of LAX cemented the opposition of local elected representatives, grouped together in a coalition headed by El Segundo municipality. Here the protest discourse was federated mainly by the idea of environmental justice in the face of coming pollution and inconvenience: issues linked to the occupation of space and the peopling of the borders of the platform. The first demand was to shift traffic to the military platform in El Toro. The coalition made much use of counter-expertise in its discourse, turning to the services of highly reactive urban studies offices.

Finally, as the last example from the USA, a rather peculiar situation arose in San Francisco, before air traffic fell considerably after September 11th: there were two coalitions, which moreover opposed each other. The first, which supported the projects of a new runway at San Francisco International, brought together the territories bordering on the airport. The perimeter defined by this local government coalition overlapped more or less with the one defined by the *Noise Roundtable*, one of the very first commissions established in the US (1982) to deal with noise at the local level (soundproofing, urbanistic constraints, information diffusion, etc.). In addition to the airport and the representatives of these limitrophe territories, the *Noise Roundtable* still includes pilots, airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The support given by this coalition to the extension project was the result of the possibilities offered local governments who

were part of the commission: to negotiate the positive effects of the extension (companies and jobs) while coping with the noise question via official instruments and in a collegiate manner.

The second coalition, which consisted of more remote territories, opposed the extension project. In 2002 this coalition, piloted by Marine County, brought together six of the nine counties situated within a perimeter of 30 to 35 kilometres around the platform. Thinking themselves also concerned by the extension and affected by airport noise, these territories ardently fought to re-position the extension project within the context of the airport offer at North California level[7] and to integrate the commission, whose perimeter is defined by only the statutory acoustic thresholds. To do so these players also made use of counter-opinions (see Los Angeles), but above all they had recourse to effective contacts and support within Congress.

We see in these various US examples a process that links the establishment of territorial coalitions and the extension of the reference scale of the problem under consideration, which have been hemmed in for a long time by the technical management instruments to measure external noise (zoning). Since then, and in countries with less open and flexible models such as France, with its hierarchical and sectoral cross-regulation, we see the rapid establishment of these representatives' coalitions. Over and above the differences between countries (role of legal disputes in the development of the debate, significance of expert counter opinions), these groups also benefit from relays to national or federal parliaments, such as the Ville et Aéroport association in France, which brings together representatives from territories that are relatively remote from the French platforms[8].

Moreover, in the United States it is becoming increasingly frequent for these multi-territorial coalitions to be backed by residents' associations. It is true that associations' approaches to equipment installation changed considerably over the past 10 years. Initially guided by the nimby (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome, many associations now adopt another attitude: BANANAs (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anybody). However, this implies the redefinition of certain planning and development principles and criteria, again at a much larger reference level than the one projected by the limited spatial perimeter of the project and its immediate sound impact. Such contacts relative to the discourse, for example, gave rise to the constitution of the main protest coalition in Boston. Communities Against Runway Expansion (CARE) represents 27 municipalities and two large inhabitants' associations. We see similar alliances in all case studies (Chicago, San Francisco).

We now observe the same phenomenon in Europe, of which the British NGO Aviation Environment Federation is a striking example. Born in 1975, its importance grew considerably with the conflict over the project of a new terminal (T5) at London Heathrow. Initially made up of associations of populations living close to the airport, this body gradually opened up to local authorities and domestic experts. It took on enough weight to influence a legal case, thanks to which the European Court of Human Rights demanded

7 Three major airports are located within a 60-kilometer radius: San Francisco International, San José Airport and Oakland Airport.

8 Association of elected representatives and parliamentarians who represent seven general councils or urban Communities, and 50 Municipalities, of which 10 are concerned by Roissy CDG.

that eight residents be paid indemnities of £ 4,000 for the violation of legislation on scheduling of "night flights" (decision of October 2, 2001, overturned by appeal in 2003). But what is most important is that the scope of this organization's actions has grown. It was not only given independent observer status during the last negotiations on new acoustic certification conducted within the International Civil Aviation Organization, a United Nations agency (September 2001). Its activities also considerably influenced the decisions of the UK government to launch a national consultation process on the development of regional airports (*supra*).

Finally, again in the US, these coalitions take advantage of the relatively clear strategies of some environmental administrations, which seek to obtain larger competencies relative to aircraft noise. The attitude of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is rather explicit, for example. For the past 15 years it has been actively pressuring relevant government bodies which since 1981 had been under the exclusive jurisdiction of the FAA. It commissions experts and university laboratories to establish diagnoses which, if they do not downright contradict, are at least more critical of the validity of acoustic indices and the resulting regulatory thresholds (DNL 65 dB(A)). This feeds into the recommendations the EPA customarily makes to the Environmental Impacts Assessments (National Environmental Policy Act of 1969), but which the FAA is free not to follow. However, in this way it gives more or less formal support to certain protesters, such as Boston.

In the end, the environmental aspirations expressed mainly in terms of the reduction of sound emissions were until recently conveyed only by the associations in defence of the living environment. Though sometimes relayed by local political positions, they often remained isolated. Globally, action by representatives was barely coordinated, hesitating between economic and tax income advantages and the disadvantages of airport presence (see noise impacts).

To this day, in spite of the multiplicity of communities' social and spatial concerns, demands are primarily territorial. They may be conveyed by larger groups, which sometimes include elected representatives, association-based movements and experts. Owing to the critical mass and the strength of the proposals submitted (territorial planning and economic development considerations) these groups have in many countries positioned themselves in the public arena as bodies which have a say in the future of airports.

This meeting between new legitimacies and territorial strategies is part of the more general protest taking place in several places around the world. The local common good increasingly balances out the concept of common good at national level, as circumscribed by the interests of the space of flows, strictly speaking. This is despite the scope of actions conducted by players of the air transport industry and supervisory authorities, in particular concerning noise reduction at source, as mentioned above. The question of the social and spatial impacts of aircraft noise plays an important role in these developments and reconfigurations.

In fact, these impacts and the evaluation demands they generate do more than just highlight the inadequacies of the historic techno-centered approach to environmental impact (Faburel, 2005b), which initially translated into the normalized use of equally technical instruments, i.e., acoustic zoning to assist in soundproofing, defining urbanistic constraints, determining noise taxes, or selecting eligible players for the relevant debate structures.

Box 1: Relative social efficacy of sound thresholds

Because of the obstacles mentioned above, Denver International Airport (fifth US airport and tenth in the world in number of passengers, 36 mppa, and in the number of movements, 493,000) was the only major airport built in the United States during the past 15 years (inaugurated in 1995). The project was accepted only after several years of negotiation (Harvard, Case Program, 1993) between the municipality of Denver, backed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on the one hand, and the host municipalities on the other (Adams County and the municipalities of Aurora, Brighton, Commerce City and Thornton). These negotiations were fed by voluminous study reports and numerous expert opinions generating over 40 reports, 5 books, and continuous hearings (Dempsey, 1997). It led notably to a commitment of the project promoters to establish a maximum annual threshold for sound levels. Since then, this type of commitment has been made in other cases (e.g., Amsterdam Schiphol or Roissy CDG since 1997). Logically, the commitment was completed by the implementing an impressive monitoring and surveillance system (almost 100 points on the noise scale) to generate the information that would be required to verify compliance with the agreement. However, for reasons linked to traffic preview modelling and resulting noise, the agreement soon proved impossible to comply with. As of its first year of operation, the airport registered 84,000 complaints due to noise, as against 470 for the old Denver airport (Stapleton). Since then, Denver has been taken to court regularly by local governments. In January 2002 the Colorado Supreme Court sentenced the city of Denver to pay Adams County, and the four municipalities concerned, damages of $ 5.3 million for 42 registered violations of the noise threshold, and this for the first year of airport operation only. Mistrust reigns supreme, to the extent that a re-negotiation of the threshold seems quite impossible. Denver is preparing to pay damages for a number of years to come.

Above all, such effects and demands lead to:

- a signifying "rumor" within the space of belonging which is now symbolically coded and not only technically reified via sound zoning;
- and an often tense and untamed link to other scales, where physical spatial discontinuity has long prevailed owing to extra-territoriality and its underlying economic assumptions.

In this sense, these effects and the social expectations relating to them shape social permeability between practices and representations, as well as porous spatial relations between categories of players and scales that were long ignorant of each other.

The territory as a lever for action?

Confronted with such issues, and players' approaches made apparent by these social constructs, a new objective is gradually establishing itself worldwide: to make platforms socially acceptable, thus ensuring their sustainable insertion within metropolitan regions. More than before, the aim here is to improve junctures between airports and their host

territories; initiatives claiming this objective are multiplying. They are mainly implemented by airport managers and operators, whose pathways are thus guided by more territorialized actions than in the past, or by the positions of mediators or territorial project stakeholders. In these terms, there are other effects of the entry of values and legitimacies of local territories upon the scene. The issue now no longer only relates to arguments or coalitions: it also deals with the impact on the attitudes and legitimacies of more historical players in this field.

This issue, for example, motivated the implementation of a European project, the Options For Airports Regions (COFAR). It associates the leading airports in the European space (the three London airports, Amsterdam Schiphol, Brussels, Frakfurt Rhein-Main, Paris CDG and others), their metropolitan regions, and other local communities in northwestern Europe. For a time, the objective was to record the best airport management practices, notably as concerns territorial insertion, and to reflect on possible ways to spread them. However, the ensuing meetings and reflections led to the reformulation of certain ideas. The Airport-City (Conway, 2000), extension of the previous idea of the air transport center (aéropôle), itself originating in the City Airport (Seneviratine, 1996), made a remarkable comeback for a while. It sometimes still prevails in certain decision-making bodies, with emblematic examples such as London City Airport (Marquis, 2007).

But above all, beyond studies and concepts, several recent planning initiatives bear witness to a new quest, linked to modifications of spatial referents among players of the air transport industry, above all airport administrators. For Roissy CDG in France one observes:

- attempts to equalize the fiscal consequences of airport presence (Lachenaud, 1997), or to requalify traditional villages whose dynamics had come to a halt;
- the introduction of a fine-tuned offer requested by local transport operators servicing local platform employees, notably in response to irregular working schedules (Papa Charlie or montage Allobus by Aéroports de Paris, local communities and the Syndicat des Transports d'Ile-de-France);
- the will to promote access of the local population to jobs generated directly or indirectly by the airport (GIP Emploi, specialized training institutions);
- even the creation of a new public urban planning body, Etablissement Public d'Aménagement, the perimeter of which includes the airport and its surroundings (Plaine de France).

We find similar initiatives in several major European airports: launched by the British Airport Authority in Heathrow, the Dutch government in Schiphol concerning local transport services, the Job Centre in Gatwick, Job Fair in Stansted, or the Bourse à l'emploi in Brussels.

The spatial and temporal scales of belonging and anchoring seem to assert themselves as fully operational referents in both discourse and action, completing the scales already present in the debate: market areas and hubs; continental integration areas and gateways; metropolitan areas and city networks; functionalities of the service centre and of the hinterland. Nonetheless, certain action practices are largely overlooked in this gradual repositioning, and the quest for social acceptability is all too often limited to new norms for relations between scales and players: an attempt by air transport industry players to regain control.

A first critical oversight: lacking controversy with official technical expert opinions

In fact, an examination of the spatial referents of the various players in the game, as well as the new role of territorial attributes and local balances for the debate, lead us to repeat that there is a shortage of evaluations of airport presence impact on spaces nearby: more sustained recourse to the evaluation of these efforts and the stakes they may represent for the territories must be considered as an important key, for a large number of airport areas.

Proportionally speaking, acoustic noise estimations now compete with traditional forms of modelling of economic impact on large spaces (nations), or the prospective analysis of air traffic. On the other hand, there are few studies that generate a finer understanding of the relational dynamics between airports and local territories, or—transversally speaking—of the geographies we have briefly presented. As a matter of fact, one of the immediate consequences of this technological hold on issues under discussion comes down to a lack of evaluations of more complex phenomena, even in statutory CBA evaluations (cost-benefit analyses), a lack that has been confirmed often (Faburel, Mikiki, 2004). Yet, the specificity of the highly entangled changes we now observe calls for transdisciplinary approaches which are far from the cut and dried logic that dominated in the past.

Such observations offer a double advantage beyond outlining a new understanding of territories,. First, they feed the debate, notably the controversy with the vulgate versions that cropped up to mask the continuing evaluative void, or were nourished by purely functionalist analyses of urban phenomena.

For example, let us consider the arguments advanced by French air transport industry players in their discussions with local organizations or populations. Confronted with the latter, the industry long referred to the principle of "urbanistic anteriority", meaning that these populations had moved to the given area after the construction of the airport. They invoke the behavioral rationality of households: many still operational airports, such as Roissy CDG, were built in spaces that were not highly urbanized at the time of their construction. This ties in with one of the striking characteristics of urban planning options adopted in France, and at wider European level, over the past 20 years: keeping platforms at a distance.

The industry players address the register of the *homo economicus*, along the lines of neo-classical economic theory. They view concerned parties as perfectly informed, rational and sovereign in their decisions—in this case residential decisions. As a result, when confronting local elected representatives, they refer to the laxity with which building permits are granted, and call for strict compliance with imposed urban constraints (*supra*). When faced with problems, inhabitants and elected representatives should shoulder their responsibilities.

However, as already mentioned, these arguments are in no way confirmed by data from significant empirical studies. Always with reference to Roissy CDG, but also Frankfurt Rhein-Main, Amsterdam Schiphol, Sydney Kingsford Smith and many others, we had until 2003-2004 no fine-tuned survey of the determinants of the residential mobility of populations living close to airports, and no exhaustive analyses of the explanatory causes for the (supposed) granting of building permits by municipalities (except for an administrative report from the early 1980s), no estimations of the impact of aircraft noise on property values, in spite of over 30 evaluations made abroad over the past thirty years (*supra*).

Here we are indeed dealing with preconceived notions that jointly affect a number of airports. Yet vulgates and preconceived notions, by creating distance and letting spaces of discourse lie unused, fragment and direct arguments (see Schéma). In fact they actively contribute to the creation of these conflicts by setting responsibilities that should be shared, and scales that in fact overlap each other.



Fig. 10.1 Source: Faburel & Barraqué, 2002.

As a second advantage, and at a more fundamental level, feeding the debate by testing these preconceived notions might enable a break with the causal model of representing phenomena, i.e., the often positivistic and deductive model of classic expertise, which dominates in airport issues. As a matter of fact, the doctrine that prevailed for a long time was linked to this type of reading, and to certain preferred spatial scales (Faburel, 2005b; Lévy, 2007). The importance of the quantitative approach to structuring effects is certainly the liveliest expression of this doctrine. Deriving from a segmented representation of reality, it separates transport from habitat, the economic from the residential, the airport from the surrounding territories, etc. It is one of the reasons why this doctrine long acted as a brake on the observation of first transversal, then territorial dynamics and developments. It indirectly contributed to the collective blindness not only to the multiple ways in which airports affect their surrounding territories, but above all to the growing constraints generated by conflicts. Thus it obscured the exchange potential disclosed by dynamics contributing to improved cooperation between players. It is likely that this straitjacket on evaluations hampered the formulation of a list of joint interests and the acquisition of the skills to compromise. The agreement reached in 2005 in Los Angeles as a result of urban studies and expert counter-opinions seems to confirm this thesis.

However, owing to the developments discussed above, among the most significant of which is the growing trend towards other spatial scales and territorial stakes within the debate, changes are gradually occurring, as witnessed by:

- the multiplication, although still modest, of studies dedicated to certain effects (e.g., depreciation of property values in France: BIPE, 2004; Faburel, 2005c);
- the constitution in 2004 of an exchange group (*Amsterdam Group*), bringing together government representatives, airport authorities and scientific experts at international seminars on the not strictly acoustic impacts of aircraft noise (inconvenience, health problems, property values depreciation, associative action);
- and above all the "anti-expert opinions" recently brought into action by territorial coalitions around Amsterdam Schiphol or Frakfurt Rhein-Main, as in San Francisco in 2002; via both scientific and association-based expert groups these initiatives aim to put the impartiality of official evaluations and expert opinions to the test of scientific knowledge (Faburel, Rui, Déroubaix, Lévy, Gobert, 2007).

However, another element, consubstantial with the preceding one, continues to play an important role: it explains, if not the relativity, at least the chaos that characterizes the dynamics of the production of relevant knowledge. In fact, there is another vital reason for the ongoing absence of less explicative and predictive and more comprehensive and interpretative evaluations. This vital reason is another absence: the generalized absence of territorial representatives in decision-making processes dealing with the future of airports, in spite of multiple round tables and other "noise" committees in many airports. Their active presence would help shed a light on recent queries, since the transdisciplinary evaluation of specific geographies on the one hand, and the participation of the concerned territories in decision-making on the other hand, are closely linked here, as in other areas (Stengers, 1997): both act as relays to other realities.

A second critical oversight: the true opening up of decision-making processes to territorial players

If we look at what the battles on land transport infrastructures can teach us about conflict resolution by opening up the debate, if we analyze the literature that attempts to circumscribe the theoretical and operational outlines of concertation, negotiation and/or mediation practices, we must admit that participative mechanisms are becoming an ever more important element in the decision-makers' toolbox. Where airports are concerned, the political representations and practices of associations and multi-territorial coalitions everywhere and at all times express this participatory will. The discourse by relevant players (including growing numbers of airports[9]), the strongly wished-for junction (articulation) between airports and their host locations, are closely associated with the opening up of decision-making processes to collegiate participation, and to territorial governance as a second step.

However, one-off attempts at an opening (consultations in Manchester or Sydney Kingsford Smith in the early 2000s, mediation in Amsterdam Schiphol in 1997, Frankfurt Rhein-Main in 2001, or Boston Logan in 2003), or even more lasting efforts (Noise

9 Multiplication of services and directing offices dealing with territorial relations.

Roundtables in the English-speaking countries, consultative commissions in France and Switzerland) have disappointed many territorial players (Faburel, Rui, Déroubaix, Lévy, Gobert, op. cit.). As in the Commissions Consultatives d'Environnement in Roissy CDG or Orly, these mechanisms for a long time transmitted only ever more technical information in response to popular queries and expectations that were also anchored in territorial living experiences (Leroux, Amphoux et Bardyn, 2002).

Certainly these practices raise questions concerning public action, for example about the adequacy of procedures and participatory mechanisms for objectives pursued by the territorialized projects that support them. This raises a further sharp but pertinent point that addresses the unlikely adequacy between the scale of processes and perimeters of mechanisms to be implemented (scale, players, means) and pre-existing administrative divisions and their resulting competencies. Although on a different level, the public debate on the third airport near Paris generated such a question in 2001. "This raises the question of the legal, political, and/or operational definition of the territory", (Bourdin *in* Collin, Baudouin, 2000, p. 19), taking as a starting point the multiple overlapping perimeters delimited by living territories rather than a pre-categorization of functional space by discipline or policy.

However, if we do not fundamentally change the ways in which we construct action, i.e., if we fail to open up the airport debate to various bodies, do we not run the risk that recourse to the distribution of individual monetary subsidies (e.g., for sound insulation) will be perceived as an obligatory transaction, as the price of silence?[10] Without going into this at greater length, is there not the risk of encouraging the departure of certain categories of local resident populations, with the readily conceivable consequences this would have for the municipalities concerned?[11]

In short, without building spaces for debate that confront differently constituted groups of the public, different forms of knowledge, different approaches and stakes, i.e., developing the practice of hybrid forums[12] in order to—at least by learning about the parties' respective concerns—attempt to construct social acceptance, is there not the risk of reproducing certain errors of the past? That is to say, when isolated initiatives conducted according to sectoral and functionalist approaches in fact contributed to tacit misunderstandings and rivalries. (e.g., tax income *versus* noise nuisance).

And in fact, do these misunderstandings not represent the possible downfall of the very idea of acceptability via compensation, if it continues to position itself uniquely within the present context of *monitoring* and *benchmarking*? Reported *benchmarking*-based comparative initiatives (e.g., Province of Noord-Holland, COFAR, 2000) to this

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10 This was a persistent difficulty for Frankfurt Rhein-Main.

11 Baumol and Oates have long expressed this theoretical fear (1988); it was confimed by Béhar, Davezies, Korsu (op. cit.) for the Plaine de France (surroundings of Roissy) for the question of the airport job offer and possible resulting residential mobility.

12 According to Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2001), hybrid forums are an appropriate response to growing uncertainty generated by the technosciences, a response based on the organization of collective experiments and learning. Forums: open spaces in which groups can mobilize to discuss technical options that will commit the collective. Hybrid: the groups involved and the spokespersons who wish to represent them are heterogeneous (experts, politicians, technicians, concerned lay persons), questions and problems are part of various registers (ethics, economics, physiology, nuclear physics, electromagnetics, etc.).

very day seek to measure airport performance solely by standardized technical indicators; these, moreover, refer only to results and completely overlook action implementation procedures (Francis, Humphreys, Fry, 2002).

Finally, without the recognition of the legitimacy of territorial representatives as full partners, contributing to the creation of a common territory, is there not the risk of underestimating the opportunities of negotiation/cooperation, perhaps of appeasing tensions, that the new territorial insertion projects might generate? Yet in spite of the many pitfalls and obstacles in the way of these deliberative experiences, initiatives continue to multiply. And, echoing the generalization of airport-related conflicts and imposed constraints, certain of these initiatives seem to generate progress, or even profound change in terms of who carries the project, above all in more "pragmatic" cultures:

- Los Angeles International Airport, with a *community agreement* reached in 2005 between concerned parties: the airport authority, i.e., the city of Los Angeles, and the territories bordering upon the platform, aiming to roll back the airport's activities engagements, validated by the FAA;
- Vienna International Airport, with the partnership-based elaboration of a sustainable development policy on the initial basis of a new set of indicators, much more permeable to territorial concerns (e.g., land ownership, property values depreciation, health considerations relating to more or less immediate airport surroundings);
- closure of Berlin Tempelhof and the concomitant extension of Schönefeld, involving negotiations which—since they belong to the German multi-scale model—resulted in the partnership-based implementation of more fine-tuned and mixed territorial planning than the global radioconcentric zoning that is usually adopted;
- at Orly, the launch of a two-year concertation process, resulting in a governance structure for the airport area; its first mission is the elaboration of a sustainable development charter, based on a table of indicators established in partnership with government authorities, territorial representatives, and local environmental protection associations.

These successful moves highlight the pragmatic transactions that are being discussed and/or launched relative to the territorial management of airports and their impact (e.g., negotiating trajectories around certain US airports for environmental reasons, for example). Note that in these few cases the production of territorial information and the establishment of new indicators (less focused on only performance-based prediction and viewed more as a vector of an opening to other problems, tracking territorial negotiations) are more or less actively involved in the opening of round table discussions to local players, and in negotiations at more territorial level than hitherto.

Conclusion: grounding of the space of air flows or take-off time for local territories?

Very early on, since the 1950s-1960s, airport areas asserted themselves as spaces endowed with singular forms and powers. Whatever the planning and development models and options long defended by each of the national authorities in charge of the siting of airport platforms (e.g., as downright urban equipment in the US until the late 1980s), these areas:

- To this day share common territorial and architectural forms, guided first by the economic function of rapid service, commerce, storage, representation (conferences, trade fairs, etc.);
- They have long been the seat of socio-politically atypical organizations, first directed by the dominant doctrines and approaches of the players of the "space of flows, and the socio-economic interests that underpinned them (conquering markets, demand for professional mobility), interests that were met by metropolitan competition.

The production of urban forms was thus for a long time dominated by players of the air transport industry: aeronautics manufacturers, airlines, airport authorities and regulators (administrative supervision authorities, International Civil Administrations Organi-Zation, ICAO, Eurocontrol). This was to the detriment of other forms of spatial logic (Castells, 1996), the first effect being the a-territorial character of airport equipment and often of the areas that hosted them: a strictly scale-based representation of space-guided options and interventions.

However, these airport areas, which on average represent 5-10 % of agglomerated areas, are gradually becoming downright planning and development laboratories (stakes, principles, modes of action). As we have attempted to demonstrate, environmental experience and resistance, and resulting socio-political effects played a significant role in this:

- The defense of other value systems, based on the anchoring and identity of places rediscovered or updated that had for a long time been subject to the territorial or environmental impact of airport functioning persistently straitjacketed by official technical-economic evaluations;
- The general extension and/or spread of multi-territorial coalitions; going out from stakes relating to the impact of airport functioning and air traffic on more or less remote surrounding territories, the coalitions voice the growing protest against dominant doctrines and approaches, at least imposing a revision of its political trajectory to the space of airborne flows.

Owing to the economic risks resulting from increasingly generalized environmental conflicts for the entire air transport industry chain, i.e., both for trade globalization and private airport management, industry players have had to, often hastily, learn to accept new representations of space that imply meaning, *place* and thus territory for the protesters.

- space not only as in the post-Fordist era, as a resource strictly of scale, essentially dedicated to activities with strong capital intensity and to metropolitan competition;
- but space also as the foundation of experiences and identities that are no less singular, components of *places* and territories;

- that is to say no longer a simple support for hosting activities, de-realised (deprived of reality) and torn away from its territories, but also a vector of fully anchored material phenomena (socio-political, symbolic);
- and thus a true junction (articulation) of *places*, therefore of new intervention objects, of multiple negotiations, with emerging forms of power and regulation (participatory bodies, governance structures, partnership-based projects).

Judging by the number of initiatives launched here and there over the past decade (some of which are discussed in the present article), the spatial and temporal scales of locations of belonging and anchoring seem to assert themselves as true referents, complementary to the scales already present in the debate: market area and hub, continental integration space and gateway, metropolitan area and city network, functionality of service area and hinterland.

In this situation, the air transport industry players, to this day primarily airport administrators, now take part in multiple contexts (multi-memberships). Having long turned their backs upon territories,[13] they are now forced to intercede in space, or even act as territorial mediators, notably in projects they are associated with or carry. Thanks to this new function, and the resulting evolution of relevant stakes and ways of functioning, the airport itself becomes an object of juncture (articulation), and thus of specific functional, socio-political and urban creation. The airport must learn to cope with the underlying trends that affect the development of the urban fabric (e.g., social polarization around airports that codes the *genus loci*).

As a matter of fact, if we take into account first the globalization of trade and the increased distance to powers centers, and second the privatization of airport management, local planning and development action gradually appears to both public authorities and airport administrations as the main lever to balance out platform impact and build new acceptance of airport equipment functioning (Humphreys et Francis, 2002).

However, constrained by purely political power relations, these changes often still look like simple administrative arrangements, legal adjustments or adaptations of action modes and/or routines. As shown by experiences generated by mechanisms of dialogue, the quest for the social acceptance of airport functioning often limits itself to attempts to regain control by air transport industry players, via new norms of the relations between scales and the parties concerned. It calls for learning that is often at the elementary stage, even if certain advances discussed above demonstrate that the process of change has been launched.

In this context, judging by current difficulties relating to two issues: first, proficiency in environmental and territorial expertise (with the problem of sustainable development indicators marking multiple negotiations); second—consubstantially—the opening up of decision-making processes to territorial scales and players, and to the concerns of the resident populations (e.g., territorial compensation). Such are the updated stakes in this development, slow but seemingly path-breaking, towards other junctures between forms, experiences, and powers.

[13] Internal airport architecture was long an interesting testimony of this. Torn between technological prowess and compliance with the rules of commercial efficiency, it was decidedly oriented towards the big wide world.

Dealing with these issues by a growing number of airports (if not already under way, then at least under discussion) is one of the keystones that will enable us to know whether we are witnessing a new form of adaptation-hybridization of the space of flows (airborne), a new highly effective adaptation by the market economy (see the figure of the rhizome as described by Deleuze and Guattari, 1980), or a new regulation, a gradual re-founding of modes of governance under the auspices of environmental problems (Latour, 1999; Lolive and Soubeyran, 2007), transforming: airport areas into relevant laboratories, and sustainable planning and development into a common referent that is gradually coming into being.

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Chapter 11

Conclusion: The Revenge of Places[1]

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Christophe Jemelin
Vincent Kaufmann

Our book began by attempting to position the design of the networked city within the wider issue of the links between forms, experiences and power. Like the changes to the present-day city which have been broadly conceptualized through the use of terms such as "global city", "networked city" and "metropolization", the sociopolitical processes which occur in parallel with these transformations have rarely been subject to systematic evaluation. The challenge which the authors faced was providing a clear and systematic presentation of the dynamics of networked cities (social mobility, spatial mobility, residential strategies) and their design process (political and democratic). Thanks to the journey, or movement, which has taken us from the experience of a networked city to its political design, we are now able to summarize our findings thus far.

To begin with, we should remind ourselves of both the definition of the networked city and the analytical framework set out by Manuel Castells in the preamble to this book. The networked city has four basic characteristics. The first relates to use, and refers to the perpetual and continually shifting interconnections between the local and the global, between places and flows. The second relates to lifestyle transformations associated with the networked society, and the challenges which they generate in terms of spatial, residential and social mobility. Social processes and political programmes together reorganize social morphology and the geography of social differentiation. This is reflected in the gradual breakdown of community solidarities, which in turn is reflected in a certain disqualification of the places of daily life: this is the third basic characteristic. The fourth and final aspect concerns the problem of those political processes which help shape the networked city, in other words, rethinking modern planning, decision-making and power distribution.

[1] This chapter is partially based on work supported by the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North–South: Research Partnerships for Mitigating Syndromes of Global Change.

Yet, given this initial assessment, the reader will have noted that the approach adopted in this collection of articles is somewhat unconventional. This was a conscious decision, as these articles encourage further examination and a fresh reading of presumed design trends in relation to the networked city. These articles share a further common feature in that they place the social actors, the political processes, and the design conditions at the heart of their analysis of the networked city. Rather than concluding with facile statements such as "it is clearly a highly complex issue", we propose a summary of the empirical and theoretical contributions advanced in this work. While this book does not claim to be ground-breaking, it does offer a wealth of new insights into the notion of the networked city and should provide the much-needed impetus for further scientific examination of the subject.

The domination of flows and places

The first aspect of the networked city that is largely discussed in these articles is the dialectic between places and networks and its effects on the organization of localized spaces. The concept of the space of flows and the space of places was formalized by Castells as the structural domination of the former over the latter; this, in turn, leads to a (dual) fragmentation of that which is connected locally and/or globally, from that which is not (Castells, 1996). These ideas have been discussed extensively in the literature of the past 15 years. However, there is general agreement concerning the critique of technical determinism and the dominating vision of the space of flows over places (Webster, 1997; Offner, 2000; Pflieger, 2006). Castells himself recognizes that a systemic link between networks/flows/elites cannot be proven in absolute terms and that it falls to the researcher to explore the multiple pathways that can connect places and flows.

How far does the space of flows dominate the space of places? This is the first question raised by Guillaume Faburel. With the explosion in flows, communications and long-distance mobility, the arrival of the networked society has occurred concomitantly with a re-questioning of modern planning ideals. Airports, which have been built since the mid-20th century in the name of progress, can no longer be planned unilaterally, that is by the aviation sector alone. Social actors, residents, and environmental organizations place local territories in spaces which had until that point been merely docking stations within the air space. The local territories which have been progressively constructed, in fact, call into question the domination of flows over places. Whether by air, by rail or by road, the flows of persons generate annoyances, noise, pollution, and destruction of the landscape. The planning of these transport routes and hubs is no longer dominated by the demands of economic development or by a strict technicist logic. The integration of these residents or their representatives in the planning process readdresses the balance between flows and places, between "the landing of the space of flows" and "the take-off of the space of places", to quote Guillaume Faburel. Also, at the metropolitan level, the contribution of Fritz Sager shows to what extent the polycentric organization of the city and, de facto, the interconnection between its different zones creates a tension, expressed in wanting to live far from infrastructures but still benefit from convenient links to business districts, train stations and motorways.

Reconstructing mobilities

The networked city also appears to be organized around mobilities, which not only connect it to other globalized spaces but also serve to bring intra-metropolitan spaces together. By adopting a position that bucks prevailing trends, Sven Kesselring shows that the term "mobility" in fact hides the incredibly varied organization of places and flows. Between the local and the global, the pioneers of mobility, who at first glance appear to benefit the most from a networked society, organize their places in various ways. For some, their mobility revolves around a social gravitation center, while for others it is decentered, or to be more precise re-centered on a small network of global neighborhoods, such as in New York and London, for example. Kesselring shows that mobility pioneers can be physically immobile, while reminding us that the space of flows is also the space of communication. In this way the networked city systematically transforms the lives of people, their habitat, and their places. In turn, it is subject to reorganization instigated by its residents. From this point of view, the Internet explosion has enabled an even greater diversity in terms of the organization of places and flows. In his article, Sven Kesselring gives back choice to places, seeing mobility as "the structural side of motility within societies [which] is restored within the local to the global infrastructures". In this sense, he ventures beyond a straightforward reading of the space as a Brownian motion where everything moves, permanently and everywhere. The pioneers of mobility value all places as mooring points, albeit to varying degrees, and the topology of communication or transport networks for them gives a structure to their private and professional lives.

However, mobility pioneers are not the only mobile actors in the networked city, and the systems of places multiply from the moment we also take day-to-day mobility into consideration. We know that the capacity for mobility is unequally distributed (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2004; Fol, 2005; Flamm and Kaufmann, 2006; Blumenberg, 2004). Practices and representations vary widely from one social category to another. They depend, moreover, on a complex system of competences which makes the potential of mobility (or motility) a new form of capital that is indispensable to social and physical mobility. Besides an examination of mobility pioneers, the article by Vincent Kaufmann *et al.* re-examines how the sociology of neighborhoods is transformed by accessibility policies, as well as the value given to places in mobile society. By focusing on mobility, we therefore return inevitably to places, and to their symbolic, affective, social and economic value.

What happens to places? Inequalities, distancing and valorization

The space of places can be defined, also with reference to Castells, as the space of experience, the sense of which is centered on the promotion of the locality and of community interactions. Nevertheless, an oversimplified vision of the space of places would consist of a nostalgic approach to the historic/ancient spaces of urbanity. According to this vision, Belleville or the public spaces in Barcelona could be considered as spaces that are under threat of extinction, due to a global urban development that is dominated by flows and crumbling community solidarity. Nevertheless, the places of experience do not disappear, but are merely reduced through increasingly varied urban and social forms.

To understand the function of places, we can, for example, study daily mobility. As we have mentioned above, mobility practices tend to promote the places of day-to-day living, the places where we like to live, the train stations and places of flows. By identifying the driving forces behind gentrification in terms of the planning of infrastructures and public spaces, Vincent Kaufmann *et al.* underline that mobility reconfigures both the center and the outlying areas of the city. Between the gated communities and the gentrified spaces of the city center, a cultural divide forms as a function of the preferred type of accessibility: for some the car, for others public transport. However, here too, this difference tends to be more nuanced. Transit Oriented Development (TOD) or pedestrian pockets in North America represent a mix between the morphology of gated communities and the advantages of public transport accessibility, which to date have been limited to the city center. For example, in the suburbs of San Francisco some TOD neighborhoods also feature gated communities. Besides the division between the modes of access to these neighborhoods, one common point emerges from the building of gated community and from the museumification of traditional neighborhoods: the greater (symbolic and property) value placed on constructed spaces and urban forms. More than ever, the places of daily life are highly valued, a situation to which the socially worrying phenomenon of gated communities has also contributed. Interestingly, the "old-fashioned" of New Urbanism and the "museumification" of traditional neighborhoods alike attribute great importance to shared spaces.

In relation to the social differentiation of the space, Katharina Mandersheid and Max Bergman were inspired by the structuralist approach, which conceptualizes space as the zone where social organization takes place. The aim of their article is to understand the possible correlations between mobility behaviors, residential strategies and forms of social stratification. The scope of the methodological apparatus that they mobilize mirrors the complexity of finding a new social stratification model, or even a successor to the Burgess model. The latter illustrated the old spatial structure of American cities in a simplified way: a structure which moved from the center to the outskirts: from business districts, to immigrant residential zone, to working class residential zone, to the inner suburbs residential zone, and finally to the suburbs (Park and Burgess, 1967). In the 1970s, Manuel Castells attempted to update this model as part of his work on understanding the Fordist organization of the city, but he was hampered by the fact that at that time the IT and mathematic resources needed to handle such a high volume of large-scale variables had yet to be developed (Castells and Godard, 1974). The contribution of Mandersheid and Bergman underlines that one of the specificities of the networked city is the complexification of social morphology, known as the post-modern spatial pattern. Existing segregation gaps close: both low-income and affluent neighborhoods can be found in all strata of the city: the centre, residential areas, as well as suburban zones. This apparent social diversity masks an even more fragmented social geography. A closer look reveals vastly different neighborhood profiles that can change from one street or block to the next; in other words, micro-fragmentation on an infra-municipal scale. Thus, we observe a paradox for urban sociology: while analytical tools are becoming ever more sophisticated, the form that inequalities take is growing ever more complex.

The design of places: new boundaries of political engagement

The reflexive analysis of Castells' architectural diagnostics on the space of flows, by Jean-Louis Genard, is key in the study of the design of the networked city. In his preamble, Castells underlined the difficulty that architecture has in creating sense for places, within urban spaces that are without history. "The large residential spaces and spaces of activities that can be found in European metropolitan regions lack any physical, cultural or historical marking." The architecture of the space of flows, of shopping malls, airports or business districts no longer gives sense to its residents, who find themselves isolated, in a state of limbo between their habitat and the world at large. While we have previously discussed the relative aspect of the loss of sense and the dilution of places, in terms of reinvestment in central and outlying neighborhoods, Genard rightly reminds us that post-modern discourse, like the museumification movement, offers a retrospective and normative retelling of the loss of sense, of the loss of places as well as the loss of the city itself. Such a stance, however, must be put into perspective by considering reflexivity and practices, which themselves are more reflexive. Recent urban sociology has shown how shopping malls, train stations and multimodal spaces represent *the* places of social appropriation, places to gather, places for—sometimes violent—exchanges, or places of public expression. Shopping malls are places of urbanity and interaction for young people and the elderly alike, a fact that is welcomed by urban planners. Is it not symptomatic that the Gare du Nord in Paris has become the new seat of identity confrontations that pitch gangs from housing projects on the outskirts of the city against one another? The diverse appropriations of these "artefacts of globalization"—to use the term coined by Chilean sociologist Carlos de Mattos—turn urban spaces into places of sense-making.

By recognizing shopping malls or train stations as spaces of urbanity, we do not place all urban spaces at the same level. In fact, the opposite is true. History and long periods of time progressively shape the space and prevent us from considering any urban object, old or new, on a line of equivalence. The articles by Agnès Sander and Vincent Guigueno, respectively, appear to not focus on the networked city, unlike the other articles in this collected work. In reality, though, they offer an unconventional look at the city, seeing it not only as the product of current architectural programs, but also as one which has been inherited, then remains unchanged before ultimately being remodelled; in the words of André Corboz (2002), the city can be considered as a palimpsest. The form defined by Haussmann in an outlying neighborhood of 19th century Paris continues even today to provide the framework for urbanization, thereby allowing the traditional principles which underpin the design of the urban space to endure. The same is also true of the principles of urban planning in 1970s France. In his article, Vincent Guigueno recalls that these were firmly anchored in hyper-modern planning ideals that subsequently became the "infrastructure of the space". When translated into urbanization plans, schemes and rules, these engineer-generated ideals have marked the space according to sustainable political territories, or "lines of demarcation", as Vincent Guigueno calls them, that heavily structure current Parisian urban planning. Caricatured, often to an extreme by the French and the structuralist schools of urban sociology, the experience generated in the 1970s with new cities, with the industrial cities of Dunkerque or Fos, and with large infrastructures, represents the ecological environment in which the most influential urban sociologists of

our day have evolved. These include Henri Lefebvre—rediscovered by American urban studies—and Manuel Castells. Between acquiescence and radical criticism, the dual relation between French technocrats and urban sociologists (Pflieger, 2006, Amiot, 1986) has modelled the course of urbanism in France and in Europe generally, as well as the acuity of scientific analyses of the city. According to Vincent Guigueno, "The history of urban forms begins with an epistemology of the urban sciences," an issue that is also addressed by Adriana Rabinovich, who clearly illustrates the extent to which the history of urban planning practices is inextricably linked with the history of ideas. By carrying out an in-depth investigation of the sources of modern urbanism, of the immediate and reflexive critical responses that it has generated, history can be re-read diachronically through the prism of current problems. In doing so, we are able to deepen our understanding of urban forms.

This historic appraisal also shows that the autocratic urban planning of Haussmann has given way to appropriation and resistance, not to mention a state of "perpetual construction." The property-related context and the localization of programs in outlying areas of the city provided a certain flexibility, far from the formal rigor of the Avenue de l'Opéra in Paris. According to Agnès Sander, "Public actions and the choices of property owners are not the same in the prestigious center of the French capital as they are in its suburbs." The resistance to planning, as topical today as ever before, can assume conventional forms such as property speculation. This resistance combined with successive public action produces imperfect alignments and considerable formal diversity.

The article by Jean-Louis Genard stresses the need for greater analyses of the place of social movements and the place of users in the design of the city. The end result of his work is not to simplify the sense of a form to the sense that architects wished to bestow on it when they designed it. Like Scott Lash (1999), Genard qualifies the development of urban planning practices as reflexive. This reflexive moment goes beyond the myth of participatory democracy, which would later introduce a new ideal relation between the elected representative and the user. Instead, reflexivity integrates all pathways of resistance, appropriation or contestation which are at the disposal of users. The hybrid forums of Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2001) have often been cited in this book and the issue of the design of the networked city is contextualized in how we transform urban artefacts and infrastructures into public objects—*making things public* as Bruno Latour speaks of.

The key concept of reflexivity which was formalized by Jean-Louis Genard has long been applied by Guillaume Faburel, Adriana Rabinovich and Fritz Sager to various objects: tramway lines, airports or urban land use plans. Across the board, their work highlights three types of complexity in the design of networked cities. First and foremost, there is a complexity of actors within a system of public action that is marked by the presence of diverse public institutions, specific interest groups, social movements, experts and technicians. The second is a complexity of community frameworks. The article by Fritz Sager illustrates how financial arguments, like public spending restrictions, have given way to arguments such as *Not in my backyard* (NIMBY). Citizens can form different coalitions or shifting alliances according to whether they wish to defend their rights as taxpayers or as local resident, or as environmental guardians. Guillaume Faburel also shows how arguments that oppose environmental inequalities could be made by local wealthy residents in the name of poor households. Such action transforms a NIMBY mind-set into a more community-oriented stance. These two examples illustrate the complexity of cognitive

registers and defenses. Furthermore, the public authorities are often unable to "decode" such discourse and to understand these combined networks of resistance. In this regard, discrediting the NIMBY-driven mobilization of users—of which the social sciences are also guilty—disqualifies local resistance out of hand without understanding the dynamics and the need to link such mobilization to the place of experience. Finally, there is a complexity of procedures, and the tendency is a stockpiling past practices. The history of planning trends and practices put forward by Adriana Rabinovich shows how cities have not been subject to a succession of modes of action from one decade to the other, but rather to a stockpile of modes of action. Faced with the complexity of the systems of actors and the community frameworks, public actors mobilize a range of procedures in their search for tools: the formal plan, participatory or popular urban land use planning, scenarios, user-expert forums, public debates, project-oriented procedures, internet consultation, e-governance, etc. The study of the design of the networked city encourages us to prise open the black box of public action and to understand how powers organize themselves. However, the diversity of democratic tools does not make this task easy for researchers.

To conclude, we are currently witnessing the revenge of places. These places are marked by diversity and reflect users' volition of choice: the old remains and becomes the sanctuary for the back-to-the-city movement; public transport brings reinvestment to densely populated areas; the suburbs continue to develop albeit with higher expectations in terms of public spaces and accessibility; shopping malls change shape and progressively open up to the surrounding space (with the trend for open-air *malls*, trading centres *ex nihilo*). The places of networks become places of life and urbanity. This diversity sets the contours of an optional city, to quote Yves Chalas (2002); a city that offers its users a wide range of opportunities depending on their generation, their family profile, their mobility constraints, and their integration into international networks. Yet, at the same time, the organization of these places becomes increasingly complex: the pattern of inequalities grows more diffuse, making it difficult to understand the logic that drives the process. A large share of users do not have a choice; they are not the masters of their own residential mobility. Sometimes, residents invest in the places they occupy, turning them into strongholds which then enter into conflict with much larger-scale projects?—metropolitan for transport infrastructure, global for airports. The rationalities of scales are set on an inexorable collision course, the repercussions of which will be felt far and wide (Offner and Pumain, 1996).

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